I was accompanied by Udet and Count Kerkhove who also had very good relations with France from other times. The central point perhaps of the visit and its real purpose occurred after a lunch given by Pierre Cot, the Minister of Aviation. On my other side the Foreign Minister was sitting, and also the Minister of the Navy was there. After lunch the three French Ministers, Wilmer, the C in C of the French Air Force, Udet and myself remained in a special room and the French Foreign Minister asked me to take home with me some propositions made by his office.
I should add our German Ambassador in France was also there, also in the smaller circle. When I said that I didn't want to interfere in his business he himself did not take any notice of it. He said that the most important thing was to report to Hitler on my impressions. He himself could not approach Hitler. The Ambassador was then Count Welczek. I was extremely surprised; I had no idea. I couldn't imagine that the head of State should not see his own ambassador. On that basis I said I would only act as a postman, and as such would transmit what I would be told now. I would give my very best own will.
The contents of the conversation were; to have a far-reaching agreement between the two countries, main purpose being to establish a really permanent and lasting peace between the two countries. I could take over this assignment with the best conscience in the world. After all, I said yesterday what I thought of military events in Europe in the last thousand years. My impression was that the Foreign Minister was very serious in this business, not did I have any suspicions that this might be a political trap and the Air Minister, who was always described as Communist in Germany, I liked Cot very much indeed, and our conversations were very intimate and very frank.
The French Foreign Minister at that time was called Delboss. The farewell on the Le Bourget Airfield led to fraternization between all of us and between ourselves and five or six of the highest French Generals. I must not forget that one of the oldest French Generals, General Keller, expressed with tears in his eyes he was now convinced that the thousand years war between France and Germany was now a matter of the past. We also were deeply moved.
On 9 October I flew from Paris to Berchtesgaden and reported to Hitler at once. He ordered me to report to him as soon as I had returned. I may perhaps say quite generally I could only see Hitler if Goering gave me permission or ordered me to do so, or of course, if Hitler himself ordered me to come and see him.
I myself could not go and see him as I was merely a subordinate.
In the presence of Udet I gave a report to Hitler lasting over two hours on the evening of the 9th of October, when my impression was still very fresh. Hitler listened very attentively, asked a number of detailed questions. I could tell him all about the various details which we saw and heard, not so much the military ones, but the political details. I could never talk enough about these things. After all, it was a fairly long conversation with the head of State. I recommended all these things very warmly and I asked him to take this extended hand and he would represent the greatest glory if he would succeed in coming to a lasting agreement with France which would be based on a very far-reaching economic community between the two countries.
I compared this with the time of the German Customs League prior to 1870 when the German states were linked together only through this Customs League. I recalled to his memory, that both countries, France and Germany, had been a unit and a community for centuries at one time, and what was a strength at that time would today merely mean a normal state. I want to express in particular that nobody pleaded that the two countries should be politically linked or together but political collaboration was a necessity.
On 11 October, two days later, the Italian Ambassador called on me -
Q Just a minute. I have to ask another question. Is it correct that during this conversation you also offered to go as a special envoy to France and to complete this task?
A Oh, yes. I told him that Count Welczek should be called to Hitler in order to give a report. Hitler said no, that is not necessary. I then said that he must have somebody if he wished to pursue this matter, who enjoyed his confidence and also the confidence of the government to which he was sent. I told him that I was prepared at all times to serve under Welczek as a special envoy only for that one task.
I explained to him that I regarded Welczek as a man who enjoyed the confidence of the French Government, and that it would be a pity if Hitler would not see that man more frequently.
Q Witness, did Hitler take a position on this question or did he keep silent 1735 A again as he did before?
A. Apart from putting questions to me he didn't say anything decisive at all. After all, I was not a foreign office official, and I could hardly expect him to do so. Perhaps later on I can describe what I did as far as Neurath is concerned.
Q But before that I would ask you one more question. In Belgium and in France were you told why you or all persons were approached by these foreign countries and had the confidence of these countries?
A The Belgians were explicit on that point. When I told Count Welczek that, after all, the Foreign Office was concerned here; that it would not serve any useful purpose, he replied, "That will not be read higher up. If you are coming as a soldier to Hitler, he will listen to you, for, after all, soldiers are your trump cards at the moment. Also we have confidence in you, confidence that you will at least be able to see Hitler; and he also has the confidence that you personally will do your best in this respect."
Q Witness, at that time did others also approach you, other diplomatic representatives, and lend you their confidence?
A Yes.
Q Did you have the confidence of Mr. Messerschmidt?
A Oh, yes, Mr. Messerschmidt; but that was before all this. I think that really took place in 1933, '34 or perhaps in '35. He visited me three times. When he was the Consul General of the United States he had some difficulties with some American subsidiary companies in Germany. One was Standard Oil, as far as I recall. I asked him why he wanted to see me because this was not my business. Then he said that he would have full confidence that I would look after his interests. He had been told by other diplomatic representatives that I was able to help him.
Q All right. Now witness, we come to the steps you took after your report to Hitler, the steps you took later on. I ask you to tell about that briefly.
A Perhaps I'll do that. It was after my visit to England.
Q Very well, go ahead.
A On 11 October, 1937, the Italian Ambassador came to me. That was Prof. Attolico. He told me that the Italians had got very excited at my Paris visit. It was believed that I had come to arrangements there which were in contradiction to German-Italian agreements. I calmed him down at once without giving him too many details; but he asked me to pay a brief visit to Italy 1737A before going to England.
We had been asked to go there, to England, on the 17th of October. An air force exhibition in Milan was the occasion; and I was asked to open that exhibition on the 12th of May the following day. That, of course, was headlined by the Italian papers. Attolico came again and saw me after this and expressed his gratitude. He said that Delboss had put a trap in front of me. On the 17 October was the visit to England.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness gives the date the 12th of May. Is that what he meant for the exposition in Milan?
A 12 October.
THE PRESIDENT: What year?
A It was all in October, 1937. I went from France, Italy and now to England. The visit had been arranged by the Royal Air Force as a reply visit paid by the Regal Air Force to us in January, 1937. At that time figures were exchanged between us on planned armaments, that is to say, the figures concerning bombers, fighters, and so forth, by agreement with Goering and Hitler. Here again the intention existed to know exactly what the other was doing. The other point was the intention to come to terms in all these questions.
The visit to England lasted until October 25. England had quite a lot to show. The Air Force was very well organized and had first-rate personnel. The visits were very cordial. Political conversations of an official nature were not held; but unofficially there we spent an evening in a club, in a very small circle of ten people, perhaps less than ten. Lord Swindon, who was then Minister of Aviation, took part, as well as the leader of the opposition, Mr. Churchill, and Lord Emmer, Secretary of State for India, and from the British Air Force Lord Trenshard.
We had brought General Stumpf and of course General Udet. This was more in the nature of a personal contact; and political questions weren't touched upon. The other hosts had told me before, "Today you meet your first and second best enemy. Don't be confused by this; but if there is an attack, hit back." That is what happened, but it was a very jolly evening.
Before we took off again, that is to say, on the 24th of October, Mr. Eden, the Foreign Secretary, rang me up. He said that he had been busy all the 1738A time before, but could I see him now.
I said that I'd be delighted but that a program had been arranged for us by the RAF to visit an airfield tomorrow before returning. I asked that if the program could be changed, would he please contact the RAF. He told me that perhaps that would be a bit too complicated and asked if perhaps I could see him later on. I could be with him in two hours and thirty minutes; and that was how long my aircraft took from Berlin to London at that time. Unfortunately I never saw Mr. Eden.
I reported about that trip to England on the 2nd of November. The report took over two hours. Hitler was much more accessible than when I talked to him about France. I reported particularly my talk with Mr. Churchill and drew his attention to the seriousness which was expressed. Hitler immediately interrupted me. He said verbally, "Please do not worry at all; never in my life will I do anything against Britain. The basis of my whole policy is collaboration with Britain." These words calmed me considerably. I immediately explained to him once more that the way to come to terms with England would be by Brussels and Paris; and I explained why.
Nuerath I saw on 11 October on the trip to France; and on the 28th of October I reported to him on my trip to England in great detail. All I could tell him at the time was what Hitler had said or had failed to say about France. Neurath again was very friendly and thanked me for having worked for him in this sense. I was in agreement with him that without any further invitations by him or Hitler I must not take any further steps, which, of course, I said to him.
Then on 1st November 1937 I went and saw Field Marshal von Blomberg who at that time was C and C of the Armed Forces, that is to say, Goering's military superior. I reported to him. Blomberg in all things agreed with me entirely as did Neurath. Goering at that time did not have enough time to see me. I asked on several occasions to be allowed to report to him on these very important matters; but this did not happen because he simply declined.
Q Witness, I think we can leave this field now. Will you only explain briefly to the Tribunal whether you have received foreign delegations and of 1739 A which nations and what happened at those occasions?
A. I said before that the British had seen us in January 1937. After that I had perhaps five or six visits from Englishmen. The French paid a return visit in 1938. On that occasion again we returned the very cordial welcome which the French had given to us. We showed the French our troops and factories. Yesterday reference was made by the witness Vorwald to this, saying that we only showed what the troops had at their disposal at the time and what expressly had been permitted to be shown by Goering. One request had been made by the department for the General Staff. I know that somebody Alleged that Hitler at the end of the war should have said I had shown secret methods to foreign visitors and damaged Germany thereby. That is a slanderous statement.
It was alleged that I had shown radar instruments, and at that time we didn't have any radar at all.
We were visited by representatives of all sorts of European countries: Italians, Yugoslavs, Brazilians, Poles, and so forth. I do not wish to give details here, but with Sweden, above all, we have always had very friendly relations.
Q. Witness, did you have any doubts at all so far as fetching facts and informations were concerned?
A. Not in the slightest. Above all, the British had allowed us to see perhaps their most intimate business, the so-called shadow factories, which was definitely a preparatory measure for mobilization. Industry which did not work for aviation in peacetime was already switched over to a military state in peace-time as a temporary measure, and when we were shown around there it was in full swing.
We did not show anything more secret, but we did show things which were of interest to a foreign visitor, because, after all, we could hardly show all our visitors all our Junker 52's, or an old BMW -6 engine of an antediluvian nature. I was convinced that mutual frankness would create confidence, and that confidence would be the basis for a personal approach and to create lasting peace.
Q. Very well.
Witness, you told us that Goering did not receive you. I ask you, in this connection, to explain your relations with Goering, and from the very beginning. From the beginning, were your relations with Goering very good and did you trust each other, or were there already differences from the very beginning?
A. At the beginning our relations were entirely normal, and Goering gave me his confidence. I made every effort to justify this. We had our first argument when we discussed the speed and the extent of rearmament, and we had two different opinions.
Goering, in about 1935 or 1936, had cultivated the habit of not standing contradiction and never allowing you to finish your sentence.
1741(a) That I would never stand for.
I told him that I was not a corporal, that my position was a high one, and that I had to express my opinions. It was bad enough if he didn't take any notice of my opinions, but that was his good right. However, he had to listen to me. It was very difficult to see him. Sometimes it took me seven months to have one conversation with him in that period, although he sometimes gave me orders for one of his A de C's. I would have to say quite a lot about this, but I could hardly argue with the A de C about these things.
I believe sometimes I took a rather stiff attitude, and certainly there were people who didn't like my manner.
Goering had been led to the conviction that I was after his own job, as he himself outwardly did not concern himself with the Luftwaffe. That was also used by enemies which Goering had in the Party, and he had quite a lot. These enemies would say publicly that Goering knew nothing about the Luftwaffe and Goering reproached me for that. I assured him that was untrue, and I supplied proof. But then he decided, in 1937 -- in the summer of 1937 -- to assume in reality, in every detail, the leadership of the Luftwaffe. He had already had the right to give large orders, and on top of that he decided to divide the whole organization into four parts. I told him that could only be justified if he himself would sit in the Ministry and do some work. He said he would do so. "Well, all right," I said, but nevertheless I asked him as to my position in the subdivisions, my position having been number two, and now it became number three or four. The Chief of General Staff had to ask the man responsible for planning, who transmitted requests to all the other departments, and he had to be number two. That is to say, the next man under the C in C.
He asked me whether I wished to become Chief of General Staff. No, that was not my intention, I told him, but if I had to remain, I would prefer being Chief of General Staff than to become dependent upon my former subordinates.
Goering declined this, and I asked him to let me go. After all, I was still with the Hansa in the Board of Directors, and I would be very glad to go back there.
He said that position was far too small for me. I told him, "No, that position is just the right size for me, it is almost a suit tailored for me." He thought that was out of the question.
When he thereupon gave up the correct manners which I always expected from him and there was quite a terrific argument between us, I really meant to resign, and I by no means meant this as an empty threat. He told me finally that according to a Fuehrer order no officer, no official, no civil servant, had the right to resign.
"If one of us has to go, the people above us will tell us in good time." I told him that I could see a method, are a way, to relieve my position. He said, "If you report sick, that is no good at all, I shall immediately say you are quite well." I told him what I thought of, what I had in mind, and thereupon he gave in and brought the conversation to an end by expressing groat confidence in me. However, that meant putting things off, putting difficulties off, which reared their heads again and again.
It was quite obvious that my elimination had been effected. Very frequently I was not asked to attend important conferences, and later I was only told by hearsay what had boon discussed. What was even worse, my rears for a unified leadership as far as the carrying out of the task was concerned -- I make a distinction between leading and carrying out things. That unification no longer existed. The 4 parts of the General Staff, State Secretary, General Inspectorate, personnel Office, and GL -- from that time on they lead an existence of their own, and with the many tasks they had and everything else, they could no longer expect sufficient collaboration. Attempts were always made; we had the best will in the world, but what was lacking was the possibility to give orders in that sense.
Q. Will you be a bit more brief, please?
A. That has brought me to the end, really. The days in the war come later.
THE PRESIDENT: This is a good time for recess.
(A recess was taken).
THE MARSHALL: Tribunal No. 2 is again in session.
BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q. Witness, you have just described your relationship to Goering. Will you explain to the Court how your relationship to Hitler was during those years, how often you have met him, at which opportunities, and what impression you gained from him.
A. During those years, except at official occasions, that is to say when he called high military leaders to him, or when he invited them for dinner twice or three times a year, we only met comparatively seldom. I have no records of these occasions, but I should think that I spoke to him about five or six times a your and I reported to him, but always upon his order. At that time he was able to listen very well. On the whole, he was a completely different person in those years than later on in the war. he was amiable and friendly to all people, always considerate. He accepted suggestions. I cannot recall that during all the years of peace he ever expressed unfriendly feelings t ward myself r any of the other gentlemen who accompanied me at the time of reporting to him. I gained the impression that it was even possible to influence him because he was quite accessible to good reasons. On the other hand, I observed at times during these years that many of those who were closest to him did not tell him openly what they thought. Sometimes I was warned, not to express my opinion so clearly, but I never suffered any reaction from Hitler. True, he did not always agree to proposals because he may have been equally accessible to arguments presented from others, who tried to prove the opposite of my opinion. At that time he frequently moved around right amongst the masses by whom he was adored---indeed, worshiped. He held a strong position within the German nation, such as I have never seen held by any other individual in Germany. He was particularly fond of children, and all his measures for public welfare for instance, for the winter relief which netted several hundred million marks every year, were his own creation.
As Germany in 1933 was in great economic need, this relief came at the right time for many thousands and hundreds of thousands.
1745(a) On every occasion, he emphasized the social aspect, and what I had liked about him, already before 1933, was a sound synthesis between national interests and social interests.
For, after all, our old Reich under the Kaiser had failed because a combination of this kind did not exist as it should. The slogans "National and Social" were always right before, waiting for somebody to pick them up, and. the Weimar parties had failed to do that and therefore failed altogether. And now, that the people in its desperation did not see any other way out, it rallied around Hitler, and the measures he took after 1933 were successful. We had eight million unemployed in 1933, and that figure increased from week to week. In the Lufthansa, I myself registered the dismissal of, altogether, one thousand workers before 1933, I went there myself, and in our workshops where we carried out our repairs I had to dismiss 500 out of a thousand workers, all of whom could not find other jobs; and I have to say that this was one of the most difficult tasks which I ever had to perform. I did not merely want to publish it on the blackboard outside the plant, but I wanted to face the people when I told them. I have talked to them, and about what would become of them, and it w s hopeless. Contrary to our custom, on the part of the Lufthansa, we paid these people's salaries for many months, though we had no funds at our disposal at that time; but I could borrow it from the banks so as to make at least a transitional period possible for these people. Unemployment relief was not sufficient for the subsistence of these people. It was only slow starvation for them, and I was deeply impressed realizing what it meant to be unemployed. That, however was done away with in a few months in 1933. I can say I considered this a miracle. The people recovered. When I visited the Ruhr area in 1933, I could see workers' children in the streets showing signs of starvation. In 1934, on some occasion, I was again in the Ruhr. area. Goering delivered a public address Curt No. 2 there, and I had to join him bee use I also wanted to visit industrial plants.