He said on that occasion that unless a decision was reached in a short time, he himself would continue rearmament. He suggested increasing the German armed forces to 200,000 men and limiting them to that figure, and he equally renounced bombing warfare for all countries. No decision was reached.
I believe that it was in the autumn of 1933 when Hitler announced that Germany would leave the League of Nations, would leave at least the Disarmament Conference, but simultaneously Germany left the League of Nations. I know that at that time Goering was very worried. He called us to him and described the situation not too optimistically. All I could reply was that up to that time no beginning of German rearmament in the air had been made, and that if the order to do so were to be given, it would take several months or years.
No order was given at the time. All that was ordered was an increase in the number of pilot training schools and an extension on industry. The orders which were now given to the industry concerned in particular the type of Junker 52, of which I said before that in 1932 the first type of aircraft of that sort reached the schools in that year. The Lufthansa was interested in that in order to increase its total number of aircraft with that very good model as quickly as possible.
This is how it happened that the Junkers firm was increased and extended. Heinkel was next. Heinkel at the time had usually foreign orders. Heinkel worked for several countries, and whey supplied small and medium size aircraft.
In 1935, in March, Hitler ordered officially that Germany should re-arm, and he claimed that Germany should have armed authority.
Q Just a minute, witness. Before you continue, I want to ask you again: Up to that point - that is in March 1935 - there was not even a secret rearmament was there?
A No, you could not call that rearmament. I said that the schools had been extended. I also reminded you that the industries had been extended. Models of new German aircraft were in the factories for military purposes which had been built on orders from abroad.
Q Will you please continue?
A From the spring of 1935 - that is to say, March - the rearmament became official. The first which was done was a fighter group, in Boeweritz from the 1726 A Squadron Richthofen, which had been newly founded.
They were equipped with a fairly old model, and the undercarriage could not even be retracted. Modern engines were not at their disposal, or to put it better, there was no military engine at all.
The road of rearmament was a slow one. In the coming years relatively little material was at our disposal. New aircraft had to be built, and perhaps there might have been preparations by comparing foreign models with them. Now, a definite number of fighter aircraft and bombers and reconnaissance aircraft were built.
I do not wish to go into the technical details of these types, for I don't think such questions are relevant here, but only in, perhaps, 1937 or 1938 - I do not recall the exact year - it was in 1937 - we had our first modern fighter aircraft, and a little later a medium size bomber aircraft which was roughly on the same technical level as Britain, France, and so on. The reconnaissance aircraft were not so interesting, but figures were very small, nor was there a real Luftwaffe in existence then.
The question how strong and how quickly rearmament should be effected was highly debatable within the Luftwaffe. Goering, I suppose because of his knowledge of Hitler's wishes, demanded great speed. My chiefs of departments, above all the chief of the leading office, the Fuehrungsamt, the Chief of Personnel, and I myself, opposed this, not because we did not wish to re-arm but because we wanted to have the rearmament effected in what we regarded as a reasonable and possible frame.
Of course, you could get large numbers of recruits or young pilots, and you could train them within one to two years as soldiers and pilots, but you could not in two years or five years or even in ten years create all the superior officers who had sufficient experience necessary to conduct a large branch of an armed force. That point was hotly debated in the later course of the peace years. On the one hand there were Hitler and Goering, and on the other hand were my experts and I. Our contradictions were not taken notice of as a principle.
This led me to make several attempts to be allowed to resign.
Q We shall come to that later, witness. Witness, please tell the Court briefly when the air armament was concluded, at least in Goering's opinion.
1727A We have heard your opinion.
A No final stage can ever be described, but when new squadrons had been installed - and we took the view that you can use them after a certain time, after a year or a year and a half - then the order was given to march. Well, anyway, no conclusion of the armament program was really reached; even in 1939, only a fraction of that was reached and effected which had been wished for from above, but with our best will, we could not have achieved more than we did.
Q It can be alleged, it can be opposed to your view, that in 1939 the German Luftwaffe, after the successes it had was superior to the air forces of the neighboring countries. These countries, in your opinion, had rearmed. Is it possible then to say that Germany had also rearmed sufficiently?
A The high level of armament as it was requested - I did not understand that at all, and therefore I opposed this, not only for the reasons which I explained before - that sufficient numbers of leaders should be trained - but there were other reasons as well. Perhaps I can go into that later on, but the air forces of the other countries were in 1939 perhaps - not in all countries, of course - were sufficiently strong. Nevertheless - and that I shall explain later on I considered the strength of the British Air Force, for instance, to be superior to ours, although I may not have shown proof of that in the first months of the war.
In France there was a crisis in production and development of the factories. They had been taken over by the state, and in the transition period they were exposed to the negative sides of the state taking over industry which they had not overcome.
A (continuing): The Polish air force was to a large extent dependent on the French air force and was affected by the crisis of French industry automatically.
Q Witness, when in 1937 and '38 the first drives of Hitler against the foreign countries took place, at that time was the Luftwaffe already sufficiently armed in order to be able to keep up a serious conflict?
A No, it was not. I explained that on frequent occasions, whenever I could see Goering, for instance, or Hitler, but Hitler said the war effort would be a military conflict. These things were purely political disputes.
Q Witness, was this rearmament of the Luftwaffe your task? Did your task of state secretary change, and in what manner did that change, if that did?
A State secretary in the Air Ministry was a purely formal appointment, as it was a ministry in contrast to army and navy. I may perhaps add it was a purely political matter when a cabinet was formed in 1933. That was the method how Hitler obtained a third member of his party, made a third member of his party a third member of the cabinet. Therefore, for the reason there was a minister, there had to be a state secretary. The functions of a state secretary in a civilian ministry I fulfilled only up to a point, and that only as long as 1937. My military position was always in the foreground as Goering did not concern himself with the troops at that time. It was my task, therefore, to inspect the troops, and that led to my being ordered to become an inspector general, and that position was my main sphere of task up to 1941, up to the end of 1941.
Q Witness, in this position as inspector general, you had to carry out the reconstruction of the Luftwaffe?
A No, you could not say that. As inspector general I had to inspect the troops. I was not the commander cf the troops. I was an independent official, who, on behalf of the Commander in Chief Goering, saw to it that the various units -- checked up on the fact that the various units were equipped with material, their billets, their food, and all such matters, that all these things were in order.
As state secretary, as it was a civilian appointment, I was only concerned with civil aviation, the so-called civilian air rights or air laws. These were the various permissions which you gave other nations to fly over your territory, and things like that. In the beginning weather forecasts were under that office, and that later on became also a military function. The state secretary, unlike other ministries, in that position he was not concerned with the budget. The most influential man for the budget was the Chief of the General Staff who from 1937 was no longer with me or under me, and whose requests, as long as they had been passed by Goering, decided how big the budget would be automatically.
Q. Witness, who then would decide on the establishment of the types of plans, of the courses, who would carry out this plan, and under whose authority were these plans?
A. Perhaps one should make here a difference between to carry out and to plan. The one is the planning office, that is to say, that office which creates the plans. That was the general staff. The approving position was Goering. The actual carrying out was in the hands of the various offices. Among others I, myself, was concerned with it. For instance, I was always in charge of administration. At that time that was the piece moving, the barracks and airfields, at that time food, clothes, and all the other things concerned with that administration. I was also always in charge of the training of the troops, of the pilots, etc., order in carrying out of these tasks concerned which was planned by the General Staff, all overseen by C. in C. Goering. All that was in my hands.
The Chief of Personnel was independent of me from 1937 onwards, was in charge of personnel lists. He decided how many officers there should be, what sort of training they should be given, and what positions they should take up, and in the higher positions Goering himself had to give his approval. From 1937 onwards the technical side had been removed from my command and was organized under a general Luftzeugmeister.
This G.L. was now in charge of the technical rearmament, again in accordance with the planning of the General Staff. I think that roughly is the answer to your question.
Q. Yes, that is sufficient. Witness, is it correct to say that in your capacity as inspector general you had to make trips abroad too, that is, you had to see to the care of the comradely relationship of the air forces of other countries?
A. Yes. I forgot to answer one point in your last question. You asked who was in charge of the troops. May I just repeat and make up for that? The troops were under the fleets, under the air fleets, under a Luftgau. When the organization was completed four air fleets were in existence, and roughly, according to the army, districts of the army. There was one Luftgau for each territory of the Luftwaffe. These commanders in chief of the Luftgau were the commanders of the troops and were immediately under C. in C. Goering.
Now, I come to your question of the visits. Perhaps I can look up a note to get hold of the dates. The visits which I made were only, some of them, made in my capacity as inspector general. Some of them were made for purely personal reasons, relations with people. For instance, the first visit which I made at the request of Van Zeeling, the Belgian Prime Minister, that must have been about 1936. I visit Belgium. The ambassador for Belgium in Berlin, Count Kerkhove, was a personal friend of mine. One day he asked me to go to Belgium with him; the Prime Minister VanZeeland would like to see me. I was very astonished at this idea and I asked him what the matter was. I then told him that I had to have the permission of my superior officers. I received it. This was an entirely private journey. The purpose of the trip, as I realized in Belgium, was that Van Zeeland wished to come to terms with Germany, not only formally but fullheartedly. Belgium, since the First World War, had a treaty with France and was under an obligation to come to France's aid militarily by agreement with France. Van Zeeland wished to renounce that treaty, and he wished to have the same terms between Belgium and France as between Belgium and Germany.
Belgium was also prepared in economic matters, which was a very urgent point for Germany at the time, to make concessions, far-reaching concessions. The visit started with a brief call on the king, who did not refer to the purpose of the visit. This was purely a courtesy call, but this visit gave support to my trip. I saw that the prime minister acted in accordance with his king. The plan as such, although I emphasized it several times that I am not a politician, that it was not my intention to interfere in foreign office matters, but here Von Neurath entirely agreed with my visit. He had not the bureaucratic mind. The plan impressed me. Rather, I saw the possibility to create friendly relations between Germany and Belgium, and via Belgium to France, an later on via France to England itself.
I was convinced that the ever-privileged policy of balance of power no longer applied since the first World War. The powers in Europe had been dislodged too much and joint friendship between France and Britain was definitely a British interest, in that sense.
When I returned I reported orally to Herr von Neurath who entirely agreed with that point of view. I also reported to Field Marshal von Blomberg, who, apart from Goering, was my military superior. He took the same line. I reported to Hitler and Goering. Both received my report but did not express their own opinion. To my question whether and what I could tell the Belgian Ambassador I was told that would have to be done through other channels, not through me. My orders had come to an end by giving this report. This was my first visit and that was entirely unofficial.
Then I went to Belgium in May 1937. At that time, as a Luftwaffe man officially I was received by the C in C of the Belgian Air Force, General Duvivier; also by the Minister of War and other officials. That was a very friendly visit which also led to very good personal relations between ourselves and their pilots.
I was particularly interested in Belgium because in the first World War Germany had marched through Belgium, had violated Belgian neutrality, and had to make up for this now. I believed that the views as expressed by Belgium an both occasions were aimed at finally burying the hatchet. I assumed that there was a direct connection between my Belgian visit and a visit by the French Ambassador Poncet who came to call on me in my office and extended an invitation by the French Government on the occasion of the International Exhibition. That visit took place from 4 to 9 October 1937 in Paris with the full approval of Goering and Hitler. The visit was most impressive since I believe since 1867 it was the first time that a German officer could pay an official friendly visit to France. The French told me with the greatest satisfaction that was the first the French Company of Honor had presented its arms since in 1867 the Prussian Crown Prince had visited Paris.
The French made great efforts to make the visit a success and I must say they succeeded all along the line. The main point was joint military inspections. Very cordial words were exchanged with the generals of the French Air Force.
I was accompanied by Udet and Count Kerkhove who also had very good relations with France from other times. The central point perhaps of the visit and its real purpose occurred after a lunch given by Pierre Cot, the Minister of Aviation. On my other side the Foreign Minister was sitting, and also the Minister of the Navy was there. After lunch the three French Ministers, Wilmer, the C in C of the French Air Force, Udet and myself remained in a special room and the French Foreign Minister asked me to take home with me some propositions made by his office.
I should add our German Ambassador in France was also there, also in the smaller circle. When I said that I didn't want to interfere in his business he himself did not take any notice of it. He said that the most important thing was to report to Hitler on my impressions. He himself could not approach Hitler. The Ambassador was then Count Welczek. I was extremely surprised; I had no idea. I couldn't imagine that the head of State should not see his own ambassador. On that basis I said I would only act as a postman, and as such would transmit what I would be told now. I would give my very best own will.
The contents of the conversation were; to have a far-reaching agreement between the two countries, main purpose being to establish a really permanent and lasting peace between the two countries. I could take over this assignment with the best conscience in the world. After all, I said yesterday what I thought of military events in Europe in the last thousand years. My impression was that the Foreign Minister was very serious in this business, not did I have any suspicions that this might be a political trap and the Air Minister, who was always described as Communist in Germany, I liked Cot very much indeed, and our conversations were very intimate and very frank.
The French Foreign Minister at that time was called Delboss. The farewell on the Le Bourget Airfield led to fraternization between all of us and between ourselves and five or six of the highest French Generals. I must not forget that one of the oldest French Generals, General Keller, expressed with tears in his eyes he was now convinced that the thousand years war between France and Germany was now a matter of the past. We also were deeply moved.
On 9 October I flew from Paris to Berchtesgaden and reported to Hitler at once. He ordered me to report to him as soon as I had returned. I may perhaps say quite generally I could only see Hitler if Goering gave me permission or ordered me to do so, or of course, if Hitler himself ordered me to come and see him.
I myself could not go and see him as I was merely a subordinate.
In the presence of Udet I gave a report to Hitler lasting over two hours on the evening of the 9th of October, when my impression was still very fresh. Hitler listened very attentively, asked a number of detailed questions. I could tell him all about the various details which we saw and heard, not so much the military ones, but the political details. I could never talk enough about these things. After all, it was a fairly long conversation with the head of State. I recommended all these things very warmly and I asked him to take this extended hand and he would represent the greatest glory if he would succeed in coming to a lasting agreement with France which would be based on a very far-reaching economic community between the two countries.
I compared this with the time of the German Customs League prior to 1870 when the German states were linked together only through this Customs League. I recalled to his memory, that both countries, France and Germany, had been a unit and a community for centuries at one time, and what was a strength at that time would today merely mean a normal state. I want to express in particular that nobody pleaded that the two countries should be politically linked or together but political collaboration was a necessity.
On 11 October, two days later, the Italian Ambassador called on me -
Q Just a minute. I have to ask another question. Is it correct that during this conversation you also offered to go as a special envoy to France and to complete this task?
A Oh, yes. I told him that Count Welczek should be called to Hitler in order to give a report. Hitler said no, that is not necessary. I then said that he must have somebody if he wished to pursue this matter, who enjoyed his confidence and also the confidence of the government to which he was sent. I told him that I was prepared at all times to serve under Welczek as a special envoy only for that one task.
I explained to him that I regarded Welczek as a man who enjoyed the confidence of the French Government, and that it would be a pity if Hitler would not see that man more frequently.
Q Witness, did Hitler take a position on this question or did he keep silent 1735 A again as he did before?
A. Apart from putting questions to me he didn't say anything decisive at all. After all, I was not a foreign office official, and I could hardly expect him to do so. Perhaps later on I can describe what I did as far as Neurath is concerned.
Q But before that I would ask you one more question. In Belgium and in France were you told why you or all persons were approached by these foreign countries and had the confidence of these countries?
A The Belgians were explicit on that point. When I told Count Welczek that, after all, the Foreign Office was concerned here; that it would not serve any useful purpose, he replied, "That will not be read higher up. If you are coming as a soldier to Hitler, he will listen to you, for, after all, soldiers are your trump cards at the moment. Also we have confidence in you, confidence that you will at least be able to see Hitler; and he also has the confidence that you personally will do your best in this respect."
Q Witness, at that time did others also approach you, other diplomatic representatives, and lend you their confidence?
A Yes.
Q Did you have the confidence of Mr. Messerschmidt?
A Oh, yes, Mr. Messerschmidt; but that was before all this. I think that really took place in 1933, '34 or perhaps in '35. He visited me three times. When he was the Consul General of the United States he had some difficulties with some American subsidiary companies in Germany. One was Standard Oil, as far as I recall. I asked him why he wanted to see me because this was not my business. Then he said that he would have full confidence that I would look after his interests. He had been told by other diplomatic representatives that I was able to help him.
Q All right. Now witness, we come to the steps you took after your report to Hitler, the steps you took later on. I ask you to tell about that briefly.
A Perhaps I'll do that. It was after my visit to England.
Q Very well, go ahead.
A On 11 October, 1937, the Italian Ambassador came to me. That was Prof. Attolico. He told me that the Italians had got very excited at my Paris visit. It was believed that I had come to arrangements there which were in contradiction to German-Italian agreements. I calmed him down at once without giving him too many details; but he asked me to pay a brief visit to Italy 1737A before going to England.
We had been asked to go there, to England, on the 17th of October. An air force exhibition in Milan was the occasion; and I was asked to open that exhibition on the 12th of May the following day. That, of course, was headlined by the Italian papers. Attolico came again and saw me after this and expressed his gratitude. He said that Delboss had put a trap in front of me. On the 17 October was the visit to England.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness gives the date the 12th of May. Is that what he meant for the exposition in Milan?
A 12 October.
THE PRESIDENT: What year?
A It was all in October, 1937. I went from France, Italy and now to England. The visit had been arranged by the Royal Air Force as a reply visit paid by the Regal Air Force to us in January, 1937. At that time figures were exchanged between us on planned armaments, that is to say, the figures concerning bombers, fighters, and so forth, by agreement with Goering and Hitler. Here again the intention existed to know exactly what the other was doing. The other point was the intention to come to terms in all these questions.
The visit to England lasted until October 25. England had quite a lot to show. The Air Force was very well organized and had first-rate personnel. The visits were very cordial. Political conversations of an official nature were not held; but unofficially there we spent an evening in a club, in a very small circle of ten people, perhaps less than ten. Lord Swindon, who was then Minister of Aviation, took part, as well as the leader of the opposition, Mr. Churchill, and Lord Emmer, Secretary of State for India, and from the British Air Force Lord Trenshard.
We had brought General Stumpf and of course General Udet. This was more in the nature of a personal contact; and political questions weren't touched upon. The other hosts had told me before, "Today you meet your first and second best enemy. Don't be confused by this; but if there is an attack, hit back." That is what happened, but it was a very jolly evening.
Before we took off again, that is to say, on the 24th of October, Mr. Eden, the Foreign Secretary, rang me up. He said that he had been busy all the 1738A time before, but could I see him now.
I said that I'd be delighted but that a program had been arranged for us by the RAF to visit an airfield tomorrow before returning. I asked that if the program could be changed, would he please contact the RAF. He told me that perhaps that would be a bit too complicated and asked if perhaps I could see him later on. I could be with him in two hours and thirty minutes; and that was how long my aircraft took from Berlin to London at that time. Unfortunately I never saw Mr. Eden.
I reported about that trip to England on the 2nd of November. The report took over two hours. Hitler was much more accessible than when I talked to him about France. I reported particularly my talk with Mr. Churchill and drew his attention to the seriousness which was expressed. Hitler immediately interrupted me. He said verbally, "Please do not worry at all; never in my life will I do anything against Britain. The basis of my whole policy is collaboration with Britain." These words calmed me considerably. I immediately explained to him once more that the way to come to terms with England would be by Brussels and Paris; and I explained why.
Nuerath I saw on 11 October on the trip to France; and on the 28th of October I reported to him on my trip to England in great detail. All I could tell him at the time was what Hitler had said or had failed to say about France. Neurath again was very friendly and thanked me for having worked for him in this sense. I was in agreement with him that without any further invitations by him or Hitler I must not take any further steps, which, of course, I said to him.
Then on 1st November 1937 I went and saw Field Marshal von Blomberg who at that time was C and C of the Armed Forces, that is to say, Goering's military superior. I reported to him. Blomberg in all things agreed with me entirely as did Neurath. Goering at that time did not have enough time to see me. I asked on several occasions to be allowed to report to him on these very important matters; but this did not happen because he simply declined.
