A. I said before that the British had seen us in January 1937. After that I had perhaps five or six visits from Englishmen. The French paid a return visit in 1938. On that occasion again we returned the very cordial welcome which the French had given to us. We showed the French our troops and factories. Yesterday reference was made by the witness Vorwald to this, saying that we only showed what the troops had at their disposal at the time and what expressly had been permitted to be shown by Goering. One request had been made by the department for the General Staff. I know that somebody Alleged that Hitler at the end of the war should have said I had shown secret methods to foreign visitors and damaged Germany thereby. That is a slanderous statement.
It was alleged that I had shown radar instruments, and at that time we didn't have any radar at all.
We were visited by representatives of all sorts of European countries: Italians, Yugoslavs, Brazilians, Poles, and so forth. I do not wish to give details here, but with Sweden, above all, we have always had very friendly relations.
Q. Witness, did you have any doubts at all so far as fetching facts and informations were concerned?
A. Not in the slightest. Above all, the British had allowed us to see perhaps their most intimate business, the so-called shadow factories, which was definitely a preparatory measure for mobilization. Industry which did not work for aviation in peacetime was already switched over to a military state in peace-time as a temporary measure, and when we were shown around there it was in full swing.
We did not show anything more secret, but we did show things which were of interest to a foreign visitor, because, after all, we could hardly show all our visitors all our Junker 52's, or an old BMW -6 engine of an antediluvian nature. I was convinced that mutual frankness would create confidence, and that confidence would be the basis for a personal approach and to create lasting peace.
Q. Very well.
Witness, you told us that Goering did not receive you. I ask you, in this connection, to explain your relations with Goering, and from the very beginning. From the beginning, were your relations with Goering very good and did you trust each other, or were there already differences from the very beginning?
A. At the beginning our relations were entirely normal, and Goering gave me his confidence. I made every effort to justify this. We had our first argument when we discussed the speed and the extent of rearmament, and we had two different opinions.
Goering, in about 1935 or 1936, had cultivated the habit of not standing contradiction and never allowing you to finish your sentence.
1741(a) That I would never stand for.
I told him that I was not a corporal, that my position was a high one, and that I had to express my opinions. It was bad enough if he didn't take any notice of my opinions, but that was his good right. However, he had to listen to me. It was very difficult to see him. Sometimes it took me seven months to have one conversation with him in that period, although he sometimes gave me orders for one of his A de C's. I would have to say quite a lot about this, but I could hardly argue with the A de C about these things.
I believe sometimes I took a rather stiff attitude, and certainly there were people who didn't like my manner.
Goering had been led to the conviction that I was after his own job, as he himself outwardly did not concern himself with the Luftwaffe. That was also used by enemies which Goering had in the Party, and he had quite a lot. These enemies would say publicly that Goering knew nothing about the Luftwaffe and Goering reproached me for that. I assured him that was untrue, and I supplied proof. But then he decided, in 1937 -- in the summer of 1937 -- to assume in reality, in every detail, the leadership of the Luftwaffe. He had already had the right to give large orders, and on top of that he decided to divide the whole organization into four parts. I told him that could only be justified if he himself would sit in the Ministry and do some work. He said he would do so. "Well, all right," I said, but nevertheless I asked him as to my position in the subdivisions, my position having been number two, and now it became number three or four. The Chief of General Staff had to ask the man responsible for planning, who transmitted requests to all the other departments, and he had to be number two. That is to say, the next man under the C in C.
He asked me whether I wished to become Chief of General Staff. No, that was not my intention, I told him, but if I had to remain, I would prefer being Chief of General Staff than to become dependent upon my former subordinates.
Goering declined this, and I asked him to let me go. After all, I was still with the Hansa in the Board of Directors, and I would be very glad to go back there.
He said that position was far too small for me. I told him, "No, that position is just the right size for me, it is almost a suit tailored for me." He thought that was out of the question.
When he thereupon gave up the correct manners which I always expected from him and there was quite a terrific argument between us, I really meant to resign, and I by no means meant this as an empty threat. He told me finally that according to a Fuehrer order no officer, no official, no civil servant, had the right to resign.
"If one of us has to go, the people above us will tell us in good time." I told him that I could see a method, are a way, to relieve my position. He said, "If you report sick, that is no good at all, I shall immediately say you are quite well." I told him what I thought of, what I had in mind, and thereupon he gave in and brought the conversation to an end by expressing groat confidence in me. However, that meant putting things off, putting difficulties off, which reared their heads again and again.
It was quite obvious that my elimination had been effected. Very frequently I was not asked to attend important conferences, and later I was only told by hearsay what had boon discussed. What was even worse, my rears for a unified leadership as far as the carrying out of the task was concerned -- I make a distinction between leading and carrying out things. That unification no longer existed. The 4 parts of the General Staff, State Secretary, General Inspectorate, personnel Office, and GL -- from that time on they lead an existence of their own, and with the many tasks they had and everything else, they could no longer expect sufficient collaboration. Attempts were always made; we had the best will in the world, but what was lacking was the possibility to give orders in that sense.
Q. Will you be a bit more brief, please?
A. That has brought me to the end, really. The days in the war come later.
THE PRESIDENT: This is a good time for recess.
(A recess was taken).
THE MARSHALL: Tribunal No. 2 is again in session.
BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q. Witness, you have just described your relationship to Goering. Will you explain to the Court how your relationship to Hitler was during those years, how often you have met him, at which opportunities, and what impression you gained from him.
A. During those years, except at official occasions, that is to say when he called high military leaders to him, or when he invited them for dinner twice or three times a year, we only met comparatively seldom. I have no records of these occasions, but I should think that I spoke to him about five or six times a your and I reported to him, but always upon his order. At that time he was able to listen very well. On the whole, he was a completely different person in those years than later on in the war. he was amiable and friendly to all people, always considerate. He accepted suggestions. I cannot recall that during all the years of peace he ever expressed unfriendly feelings t ward myself r any of the other gentlemen who accompanied me at the time of reporting to him. I gained the impression that it was even possible to influence him because he was quite accessible to good reasons. On the other hand, I observed at times during these years that many of those who were closest to him did not tell him openly what they thought. Sometimes I was warned, not to express my opinion so clearly, but I never suffered any reaction from Hitler. True, he did not always agree to proposals because he may have been equally accessible to arguments presented from others, who tried to prove the opposite of my opinion. At that time he frequently moved around right amongst the masses by whom he was adored---indeed, worshiped. He held a strong position within the German nation, such as I have never seen held by any other individual in Germany. He was particularly fond of children, and all his measures for public welfare for instance, for the winter relief which netted several hundred million marks every year, were his own creation.
As Germany in 1933 was in great economic need, this relief came at the right time for many thousands and hundreds of thousands.
1745(a) On every occasion, he emphasized the social aspect, and what I had liked about him, already before 1933, was a sound synthesis between national interests and social interests.
For, after all, our old Reich under the Kaiser had failed because a combination of this kind did not exist as it should. The slogans "National and Social" were always right before, waiting for somebody to pick them up, and. the Weimar parties had failed to do that and therefore failed altogether. And now, that the people in its desperation did not see any other way out, it rallied around Hitler, and the measures he took after 1933 were successful. We had eight million unemployed in 1933, and that figure increased from week to week. In the Lufthansa, I myself registered the dismissal of, altogether, one thousand workers before 1933, I went there myself, and in our workshops where we carried out our repairs I had to dismiss 500 out of a thousand workers, all of whom could not find other jobs; and I have to say that this was one of the most difficult tasks which I ever had to perform. I did not merely want to publish it on the blackboard outside the plant, but I wanted to face the people when I told them. I have talked to them, and about what would become of them, and it w s hopeless. Contrary to our custom, on the part of the Lufthansa, we paid these people's salaries for many months, though we had no funds at our disposal at that time; but I could borrow it from the banks so as to make at least a transitional period possible for these people. Unemployment relief was not sufficient for the subsistence of these people. It was only slow starvation for them, and I was deeply impressed realizing what it meant to be unemployed. That, however was done away with in a few months in 1933. I can say I considered this a miracle. The people recovered. When I visited the Ruhr area in 1933, I could see workers' children in the streets showing signs of starvation. In 1934, on some occasion, I was again in the Ruhr. area. Goering delivered a public address Curt No. 2 there, and I had to join him bee use I also wanted to visit industrial plants.
These same children, and. grown-ups, were completely changed. Their cheeks were full and rosy. They had regained their color and. laughed again. I consider this success which Hitler achieved by his system at that 1746(a) Time one of tho greatest achievements which could ever be attained; and it was really no wonder that all of us sincerely believed in this man with all of cur hearts, and that we considered anybody a fool had ho told us at that time that he would lead us into a world war and would not stop until Germany was completely destroyed.
We would have attacked anybody who would have told us that Hitler at any time had ordered and caused cruelties, tortures and murder in concentration camps. We would have considered this the worst propaganda of oar worst enemies, but it was not only myself who thought that way. All of us thought that way, also those amongst us who were tho many little busybodies in the Party, the propagandists, etc. We called them the 120% believers, even though we brushed those people off and would not tolerate that they influence us in our sphere. That was Hitler in those years, I would say up about 1937-1938, or even until 1938.
Q. I shall refer to that later on. Until '37 or '38 did you meet other leaders of the Party? And did you take part in the internal life of the party.
A. No; I had nothing to do with the Party in itself. Naturally, for instance, at these dinners with Hitler, I always met part of the higher authorities of the Party who were excellent people -- besides the others which I just described. But there was no close connection between us; the soldiers kept to themselves.
Q. Which impression, witness, did you gain from the high Party leaders; Goering, Ley, and so on; -- what was their attitude towards Hitler?
A. I gained the impression that they considered him a god who was beyond human criticism, and therefore, they could not contradict him; and every idea of his had to be considered as coming from God. It was a sort of dependence which many of them had to him and the behavior, of course, differed with the various personalities. There wore some who gave hints of their opinions first but then they became silent when they saw that Hitler did not agree with them. Others made previous inquiries through their adjutants as to the wishes of Hitler, and then suggested it to Hitler, himself, and others who magnified all of Hitler's wishes in proportion of one to a hundred thousand.
In the first years, Hitler had a sound feeling for these flatteries, and I gained the impression that he did not listen to them; but internally he actually was amused about these people, in contrast with later on.
Q. Which attitude was there between Goering and Hitler? We are particularly interested in it here.
A. That changed. It only grow into a closer relationship. Perhaps in 1931 or '32. But I know that from other people who were more closely connected with Goering. Then, in '34 or '35 -- about that time -- and in '36, it had weakened, and in '37 it became 1748a stronger again.
And that was going on until the time of the war. And from 1943 onwards, after the fall of Stalingrad, it noticeably weakened month by month.
Q. What was Goering's attitude toward Hitler?
A. He was very soft towards him. He often told me, "Milch, leave that alone. Why do you oppose him? Hitler has the right ideas about this, whether he knows it or not. It is God who gives him these ideas."
1748(b) I did not want to have that true and Goering said that I was not one of Hitler's friends as he, himself, was; which I confirmed.
Q. Witness, did you meet Hindenburg?
A. Yes; often....
Q. What impression, and what connections did you have towards him?
A. I think the greatest disaster for Germany was that the old Field Marshal -- we always called him "The Old Man" - died so early. Hitler had real respect for him, and he was not the man who could be easily persuaded; he could not be cheated either. In spite of his age, he had very clear insight in every way, and I know that he criticized Hitler very often -- as he was very rough with him -- as soon as the old Hindenburg was informed of transgressions of Party members. I know a case there were difficulties with some party members and clericals in Fast Germany. Hindenburg called Hitler and it was only a few minutes, when some counter-measures were taken by Hitler. The old gentleman took great interest in everything -- above all for all questions concerning soldiers, as we had intentions as soon as we could to arm our Air Force, to consider the Luftwaffe as a third part of the Armed Forces -- that is, not under the direction of the Army and the Navy. We wanted to follow the example of England, the old gentleman had this explained by me...he was not interested in questions concerning flying and technical matters. He never listened to them very much and he never had a telephone in his hand. He said, "I don't want this things I don't like this modern stuff."
I asked him when I was entrusted, to explain to him how much time he would give me. And he asked, "What did it actually mean -- independent air force? What is the purpose of it," he said to me. "I give you just fifteen minutes."
"I don't need such a long time," I said. "I will cover everything in seven minutes", and then I reported, "My report is complete." He said, "I understand. I thank you very much for your explanation. These ideas are new to me.
I can see that you know about them; otherwise you could not have explained it in such a short time. With these words I saw that he was very clear in these human questions. He asked me some questions which showed that he really understood the whole problem. And I only can repeat again that the way which Germany took would have been a different one if this great and wise man would have remained in the government; for Germany owes him a tremendous amount. I always considered him far above Hitler, and I think all soldiers thought the same thing.
Q. Did you meet the War Minister, Blomberg, and what were your relations with him?
A. I very often saw him after we started arming in 1935. He was Goering's superior and he often sent for me, in these years until 1938, when he resigned. I often saw him and saw him more often than I saw Goering. He was a true soldier, a very friendly man, he knew what he wanted. He was the only superior soldier from the army who also had a political feeling, and his influence on Hitler in the first years was very great, especially as long as the Chief of Staff was Reichenau. He also was very clever in dealing with political questions. Hitler esteemed Blomberg very highly, and Blomberg also quite frankly told him his opinion - and Hitler listened to him - at least, on the whole. Only some actions which Hitler took, such as the reconstruction of garrisons in the Rhineland and also, later on, the action in Austria, were done against the advice of Blomberg, and Blomberg had to give in in this matter. But the difficulties which he created were very great for Hitler and Hitler did not want to listen to him later on.
But in the first years, by the faithful loyalty of Blomberg and also by the loyalty of the army and the armed forces through his action, his treatment of Blomberg was not exactly a grateful one. Blomberg was very interested in all questions concerning the Luftwaffe. He stood beyond the Party although he was an army man, and he supported the Luftwaffe in every way possible, which we demanded from him. He was my great help. Always, what he promised he kept, and what he didn't want to promise he refused at once -- and nothing could be done about it later on. He inspected many Luftwaffe troops with me, and until 1938 he knew much better about these units of the Luftwaffe than Goering himself. That is sufficient, I think.
Q. Witness, I think this is sufficient.
A. May I add one more thing? Politically he always managed to be sensible and quiet. I always informed him about my own problems. He always shared them and always presented them to Hitler.
Q. You know that after a not very nice incident, he resigned. Do you consider it correct that Hitler had taken over the supreme command of the Wehrmacht?
A. No, I considered it only a rise to power, forced by necessity, for the next one who should have ta.ken over was Goering, and Hitler was convinced at that time that Goering would not be fit to carry out these duties. But in this we saw an unnecessary burden for the head of the state because then, in the meantime, after the death of Hindenburg, Hitler became chief of state. He was at the same time, Reichs Chancellor and he was the C. in C. That was too much for one man and Hitler also lacked the knowledge for this position. One cannot be a soldier without knowing about it and having been trained in this.
Q. Witness, what was your attitude towards the resignation of Fritsch?
A. I think this incident, which happened in the spring of 1938, was the greatest shock for me. The resignation of Blomberg could be understood from a human point of view, but the resignation of Fritsch was a dirty business. He was an extremely capable Commander in Chief and without blemish. He was not concerned with politics, in contrast to Blomberg. He did not know anything about politics; he was not interested in it at all, but naturally, in the position in which he was then, it was a great pity. But the manner in which he was removed, because one saw his clear and chivalrous attitude, his purely social feelings, and that he did not agree with things. That was a dirty business, and I know on this question that the Army never got away with it. We were only indirectly concerned with it, but I thought about it and what might possibly have been done and how little any of us expected it. And so he was replaced by another man in the same capacity. He was replaced by an equally capable man in the army. This was Field Marshal Brauchitsch.
Q. Witness, were you ever Goering's deputy in this capacity, and how long?
A. Until 1937 I was his deputy, and all offices in the Luftwaffe which were subordinate to him were also subordinate to me. This applied to the execution of orders. From 1937 onwards I was his deputy only in my own sector, and this automatically as Chief of the General Staff in his field, which applies also to the GL. In any case it was within my capacity to deputize for Goering in all matters as I was the second senior officer of the Luftwaffe, and this was done only by way of rank. But Goering reserved the right to appoint a deputy in general, that is, especially always only for the Luftwaffe. This authority he did not confer upon me. Even when he was on leave he kept this right, he retained his command. I agreed with this arrangement personally.
Q. Witness, we now approach the development of Germany up to the time of Austria. Did you ever doubt in anything that Hitler was aiming at war?
A. No. At the discussions which wore taking place he always stressed that he wanted to do everything in a peaceful way. Occasionally he also called the military leaders to tell them also that his armament for which he was keeping up the Wehrmacht had nothing to do with war and that he could not express his political wishes unless Germany was respected and that this could only be done by having a Wehrmacht. He must only have the Wehrmacht from a political aspect. That Was one point of his discussion. The other one was for the Wehrmacht to be faithful toward him and to collaborate with his party, because in all these years rumors were current that the Wehrmacht wanted to make a putsch, which was not true.
In the case of Austria I did not have any doubts about it. If I may make a comparison before this Tribunal, Austria and Germany, like North and South America, belonged to each other for hundreds of years, then in 1866 there was a short war, and here in Europe we were not so intelligent; we had too much tradition and we had too many different opinions, and those two German parts, the North and the South, were fighting each other, just as happened in North and South America at that time. Those two parts did not find a way, because the monarchy in both countries did not allow that. Who was to reign, the Hapsburgs or the Hohenzollerns? When the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs were not there anymore, there was no reason at all that these two purely German parts should not join together again, and this wish was expressed by both of them mutually. That there were people in both countries interested in not to give in, was evident. Consequently I saw in Austria a natural procedure but the Republican leaders had the same as the Monarchy.
I did not consider the methods as beneficial. Hater on I heard that a quite incapable man represented the interests of the Party in Germany and Austria. When I saw this man later on, I had my first doubt about the personal judgment of Hitler.