That he started once but found it impossible be read. He said that five thousand pieces had been printed at the beginning but even years afterwards they had still been sitting in the bookshops 1717a and, apart from three, none had ever been sold.
But then, he said, somewhere, some bishop, had started fighting Rosenberg, and it was after that, that those five thousand books had been sold out after two days. I am only giving you a picture of what Hitler said at the time. At any rate, the bookshops now had it reprinted to the extent of fifty thousand. And now the church imposed some ban on this book-it may have been the Bishop of Fulda; it might have been quite a different one. But, anyway, fifty thousands were sold overnight; and now they had printed a few hundred thousand, and then the Pope had imposed his ban. And since that time they had been unable to print the book as quickly as they sold it. But, of course, I can't guarantee the truth of that story.
Q. Witness, when did Goering give you a state position after 1933 for the first time and on what occasion?
A. As early as 1932, during the summer, Goering told me that now a joint government was being formed with the German nationals, or even the German People's party, or who else was there, and that this could be expected for the subsequent day, and that he would now form an aviation ministry, and that he had chosen me as his State Secretary. I told him at the time, "well, let's wait and see." And then, with some friends of mine, I talked about it, with a friend on the Board of Directors, and actually the decision we reached was that I should turn down the offer. In fact, Goering never brought the subject up again because the formation of that government was not realized. On the 28th of January, in the evening, some of my gentlemen friends were there; ladies were visiting me at my house, when quite suddenly, without being announced or being invited, Goering turned up. He asked me to come outside into the other room for a moment where I could be alone with him. And he explained to me, "We have got there at last. During the following day the Government, together with German Nationals already formed. I am taking over the Air Ministry,and you will be my Secretary of State."
I told him that he had said that six months ago; that in that time I had discussed the matter with others, and that, really, it was my opinion that I was not the suitable person for this; to begin with, I liked it very much with the Lufthansa, and I could not think of a better position for a life's work.
1718 a And, secondly, I said I was the sort of nan who did not like to be connected with politics; and, after all, every State position was political.
After that, I suggested to him to choose the Materials Councillor at the head of the Aviation Department in the Ministry for Traffic, whose name was Ministerial Director Brandenburg who was an excellent wartime pilot from the first world war. But Goering turned him down, and said that he was out of the question for him.
I suggested Admiral Laas who was already working the Reich's Union of the Aircraft Industry; but Goering did not want him either. When he continued to insist, I asked him for time to think it over, and told him that I could not decide on the spur of the moment. He told me, all right, and would I be good enough to visit him at the Hotel Kaiserhof on Monday morning, the thirtieth, and communicate to him my final decision? He added that I could rest assured that he would not tolerate a refusal of mine and would not accept it. I laughed and said that, "That, after all, did depend on me, too." Still, that some evening, I had talked to my most intimate collaborator, Baron von Gablenz -- whom I have mentioned repeatedly -- and I also talked to a member of the Board of Directors of the Lufthansa, the president, Herr von Stauss, and a certain Dr. Weigelt who was at the head of a small working committee in our firm. Both gentlemen, incidentally being members of the board of directors of the Deutsche Bank, the German Bank. It was with these three that I went into consultation. Two of those gentlemen explained to me that in the interests of the German Lufthansa I would have to accept the offer. They said they could appreciate that I did not like the idea, but there was no other way since, otherwise Goering would take it out on the Lufthansa. One of these two directors stated that I ought not to go, in spite of this. We made an appointment to meet the following morning, Sunday, and called in several other gentlemen for consultation, and this did, in fact, take place. It was on that occasion that everyone, including the man who had contradicted the others the previous evening, had reached the conclusion that it was in the interests of the Lufthansa, too, that I should accept the position.
I should like to emphasize that my refusal had nothing whatever to do with any political aspect or any hostile feelings I might have nurtured as to Goering at the time. But that was merely a personal question regarding my own career, my life. I loved my work, and although I wasn't too old to reconvert my life, I could not imagine any details of any new position which could tempt me so much. External, outside honors of this type didn't mean anything to me.
So I myself decided that I would leave the matter to Hitler's final decision since I did not know whether Goering might not make a proposition on his own initiative. Thus, on Monday the 30th I went to the Hotel Kaiser Hof with Goering. It was approximately 11 or 12 o'clock. I visited Goering and was in a hurry. Together with him quite some time later -- the time I can't tell you exactly -- I went to Hitler. I think Hitler had just come back with his appointment from the Reich President.
When he saw me, he told me right away: "It's a good thing that you're here. Goering has already told me that you are going to be his state secretary." Whereupon, I told him, "Mr. Hitler, that hasn't been decided. I've just come to discuss this matter with you." He then said, "Look here, I've only known you for a short time, but you're a man who knows his business.
"We talked about it and came to the conclusion that we don't have a man in the Party who knows as much about aviation as you do. That's why we have chosen you. You've got to accept. This isn't a question of the Party calling you; it's a question of Germany. Germany wants you for that position." And so I accepted.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Bergold, will you have the witness explain what he means by saying that Hitler had just come back with his appointment?
DR. BERGOLD: This means that he came back, having been nominated Reich Chancellor by the Reich President von Hindenburg.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, all right.
Q. Witness, did you have any financial advantages from the acceptance of that office?
A. To the contrary, I did not. The Lufthansa brought me an income of more than 50,000 marks per annum; and as secretary of state, even later as colonel and general, I had an income of approximately 21,000 marks. I think once it had been 24,000; but in the emergence of regulations, something came about leading to the deduction of about 3,000 marks. I can't tell you for certain. At any rate, I've never received my salary myself. I've left it to my office; and they gave me what I need and then sent to my family what my wife needed. So there was a question of dividing the salary in part; but this wasn't a question which came into it at the time. This did not come into the decision for me to accept the position or not.
Q. Witness, did you at that time make any conditions to Hitler or Goering regarding the taking of that office?
A. Yes. I made the condition that I would remain on the board of directors of the German Lufthansa in the future even if I became an employee of the Reich when I became secretary of state. In fact, I did that with a particular intention. I had hoped that I would not be granted this condition and that I could consequently say, "Well, I'm awfully sorry but I can't come." But Hitler immediately complied with that condition, so subsequently in my honorary capacity, of course, I remained on the board of directors of the German Lufthansa.
Q. Did you make a condition to Goering, too?
A, Yes. I told Goering that there was a personal habit of Goering's which was the reason for me not to join them; but he had sworn to me that he was no longer indulging in that vice.
Q. Witness, what was your position in the Third Reich in 1933?
A. At that the, first of all, it wasn't called ministry. It was called the Reich Commissar's Office because normal measures for the formation of a ministry had to be considered both with the Reich President as well as the Reichstag. First of all, Goering was Reich Commissar and I was Deputy Reich Commissar for Aviation. I think it was in March that the Reich Ministry was formed, and at that moment I became state secretary.
Q. What were your tasks as secretary of state?
A. In such a ministry the state secretary had two deputies for the minister; that is to say, since originally each ministry had only one state secretary, he had jurisdiction of everything as a Number 2. It is for that reason that he signed his letters "I.V.", "In Vertretung", or as deputy of the ministry, but others could only sign "I.A.", on behalf of or by order of the minister.
Now, the question was which pert of the business would the minister deal with himself and which would be handled through the state secretary. Since Goering was simultaneously Minister for the Interior in Prussia and since it was this task that interested him and occupied him most, he could hardly ever be seen in our office. But particularly at a later stage he was at the head since he defined the aims of our work. I considered myself as his executive organ for the carrying out of such work. For the efforts during the initial period the organization was on civilian lines. It was only later when rearmament began that it was completely militarized; and the civilian apparatus then only existed in one of the departments, the department LD. Then all other sources were militarized.
There was a command department which later on called itself general staff; and there was a technical department which was then headed by a soldier, having previously been headed by a civilian. I've already mentioned the department for aviation. Then there was an administrative department which dealt with all questions of clothing, billeting, and food and such like; in other words, the budget, financial question. Then in addition to that there was a personnel department, which dealt with personnel questions. This was the organization, of course, after the militarization, such as developed gradually on the military side.
Q. When did this occur, approximately?
A. Rearmament began at the beginning of 1935, and it was then that the matter was developed in such a manner.
Q. So that until then it had been civilian?
A. Yes, but on the other hand we did have a few officers who had retired, however, whom we had taken over and who were responsible for administrative questions for which we needed an expert whom we didn't have. This, incidentally, was later Field Marshal Kesselring, who was considered an administrative expert at the time he retired joined us.
Q. When did you join the Party?
A. In the Spring, I think; in May 1933 I put my name down.
Q. For what reason?
A. It was suggested to me that since I was carrying out state functions on a high level and since Goering was an important member of the Party I too should join the Party.
Q. Did you go through the usual education for the Party?
A. No. Pretty quickly and outside normal channels I was given my membership. I've never joined such an educational meeting or whatever they had of the Party.
Q. When did you once again become a soldier?
A. In September 1933. It was at that time that the Reich President promoted me colonel.
Q. Why was this done? Was it done for the purpose of rearmament or why?
A. In the aviational field the anti-aircraft artillery had already been handed over. This had become a part of the troops. Since I was the superior of the man who was the inspector in our ministry, the Field Marshal Von Hindenburg, who always informed himself very accurately about such questions and took care of soldierly conduct in such a way, ordered that this was not possible and that Goering and I would have to be given military rank. At that time Goering was going to be major general, but he didn't agree to that and so they gave him the rank of a commanding general right away. That is to say, he was made a three star general from the American point of view. I became a colonel. Since there wasn't yet an air force, we both were given army uniforms.
Q. Witness, this anti-aircraft organization which existed in Germany, was that permissible at the time or was it in violation of the Versailles Treaty?
A. No, it was permissible. I think there were special agreements at Geneva which were extended to that extent. First of all, there was fortification and the aircraft artillery, but later on mobile and aircraft was also granted. I can't remember the details, you see, because this took place before my time.
Q. So that you want to assert that the fact that you became a soldier had nothing to do with the rearmament activities within your position as secretary of state?
A. No. Particularly as far as the anti-aircraft weapon was concerned, we had a peculiar picture. It appears that Hindenburg learned on some occasion. On the occasion of a journey by aircraft, when I was accompanied by the anti-aircraft inspector, he suddenly took him along. We wanted something quite different, but anyway he showed him such a fortification at the anti-aircraft battery and he asked me to take him around. I was to take the parade. I was in civilian clothes, wearing a gray hat. Now, from the German point of view, it is out of the question that I should appear in such raiment on such an occasion. I told the inspector that he could shoot me if he wanted to but I wouldn't do anything like that. So he in his turn communicated this fact to Blomberg, and Blomberg talked it over with Hindenburg. That's the way this happened.
Q. Witness, after you became a soldier, did you remain a member of the Party?
A. No. You couldn't when you were a soldier. Membership in the Party was in a suspended state, In other words, you were no longer an active member of the Party.
THE PRESIDENT: We shall stop at this point.
THE MARSHAL: This Tribunal will be in recess until 0930 hours tomorrow.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 12 March 1947 at 0930 hours.)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Erhard Milch, defendant, sitting at Nuernberg, Germany, on 12 March 1947, 0930. Justice Toms presiding.
THE MARSHAL: All persons in the courtroom please take your seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal No. II. Military Tribunal No. 2 is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the court.
BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q Witness, I shall continue the direct examination. Yesterday we stopped at the question whether after you had become again a soldier, you remained a member of the Nazi Party. We now slowly come to the main part, will you please explain to this Tribunal how it came about of the building up of the Luftwaffe and when this took place?
A In 1933 Hitler became Chancellor of the Reich. In Geneva at the League of Nations the disarmament conference took place. One of the rights of Germany existing in the Versailles Treaty decided that disarmament should be called for all countries. The conferences were taking place for several years so far as I recall. From all countries soldiers had been sent there, and it was not to be wondered at that they sawed off the branch that they were sitting on. I can recall that one of the prohibitions which, was announced there was the poison of the South American Indians, which was called Gurare. Hitler ordered his delegates into Geneva so far as I can remember in order to accelerate negotiations. He demanded either to have equal disarmament of all countries, or rearmament of Germany.
He said on that occasion that unless a decision was reached in a short time, he himself would continue rearmament. He suggested increasing the German armed forces to 200,000 men and limiting them to that figure, and he equally renounced bombing warfare for all countries. No decision was reached.
I believe that it was in the autumn of 1933 when Hitler announced that Germany would leave the League of Nations, would leave at least the Disarmament Conference, but simultaneously Germany left the League of Nations. I know that at that time Goering was very worried. He called us to him and described the situation not too optimistically. All I could reply was that up to that time no beginning of German rearmament in the air had been made, and that if the order to do so were to be given, it would take several months or years.
No order was given at the time. All that was ordered was an increase in the number of pilot training schools and an extension on industry. The orders which were now given to the industry concerned in particular the type of Junker 52, of which I said before that in 1932 the first type of aircraft of that sort reached the schools in that year. The Lufthansa was interested in that in order to increase its total number of aircraft with that very good model as quickly as possible.
This is how it happened that the Junkers firm was increased and extended. Heinkel was next. Heinkel at the time had usually foreign orders. Heinkel worked for several countries, and whey supplied small and medium size aircraft.
In 1935, in March, Hitler ordered officially that Germany should re-arm, and he claimed that Germany should have armed authority.
Q Just a minute, witness. Before you continue, I want to ask you again: Up to that point - that is in March 1935 - there was not even a secret rearmament was there?
A No, you could not call that rearmament. I said that the schools had been extended. I also reminded you that the industries had been extended. Models of new German aircraft were in the factories for military purposes which had been built on orders from abroad.
Q Will you please continue?
A From the spring of 1935 - that is to say, March - the rearmament became official. The first which was done was a fighter group, in Boeweritz from the 1726 A Squadron Richthofen, which had been newly founded.
They were equipped with a fairly old model, and the undercarriage could not even be retracted. Modern engines were not at their disposal, or to put it better, there was no military engine at all.
The road of rearmament was a slow one. In the coming years relatively little material was at our disposal. New aircraft had to be built, and perhaps there might have been preparations by comparing foreign models with them. Now, a definite number of fighter aircraft and bombers and reconnaissance aircraft were built.
I do not wish to go into the technical details of these types, for I don't think such questions are relevant here, but only in, perhaps, 1937 or 1938 - I do not recall the exact year - it was in 1937 - we had our first modern fighter aircraft, and a little later a medium size bomber aircraft which was roughly on the same technical level as Britain, France, and so on. The reconnaissance aircraft were not so interesting, but figures were very small, nor was there a real Luftwaffe in existence then.
The question how strong and how quickly rearmament should be effected was highly debatable within the Luftwaffe. Goering, I suppose because of his knowledge of Hitler's wishes, demanded great speed. My chiefs of departments, above all the chief of the leading office, the Fuehrungsamt, the Chief of Personnel, and I myself, opposed this, not because we did not wish to re-arm but because we wanted to have the rearmament effected in what we regarded as a reasonable and possible frame.
Of course, you could get large numbers of recruits or young pilots, and you could train them within one to two years as soldiers and pilots, but you could not in two years or five years or even in ten years create all the superior officers who had sufficient experience necessary to conduct a large branch of an armed force. That point was hotly debated in the later course of the peace years. On the one hand there were Hitler and Goering, and on the other hand were my experts and I. Our contradictions were not taken notice of as a principle.
This led me to make several attempts to be allowed to resign.
Q We shall come to that later, witness. Witness, please tell the Court briefly when the air armament was concluded, at least in Goering's opinion.
1727A We have heard your opinion.
A No final stage can ever be described, but when new squadrons had been installed - and we took the view that you can use them after a certain time, after a year or a year and a half - then the order was given to march. Well, anyway, no conclusion of the armament program was really reached; even in 1939, only a fraction of that was reached and effected which had been wished for from above, but with our best will, we could not have achieved more than we did.
Q It can be alleged, it can be opposed to your view, that in 1939 the German Luftwaffe, after the successes it had was superior to the air forces of the neighboring countries. These countries, in your opinion, had rearmed. Is it possible then to say that Germany had also rearmed sufficiently?
A The high level of armament as it was requested - I did not understand that at all, and therefore I opposed this, not only for the reasons which I explained before - that sufficient numbers of leaders should be trained - but there were other reasons as well. Perhaps I can go into that later on, but the air forces of the other countries were in 1939 perhaps - not in all countries, of course - were sufficiently strong. Nevertheless - and that I shall explain later on I considered the strength of the British Air Force, for instance, to be superior to ours, although I may not have shown proof of that in the first months of the war.
In France there was a crisis in production and development of the factories. They had been taken over by the state, and in the transition period they were exposed to the negative sides of the state taking over industry which they had not overcome.
A (continuing): The Polish air force was to a large extent dependent on the French air force and was affected by the crisis of French industry automatically.
Q Witness, when in 1937 and '38 the first drives of Hitler against the foreign countries took place, at that time was the Luftwaffe already sufficiently armed in order to be able to keep up a serious conflict?
A No, it was not. I explained that on frequent occasions, whenever I could see Goering, for instance, or Hitler, but Hitler said the war effort would be a military conflict. These things were purely political disputes.
Q Witness, was this rearmament of the Luftwaffe your task? Did your task of state secretary change, and in what manner did that change, if that did?
A State secretary in the Air Ministry was a purely formal appointment, as it was a ministry in contrast to army and navy. I may perhaps add it was a purely political matter when a cabinet was formed in 1933. That was the method how Hitler obtained a third member of his party, made a third member of his party a third member of the cabinet. Therefore, for the reason there was a minister, there had to be a state secretary. The functions of a state secretary in a civilian ministry I fulfilled only up to a point, and that only as long as 1937. My military position was always in the foreground as Goering did not concern himself with the troops at that time. It was my task, therefore, to inspect the troops, and that led to my being ordered to become an inspector general, and that position was my main sphere of task up to 1941, up to the end of 1941.
Q Witness, in this position as inspector general, you had to carry out the reconstruction of the Luftwaffe?
A No, you could not say that. As inspector general I had to inspect the troops. I was not the commander cf the troops. I was an independent official, who, on behalf of the Commander in Chief Goering, saw to it that the various units -- checked up on the fact that the various units were equipped with material, their billets, their food, and all such matters, that all these things were in order.
As state secretary, as it was a civilian appointment, I was only concerned with civil aviation, the so-called civilian air rights or air laws. These were the various permissions which you gave other nations to fly over your territory, and things like that. In the beginning weather forecasts were under that office, and that later on became also a military function. The state secretary, unlike other ministries, in that position he was not concerned with the budget. The most influential man for the budget was the Chief of the General Staff who from 1937 was no longer with me or under me, and whose requests, as long as they had been passed by Goering, decided how big the budget would be automatically.
Q. Witness, who then would decide on the establishment of the types of plans, of the courses, who would carry out this plan, and under whose authority were these plans?
A. Perhaps one should make here a difference between to carry out and to plan. The one is the planning office, that is to say, that office which creates the plans. That was the general staff. The approving position was Goering. The actual carrying out was in the hands of the various offices. Among others I, myself, was concerned with it. For instance, I was always in charge of administration. At that time that was the piece moving, the barracks and airfields, at that time food, clothes, and all the other things concerned with that administration. I was also always in charge of the training of the troops, of the pilots, etc., order in carrying out of these tasks concerned which was planned by the General Staff, all overseen by C. in C. Goering. All that was in my hands.
The Chief of Personnel was independent of me from 1937 onwards, was in charge of personnel lists. He decided how many officers there should be, what sort of training they should be given, and what positions they should take up, and in the higher positions Goering himself had to give his approval. From 1937 onwards the technical side had been removed from my command and was organized under a general Luftzeugmeister.
This G.L. was now in charge of the technical rearmament, again in accordance with the planning of the General Staff. I think that roughly is the answer to your question.
Q. Yes, that is sufficient. Witness, is it correct to say that in your capacity as inspector general you had to make trips abroad too, that is, you had to see to the care of the comradely relationship of the air forces of other countries?
A. Yes. I forgot to answer one point in your last question. You asked who was in charge of the troops. May I just repeat and make up for that? The troops were under the fleets, under the air fleets, under a Luftgau. When the organization was completed four air fleets were in existence, and roughly, according to the army, districts of the army. There was one Luftgau for each territory of the Luftwaffe. These commanders in chief of the Luftgau were the commanders of the troops and were immediately under C. in C. Goering.
Now, I come to your question of the visits. Perhaps I can look up a note to get hold of the dates. The visits which I made were only, some of them, made in my capacity as inspector general. Some of them were made for purely personal reasons, relations with people. For instance, the first visit which I made at the request of Van Zeeling, the Belgian Prime Minister, that must have been about 1936. I visit Belgium. The ambassador for Belgium in Berlin, Count Kerkhove, was a personal friend of mine. One day he asked me to go to Belgium with him; the Prime Minister VanZeeland would like to see me. I was very astonished at this idea and I asked him what the matter was. I then told him that I had to have the permission of my superior officers. I received it. This was an entirely private journey. The purpose of the trip, as I realized in Belgium, was that Van Zeeland wished to come to terms with Germany, not only formally but fullheartedly. Belgium, since the First World War, had a treaty with France and was under an obligation to come to France's aid militarily by agreement with France. Van Zeeland wished to renounce that treaty, and he wished to have the same terms between Belgium and France as between Belgium and Germany.
Belgium was also prepared in economic matters, which was a very urgent point for Germany at the time, to make concessions, far-reaching concessions. The visit started with a brief call on the king, who did not refer to the purpose of the visit. This was purely a courtesy call, but this visit gave support to my trip. I saw that the prime minister acted in accordance with his king. The plan as such, although I emphasized it several times that I am not a politician, that it was not my intention to interfere in foreign office matters, but here Von Neurath entirely agreed with my visit. He had not the bureaucratic mind. The plan impressed me. Rather, I saw the possibility to create friendly relations between Germany and Belgium, and via Belgium to France, an later on via France to England itself.
I was convinced that the ever-privileged policy of balance of power no longer applied since the first World War. The powers in Europe had been dislodged too much and joint friendship between France and Britain was definitely a British interest, in that sense.
When I returned I reported orally to Herr von Neurath who entirely agreed with that point of view. I also reported to Field Marshal von Blomberg, who, apart from Goering, was my military superior. He took the same line. I reported to Hitler and Goering. Both received my report but did not express their own opinion. To my question whether and what I could tell the Belgian Ambassador I was told that would have to be done through other channels, not through me. My orders had come to an end by giving this report. This was my first visit and that was entirely unofficial.
Then I went to Belgium in May 1937. At that time, as a Luftwaffe man officially I was received by the C in C of the Belgian Air Force, General Duvivier; also by the Minister of War and other officials. That was a very friendly visit which also led to very good personal relations between ourselves and their pilots.
I was particularly interested in Belgium because in the first World War Germany had marched through Belgium, had violated Belgian neutrality, and had to make up for this now. I believed that the views as expressed by Belgium an both occasions were aimed at finally burying the hatchet. I assumed that there was a direct connection between my Belgian visit and a visit by the French Ambassador Poncet who came to call on me in my office and extended an invitation by the French Government on the occasion of the International Exhibition. That visit took place from 4 to 9 October 1937 in Paris with the full approval of Goering and Hitler. The visit was most impressive since I believe since 1867 it was the first time that a German officer could pay an official friendly visit to France. The French told me with the greatest satisfaction that was the first the French Company of Honor had presented its arms since in 1867 the Prussian Crown Prince had visited Paris.
The French made great efforts to make the visit a success and I must say they succeeded all along the line. The main point was joint military inspections. Very cordial words were exchanged with the generals of the French Air Force.