Outgoing documents in connection with this matter and dealing with it in principle are to be written by an officer." So it's obviously highly secret. And with it is enclosed a Directive for the Unified Preparation for War of the Armed Forces to come into force on the 1st of August 1937. The directive enclosed with it is divided into Part 1, "General Guiding Principle"; Part 2, "Likely Warlike Eventualities"; Part 3, "Special Preparations". opening passages. The general position justifies the supposition that Germany need not consider an attack from any side.
It goes on--the second paragraph:
"The intention to unleash a European war is held just as little by Germany. Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a continuous preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces. To counter attacks at any time, and to enable the military exploitation of politically favorable opportunities should they occur." and I would particularly draw the Tribunal's attention to paragraph 2b:
"The further working on mobilization without public announcement in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to begin a war suddenly and by surprise both as regards strength and time."
On the next page, under paragraph 4:
"Special preparations are to be made for the following eventualities: Armed intervention against Austria; warlike entanglement with Red Spain." time that their actions against Austria and Czechoslovakia might well involve them in war, "England, Poland, Lithuania take part in a war against us." of that document: "Probable warlike eventualities - Concentrations.
"1. War on two fronts with focal point in the West.
"Suppositions. In the West France is the opponent. Belgium may side with France, either at once or later or not at all. It is also possible that France may violate Belgium's neutrality if the latter is neutral. She will certainly violate that of Luxembourg." and I particularly refer to the last paragraph on that page under the heading "Special Case - Extension Red-Green." It will be remembered that Red was Spain and Green was Czechoslovakia.
"The military political starting point used as a basis for concentration plans Red and Green can be aggravated if either England, Poland or Lithuania join on the side of our opponents. Thereupon our military position would be worsened to an unbearable, even hopeless, extent. The political leaders will therefore do everything to keep these countries neutral, above all England and Poland." the discussion. Before I leave that document, the date will be noted, June 1937, and it shows clearly that at that date, anyway, the Nazi Government appreciated the likelihood, if not the probability of fighting England and Poland and France, and were prepared to do so if they had to. On the 5th of November 1937, the Tribunal will remember that Hitler held his conference in the Reichschancellory, the minutes of which have been referred to as the Hoszbach notes. I will refer to one or two lines of that document for the attention of the Tribunal to what Hitler said in respect of England, Poland, and France. On page 1 of that Exhibit, the middle of the page :
"The Fuehrer then stated: 'The aim of German policy is the security and preservation of the nation and its propagation. This is consequently a problem of space:" "participation in world economy", and at the bottom of page 2 he said:
"The only way cut, and one which may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an endeavor which at all times has been the cause of the formation of states and movements of nations."
And at the end of that first paragraph, on page 3:
"The history of all tines, Roman Empire, British Empire, has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable. Neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner.
The attacker always comes up against the proprietor."
THE PRESIDENT: (interposing) It has been read already.
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: But my object was only to try to collect, so far as England and Poland were concerned, everything that has been given. If the Tribunal thought that it was unnecessary, I would welcome the opportunity ...
THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal would wish you not to read anything that has been read already.
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES : I would pass then to the next document in that part of the document book. I put that document in. It was referred to by the Attorney General in his address yesterday, and it shows that on the same day as the Hoszbach meeting was taking place a communique was being issued as a result of the Polish Ambassador's audience with Hitler, in which it was said in the course of the conversation, "It was confirmed that Polish-German relations should not meet with difficulty because of the Danzig question." That document is TC 73. It put it in as GB-27. On the 2nd of January ...
THE PRESIDENT: That hasn't been read before, has it?
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: It was read by the Attorney General in his opening.
THE PRESIDENT: In his opening? Very well.
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: On the 2nd of January 1938, some unknown person wrote a memorandum for the Fuehrer. This document was one of the seven foreign office documents of which a microfilm was captured by Allied troops when they came into Germany. has headed, "Very Confidential Personal Only", and is called "Deduction on the report, Germany Embassy, London, regarding the future form of Anglo-German relations: "With the realization that Germany will not tie herself to a status quo in Central Europe, and that sooner or later a military conflict in Europe is possible, the hope of an agreement will slowly disappear among Germaphile British politicians, insofar as they are not merely playing a part that has been given to them.
Thus the fateful question arises: Will Germany and England eventually be forced to drift into separate camps and will they march against each other one day? To answer this question, one must realize the following:
"Change of the status quo in the east in the Gentian sense can only be carried out by force. So long as France knows that England, which so to speak has taken on a guarantee to aid France against Germany, is on her side, France's fighting for her eastern allies is probable in any case, always possible, and thus with it war between Germany and England. This applies then even if England does not want war. England, believing she must attend her borders on the Rhine, would be dragged in automatically by France. In other words, peace or war between England and Germany rests solely in the hands of France, who could bring about such a war between Germany and England by war of a conflict between Germany and France. It follows therefore that war between Germany and England on account of France can be prevented only if France knows from the start that England's forces would not be sufficient to guarantee their common victory. Such a situation might force England, and thereby France, to accept a lot of things that a strong Anglo-France coalition would never tolerate.
"This position would arise for instance if England, through insufficient armament or as a result of threats to her empire by a superior coalition of powers, e.g. Germany, Italy, Japan, thereby tying down her military forces in other places, would not be able to assure France of sufficient support in Europe." ship between Italy and Japan, and I would pass from my quotation to the next page where the writer is summarizing his ideas.
Paragraph five: Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us.
"1. Outwardly, further understanding with England in regard to the protection of the interests of our friends.
2. Formation under great secrecy, but with whole-hearted tenacity of a coalition against England, that is to say, a tightening of our friend ship with Italy and Japan; also the winning over of all nations whose interests conform with ours directly or indirectly.
great powers towards this purpose. Only in this way can we confront England be it in a settlement or in war. England is going to be a hard, astute opponent in this game of diplomacy. in central Europe ( I am afraid the translation of this is not very good) The particular question whether, in the event of a war in central Europe France and thereby England would interfere, depends on the circumstances and the time at which such a war commences and ceases, and on military considerations which cannot be gone into here." fairly high level, because he concludes by saying, "I should like to give the Fuehrer some of these viewpoints verbally." That document is G.B.-28. Well, I am afraid the next two documents have gotten into your books in the wrong order. If you will refer to PS-2357--you will remember that the document to the Fuehrer, which I have just read, was dated the 2nd of January.
THE PRESIDENT: February, you said?
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon, February 1938. That is PS-2357, and will be G.B.-30. In that speech he said "In the fifth year following the first great foreign political agreement with the Reich, it fills us with sincere gratification to be able to state that in our relations with the state, with which we had had perhaps the greatest difference, not only has there been a 'detente,' but in the course of the years there has been a constant improvement in relations.
This good work, which was regarded with suspiciaon by so many at the time, has stood the test, and I may say that since the League of Nations finally gave up its continual attempts to unsettle Danzig and appointed a man of great personal attainments as the new commissioner, this most dangerous spot from the point of view of European peace has entirely lost its menacing character. The Polish State respects the national conditions in this state, and both the city of Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights. And so the way to an understanding has been successfully paved, an understanding which beginning with Danzig has today, in spite of the attempts of certain mischief-makers, succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into a sincere, friendly cooperation.
"To rely on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone unturned to save that ideal which provides the foundation for the task which is ahead of us -- peace." document books, the one before that, L-43, which will be G.B. 29. This is a document to which the Attorney General referred yesterday. It is dated the 2nd of May 1938, and is entitled, "Organizational Study 1950." It comes from the office of the Chief of the Organizational Staff of the General Staff of the Air Force, and its purpose is said to be: "The task is to search, within a framework of very broadly-conceived conditions, for the most suitable type of organization of the Air Force. The result gained is termed, "Distant Objective." From this shall be deduced the goal to be reached in the second phase of the setting-up process in 1942, this will be called, "Final Objective 1942." This in turn yields what is considered the most suitable proposal for the reorganization of the staffs of the Air Force Group Commands, Air Gaus, Air Divisions, etc."
various sections, and Section I is entitled, "Assumptions." Under the heading "Assumption I, frontier of Germany", see map, enclosure one. will be seen that on the 2nd of May, 1938, the Air Force was in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary, all coming within the boundaries of the Reich. The original map is here attached to this file and if the Tribunal will look at the original exhibit, it will be seen that this organizational study has been prepared with the greatest care and authority, with a mass of charts attached to the appendages. Tribunal's copy of the translation.
"Consideration of the principles of organization on the basis of the assumptions for war and peace made in Section 1:
"1. Attack Forces:
"Principal adversaries: England, France, and Russia." And it then goes on to show all the one hundred forty-four Geschwader employed against England, very much concentrated in the Western half of the Reich; that is to say, they must be deployed in such a way that they, by making full use of their range they can reach all English territory down to the last corner.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps it is involved in the map. I think you should refer to the organization of the Air Forces, with group commands at Warsaw and Koenigsberg.
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: I am much obliged. Under the paragraph "Assumption" double heading 2, "Organization of Air Force in peacetime," seven group commands: 1 Berlin 2 Brunswick, 3 Munich, 4 Vienna, 5 Budapest, 6 Warsaw, and 7 Koenigsberg."
THE PRESIDENT: Yes
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged. And lastly, in connection with that Document, on page four of the Tribunal's translation, the last paragraph:
"The more the Reich grows in area and the more the Air Force grows in strength, the more imperative it becomes, to have locally bound commands****" I only emphasize the opening, "The more the Reich grows in area, the mere Air Force grows in strength***"but I would say one word on that document. The original, I understand, is signed by an officer who is not at the top rank in the Air Force and I, therefore, don't want to over-emphasize the inferences that can be drawn from it, but it is admitted that it at least shows the lines upon which the General Staff of the Air Force were thinking at that time. Ribbentrop succeeded von Neurath as Foreign Minister. We had another document from that captured microfilm, which is dated the 26th of August, 1938, when Ribbentrop had become Foreign Minister, and it is addressed to him as "The Reich Minister, via the State Secretary." It is a comparatively short document and one that I will read the whole of.
"The most pressing problem of German policy, the Czech problem, might easily, but must not lead to a conflict with the Entente. (TC 76-GB 31). Neither France nor England are looking for trouble regarding Czechoslovakia. Both would perhaps leave Czechoslovakia to herself, is she should, without direct foreign interference and through internal signs of disintegration, due to her own faults, suffer the fate she deserves.
This process, however, would have to take place step by step and would have to lead to a loss of power in the remaining territory by means of a plebiscite and an annexion of territory.
"The Czech problem is not yet politically acute enough for any immediate action, which the Entente would watch inactively, and not even if this action should come quickly and surprisingly. Germany cannot fix any definite time and this fruit could be plucked without too great a risk. She can only prepare the desired developments."
I pass to the last paragraph on that page. I think I can leave out the intervening lines, paragraph five.
THE PRESIDENT: Should you not read the next paragraph "for this purpose".
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: "For this purpose the slogan emanating from England at present of the right for autonomy of the Sudetan - Germans, which we have intentionally not used up to now, is to be taken up gradually. The international conviction that the choice of nationality was being withheld from these Germans will do useful spadework, notwithstanding the fact that the chemical process of dissolution of the Czech form of states may or may not be finally speeded up by mechanical means as well. The fate of the actual body of Czechoslovakia, however, would not as yet be clearly decided by this: but would nevertheless be definitely sealed.
"This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia is to be recommended because of our relationship with Poland. It is unavoidable that the German departure from the problems of boundaries in the south east and their transfer to the east and north east must make the Poles sit up. The fact is**** -- I put in an "is" because I think it is obviously left out of the copy I have in front of me. -- "The fact is that after the liquidation of the Czech question, it will be generally assumed that Poland will be the next in turn.
"But the later this assumption sinks in in international politics as a firm factor, the better.
In this sense, however, it is important for the time being, to carry on the German policy, under the well known and proved slogans of 'the right to autonomy' and 'Racial unity'. Anything else might be interpreted as pure imperialism on our part and create the resistance to our plan by the Entente at an earlier date and more energetically, than our forces could stand up to." up to a Munich settlement. While at Munich, or rather while a day or two before the Munich agreement was signed, Herr Hitler made a speech. On the 26th September, he said: I think I just will read two lines.
"I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for Germany in Europe." And again, the last document in your book, which is another extract from that same speech, I will not read unless the Tribunal desire, because the Attorney General quoted it in his address yesterday. These two documents precede 28, which is already in as GB-2 and TC-29, which is the second extraction of that same speech, GB-32. has already been put in by my American colleagues. It is C-23, now US-49, and which appears before the TC-28 in your Document book. The particular passage of the Exhibit, to which I would refer, is a letter from Admiral Carl, which appears at the bottom of the second page. It is dated some time in September, with no precise date, and is entitled "Opinion on the 'Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England'."
"There is full agreement with the main theme of the study." Again, the Attorney General quoted the remainder of that letter yesterday, which the Tribunal will remember.
"If according to the Fuehrer's decision Germany is to acquire a position as a world power whe needs not only sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval communications and secure access to the ocean." That, then, was the position at the time of the Munich agreement in September 1938. The gains of Munich were not, of course, so great as the Nazi Government had hoped and had intended and as a result, they were not prepared straight away to start any further aggressive action against Poland or elsewhere but, we have heard this moraine, when Mr. Alderman dealt in his closing remarks, with the advantages that were gained by the seizure of Czechoslovakia, what Jodl and Hitler said on subsequent occasions that Czechoslovakia was only setting the stage for thie attack on Poland, it is, of course, obvious now that they intended and indeed had taken the decision to proceed against Poland so soon as Czechoslovakia had been entirely occupied.
We know now from what Hitler said in talking to his military commander: at a later date, the Tribunal will remember the speech where he said that from the first he never intended to abide by the Munich agreement but that he had to have the whole of Czechoslovakia. As a result, although not ready to proceed in full force against Poland, after September 1938, they did at once begin to approach the Poles on the question of Danzig until, as the Tribunal will see, the whole of Czechoslovakia had been taken in March; no pressure was put on but immediately after the Sudetan land had been occupied, preliminary steps were taken to stir up trouble with Poland, which would and was to eventually lead to their excuse or so-called justification for their attack on their country.
If the Tribunal would turn to part three:-
THE PRESIDENT: I think it is time to adjourn now until ten o'clock tomorrow morning.
(Whereupon, at 1700 hours the hearing of the Tribunal adjourned to reconvene the following day at 1000 hours.)
Military Tribunal, in the matter of: The
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has received an urgent request from the defendants' counsel that the trial should be adjourned at Christmas for a period of three weeks. The Tribunal is aware of the many interests which must be considered in a trial of this complexity and magnitude, and as the trial must inevitably last for a considerable time, the Tribunal considers that it is not only in the interest of the defendants and their counsel but of every one concerned in the trial that there should be a recess. On the whole it seems best to take that recess at Christmas rather than at a later date when the Prosecution's case has been completed. The Tribunal will therefore rise for the Christmas week and over the 1st of January, and will not sit after the session on Thursday, the 20th of December, and will sit again on Wednesday, the 2nd of January.
JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like, in justice to my staff, to note the American objection to the adjournment for the benefit of the defendants.
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: May it please the Tribunal, the Tribunal will return to Part 3 of that document book, in which I included the documents relating to the earlier discussions between the German and Polish governments on the question of Danzig. Those discussions, the Tribunal will remember, started almost immediately after the Munich crisis in September 1938, and started, in the first place, as cautious and friendly discussions until the remainder of Czechoslovakia had finally been seized in March of the following year. No, 44. This document, taken from the Official Polish White Book, which I put in as Exhibit GB 27, gives an account of a luncheon which took place at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, on the 25 October, where Ribbentrop saw M. Lipski, the Polish ambassador to Germany:
"In a conversation on 24 October, over a luncheon at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, at which M. Hewel was present, M. von Ribbentrop put forward a proposal for a general settlement of issues (Gesamtloesung) between Poland and Germany. This included the reunion of Danzig with the Reich, while Poland would be assured the retention of railway and economic facilities there. Poland would agree to the building of an extra-territorial motor road and railway line across Pomorze. In exchange M. von Ribbentrop mentioned the possibility of an extension of the Polish-German Agreement by twenty-five years and a guarantee of Polish-German frontiers."
I don't think I need read the following lines. I go to the last but one paragraph:
"Finally, I said that I wished to warn M. von Ribbentrop that I could see no possibility of an agreement involving the reunion of the Free City with the Reich. I concluded by promising to communicate the substance of this conversation to you." the case and that is that the whole question of Danzig was, as indeed Hitler himself said, no question at all. Danzig was raised simply as an excuse, a so-called justification, not for the seizure of Danzig but for the invasion and seizure of the whole of Poland, and we see it starting now. As we progress with the story it will become ever more apparent that that is what the Nazi Government were really aiming at, only providing themselves with some kind of crisis which would afford some kind of justification for walking into the rest of Poland.
I turn to the next document. It is again a document taken from the Polish White Book, TC 73, No. 45, which will be GB 28. TC 73 will be the Polish White Book, which I shall put in later. That document sets out the instructions that Mr. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, gave to Mr. Lipski to hand to the German Government in reply to the suggestions put forward by Ribbentrop at Berchtesgaden on the 24 October. I need not read the first page. The history of Polish-German relationship is set out, and the needs of Poland in respect to Danzig are emphasized. I turn to the second page of that exhibit, to Paragraph 6:
"In the circumstances, in the understanding of the Polish Government the Danzig question is governed by two factors: the right of the German population of the city and the surrounding villages to freedom of life and development; and the fact that in all matters appertaining to the Free City as a port it is connected with Poland. Apart from the national character of the majority of the population, everything in Danzig is definitely bound up with Poland." pass to Paragraph 7:
"Taking all the foregoing factors into consideration, and desiring to achieve the stabilization of relations by way of a friendly understanding with the Government of the German Reich, the Polish Government proposes the replacement of the League of Nations guarantee and its prerogatives by a bi-lateral Polish-German Agreement. This Agreement should guarantee the existence of the Free City of Danzig so as to assure freedom of national and cultural life to its German Majority, and also should guarantee all Polish rights. Notwithstanding the complications involved in such a system, the Polish Government must state that any other solution, and in particular any attempt to incorporate the Free City into the Reich, must inevitably lead to a conflict. This would not only take the form of local difficulties, but also would suspend all possibility of Polish-German understanding in all its aspects."
And then finally in Paragraph 8:
"In face of the weight and cogency of these questions, I am ready to have final conversations personally with the governing circles of the Reich. I deem it necessary, however, that you should first present the principles to which we adhere, so that my eventual contact should not end in a breakdown, which would be dangerous for the future." the German point of view. They had put forward a proposal, the return of the City of Danzig to the Reich, which they might well have known would have been unacceptable. It was unacceptable and the Polish Government had warned the Nazi Government that it would be. They had offered to enter into negotiations, but they hadn't agreed, which is exactly what the German Government tad hoped.
They hadn't agreed to the return of Danzig to the Reich. The first stage in producing the crisis had been accomplished. the Polish Government had offered to enter into discussions with the German Government, we find another top secret order issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, signed by the defendant Keitel. It goes to the OKH, OKM, and OKW and it is headed "First Supplement to Instruction dated 21 October 1938.
"The Fuehrer has ordered:
"Apart from the three contingencies mentioned in the instructions of 21 October 1938, preparations are also to be made to enable the Free State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops by surprise.
"The preparations will be made on the following basis:
"Condition is quasi-revolutionary occupation of Danzig, exploiting a politically favorable situation, not a war against Poland." been seized and therefore they were not ready to go to war with Poland. That document does show how the German Government answered the proposal to enter into discussions. That is C 137 and will become GB 33.
On the 5 January 1939 Mr. Beck had a conversation with Hitler. It is unnecessary to read the first part of that document, which is the next in the Tribunal's book, TC 73, No. 48, which will become GB 34. In the first part of that conversation, of which that document is an account, Hitler offers to answer any questions. He says he has always followed the policy laid down by the 1934 agreement. He discusses the question of Danzig and emphasizes that in the German view it must sooner or later return to Germany. I quote the last but one paragraph on that page:
"Mr. Beck replied that the Danzig question was a very difficult problem. He added that in the Chancellor's suggestion he did not see any equivalent for Poland, and that the whole of Polish opinion, and not only people thinking politically but the widest spheres of Polish society, were particularly sensitive on this matter.
"In answer to this the Chancellor stated that to solve this problem it would be necessary to try to find something quite new, some new form, for which he used the term 'Korperschaft,' which on the one hand would safeguard the interests of the German population, and on the other the Polish interests. In addition, the Chancellor declared that the Minister could be quite at ease, there would be no faits accomplis in Danzig and nothing would be done to render difficult the situation of the Polish Government." on the 24 November, orders had already been received or issued for preparations to be made for the occupation of Danzig by surprise, yet here he is assuring the Polish Foreign Minister that there is to be no fait accompli and that he is to be quite at his ease.
GB-35, conversation between Mr. Beck and Ribbentrop on the day after the one which I have just referred between Beck and Hitler.
"Mr. Beck asked -
THE PRESIDENT: Did you draw attention to the fact that the last conversation took place in the presence of the Defendant Ribbentrop?
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very obliged to you. No, I didn't. As I say, it was on the next day, the 6th of January. The date in actual fact does not appear on the copy I have got in my book. It does appear in the White Book itself.
"Mr. Beck asked M. Von Ribbentrop to inform the Chancellor that whereas previously, after all his conversations and contacts with German statesmen, he had been feeling optimistic, today for the first time he was in a pessimistic mood. Particularly in regard to the Danzig question, as it had been raised by the Chancellor, he saw no possibility whatever of agreement."
I emphasize this last paragraph:
"In answer M. Von Ribbentrop once more emphasized that Germany was not seeking any violent solution. The basis of their policy towards Poland was still a desire for the further building up of friendly relations. It was necessary to seek such a method of clearing away the difficulties as would respect the rights and interests of the two parties concerned." expression of good faith. On the 25th of the same month, January 1939, some fortnight or three weeks later he was in Warsaw and made another speech, of which an extract is set out in PS-2530, which will become GB-36:
"In accordance with the resolute will of the German National Leader, the continual progress and consolidation of friendly relations between Germany and Poland, based upon the existing agreement between us, constitute an essential element in German foreign policy. The political foresight, and the principles worthy of true statesmanship, which induced both sides to take the momentous decision of 1934, provide a gurantee that all other problems arising in the course of the future evolution of events will also be solved in the same spirit, with due regard to the respect and understanding of the rightful interests of both sides.
Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the future will full confidence in the solid basis of their mutual relations." the Poles were beginning to sit up, as your Lordship will remember the expression used in the note to the Fuehrer "sit up". And I assume they would be the next in turn, because on the 30th of January, Hitler again spoke in the Reichstag, 30th of January 1939, and gave further assurances of their good faith. his address, and therefore, I only put it in now as an exhibit. That is TC-73, Number 57, which will become GB-37. of Czechoslovakia and the setting up of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. document book, I had intended to refer to three documents where Hitler and Jodl were setting out the advantages gained through the seizure of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. But the Tribunal will remember that Mr. Alderman in his closing remarks yesterday morning dealt very fully with that matter, showing what advantages they did gain by that seizure and showing on the chart that he had on the wall, the immense strengthening of the German position against Poland. Therefore, I leave that matter. The documents are already in evidence, and if the Tribunal should wish to refer to them they are found in their correct order in the story in the document book. their marching into the rest of Czechoslovakia the heat was beginning to be turned on against Poland. way through the document book--it follows after Jodl's lecture, which is a long document--TC-73, Number 61. It is headed "Official documents concerning Polish-German Relations."
THE PRESIDENT: Does it come after TC-72?
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: It comes after L-172.
THE PRESIDENT: Page 1397, I am told it is.
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes, that's correct. It doesn't actually represent the page number, but that is at the bottom of the page. I am sorry, these are not numbered.
THE PRESIDENT: I have got it now.
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: This will be GB-38.
On the 21st of March Mr. Beck again saw Ribbentrop, and the nature of the conversation was generally very much sharper than that that had been held a little time back at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden.
"I saw M. Von Ribbentrop today. He began by saying he had asked me to call on him in order to discuss Polish-German relations in their entirety.