In this sense, however, it is important for the time being, to carry on the German policy, under the well known and proved slogans of 'the right to autonomy' and 'Racial unity'. Anything else might be interpreted as pure imperialism on our part and create the resistance to our plan by the Entente at an earlier date and more energetically, than our forces could stand up to." up to a Munich settlement. While at Munich, or rather while a day or two before the Munich agreement was signed, Herr Hitler made a speech. On the 26th September, he said: I think I just will read two lines.
"I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for Germany in Europe." And again, the last document in your book, which is another extract from that same speech, I will not read unless the Tribunal desire, because the Attorney General quoted it in his address yesterday. These two documents precede 28, which is already in as GB-2 and TC-29, which is the second extraction of that same speech, GB-32. has already been put in by my American colleagues. It is C-23, now US-49, and which appears before the TC-28 in your Document book. The particular passage of the Exhibit, to which I would refer, is a letter from Admiral Carl, which appears at the bottom of the second page. It is dated some time in September, with no precise date, and is entitled "Opinion on the 'Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England'."
"There is full agreement with the main theme of the study." Again, the Attorney General quoted the remainder of that letter yesterday, which the Tribunal will remember.
"If according to the Fuehrer's decision Germany is to acquire a position as a world power whe needs not only sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval communications and secure access to the ocean." That, then, was the position at the time of the Munich agreement in September 1938. The gains of Munich were not, of course, so great as the Nazi Government had hoped and had intended and as a result, they were not prepared straight away to start any further aggressive action against Poland or elsewhere but, we have heard this moraine, when Mr. Alderman dealt in his closing remarks, with the advantages that were gained by the seizure of Czechoslovakia, what Jodl and Hitler said on subsequent occasions that Czechoslovakia was only setting the stage for thie attack on Poland, it is, of course, obvious now that they intended and indeed had taken the decision to proceed against Poland so soon as Czechoslovakia had been entirely occupied.
We know now from what Hitler said in talking to his military commander: at a later date, the Tribunal will remember the speech where he said that from the first he never intended to abide by the Munich agreement but that he had to have the whole of Czechoslovakia. As a result, although not ready to proceed in full force against Poland, after September 1938, they did at once begin to approach the Poles on the question of Danzig until, as the Tribunal will see, the whole of Czechoslovakia had been taken in March; no pressure was put on but immediately after the Sudetan land had been occupied, preliminary steps were taken to stir up trouble with Poland, which would and was to eventually lead to their excuse or so-called justification for their attack on their country.
If the Tribunal would turn to part three:-
THE PRESIDENT: I think it is time to adjourn now until ten o'clock tomorrow morning.
(Whereupon, at 1700 hours the hearing of the Tribunal adjourned to reconvene the following day at 1000 hours.)
Military Tribunal, in the matter of: The
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has received an urgent request from the defendants' counsel that the trial should be adjourned at Christmas for a period of three weeks. The Tribunal is aware of the many interests which must be considered in a trial of this complexity and magnitude, and as the trial must inevitably last for a considerable time, the Tribunal considers that it is not only in the interest of the defendants and their counsel but of every one concerned in the trial that there should be a recess. On the whole it seems best to take that recess at Christmas rather than at a later date when the Prosecution's case has been completed. The Tribunal will therefore rise for the Christmas week and over the 1st of January, and will not sit after the session on Thursday, the 20th of December, and will sit again on Wednesday, the 2nd of January.
JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like, in justice to my staff, to note the American objection to the adjournment for the benefit of the defendants.
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: May it please the Tribunal, the Tribunal will return to Part 3 of that document book, in which I included the documents relating to the earlier discussions between the German and Polish governments on the question of Danzig. Those discussions, the Tribunal will remember, started almost immediately after the Munich crisis in September 1938, and started, in the first place, as cautious and friendly discussions until the remainder of Czechoslovakia had finally been seized in March of the following year. No, 44. This document, taken from the Official Polish White Book, which I put in as Exhibit GB 27, gives an account of a luncheon which took place at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, on the 25 October, where Ribbentrop saw M. Lipski, the Polish ambassador to Germany:
"In a conversation on 24 October, over a luncheon at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, at which M. Hewel was present, M. von Ribbentrop put forward a proposal for a general settlement of issues (Gesamtloesung) between Poland and Germany. This included the reunion of Danzig with the Reich, while Poland would be assured the retention of railway and economic facilities there. Poland would agree to the building of an extra-territorial motor road and railway line across Pomorze. In exchange M. von Ribbentrop mentioned the possibility of an extension of the Polish-German Agreement by twenty-five years and a guarantee of Polish-German frontiers."
I don't think I need read the following lines. I go to the last but one paragraph:
"Finally, I said that I wished to warn M. von Ribbentrop that I could see no possibility of an agreement involving the reunion of the Free City with the Reich. I concluded by promising to communicate the substance of this conversation to you." the case and that is that the whole question of Danzig was, as indeed Hitler himself said, no question at all. Danzig was raised simply as an excuse, a so-called justification, not for the seizure of Danzig but for the invasion and seizure of the whole of Poland, and we see it starting now. As we progress with the story it will become ever more apparent that that is what the Nazi Government were really aiming at, only providing themselves with some kind of crisis which would afford some kind of justification for walking into the rest of Poland.
I turn to the next document. It is again a document taken from the Polish White Book, TC 73, No. 45, which will be GB 28. TC 73 will be the Polish White Book, which I shall put in later. That document sets out the instructions that Mr. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, gave to Mr. Lipski to hand to the German Government in reply to the suggestions put forward by Ribbentrop at Berchtesgaden on the 24 October. I need not read the first page. The history of Polish-German relationship is set out, and the needs of Poland in respect to Danzig are emphasized. I turn to the second page of that exhibit, to Paragraph 6:
"In the circumstances, in the understanding of the Polish Government the Danzig question is governed by two factors: the right of the German population of the city and the surrounding villages to freedom of life and development; and the fact that in all matters appertaining to the Free City as a port it is connected with Poland. Apart from the national character of the majority of the population, everything in Danzig is definitely bound up with Poland." pass to Paragraph 7:
"Taking all the foregoing factors into consideration, and desiring to achieve the stabilization of relations by way of a friendly understanding with the Government of the German Reich, the Polish Government proposes the replacement of the League of Nations guarantee and its prerogatives by a bi-lateral Polish-German Agreement. This Agreement should guarantee the existence of the Free City of Danzig so as to assure freedom of national and cultural life to its German Majority, and also should guarantee all Polish rights. Notwithstanding the complications involved in such a system, the Polish Government must state that any other solution, and in particular any attempt to incorporate the Free City into the Reich, must inevitably lead to a conflict. This would not only take the form of local difficulties, but also would suspend all possibility of Polish-German understanding in all its aspects."
And then finally in Paragraph 8:
"In face of the weight and cogency of these questions, I am ready to have final conversations personally with the governing circles of the Reich. I deem it necessary, however, that you should first present the principles to which we adhere, so that my eventual contact should not end in a breakdown, which would be dangerous for the future." the German point of view. They had put forward a proposal, the return of the City of Danzig to the Reich, which they might well have known would have been unacceptable. It was unacceptable and the Polish Government had warned the Nazi Government that it would be. They had offered to enter into negotiations, but they hadn't agreed, which is exactly what the German Government tad hoped.
They hadn't agreed to the return of Danzig to the Reich. The first stage in producing the crisis had been accomplished. the Polish Government had offered to enter into discussions with the German Government, we find another top secret order issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, signed by the defendant Keitel. It goes to the OKH, OKM, and OKW and it is headed "First Supplement to Instruction dated 21 October 1938.
"The Fuehrer has ordered:
"Apart from the three contingencies mentioned in the instructions of 21 October 1938, preparations are also to be made to enable the Free State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops by surprise.
"The preparations will be made on the following basis:
"Condition is quasi-revolutionary occupation of Danzig, exploiting a politically favorable situation, not a war against Poland." been seized and therefore they were not ready to go to war with Poland. That document does show how the German Government answered the proposal to enter into discussions. That is C 137 and will become GB 33.
On the 5 January 1939 Mr. Beck had a conversation with Hitler. It is unnecessary to read the first part of that document, which is the next in the Tribunal's book, TC 73, No. 48, which will become GB 34. In the first part of that conversation, of which that document is an account, Hitler offers to answer any questions. He says he has always followed the policy laid down by the 1934 agreement. He discusses the question of Danzig and emphasizes that in the German view it must sooner or later return to Germany. I quote the last but one paragraph on that page:
"Mr. Beck replied that the Danzig question was a very difficult problem. He added that in the Chancellor's suggestion he did not see any equivalent for Poland, and that the whole of Polish opinion, and not only people thinking politically but the widest spheres of Polish society, were particularly sensitive on this matter.
"In answer to this the Chancellor stated that to solve this problem it would be necessary to try to find something quite new, some new form, for which he used the term 'Korperschaft,' which on the one hand would safeguard the interests of the German population, and on the other the Polish interests. In addition, the Chancellor declared that the Minister could be quite at ease, there would be no faits accomplis in Danzig and nothing would be done to render difficult the situation of the Polish Government." on the 24 November, orders had already been received or issued for preparations to be made for the occupation of Danzig by surprise, yet here he is assuring the Polish Foreign Minister that there is to be no fait accompli and that he is to be quite at his ease.
GB-35, conversation between Mr. Beck and Ribbentrop on the day after the one which I have just referred between Beck and Hitler.
"Mr. Beck asked -
THE PRESIDENT: Did you draw attention to the fact that the last conversation took place in the presence of the Defendant Ribbentrop?
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very obliged to you. No, I didn't. As I say, it was on the next day, the 6th of January. The date in actual fact does not appear on the copy I have got in my book. It does appear in the White Book itself.
"Mr. Beck asked M. Von Ribbentrop to inform the Chancellor that whereas previously, after all his conversations and contacts with German statesmen, he had been feeling optimistic, today for the first time he was in a pessimistic mood. Particularly in regard to the Danzig question, as it had been raised by the Chancellor, he saw no possibility whatever of agreement."
I emphasize this last paragraph:
"In answer M. Von Ribbentrop once more emphasized that Germany was not seeking any violent solution. The basis of their policy towards Poland was still a desire for the further building up of friendly relations. It was necessary to seek such a method of clearing away the difficulties as would respect the rights and interests of the two parties concerned." expression of good faith. On the 25th of the same month, January 1939, some fortnight or three weeks later he was in Warsaw and made another speech, of which an extract is set out in PS-2530, which will become GB-36:
"In accordance with the resolute will of the German National Leader, the continual progress and consolidation of friendly relations between Germany and Poland, based upon the existing agreement between us, constitute an essential element in German foreign policy. The political foresight, and the principles worthy of true statesmanship, which induced both sides to take the momentous decision of 1934, provide a gurantee that all other problems arising in the course of the future evolution of events will also be solved in the same spirit, with due regard to the respect and understanding of the rightful interests of both sides.
Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the future will full confidence in the solid basis of their mutual relations." the Poles were beginning to sit up, as your Lordship will remember the expression used in the note to the Fuehrer "sit up". And I assume they would be the next in turn, because on the 30th of January, Hitler again spoke in the Reichstag, 30th of January 1939, and gave further assurances of their good faith. his address, and therefore, I only put it in now as an exhibit. That is TC-73, Number 57, which will become GB-37. of Czechoslovakia and the setting up of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. document book, I had intended to refer to three documents where Hitler and Jodl were setting out the advantages gained through the seizure of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. But the Tribunal will remember that Mr. Alderman in his closing remarks yesterday morning dealt very fully with that matter, showing what advantages they did gain by that seizure and showing on the chart that he had on the wall, the immense strengthening of the German position against Poland. Therefore, I leave that matter. The documents are already in evidence, and if the Tribunal should wish to refer to them they are found in their correct order in the story in the document book. their marching into the rest of Czechoslovakia the heat was beginning to be turned on against Poland. way through the document book--it follows after Jodl's lecture, which is a long document--TC-73, Number 61. It is headed "Official documents concerning Polish-German Relations."
THE PRESIDENT: Does it come after TC-72?
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: It comes after L-172.
THE PRESIDENT: Page 1397, I am told it is.
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes, that's correct. It doesn't actually represent the page number, but that is at the bottom of the page. I am sorry, these are not numbered.
THE PRESIDENT: I have got it now.
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: This will be GB-38.
On the 21st of March Mr. Beck again saw Ribbentrop, and the nature of the conversation was generally very much sharper than that that had been held a little time back at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden.
"I saw M. Von Ribbentrop today. He began by saying he had asked me to call on him in order to discuss Polish-German relations in their entirety.
"He complained about our Press, and the Warsaw students' demonstrations during Count Ciano's visit." I think I can go straight on to the larger paragraph, which commences with "Further."
"Further, M. von Ribbentrop referred to the conversation at Berchtesgaden between you and the Chancellor, in which Hitler put forward the idea of guaranteeing Poland's frontiers in exchange for a motor road and the incorporation of Danzig in the Reich. He said that there had been further conversations between you and him in Warsaw" -that is, between him, of course, and Mr. Beck.
"He said that there had been further conversations between you and him in Warsaw on the subject, and that you had pointed out the great difficulties in the way of accepting these suggestions. He gave me to understand that all this had made an unfavourable impression on the Chancellor, since so far he had received no positive reaction whatever on our part to his suggestions. M. von Ribbentrop had had a talk with the Chancellor only yesterday. He stated that the Chancellor was still in favour of good relations with Poland, and had expressed a desire to have a thorough conversation with you on the subject of our mutual relations. M. von Ribbentrop indicated that he was under the impression that difficulties arising between us were also due to some misunderstanding of the Reich's real aims. The problem needed to be considered on a higher plane. In his opinion our two States were dependent on each other." Briefly, Ribbentrop emphasizes the German argument as to why Dating should return to the Reich, and I turn to the first paragraph on the following page.
"I stated" -- that is Mr. Lipski -- "I stated that now, during the settlement of the Czechoslovakian question, there was no understanding whatever between us.
The Czech issue was already hard enough for the Polish public to swallow, for, despite our disputes over the Czechs -
THE PRESIDENT: "With the Czechs."
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon.
"-- with the Czechs, they were after all a Slav people. But in regard to Slovakia the position was far worse. I emphasized our community of race, language and religion, and mentioned the help we had given in their achievement of independence. I pointed out our long frontier with Slovakia. I indicated that the Polish man in the street could not understand why the Reich had assumed the protection of Slovakia, that protection being directed against Poland. I said emphatically that this question was a serious blow to our relations.
"Ribbentrop reflected a moment, and then answered that this could be discussed.
"I promised to refer to you the suggestion of a conversation between you and the Chancellor. Ribbentrop remarked that I might go to Warsaw during the next few days to talk over this matter. He advised that the talk should not be delayed, lest the Chancellor should come to the conclusion that Poland was rejecting all his offers.
"Finally, I asked whether he could tell me anything about his conversation with the Foreign Minister of Lithuania.
"Ribbentrop answered vaguely that he had seen Mr. Urbszys on the latter's return from Rome, and they had discussed the Memel question, which called for a solution."
That conversation took place on the 21st of March. It wasn't very long before the world knew what the solution to Memel was. On the next day German armed forces marched in. is unnecessary -- turn over to TC-72, Number 17, which becomes GB-39. anxiety was growing both in the Government of Great Britain and the Polish Government, and the two Governments therefore had been undertaking conversations between each other.
On the 31st March, the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, spoke in the House of Commons, and he explained that as a result of the conversations that had been taking place between the British and Polish Governments -- I quote from the last but one paragraph of his statement:
"As the House is aware, certain consultations are now proceeding with other Governments. In order to make perfectly clear the position of His Majesty's Government in the meantime before those consultations are concluded, I now have to inform the House that during that period, in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to this effect.
"I may add that the French Government have authorised me to make it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as do His Majesty's Government!" Anglo-Polish Government, which repeated the assurance the Prime Minister had given a week before, and in which Poland assumed Great Britain of her support should she, Great Britain, be attacked.
I needn't read it all. Infect, I needn't read any of it. It is TC-72, Number 18. I put it in as GB-40. were feeling at that time appears to have been well justified. During the same week, on the 3rd of April, the Tribunal will see in the next document an order signed by Keitel. It emanated from the High Command of the Armed Forces. It is dated Berlin, 3rd April 1939. The subject is "Directive for the Armed Forces 1939/40.
"Directive for the uniform preparation of war by the Armed Forces for 1939/40 is being reissued.
"Part I (Frontier Defence) and Part III (Danzig) will be issued in the middle of April. Their basic principles remain unchanged.
"Part II 'Fall Weiss'" -- which is the code name for the operation against Poland -- "Part II, 'Fall Weiss', is attached herewith. The signature of the Fuehrer will be appended later.
"The Fuehrer has added the following Directives to 'Fall Weiss':
"1. Preparations must be made in such a way that the operations can be carried out at any time from 1st September 1939 onwards." This is in April, the beginning of April.
"2. The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to draw up a precise time-table for 'Fall Weiss' and to arrange by conferences the synchronised timings between the three branches of the armed forces.
"3. The plan of the branches of the Armed Forces and the details for the time-table must be submitted to the OKW by the 1st of May, 1939." the heading "Distribution", went to the OKH, OKM, OKW.
THE PRESIDENT: Are those words at the top part of the document, or are they just notes?
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: They are part of the document.
THE PRESIDENT: "Directives from Hitler and Keitel, Preparing for War."
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon; no, they are not. The document starts from under the -words "Translation of document signed by Keitel."
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: The first words being "Top Secret." "Distribution", it will be seen that there follows a translation of another document, dated 11th of April, and that document is signed by Hitler.
"I shall lay down in a later directive the future tasks of the Armed Forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with these for the conduct of the war." No question about war, "conduct of the war."
"Until that directive comes into force, the Armed Forces must be prepared for the following eventualities:
"I. Safeguarding the frontiers of the German Reich, and protection against surprise air attacks.
"II. 'Fall Weiss'.
"III. The annexation of Danzig.
"Annexe IV contains regulations for the exercise of military authority in East Prussia in the event of a warlike development." Annexe I is set out, which is the safeguarding of the frontiers of the German Reich, and I would quote from Paragraph (2) under "Special Orders."
"Legal Basis.
"It should be anticipated that a state of Defence or State of War, as defined in the Reichsdefense law of the 4th of September 1938, will not be declared. All measures and demands necessary for carrying out a mobilization are to be based on the laws valid in peacetime."
My Lord, that document is C-120. It becomes GB-41. It contains some other later documents to which I shall refer back in chronological order.
by the Anglo-Polish communique of the 6th of April, was seized upon by the Nazi Government to urge on, as it were, the crisis which they were developing in Danzig between themselves and Poland. they alleged that the Anglo-Polish declaration was incompatible with the 1934 Agreement between Poland and Germany, and that as a result of entering into or by reason of entering into that Agreement, Poland had unilaterally renounced the 1934 agreement. that document:
"The German Government have taken note of the Polish-
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give us the reference to it?
SIR GRIFFITH-JONES: It is TC-72, Number 14. It becomes GB-42. complete dishonesty of the whole document on the face of it.
"The German Government have taken note of the Polish-British declaration regarding the progress and aims of the negotiations recently conducted between Poland and Great Britain. According to this declaration there has been concluded between the Polish Government and the British Government a temporary understanding to be replaced shortly by a permanent agreement which will provide for the giving of mutual assistance by Poland and Great Britain in the event of the independence of one of the two states being directly or indirectly threatened." the history of German friendship towards Poland. I quote from the last paragraph, paragraph 5, on that page:
"The agreement which has now been concluded by the Polish Government with the British Government is in such obvious contradiction to these solemn declarations of a few months ago that the German Government can take note only with surprise and astonishment of such a violent reversal of Polish policy.
"Irrespective of the manner in which its final formulation may be determined by both parties, the new Polish-British agreement is intended as a regular Pact of Alliance, which, by reason of its general sense and of the present state of political relations, is directed exclusively against Germany.
"From the obligation now accepted by the Polish government, it appears that Poland intends, in certain circumstances, to take an active part in any possible German-British conflict, in the event of aggression against Germany, even should this conflict not affect Poland and her interests. This is a direct and open blow against the renunciation of all use of force contained in the 1934 declaration."
"Paragraph 7: Polish Government, however, by their recent decision to accede to an alliance directed against Germany have given it to be understood that they prefer a promise of help by a third power to the direct guarantee of peace by the German Government. In view of this, the German Government are obliged to conclude that the Polish Government do not at present attach any importance to seeking a solution of German-Polish problems by means of direct, friendly discussion with the German Government. The Polish Government have thus abandoned the path traced out in 1934 to the shaping of German-Polish relations." fact that orders for the invasion of Poland had already been issued and the Armed Forces had been told to draw up a precise timetable. negotiations and discussions. It sets out the demands of the 21st, which the government had made; the return of Danzig, the autobahn, the railway and the promise by Germany of the twenty-five years' guarantee and I go down to the last but one paragraph on page 3 of the Exhibit, under the heading (1):"The Polish Government did not avail themselves of the opportunity offered to them by the German Government for a just settlement of the Danzig question; for the final safeguarding of Poland's frontiers with the Reich and thereby for permanent strengthening of the friendly, neighbourly relations between the two countries.
The Polish Government even rejected German proposals made with this object.
"At the same time the Polish Government accepted, with regard to another state, political obligations which are not compatible either with the spirit, the meaning or the text of the German-Polish declaration of the 26 of January, 1934. Thereby, the Polish Government arbitrarily and unilaterally rendered this declaration null and void." nevertheless, they are prepared to continue friendly relations with Poland. speech in the Reichstag, 28 of April, in which he repeated, in effect the terms of the memorandum. This is Document C-72 Number 13, which becomes G.B. 43. I would only refer the Tribunal to the last part of the second page of the translation. He has again repeated the demands and offers that Germany made in March and he goes on to say that the Polish Government have rejected his offer and lastly:
"I have regretted greatly that this incomprehensible attitude of the Polish Government--" -- I beg your pardon -- "I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of the Polish Government. Bat that alone is not the decisive fact. The worst is that now Poland, like Czechoslovakia, a year ago, believes under the pressure of a lying international campaign, that it must call up troops although Germany, on her part, has not called up a single man and had not thought of proceeding in any way against Poland. As I have said, this is, in itself, very regrettable and posterity will one day decide whether it was really right to refuse the suggestion made this once by me.
This, as I have said, was an endeavor on my part to solve a question which intimately affects the German people, by a truly unique compromise and to solve it to the advantage of both countries. According to my conviction, Poland was not a giving party in this solution at all, but only a receiving party, because it should be beyond all doubt, that Danzig will never become Polish. The intention to attack on the part of Germany, which was merely invented by the International Press, led, as you know, to the so-called guarantee offer, and to an obligation on the part of the Polish Government for mutual assistance."
It is unnecessary, My Lord, to read more of that. It shows us, as I say, how completely dishonest everything that the German Government was saying at that time. There was Hitler, probably with a copy of the orders for "Fall Weiss" in his pocket, as he spoke, saying that the intention to attack by Germany was an invention of the International Press. Government issued a memorandum on the 28 of April. It is set out in the next Exhibit, TC-72 Number 16, which becomes G.B. 44. It is unnecessary to read more than-
THE PRESIDENT: It is stated as the 5 of May, not the 28th of April.
SIR GRIFFITH JONES: I beg your pardon, yes, on the 5th of May. that reply. I can summarize the document in a word. It sets out the objectives of the 1934 agreement to renounce the use of force and to carry on friendly relationship between the two countries; to solve difficulties by arbitration and other friendly means. The Polish Government appreciates that there are difficulties about Danzig and have long been ready to carry out discussions. They set out again their part of the recent discussions and I turn to the second page of the document, the one but last paragraph or perhaps I should go back a little, to the top of that page, the first half of that page.