We had no obligation to do that, nor was it opportune, Mr. Schacht, in the year 1933, in the beginning, could not raise funds, because in the beginning he had no function.
That also referred to a later date. And here it was a matter of course that the funds be raised through the Minister of Finance and the President of the Reichsbank, according to the orders of the Fuehrer.
We left no doubt that if the other side would not disarm we had to rearm. That was clearly expressed in our articles since 1921, and, therefore, for all the world.
QIsn't it a fact that on the 21st of May, 1935, by a secret decree, Schacht was named Plenipotentiary for the War Economy?
AThe date, if you will kindly read the decree to me, I could tell you exactly. I do not have the dates in my head, especially if they do not have anything to do with me personally, but that can be seen from the decree.
QAt any event, shortly after he was named he suggested you as commissioner for war materials and foreign currency, didn't he?
AIf Mr. Schacht, shortly after his appointment, suggested that, then that appointment could have taken place only in 1936, because only in December of 1936, Mr. Schacht, together with the war minister von Blomberg, made the proposals or suggestions that I should become commissar for raw materials and foreign currency.
QWell, I ask you if you didn't give this answer to the American interrogator on the 10th day of October, 1945, referring to Schacht:
He made the suggestion that I was to become the commissioner for war materials and foreign currency. He had the idea that in that position I could give the minister for economics and the president of the Reichsbank valuable support.
Now, did you give that answer, and is that information correct?
AOnce more, please.
QReferring to Schacht, the record shows that you said:
He made the suggestion that I was to become the commissioner for war materials and foreign currency. He had the idea that in that position I could give the minister for economics and the president of the Reichsbank valuable support.
A That is absolutely correct, with the exception of the word "Reichstag". That ought to be president of the Reichsbank.
QYes. That is the way I have it.
AIt sounded like Reichstag president over the earphones.
Q (Reading) Moreover, he was very outspoken in the suggestion that he and Blomberg made that I was to be put in charge of the Four Year Plan. However, the idea that Schacht had there is that I myself did not know very much about economy and that he could very well hide in the protection of my broad back.
AThat I said the other day quite clearly,
QNow, from that time on you and Schacht collaborated for some time in preparing a rearmament program, did you not?
AI worked from that time on together with Schacht in economic matters as far as the entire German economy was concerned, and also the armament economy, and, of course, as a prerequisite for the establishing of the German Army.
Q And you and he had some jurisdictional differences and executed on agreement setting up different spheres of authority, did you not?
AYes.
QAnd that was in 1937 on the 7th of July, right?
AOn that day a certain suggestion was made which did not create anything final. That was in the background of the personalities and the two positions. I, Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, Schacht as President of the Reichsbank, both of us had great possibilities of influencing German economy. In the case of Schacht he was a very strong personality and whilst not wanting to overemphasize my importance and disregarding whether we were friends or not, on the basis of the two positions we had to got into difficulties and one or the other had to cede finally.
QAnd there came a time when he left the Ministry of the Reichsbank?
AFirst he resigned from the Ministry of Economy in November 1937 and as much as I know as president of the Reichsbank he resigned at the end of 1938 but I could not be certain about that date.
QNow, there was no disagreement between you and him that the program of rearmament should be carried through, was there? You disagreed as to methods of doing it.
AI assume for Mr. Schacht that as a good German, of course, he was ready to put all his strength and ability at the disposal of Germany to reestablish Germany as a strong nation and differences could only have occurred with regard to methods because neither Mr. Schacht nor I prepared for a war of aggression.
QAnd after he left the rearmament work he remained as a Minister without portfolio and act in the Reichstag for sometime, did he?
AThat is correct. The Fuehrer desired that specifically and I believe he wanted to express his gratitude to Schacht in that way.
QAnd do you recall a time when you considered the calling up of fifteen year olds, the conscription of fifteen year olds?
ADuring the war you mean?
QYes.
AThat is with the Air Force, with the Luftwaffe as auxiliaries. They were fifteen or sixteen years, I don't remember that exactly, which were called as auxiliaries for the Air Force.
QI will ask you be shown Document 3700 PS (U.S.A. Exhibit 780) and ask you whether you received from Schacht the letter of which that is a carbon copy.
(Document shown to witness)
AYes, I have received that letter. The date is not given here, that is the year. That is missing from the copy.
QCould you fix, approximately, the date of its receipt?
AIt says here 3rd of November, but according to the incident described on the other side, on the back, I assume it must be '43. On this copy the year is not given but I believe it is the year 1943 when I received this letter.
QDid you reply to Document 3700 PS (Exhibit U.S.A. 780)?
AI could not say that today with certainty -- possibly.
QNow, the Four Year Plan had as its purpose to put the entire economy in a state of readiness for war, did it not?
AI have explained that it had two tasks; first to assure German economy against crises, that is to say to make it independent of difficulties of export and nutrition problems. Second, to establish it as independent of any blockade, that is to say, based on the experience of the First World War, to make sure that any blockade would not have the disasterous consequences that the first one had. But that the Four Year Plan in this respect was a basic prerequisite for the reestablishment of the armament industry, goes without saying. Without it rearmament could not have taken place. The armament industry could not have been reorganized.
QTo get a specific answer, if possible, did you not say in a letter to Schacht, dated the 18th day of December, 1936, that you saw it to be your task, using these words -- "within four years to put the German economy in a state of readiness for war"? Did you say that or didn't you?
AOf course I said that.
QNow, do you recall the report of Blomberg in 1937 in which, and you may examine if you wish Document C 175, in which he starts his report by saying:
"The gcacz general political position justifies the supposition that Germany not consider an attack from any side"?
(Document shown to witness)
AThat may have been probable for that moment. The situation of Germany in 1937, I considered that the most quiet one. At that period, at that time the general situation was quite peaceful. But that had nothing to do with the fact that I felt obliged, independent of changing difficulties and differences, to make the German economy ready against crises or blockades which could have been brought about by war and one year later incidents of a different nature occurred.
QWell now, doesn't Blomberg continue:
"Grouhds for this are, in addition to the lack of desire for war in almost all nations, particularly the western powers, the deficiencies in the preparedness for war of a number of states and of Russia in particular"?
That was the situation in 1937, was it not?
AThat is the way Herr von Blomberg saw the situation. Concerning the readiness for war in Russia Herr von Blomberg in the same way as all the representatives of our Reichswehr, our Armed Forces, was in error contrary to the opinions which had been added from other sides concerning the armament in Russia. This is only the opinion of von Blomberg, not the Fuehrer's, not mine or not the opinion of other people.
QThat, however, was the report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on the 24th of June, 1937, was it not?
AThat is correct.
QYou organized one month later the Hermann Goering Works?
ARight.
QAnd the Hermann Goering Works was concerned with putting Germany in Condition of readiness for war, was it not?
ANo, that is not right. The Hermann Goering Works were concerned first exclusively with the improvement of production of German iron ore in the area of Salzgitter near Oberpfalz and after the annexation of Austria with the iron ore production in Austria. The Hermann Goering Works first established improvement on mines and foundries. Only much later steel works and rolling mills were added, and that is to say basic industry first.
Q The Hermann Goering Works was a part of the Four Year Plan, was it not?
AThat is right.
QAnd you have already said that the Four Year Plan and as its purpose to put the economy in a state of readiness for war; that the Hermann Goering Works was organized to exploit are mining and iron smelting resources and to carry the process through to completed guns and tanks, was it not?
A No. The Hermann Goering Works had at first no armament works of their own, only, as I have to say again, the basic product, raw steel.
QWell, at all events, you continued your efforts and on the 8th of November 1943, you made a speech describing those efforts to the Gauleiters in the Fuehrer Building at Munich, is that right?
AI don't know the date, but around that time I made a short speech in connection with other speeches made to the Gauleiters.
As far as I remember it was about the situation in the air and also maybe the armament situation.
I do not remember the words of that speech because I have not been asked about it since, but the fact is so.
QWell, let me remind you if you used these terms, refresh your recollection.
"Germany, at the beginning of the war, was the only country in the world possessing an operative fighting air force.
The other countries had split their air arms up into army and navy air forces and had considered the air arm primarily as a necessary and important auxiliary of the other branches of the forces.
In consequence, they relaxed the instrument which is alone capable of dealing concentrated and effective blows, namely, the operative air force.
In Germany we had gone ahead on those lines from the very outset, and the main body of the air force was disposed so that it could thrust deep into the hostile areas with strategic effect, while a lesser portion of the air force, consisting of Stukas and, of course, fighter planes, went into action on the front line in the battlefields.
You all know what great results were achieved by these tactics and what superiority we attained at the very beginning of the war through this modern kind of air force."
AThat is definitely true. I said that under all circumstances, and what is still more decisive, I acted like that, too.
But in order to be sure that this is understood correctly, I would like to explain it briefly.
In this statement I dealt with two separate opinions of air strategy which are still debated today and not quite clear, that is to say:
shall the air force be an auxiliary of army and navy and part of either the army or navy, or should it be a separate part of the armed forces?
I have explained that nations with a very large navy find it to be understood if such a distribution takes place between army and navy, but we, consequently and quite correctly, had chosen the path that besides army and navy we had built a strong air force, and I underlined the word "strong," and I explained what part we had taken, how we came to an operative air force.
As an expert I still am of the opinion that only operative air forces can bring about decisions.
I have also explained as to the proportion between two and four motored planes, that at first I was satisfied with the two-motored planes because, first, I did not have four-motored, and then because the operating radius of the four-motored bombers was not large enough.
I further pointed out that the quick termination of the campaign in Poland and in the West proved in an extraordinary way the effectiveness of the air force.
That is quite correct.
QI remind you of the testimony of the witness Milch sworn in your behalf, as to a subject on which I have not heard you express yourself.
He said.
"I nave been under the impression that already at the time of the occupation of the Rhineland, he, Goering, was worried that Hitler's policies would lead to war."
Do you remember that?
AYes.
QAnd was it true or false? True or mistaken, perhaps I should say.
ANo, I did not want any war, and I saw the best possibility to avoid war in a strong armament, according to the well known principle, "He who has a strong sword has peace."
Q You are still of that opinion?
AI am of that opinion today because I see the complications in existence more than ever.
QAnd it is true, as Milch said, that you were worried that Hitler's policies would lead to war at the time of the occupation of the Rhineland?
AExcuse me. I just understood that you asked whether it is also my opinion today that only a nation that is armed can have peace.
That is what I meant to answer with my last statement.
You referred to the statement by Milch, that I was worried that the policy of the Fuehrer could lead to war.
I would like to say that I was worried that war as such would come, and if possible I wanted to avoid it, not in the sense that the policy of the Fuehrer would lead to it, because the Fuehrer also desired to carry out his program by agreements and diplomatic action.
On the question of the Rhineland occupation, I was worried temporarily about the reactions, repercussions.
Just the same, it was necessary.
QAnd when nothing happened, the next step was Austria?
AThat has nothing to dowith it, that one can be brought in relation to the other.
Austria would never have caused me worries about war, as did the Rhineland occupation, because the occupation of the Rhineland--well, I could believe that a repercussion would occur there, but how any repercussions could occur from abroad after the reunion of two brother nations was not clear to me.
I did not expect that, especially since Italy, who always made believe that she had a vital interest, was eliminated.
England and France had no business to be concerned about the union, so there I did not see the danger of a war.
QI ask you just a few questions about Austria. You said that you and Hitler had deep regret about the death of Dollfuss, and I ask you if it isn't a fact that Hitler put up a plaque in Vienna in honor of the men who murdered Dollfuss, and went and put a wreath on their graves when he was there.
Is that a fact? Can't you answer that yes or no?
ANo, I can neither answer it with yes nor no, if I have to say the truth, because I cannot say, "Yes, he did it," because I don't know; I cannot say, "No, he didn't do it," because I don't know that either.
I wanted to say that I heard about that here and never before.
QNow, in June of 1937, Seyss-Inquart came to you and to the Secretary of State Keppler, and you had some negotiations.
AYes.
QAnd it was Seyss-Inquart's desire to have an independent Austria, was it not?
AAs far as I remember, yes.
QAnd Keppler was the man who was sent by Hitler to Vienna at the time of the Anschluss, and who telegraphed to Hitler not to march in, do you recall?
AYes.
QThat is the telegram that you characterized as impudent and senseless from the man who was on the ground and who had negotiated earlier with Seyss-Inquart, do you recall that?
AI did not designate the telegram by those words which have just been translated to me, "impudent."
I said that this telegram had no influence any more and was superfluous because the troops were on the move already, or at least they had the orders; the thing was roiling already.
QYou had demanded that Seyss-Inquart be made Chancellor?
Is that right?
ANot I personally wanted it, but that developed out of circumstances.
He was at that time the only one who could assume the Chancellorship because he was in the Government already.
QNow, did Seyss-Inquart become Chancellor of Austria with the understanding that he was to surrender his country to Germany, or did you lead him to believe that he would be independent, have an independent country?
A I explained the other day that even at the moment when the Fuehrer left by plane the next morning, the Fuehrer himself still had some reservations in his mind, doubt as to whether a permanent union could be carried out, and I also said that I personally did not consider the solution far-reaching enough and I was for an absolute, direct, and total Anschluss, annexation.
I did not know Seyss-Inquart's attitude at that time for sure.
At any rate, I knew that I had to consider that his attitude would be rather in the direction of still a separate form, not so far toward an absolute and total annexation, and therefore, I was very much satisfied when that finally crystallized.
QI respectfully submit that the answers are not responsive, and I repeat the question.
Did Seyss-Inquart become Chancellor of Austria with an under standing that he would call in the German troops and surrender Austria to Germany, or did you lead him to believe that he could continue an independent Austria?
AExcuse me, but that is a number of questions which I cannot simply answer with yes or no.
First, if you ask me, "Did Seyss-Inquart become Chancellor and was that demanded from Hitler?"
--yes.
And if you ask me then, "Did he become Chancellor under the assumption that he should send the telegram for troops to march in?"
-
I say no, because at that time nobody spoke about the fact that he should send the telegram.
If you ask me thirdly, "Did he become Chancellor under the assumption that he would be able to maintain an independent Austria?"
-
then I have to say again that the final turn of events on that evening \ was not clear even in the Fuehrer's mind.
That is what I tried to explain.
QIsn't it true that you expected that he might want to remain as independent as possible, and that that was one of the reasons why the troops were marched in?
A No. Excuse me, there are two questions. I absolutely suspected that Seyss-Inquart wanted to be as independent as possible.
The sending of troops had nothing at all to do with that suspicion, and it would not have been necessary.
I gave my reasons for the sending of the troops.
QIt was never intimated to Seyss-Inquart that Austria would not remain independent until after--as you put it--the Fuehrer and you were in control of Austria's fate?
Is that a fact?
AThat was certainly not told to him before the Fuehrer. As far as I was concerned, it was known generally that I desired it, and I assume that he know of my attitude.
QNow, you have stated that you then, in conversation with Ribbentrop in London, stressed that no ultimatum had been put to Seyss-Inquart, and you have said that legally that was the fact.
AI did not say "legally," I said "diplomatically."
THE PRESIDENT:Is that a convenient time to break off?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:Yes, your Honor.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1000 hours, 19 March 1946.)
Official transcript of the International Military Tribunal in the matter of the I United States of America, the French Re public, the United Kingdom, of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, against Hermann Wilhelm Goering et al, Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 19 March 1946, 1000-1300, Lord Justice Lawrence presiding.
DR.STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Goering): With the approval of the Tribunal, I call as witness Mr. Dahlerus, from Stockholm.
BIRGERDAHLERUS, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
QWill you tell me your name?
ABirger Dahlerus.
QWill you repeat this oath after me:
I swear that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,so help me God.
(The witness repeated the oath).
You may sit down if you wish.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. STAHMER:
QMr. Dahlerus, would you please tell the Court how it happened that you, as a private individual and a Swede, made efforts for reaching an understanding between England and Germany?
AI did know England very well, since I had lived there for twelve years, and I also knew Germany very well. I had seen the First World War from both sides, having lived in Germany and England during the first war.
On a visit to England by the end of June, 1939, I traveled around a number of cities, Birmingham, Coventry, Manchester and London, and I found all around a very determined position that the British public wouldn't stand for any aggression any longer from the German side.
On the 2nd of July I met with some friends in the Constitutional Club, and we discussed the position and they summed up the general opinion in England in a rather clear way. As this summary of the general opinion in England was a basis for my discussions afterwards with Goering, I think I shall quote it.
THE PRESIDENT:The Russian translation is not coming through. I am told it is coming through with interruptions.
DR. STAHMER:Should the witness repeat his testimony?
THE PRESIDENT:Would you just repeat the last sentence that you stated You said that on the 2nd of July you met friends in the Constitutional Club and discussed the general situation.
AAnd they summed up the position in a rather clear way. This formed the basis for my discussions afterwards with Goering. I therefore think I shall quote exactly the summary they made up of the opinion in Great Britain:
Formation of our opinion obtained by observation of conditions in England and from discussion with ordinary people.
A.Agreement that Berchtesgaden and Czechoslovakia have shaken confidence. Immediately after Berchtesgaden and before Czechoslovakia possibly could have obtained by cooperation many things decided by Germany.
B.British public opinion now exasperated. Decided that we go so far and no further.
C.Britain now had commitments which did not exist at the time of the Berchtesgaden meeting.
Poland and Danzig. Invasion of Danzig means war with Poland and Britain.
THE PRESIDENT:I am afraid the French translation isn't coming through properly now. The French and Russian are coming together. BY THE PRESIDENT:
QNow, Witness, would you go on with the document. You have given us a, b, and c, I think.
AWell, the end of c is as follows:
"Britain automatically involved by virtue of new commitments. Therefore, automatically war with Britain.
"d. Britain does not advertise her strength: not even fully appreciated by general British public."
Then follows Statement No.2, about Lord Halifax's sp "Own personal observation indicates that Britain solid behind his statement."
THE PRESIDENT:One moment. I am afraid the Russian is coming through on the French again.
I am afraid the Tribunal must adjourn then.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: Before the witness goes on with his evidence, the Tribunal ants me to say that the system by which the earphones are connected with the interpreters was checked over after the Court rose last night, was checked over gain at 9:30 this morning, and again at 9:35 this morning.
But everyone who comes into this Court must realize that it has not been possible to bury these cables so as to make them altogether safe. It is, therefore, of the very greatest importance that everybody who comes into this Court should take real care to avoid, if possible, treading upon these cables, which may become injured by being kicked and broken, and in that way the faults in the system occur.
Everything is being done to maintain the system as efficiently as possible. It, therefore, rests with those who use this Court to see that they do their best o assist in keep ing the system efficient. DIRECT EXAMINATION CONTINUED):
QWould you please continue, witness?
APoint Number Two: Lord Halifax's speech. Own personal observation indicates that Britain solidly behind his statement. Lord Halifax understates is case, as is British custom; that is to say, understates the strength of Great Britain's force. Is perhaps not fully understood by Germany.
Number Three: Britain desires peace, but not peace at any price. erman people very acceptable to British, and does not appear to be any good reason for armed conflict. As in past, Germany will certainly be defeated and rill obtain far less by means of war than by peaceful methods of negotiation. Britain and her friends will also suffer very heavily. May be end of civilization.
THE PRESIDENT:Yes.
AHaving observed that there was rather a disinclination in the Third *eich to forward unfavorable reports, I felt it was both my duty and it might be of great value if this exact opinion in Great Britain was brought to the highest quarters in Germany.
QMr. Dahlerus, one question. Were these friends of yours members of the English Parliament?
ANo, it was people from the business world, and if the Court so desires, can hand over a list of the names.
THE PRESIDENT:Go on, Dr. Stahmer.
QWhat were their names?
A May I save time and hand in the list of names to the Court?
THE PRESIDENT:Their names are not of any great importance, are they, if they were people inthe business world?
AAfter having agreed with my friends in reference to the advisability of visit to Germany, I left for Germany and got an appointment with Goering on 6 July, four o'clock in the afternoon, at Karinhall.
I told him about my observations in Great Britain and strongly emphasized the necessity to take such actions that no risk of war might occur. Goering doubted if these observations may not refer to an attempt on the British side to bluff and also emphasized that he was of the opinion that Great Britain wanted to control developments on the Continent.
A I told him that I did not want him to accept my statements as a neutral citizen, but suggested that a meeting should be arranged where he and some other members of the German Government would have an opportunity of meeting British citizens who knew conditions well.
I suggested that such an informal meeting might usefully take place in Sweden, possibly on the invitation of His Majesty the King of Sweden, or the Swedish Government.
On the 8th of July I received from Goering the reply that Hitler agreed to this plan, and I left for Sweden to ascertain if it was possible to make arrangements in Sweden.
The Swedish Government, for certain reasons, considered it inadvisable that His Majesty the King or the Government issue such an invitation, but they had nothing against if private people made such arrangements.
Count Trola Wachmeester willingly placed his castle, Trola Beelja at our disposal for such a meeting.
I left on the 19th of July for London to make the arrangements.
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Stahmer, can't you take the witness on, in order to save time, to the actual negotiations?
All these preliminaries do not seem to the Tribunal to be very important.
Can't you take him on to the actual negotiations?
DR. STAHMER:I can, yes. He is about to speak of the conference that took place in Soenke Nissen Koog.
BY DR. STAHMER:
QIf the witness could please describe that meeting. You were about to say that on the 19th of July you flew to London.
Did you there meet Lore Halifax on the 20th?
AYes.
QI consider this report essential. Could you please tell us about that?
What took place during this conference with Lord Halifax?
AI met Lord Halifax on the 20th, and be then emphasized that he did not want any members of the British Government or Parliament to participate, but His Majesty's Government would, with interest, follow the results of the meeting.
The meeting took place at Soenke Nissen Koog, in Schleswig Holstein, a place belonging to my wife.
Seven Britishers, Goering, Bodenschatz, and Dr. Schoettl were present.
QOn what day was this?
AIt was on the 7th of August, and the meeting started at 10 o'clock.
The meeting started, and Goering invited the Britishers to put any questions they liked.
Thereafter a long discussion took place about political developments, particularly with reference to connections between Great Britain and Germany, and eventually on both sides they came to discuss the question of Munich and events at Munich.
The British representatives emphasized the necessity of stopping the aggression policy in Europe, and the question of the Corridor and Danzig was discussed.
The British members made it perfectly clear that in case Germany with force would try to occupy any territory, the British Empire would, according to obligations to Poland, help Poland.
Goering mentioned on his word of honor as a statesman and as a soldier that, although he was in charge of the most powerful air force in the world and it might be tempting to him to lead his air force in battle, he would do all he could to help prevent a war.
The result of the meeting was that all present came to the conclusion that it would be of great value if, by delegates from Great Britain and Germany, a meeting could be arranged as early as possible.
The conference ended late at night, and next morning the British delegates suggested that such a conference should be extended to four nations, Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany.
I went to Sylt, where Goering was staying, and he consented on behalf of Germany to such a modification of the proposal.
QWere British members of Parliament present at this meeting?
ANo, only business people from England.
QHas a report been given to Lord Halifax about this visit?
A The British members left Germany early on the 9th of August and immediately submitted on their return a report to the Foreign Office.
QDid this meeting that you intended take place, or did events continue as before?
AI received a confirmation from Goering personally that Hitler had agreed to such a conference being arranged, and the matter was discussed in London, and I received, on the 19th of August, a request to go to Paris, evidently to obtain a reply from the British side.
Before I left, on the 21st of August, information came that a commercial treaty had been closed between Russia and Germany, and on the following day this had been extended to an agreement also covering political questions.
On the 23rd I was requested by a phone call from Goering early in the morning, 10.
30, if possible to come to Berlin at once.
QWas the danger of the situation discussed?
AYes. Goering mentioned that in the meantime the situation had become very serious.
QThen when did you meet Goering?
AI arrived in Berlin on the 24th and saw Goering at 2 o'clock in the afternoon.
QWhat took place in your conference?
AHe told me that it was a very serious situation, due to the fact that no settlement had been reached between Poland and Germany, and he asked me if I possibly could to proceed to London and explain the position in London.
QWas it your task to print out particularly there that Germany was perfectly prepared to reach an understanding with England?
AYes. Goering explained that Germany was anxious to come to an understanding with Great Britain.
QWhen did you leave for London?
AThe following morning, on the 25th, Friday.