completed; on April 4th the Naval Operational Order was On April 2nd he records that all the preparations are issued; and on the 9th April, the invasion was begun.
From all this it is clear that when the plans for an attack on Norway were being made, they were not made for the purpose of forestalling an imminent Allied landing, but, at the most, that they might prevent an Allied occupation at some future date.
When the final orders for the German invasion of Norway were given, the diary of the Naval Operations Staff for March 23rd 1940 records:
"A mass encroachment by the English into Norwegian territorial waters ... is not to be expected at the present time."
And Admiral Assmann's entry for March 26th says:
"British landing in Norway not considered serious."
Documents which were subsequently captured by the Germans are relied on to show that the Allied plan to occupy harbours and airports in Western Norway was a definite plan, although in all points considerably behind the German plans under which the invasion was actually carried out. These documents indicate that an altered plan had been finally agreed upon on March 20th 1940, that a convoy should leave England on April 5th, and that mining in Norwegian waters would begin the same day; and that on April 5th the sailing time had been postponed until April 8th. But these plans were not the cause of the German invasion of Norway. Norway was occupied by Germany to afford her bases from which a more effective attack on England and France might be make, pursuant to plans prepared long in advance of the Allied plans which are now relied on to support the argument of Self defense.
in accordance with the reservations made by many of the It was further argued that Germany alone could decide, Signatory Powers at the time of the conclusion of the BriandKellogg Pact, whether preventive action was a necessity, and that in making her decision her judgment was conclusive.
But whether action taken under the claim of self-defense Was in fact aggressive or defensive must ultimately he subject to investigation and adjudication if international law is ever to be enforced.
No suggestion is made by the defendants that there was any plan by any belligerent, other than Germany, to occupy Denmark. No excuse for that aggression has ever been offered.
As the German armies entered Norway and Denmark, German memoranda were handed to the Norwegian and Danish Governments which gave the assurance that the German troops did not come as enemies, that they did not intend to make use of the points occupied by German troops as bases for operations against England, as long as they were not forced to do so by Treasures taken by England and France, and that they had come to protect the North against the proposed occupation of Norwegian strong points by English-French forces.
The memoranda added that Germany had no intention of infriging the territorial integrity and political independence of the Kingdom of Norway then or in the future. Nevertheless, on the 3rd of June 1940, a German Naval memorandum discussed the use to be made of Norway and Denmark, and put forward one solution for consideration, that the territories of Denmark and Norway acquired during the course of the war should continue to be occupied and German possessions.
organized so that they could in the future be considered as In the light of all the available evidence it is impossible to accept the contention that the invasions of Denmark and Norway were defensive, and in the opinion of the Tribunal they were acts of aggressive war.
THE INVASION OF BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS AND
LUXEMBURG The plan to seize Belgium and the Netherlands was considered in August 1938, when the attack on Czechoslovakia was being formulated, and the possibility of war with France and England was contemplated.
The advantage to Germany of being able to use these countries for their own purposes, particularly as air bases in the war against England and France, was emphasized. In May of 1939, when Hitler made his irrevocable decision to attack Poland, and foresaw the possibility at least of a war with England and France in consequence, he told his military commanders:
"Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied...
Declarations of neutrality must be ignored."
On August 22nd in the same year, he told his military commanders that England and France, in his opinion, would not "violate the neutrality of these countries." At the same time he assured Belgium and Holland and Luxemburg that he would respect their neutrality; and on the 6th October 1939, after the Polish campaign, he repeated this assurance. On the 7th October General von Brauchitsch directed Army Group B to prepare "for the immediate invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory, if the political situation so demands." In a series of orders, which were signed by the defendants Keitel and Jodl, the attack was fixed for the 10th November 1939, but it was postponed from time to time until May of 1940 on account of weather conditions and transport problems.
said:
At the conference on the 23rd November 1939 Hitler "We have an Achilles heel:
The Ruhr. The progress of the war depends on the possession of the Ruhr.
If England and France push through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the greatest danger.
.. Certainly England and France will assume the offensive against Germany when they are armed.
England and France have means of pressure to bring Belgium and Holland to request English and French help.
In Belgium and Holland the sympathies are all for France and England ... If the French army marches into Belgium in order to attack us, it will be too late for us.
We must anticipate them ...
We shall sow the English coast with mines which cannot be cleared.
This mine warfare with the Luftwaffe demands a different starting point.
England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves.
The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring England to her knees.
However, this can only occur if we have occupied Belgium and Holland ... My decision is unchangeable;I shall attack France and England at the most favorable and quickest moment.
Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless.
No one will question that when we have won. We shall not bring about the breach of neutrality as idiotically as it war in 1914.
If we do not break the neutrality, then England and France will.
Without attack, the war is not to be ended victoriously."
On the 10th May 1940 the German forces invaded the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg. On the same day the German Ambassadors handed to the Netherlands and Belgian Governments a memorandum alleging that the British and French armies, with the consent of Belgium and Holland, were planning to march through those countries to attack the Ruhr, and justifying the invasion on these grounds. Germany, however, assured the Netherlands and Belgium that their integrity and their possessions would be respected. A similar memorandum was delivered to Luxemburg on the same date.
There is no evidence before the Tribunal to justify the contention that the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg were invaded by Germany because their occupation had been planned by England and France.
British and French staffs had been cooperating for making certain plans for military operations in the Low Countries, but the purpose of this planning was to defend these countries in the event of a German attack.
The invasion of Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg was entirely without justification.
It was carried out in pursuance of policies long considered and prepared, and was plainly an act of aggressive war. The resolve to invade was made without any other consideration than the advancement of the aggressive policies of Germany.
THE AGGRESSION AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA AND GREECE
On the 12th August 1939 Hitler had a conversation with Ciano and the defendant Ribbentrop at Obersalzberg. He said then:
"Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for the neutrals to be liquidated one after the other.
This process could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one partner of the Axis covered the other while it was deal ing with the uncertain neutral.
Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a neutral of this kind."
This observat on was made only two months after Hitler had given assurances to Yugoslavia that he would regard her frontier as final and inviolable. On the occasion of the visit to Germany of the Prince Regent of Yugoslavia on 1st June 1939, Hitler had said in a public speech:
"The firmly established reliable relationship of Germany to Yugoslavia now that owing to historical events we have become neighbors with common boundaries fixed for all time, will not only guarantee but can also represent an element of calm to our lasting peace between our two peoples and countries, nerve-racked continent.
This peace is the goal of all who are disposed to perform really constructive work."
On the 6th October 1939 Germany repeated these assurances to Yugoslavia, after Hitler and Ribbentrop had unsuccessfully tried to persuade Italy to enter the war on the side of Germany by attacking Yugoslavia. On the 28th October 1940 Italy invaded Greece, but the military operations met with no success. In November Hitler wrote to Mussolini with regard to the invasion of Greece, and the extension of the war in the Balkans, and pointed out that no military operations could take place in the Balkans before the following March, and therefore Yugoslavia must if at all possible be won ever by other means, and in other ways. But on the 12th November 1940 Hitler issued a directive for the prosecution of the War, and it included the words:
"The Balkans: The Commander-inChief of the Army will make preparations, for occupying the Greek mainland north of the Aegean Sea.
, in case of need entering through Bulgaria."
On the 13th December he issued a directive concerning the operation "Marita," the code name for the invasion of Greece, in which he stated:
"1. The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive.
Because of a dangerous situation in Albania, it is doubly necessary that the British endeavor be failed to create air bases under the protection of a Balkan front, which would be danger ous above all to Italy as to the Rumanian oilfields.
2. My plan therefore is (a) to form a slowly Increasing task force in Southern Rumania within the next month, (b) after the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to send a task force for the occupation of the Aegean north coast by way of Bulgaria and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland."
at which the defendants Ribbentrop, Keitel, Jodl and others were present, On the 20th January 1941, at a meeting between Hitler and Mussolini, Hitler stated:
"The massing of troops in Rumania serves a threefold purpose.
(a) an operation against Greece;
(b) Protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey;
(c) Safeguarding the guarantee to Rumania ...
It is desirable that this deployment be completed without interference from the enemy.
Therefore, disclose the game as late as possible.
The ten dency will be to cross the Danube at the last pos sible moment, and to line up for attack at the earliest possible moment."
On the 19th February 1941 an OKW directive re the operation "Marita" stated:
"On the 18th February the Fuehrer made the following decision regarding the carrying out of Operation Marita:
The following dates are envisaged:
Commencement of building bridge 28th February:
Crossing of the Danube, 2nd March."
On the 3rd March 1941, British troops landed in Greece to assist the Greeks to resist the Italians; and on the 18th March, at a meeting between Hitler and the defendant Raeder, at which the defendants Keitel and Jodl were also present, the defendant Raeder asked for confirmation that the "whole of Greece will have to be occupied, even in the event of a peaceful settlement, "to which Hitler replied, "The complete occupation is a prerequisite of any settlement." On the 25th March, on the Occasion of the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact at a meeting in Vienna, the defendant Ribbentrop, on behalf of the German Government, confirmed the determination of Germany to respect the 26th March the Yugoslav Ministers, who had adhered to the Tripartite Pact, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia at all times.
On the were removed from office by a coup d'etat in Belgrade on their return iron Vienna, and the new Government repudiated the pact. Thereupon on 27th March, at a conference in Berlin with the High Command at which the defendants Goering, Keitel and Jodl were present, and the defendant Ribbentrop part of the time, Hitler stated that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in regard to the contemplated attack on Greece, and even more so with regard to the attack upon Russia which was to be conducted later on. Hitler announced that he was determined, without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new Government, to make all preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. He stated that he would act with "unmerciful harshness."
On the 6th April German forces invaded Greece and Yugoslavia without warning, and Belgrade Was bombed by the Luftwaffe. So swift was this particular invasion that there had not been time to establish any "incidents" as a usual preliminary, or to find and publish any adequate "political" explanations. As the attack was starting on the 6th April, Hitler proclaimed to the German people that this attack was necessary because the British forces in Greece (who were helping the Greeks to defend themselves against the Italians) represented a British attempt to extend the war to the Balkans.
It is clear from this narrative that aggressive war against Greece and Yugoslavia had long been in contemplation, Certainly as early as August of 1939. The fact that Great Britain had come to the assistance of the Greeks, and might thereafter be in a position to inflict great damage upon German countries.
interests was made the occasion for the occupation of both THE AGGRESSIVE WAR AGAINST THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.
On the 23rd August 1939 Germany signed the non-aggression pact with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
The evidence has shown unmistakably that the Soviet Union on their pert conformed to the terms of this pact; indeed the German Government itself had been assured of this by the highest German sources. Thus, the German Ambassador in Moscow informed his Government that the Soviet Union would go to war only if attacked by Germany, and this statement is recorded in the German War Diary under the date of June 6th 1941.
Nevertheless, as early as the late summer of 1940, Germany began to make preparations for an attack on the USSR, in spite of the non-aggression pact. This operation was secretly planned under the code name "Case Barbarossa", and the former Field Marshal Paulus testified that on the 3rd September 1940, when he joined the German General Staff, he continued developing "Case Barbarossa", which was finally completed at the beginning of November 1940; and that even then, the German General Staff had no information that the Soviet Union Was preparing for war.
On the 18th of December 1940 Hitler issued directive No. 21, initialled by Keitel and Jodl, which called for the completion of all preparations connected with the realization of "Case Barbarossa" by the 15th May 1941. This directive stated:
crush Soviet Russia In a quick campaign before "The German armed forces must be prepared to the end of the war against England.
.. Great Caution has to be exercised that the intention of an attack will not be recognized."
Before the directive of the 18th December had been made, the defendant Goering had informed General Thomas, chief of the Office of War Economy of the OKW, of the plan, and General Thomas made surveys of the economic possibilities of the USSR including its raw materials, its power and transport system, and its capacity to produce arms.
In accordance with these surveys, an economic staff for the Eastern territories with many military-economic units (Inspectorates, Commandos, groups) was created under the supervision of the defendant Goering. In conjunction with the military command, these units were to achieve the most complete and efficient economic exploitation of the occupied territories in the interest of Germany.
The framework of tie future political and economic organization of the occupied territories was designed by the defendant Rosenberg over a period of three months, after conferences with and assistance by the defendants Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Funk, Goering, Ribbentrop, and Frick or their representatives. It was made the subject of a most detailed report immediately after the invasion.
These plans outlined the destruction of the Soviet Union as an independent State, and its partition, the creation of so-called Reich Commissariats, and the conversion of Esthonia, Latvia, Byelorussia and other territories into German colonies.
war against the U.S.S.R. In December 1940 Hungary agreed to participate on At the same time Germany drew Hungary, Rumania and Finland into the the promise of Germany that she should have certain territories at the expense of Yugoslavia.
In May 1941 a final agreement was concluded with Antonescu, the Prime Minister of Rumania, regarding the attack on the U.S.S.R., in which Germany promised to Rumania, Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and the right to occupy Soviet territory up to the Dnieper.
On the 22nd June 1941, without any declaration of war, Germany invaded Soviet territory in accordance with the plans so long made.
The evidence which has been given before this Tribunal proves that Germany had the design carefully thought out, to crush the U.S.S.R. as a political and military power, so that Germany might expand to the cast according to her own desire. In "Mein Kampf", Hitler had written:
"If now territory were to be acquired in Europe, it must have been mainly at Russia's cost, and once again the new German Empire should have set out on its march along the same road as was for merly trodden by the Teutonic Knights, this time to acquire soil for the German plough by means of the German sword and thus provide the nation with its daily bread."
But there was a more immediate purpose, and in one of the memoranda of the OKW that immediate purpose Was stated to be to feed the German armies from Soviet territory in the third year of the war, even if "as a result many millions of people as the defendant Rosenberg said, will be starved to death if we take out of the country the things necessary for us."
The final aims of the attack on the Soviet Union were formulated at a conference with Hitler on July 16, 1941, in which the defendants Goering, "There can be no talk of the creation of a mili-Keitel, Rosenberg and Bormann participated:
tary power west of the Urals, even if we should have to fight 100 years to achieve this ... All the Baltic regions must become part of the Reich.
The crimea and adjoining regions (North of the Crimea) must likewise be incorporated into the Reich.
The region of the Volga as well as the Baku district must likewise be incorporated into the Reich, The Finns want Eastern Karelia.
How ever, in view of the large deposits of nickel, the Kola peninsula must be coded to Germany," It was contended for the defendants that the attack upon the USSR was justified because the Soviet Union was contemplating an attack upon Germany, and making preparations to that end.
It is impossible to believe that this view was ever honestly entertained.
The plans for the economic exploitation of the USSR, for the removal of masses of the population, for the murder of Commissars and political leaders, were all part of the carefully prepared scheme launched on the 22nd June without warning of any kind, and without the shadow of legal excuse, It was plain aggression.
WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
Four days after the attack launched by the Japanese on the United States fleet in Pearl harbor on December 7, 1941, Germany declared war on the United States.
The Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan, had been signed on the 27th September 1940, and from that date until the attack upon the USSR the defendant Ribbentrop, with other defendants, was endeavouring to induce Japan to attack British possessions in the Far East. This, it was the war.
thought would hasten England's defeat, and also keep the United States out of The possibility of a direct attack on the United States was considered and discussed as a matter for the future.
Major von Falkenstein, the Luftwaffe Liaison officer with the Operations Staff of the OKW, summarizing military problems which needed discussion in Berlin in October of 1940, spoke of the possibility "of the prosecution of the war against America at a later date." It is clear, too, that the German policy of keeping America out of the war, if possible, did not prevent Germany promising support to Japan even against the United States. On the 4th April 1941, Hitler told Matsuoka, the Japanese Foreign Minister, in the presence of the defendant Ribbentrop, that Germany would "strike without delay" if a Japanese attack on Singapore should lead to war between Japan and the United States. The next day Ribbentrop himself urged Matsuoka to bring Japan into the war.
On the 28th November 1941, ten days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Ribbentrop encouraged Japan, through her Ambassador in Berlin, to attack Great Britain and the United States, and stated that should Japan become engaged in a war with the United States, Germany would join the war immediately, A few days later, Japanese representatives told Germany and Italy that Japan was preparing to attack the United States, and asked for their support, Germany and Italy agreed to do this, although in the Tripartite Pact, Italy and Germany had undertaken to assist Japan only if she were attacked. When the assault on pearl Harbor did take place, the defendant Ribbentrop is reported to have been "overjoyed", and later, at a ceremony in Berlin, when a German medal was awarded to Oshima, the Japan Japanese had adopted of negotiating with the United States as long as ese Ambassador, Hitler indicated his approval of the tactics which the possible, and then striking hard without any declaration of war.
Although it is true that Hitler and his colleagues originally did not consider that a war with the United States would be beneficial to their interest, it is apparent that in the course of 1941 that view was revised, and Japan was given every encouragement to adopt a policy which would almost certainly bring the United States into the war. And when Japan attacked the United States fleet in Pearl Harbor and thus made aggressive war against the United States, the Nazi Government caused Germany to enter that war at once on the side of Japan by declaring war themselves on the United States.
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal will adjourn until a quarter past two.
(A recess was taken until 1415 hours.)
(The Tribunal reconvened at 1415 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION THE PRESIDENT:
I now ask Mr. Biddle to continue the reading of the judgment.
MR. BIDDLE: Violations of International Treaties.
that is a war of aggression or a war in violation of international The Charter defines as a crime the planning or waging of war treaties.
The Tribunal has decided that certain of the defendants planned and waged aggressive wars against twelve nations, and were therefore guilty of this series of crimes. This makes it unnecessary to discuss the subject in further detail, or even to consider at any length the extent to Which these aggressive wars were also "wars in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances." These treaties are set out in Appendix C of the Indictment. Those of principal importance are the following.
HAGUE CONVENTIONS In the 1899 Convention the signatory powers agreed:
"before an appeal to arms ... to have recourse, as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly powers." A similar clause was inserted in the Convention for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1907. In the accompanying Convention Relative to Opening of Hostilities, Article I contains this far more specific language:
"The Contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between them must not commence without a previous and explicit warning, in the form of either a de claration of war, giving reasons, or an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war."
Germany was a party to these conventions.
Breaches of certain provisions of the Versailles Treaty VERSAILLES TREATY are also relied on by the Prosecution--not to fortify the left bank of the Rhine (Art.
44-42); to "respect strictly the independence of Austria" (Art. 80); renunciation of any rights in Memel (Art. 99), and the Free City of Danzig (Art. 100); the recognition of the independence of the Czecho-Slovak State; and the Military, Naval and Air Clauses against German rearmament found in Part V. There is no doubt that action was taken by the German Government contrary to all these provisions, the details of which are set out in Appendix C. With regard to the Treaty of Versailles, the matters relied on are:
1. The violation of Articles 42 to 44 in respect of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland;
2. The annexation of Austria on the 13th March 1938, in violation of Article 80;
3. The incorporation of the district of Memel on the 22nd March 1939, in violation of Article 99;
4. The incorporation of the Free City of Danzig on the 1st September 1939, in violation of Article 100;
5. The incorporation of the provinces of Bohemia and Moravia on the 16th March 1939, in violation of Article 81;
6. The repudiation of the military naval and air clauses of the Treaty, in or about March of 1935. On the 21st May 1935 Germany announced, that whilst renouncing the disarmament clauses of the Treaty, she would still respect the territorial limitations, and would comply with the Locarno Pact. [With regard to the the allegation proved.
] first five breaches alleged, therefore, the Tribunal finds
TREATIES OF MUTUAL GUARANTEE, ARBITRATION AND
NON-AGGRESSION It is unnecessary to discuss in any detail the various treaties entered into by Germany with other powers.
Treaties of Mutual Guarantee were signed by Germany at Locarno in 1925, with Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy, assuring the maintenance of the territorial status quo. Arbitration treaties were also executed by Germany at Locarno with Czechoslovakia, Belgium and Poland.
Article I of the latter treaty is typical, providing:
"All disputes of every kind between Germany and Poland ... which it may not be possible to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted for decision to an arbitral tribunal.
.."
Conventions of Arbitration and Conciliation were entered into between Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark in 1926; and between Germany and Luxemburg in 1929. Non-aggression treaties were executed by Germany with Denmark and Russiae in 1939.
KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT The Pact of Paris was signed on the 27th August 1928 by Germany, the United States, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Poland and other countries; and subsequently by other powers.
The Tribunal has made full reference to the nature of this Pact and its legal effect in another part of this judgment. It is therefore not necessary to discuss the matter further here, save to state that in the opinion of the Tribunal this Pact was violated by Germany in all the cases of aggressive war charged in the Indictment. It is to be noted that on the 26th January 1934 Germany signed a was explicitly based on the Pact of Paris, and in which the use of force Declaration for the Maintenance of Permanent Peace with Poland, which was outlawed for a period of ten years.
The Tribunal does not find it necessary to consider any of the other treaties referred to in the Appendix, or the repeated agreements and assurances of her peaceful intentions entered into by Germany.
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is defined in the Agreement and THE LAW OF THE CHARTER Charter, and the crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, for which there shall be individual responsibility, are set out in Article 6. The law of the Charter is decisive, and binding upon the Tribunal.
The making of the Charter was the exercise of the sovereign legislative power by the countries to which the German Reich uncondi tionally surrendered; and the undoubted right of those countries to legislate for the occupied territories has been recognized by the civilized world.
The Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the victorious nations, but in the view of the Tribunal, as will be shown, it is the expression of international law existing at the time of its creation; and to that extent is itself a contribution to international law.
The Signatory Powers created his Tribunal, defined the law it was to administer, and made regulations for the proper conduct of the Trial.
In doing so, they have done together what any one of them might have done singly; for it is not to be doubted that any nation has the right thus to set up special courts to administer law.
With regard to the constitution of the court, all that the defendants are entitled to ask is to receive a fair trial on the facts and law.
The Charter makes the planning or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties a crime; and it is therefore not strictly necessary to consider whether and to what extent aggressive war was a crime before the execution of the London Agreement.
But in view of the heard full argument from the Prosecution and the Defense, and will great importance of the questions of law involved, the Tribunal has express its view on the matter.