Ribbentrop was sent to Moscow to negotiate a non-aggression pact with the On the 22nd August 1939 there took place the important meeting of that day, to which reference has already been made.
The Prosecution have put in evidence two unsigned captured documents which appear to be records made of this meeting by persons Who were present. The first document is headed: "The Fuehrer's speech to the Commanders-in-Chief on the 22nd August 1939...." The purpose of the speech was to announce the decision to make war on Poland at once, and Hitler began by saying:
"It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come sooner or later.
I had already made this decision in the spring, but I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few years, and only afterwards against the East.
.. I wanted to establish an acceptable relationship with Poland in order to fight first against the West.
But this plan, which was agreeable to me, could not be executed since essential points have changed.
It became clear to me that Poland would attack us in case of a conflict with the West."
Hitler then went on to explain why he had decided that the most favorable moment had arrived for starting the war. "Now," said Hitler, "Poland is in the position in which I wanted her ... I am only afraid that at the last moment some Schweinehund will make a proposal for mediation ... A beginning has been made for the destruction of England's hegemony."
This document closely resembles one of the documents put in evidence on behalf of the defendant Raeder. This latter document consists of a summary of the same speech, compiled on the day it was made, by one Admiral Boehm, from notes he had token during the meeting. In substance it military invasion, that although a conflict between Germany and the West says that the moment had arrived to settle the dispute with Poland by was unavoidable in the long run, the likelihood of Great Britain and France coming to Poland's assistance was not great, and that even if a war in the West should come about, the first aim should be the crushing of the Polish military strength.
It also contains a statement by Hitler that an appropriate propaganda reason for invading Poland would be given, the truth or falsehood of which was unimportant, since "the Right lies in Victory."
The second unsigned document put in evidence by the Prosecution is headed: "Second Speech by the Fuehrer on the 22nd August 1939", and it is in the form of notes of the main points made by Hitler. Some of these are as follows:
"Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were determined from the beginning to fight the Western Powers.
Struggle for life or death ...
destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line.
Even if war should break out in the West, the destruction of Poland shall be the primary objective.
I shall give a propagandist cause for starting the war - never mind whether it be plaus ible or not.
The victor shall not be asked later on whether we told the truth or not.
In starting and making a war, not the Right is what matters, but Victory ... The start will be ordered probably by Saturday morning."
(That is to say, the 26th August.)
In spite of it being described as a second speech, there are sufficient points of similarity with the two previously mentioned documents to make it appear very probable that this is an account of the same speech, not as detailed as the other two, but in substance the same.
These three documents establish that the final decision as to the date the year, was reached by Hitler Shortly before the 22nd August 1939.
They of Poland's destruction, which had been agreed upon and planned earlier in also show that although he hoped to be able to avoid having to fight Great Britain and France as well, he fully realized there was a risk of this happening, but it was a risk which he was determined to take.
The events of the last days of August confirm this determination. On the 22nd August 1939, the same day as the speech just referred to, the British Prime Minister wrote a letter to Hitler, in which he said:
"Having thus made our position perfectly clear, I wish to repeat to you my conviction that war between our two peoples would be the greatest calamity that could occur."
On the 23rd August Hitler replied:
"The question of the treatment of European problems on a peaceful basis is not a decision which rests with Germany, but primarily on those who since the crime committed by the Versailles Diktat have stubbornly and consistently opposed any peaceful revision.
Only after a change of spirit on the part of the responsible Powers can there be any real change in the relationship between England and Germany."
There followed a number of appeals to Hitler to refrain from forcing the Polish issue to the point of war. These were from President Roosevelt on the 24th and 25th August; from His Holiness the pope on the 24th and 31st August; and from M. Daladier, the Prime Minister of France, on the 26th August. All these appeals fell on deaf ears.
On the 25th August, Great Britain signed a pact of mutual assistance with Poland, which reinforced the understanding she had given to Poland earlier in the year. This coupled with the news of Mussolini's unwillingness The invasion of Poland, which was timed to start on the 26th August, was to enter the war on Germany's side, made Hitler hesitate for a moment.
postponed until a further attempt had been made to persuade Great Britain not to intervene. Hitler offered to enter into a comprehensive agreement with Great Britain, once the Polish question had been settled. In reply to this, Great Britain made a counter-suggestion for the settlement of the Polish dispute by negotiation. On the 29th August Hitler informed the British Ambassador that the German Government, though skeptical as to the result, would be prepared to enter into direct negotiations with a Polish emissary, provided he arrived in Berlin with plenipotentiary powers by midnight for the following day, August 30th. The Polish Government were informed of this, but with the example of Schuschnigg and Hacha before them, they decided not to send such an emissary. At midnight on the 30th August the defendant Ribbentrop read to the British Ambassador at top speed a document containing the first precise formulation of the German demands against Poland. He refused, however, to give the Ambassador a copy of this, and stated that in any case it was too late now, since no Polish plenipotentiary had arrived.
In the opinion of the Tribunal, the manner in which these negotiations were conducted by Hitler and Ribbentrop showed that they were not entered into in good faith or with any desire to maintain peace, but solely in the attempt to prevent Great Britain and France from honoring their obligations to Poland.
Parallel with these negotiations were the unsuccessful attempts made by Goering to effect the isolation of Poland by persuading Great Britain not to Dahlerus, a Swede, Dahlerus, who was called as a witness by stand by her pledged word, through the services of one Birger Goering, had a considerable knowledge of England and of things English, and in July 1939 was anxious to bring about a better understanding between England and Germany, in the hope of preventing a war between the two countries.
He got into contact with Goering as well as with official circles in London, and during the latter part of August, Goering used him as an unofficial intermediary to try and deter the British Government from their opposition to Germany's intentions towards Poland. Dahlerus, of course, had no knowledge at the time of the decision which Hitler had secretly announced on the 22nd August, nor of the German military directives for the attack on Poland which were already in existence. As he admitted in his evidence, it was not until the 26th September, after the conquest of Poland was virtually complete, that he first realized that Goering's aim all along had been to get Great Britain's consent to Germany's seizure of Poland.
After all attempts to persuade Germany to agree to a settlement of her dispute with Poland on a reasonable basis had failed, Hitler, on the 31st August, issued his final directive, in which he announced that the attack on Poland would start in the early morning hours of the 1st September, and gave instructions as to what action would be taken if Great Britain and France should enter the war in defense of Poland.
In the opinion of the Tribunal, the events of the days immediately preceding the 1st September 1939 demonstrate the determination of Hitler and his associates to carry out the declared intention of invading Poland at all costs, despite appeals from every quarter.
With the ever increasing evidence before him that this intention would lead to war with Great Britain and France as well, Hitler was resolved not to depart from the course he had set for himself, The Tribunal is fully satisfied by the evidence that the war initiated by Germany against Poland on the 1st September 1939 Was most plainly an aggressive war, which was to develop in due course into a war which embraced almost the whole world, and resulted in the commission of countless crimes, both against the laws and customs of war, and against humanity.
THE PRESIDENT:Now I shall ask M. Falco to continue the reading of the judgment.
M. TALCO:
THE INVASION OF DENMARK AND NORWAY The aggressive war against Poland was but the beginning.
The aggression of Nazi Germany quickly spread from country to country. In point of time the first two countries to suffer were Denmark and Norway.
On the 31st May 1939 a Treaty of Non-Agression was made between Germany and Denmark, and signed by the defendant Ribbentrop. It was there solemnly stated that the parties to the Treaty were "firmly resolved to maintain peace between Denmark and Germany under all circumstances." Nevertheless, Germany invaded Denmark on the 9th April, 1940.
On the 2nd September 1939, after the outbreak of war with Poland, Germany sent a solemn assurance to Norway in these terms.
"The German Reich Government is determined in view of the friendly relations which exist between Norway and Germany, under no circumstance to prejudice the in violability and integrity of Norway, and to respect the territory of the Norwegian State.
In making this de claration the Reich Government naturally expects, on its side, that Norway will observe an unimpeachable neutrality towards the Reich and till not by any third party Reich might occur.
Should tolerate any breached of Norwegian neutrality the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government differ from this so that any such breach of neutrality by a third party occurs, the Reich Government would then obviously be compelled to safeguard the interests of the Reich in such a way as the resulting situation might dictate."
On the 9th April 1940, in pursuance of her plan of campaign, Norway was invaded by Germany.
The idea of attacking Norway originated, it appears, with the defendants Raeder and Rosenberg. On the 3rd October 1939 Raeder prepared a memorandum on the subject of "gaining bases in Norway," and amongst the questions discussed was the question; "Can bases be gained by military force against Norway's will, if it is impossible to carry this out without fighting?" Despite this fact, three days later, further assurances were given to Norway by Germany, which stated:
"Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even points of controversy with the Northern States and neither has she any today."
Three days later again, the defendant Doenitz prepared a memorandum on the same subject, namely bases in Norway, and suggested the establishment of a base in Trondheim with an alternative of supplying fuel in Narvik. At the same time the defendant Raeder was in correspondence with Admiral Karls, who pointed out to him the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany. On the 10th October Raeder reported to Hitler the disadvantages to Germany which an occupation by the British would have. In the months of October and November Raeder continued to work on the possible occupation of Norway, in conjunction with the "Rosenberg Organization," The,"Rosenberg and Rosenberg as Reichsleiter was in charge of it.
Early in Organization" was the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the NSDAP, December, Quisling, the notorious Norwegian traitor, visited Berlin and was seen by the defendants Rosenberg and Raeder.
He put forward a plan for a coup d'etat in Norway. On the 12th December, the defendant Raeder and the naval staff, together with the defendants Keitel and Jodl, had a conference with Hitler, when Raeder reported on his interview with Quisling, and set out Quisling's views. On the 16th December Hitler himself interviewed Quisling on all these matters.
In the report of the activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the NSDAP for the years 1953-1943, under the heading of "Political preparations for the military occupation of Norway," it is stated that at the interview with Quisling Hitler said that he would prefer a neutral attitude on the part of Norway as well as the whole of Scandinavia, as he did not desire to extend the theatre of war, or to draw other nations into the conflict. If the enemy attempted to extend the war he would be compelled to guard himself against that undertaking however he promised Quisling financial support, and assigned to a special military staff the examination of the military questions involved.
On the 27th January 1940 a memorandum was prepared by the defendant Keitel regarding the plans for the invasion of Norway. On the 28th February 1970 the defendant Jodl entered in his diary:
"I proposed first to the Chief of OKW and then to the Fuehrer that "Case Yellow" (that is the operation against the Netherlands) and Weser Exercise (that is the operation against Norway and Denmark) must be prepared in such a way that they will be independent of one another as regards both time and forces employed."
Exercise which contained the words:
On the 1st March Hitler issued a directive regarding the Weser "The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces.
This operation should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic; further, it should guarantee our ore base in Swede a and give our Navy and Air Force a Wider start line against Britain.
.. The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in Norway must take place simultaneously.
.. It is most important that the Scandinavian States as well as the Western opponents should be taken by surprise by our measures."
On the 24th March the naval operation orders for the Weser Exercise were issued, and on the 30th March the defendant Doenitz as Commander-in-Chief of U-boats issued his operational order for the occupation of Denmark and Norway. On the 9th April 1940 the German forces invaded Norway and Denmark.
From this narrative it is clear that as early as October 1939 the question of invading Norway was under consideration. The defense that has been made here is that Germany was compelled to attack Norway to forestall an Allied invasion, and her action was therefore preventive.
It must be remembered that preventive action in foreign territory is justified only in case of "an instant and overwhelming necessity for self-defense, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation." (The Caroline Case, 1808.6.C.Rob.461). How widely the view was hold in influential German circles that the Allies intended to occupy Norway cannot be determined with exactitude. Quisling asserted that the Allies would intervene in Norway with the tacit consent of the Norwegian Government. The German Legation at Oslo disagreed with this view, although the Naval Attache at that Legation shared it.
January 13th 1940 stated that the Chief of the Naval Operations The War Diary of the German Naval Operations Staff for Staff thought that the most favourable solution would be the maintenance of the neutrality of Norway, but he harboured the firm conviction that England intended to occupy Norway in the near future relying on the tacit agreement of the Norwegian Government.
The directive of Hitler issued on March 1st 1940 for the attack on Denmark and Norway stated that the operation "should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic."
It is, however, to be remembered that the defendant Raeder's memorandum of the 3rd October 1939 makes no reference to forestalling the Allies, but is based upon "the aim of improving our strategical and operational position."
The memorandum Itself is headed "Gaining of Bases in Norway", The same observation applies mutatis mutandis to the memorandum of the defendant Doenitz of October 9th 1939.
Furthermore, on the 13th March the defendant Jodl recorded in his diary:
"Fuehrer does not give order yet for 'W' (Weser Exercise). He is still looking for an excuse."
(Justification?)
On the 14th March 1940 he again wrote:
"Fuehrer has not yet decided what reason to give for 'Weser Exercise'". On the 21st March 1940 he recorded the misgivings of Task Force XXI about the long interval between taking up readiness positions and the close of the diplomatic negotiations, and added:
"Fuehrer rejects any earlier negotiations, as otherwise calls for help go out to England and America, If resistance is put up it must be ruthlessly broken."
completed; on April 4th the Naval Operational Order was On April 2nd he records that all the preparations are issued; and on the 9th April, the invasion was begun.
From all this it is clear that when the plans for an attack on Norway were being made, they were not made for the purpose of forestalling an imminent Allied landing, but, at the most, that they might prevent an Allied occupation at some future date.
When the final orders for the German invasion of Norway were given, the diary of the Naval Operations Staff for March 23rd 1940 records:
"A mass encroachment by the English into Norwegian territorial waters ... is not to be expected at the present time."
And Admiral Assmann's entry for March 26th says:
"British landing in Norway not considered serious."
Documents which were subsequently captured by the Germans are relied on to show that the Allied plan to occupy harbours and airports in Western Norway was a definite plan, although in all points considerably behind the German plans under which the invasion was actually carried out. These documents indicate that an altered plan had been finally agreed upon on March 20th 1940, that a convoy should leave England on April 5th, and that mining in Norwegian waters would begin the same day; and that on April 5th the sailing time had been postponed until April 8th. But these plans were not the cause of the German invasion of Norway. Norway was occupied by Germany to afford her bases from which a more effective attack on England and France might be make, pursuant to plans prepared long in advance of the Allied plans which are now relied on to support the argument of Self defense.
in accordance with the reservations made by many of the It was further argued that Germany alone could decide, Signatory Powers at the time of the conclusion of the BriandKellogg Pact, whether preventive action was a necessity, and that in making her decision her judgment was conclusive.
But whether action taken under the claim of self-defense Was in fact aggressive or defensive must ultimately he subject to investigation and adjudication if international law is ever to be enforced.
No suggestion is made by the defendants that there was any plan by any belligerent, other than Germany, to occupy Denmark. No excuse for that aggression has ever been offered.
As the German armies entered Norway and Denmark, German memoranda were handed to the Norwegian and Danish Governments which gave the assurance that the German troops did not come as enemies, that they did not intend to make use of the points occupied by German troops as bases for operations against England, as long as they were not forced to do so by Treasures taken by England and France, and that they had come to protect the North against the proposed occupation of Norwegian strong points by English-French forces.
The memoranda added that Germany had no intention of infriging the territorial integrity and political independence of the Kingdom of Norway then or in the future. Nevertheless, on the 3rd of June 1940, a German Naval memorandum discussed the use to be made of Norway and Denmark, and put forward one solution for consideration, that the territories of Denmark and Norway acquired during the course of the war should continue to be occupied and German possessions.
organized so that they could in the future be considered as In the light of all the available evidence it is impossible to accept the contention that the invasions of Denmark and Norway were defensive, and in the opinion of the Tribunal they were acts of aggressive war.
THE INVASION OF BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS AND
LUXEMBURG The plan to seize Belgium and the Netherlands was considered in August 1938, when the attack on Czechoslovakia was being formulated, and the possibility of war with France and England was contemplated.
The advantage to Germany of being able to use these countries for their own purposes, particularly as air bases in the war against England and France, was emphasized. In May of 1939, when Hitler made his irrevocable decision to attack Poland, and foresaw the possibility at least of a war with England and France in consequence, he told his military commanders:
"Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied...
Declarations of neutrality must be ignored."
On August 22nd in the same year, he told his military commanders that England and France, in his opinion, would not "violate the neutrality of these countries." At the same time he assured Belgium and Holland and Luxemburg that he would respect their neutrality; and on the 6th October 1939, after the Polish campaign, he repeated this assurance. On the 7th October General von Brauchitsch directed Army Group B to prepare "for the immediate invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory, if the political situation so demands." In a series of orders, which were signed by the defendants Keitel and Jodl, the attack was fixed for the 10th November 1939, but it was postponed from time to time until May of 1940 on account of weather conditions and transport problems.
said:
At the conference on the 23rd November 1939 Hitler "We have an Achilles heel:
The Ruhr. The progress of the war depends on the possession of the Ruhr.
If England and France push through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the greatest danger.
.. Certainly England and France will assume the offensive against Germany when they are armed.
England and France have means of pressure to bring Belgium and Holland to request English and French help.
In Belgium and Holland the sympathies are all for France and England ... If the French army marches into Belgium in order to attack us, it will be too late for us.
We must anticipate them ...
We shall sow the English coast with mines which cannot be cleared.
This mine warfare with the Luftwaffe demands a different starting point.
England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves.
The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring England to her knees.
However, this can only occur if we have occupied Belgium and Holland ... My decision is unchangeable;I shall attack France and England at the most favorable and quickest moment.
Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless.
No one will question that when we have won. We shall not bring about the breach of neutrality as idiotically as it war in 1914.
If we do not break the neutrality, then England and France will.
Without attack, the war is not to be ended victoriously."
On the 10th May 1940 the German forces invaded the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg. On the same day the German Ambassadors handed to the Netherlands and Belgian Governments a memorandum alleging that the British and French armies, with the consent of Belgium and Holland, were planning to march through those countries to attack the Ruhr, and justifying the invasion on these grounds. Germany, however, assured the Netherlands and Belgium that their integrity and their possessions would be respected. A similar memorandum was delivered to Luxemburg on the same date.
There is no evidence before the Tribunal to justify the contention that the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg were invaded by Germany because their occupation had been planned by England and France.
British and French staffs had been cooperating for making certain plans for military operations in the Low Countries, but the purpose of this planning was to defend these countries in the event of a German attack.
The invasion of Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg was entirely without justification.
It was carried out in pursuance of policies long considered and prepared, and was plainly an act of aggressive war. The resolve to invade was made without any other consideration than the advancement of the aggressive policies of Germany.
THE AGGRESSION AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA AND GREECE
On the 12th August 1939 Hitler had a conversation with Ciano and the defendant Ribbentrop at Obersalzberg. He said then:
"Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for the neutrals to be liquidated one after the other.
This process could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one partner of the Axis covered the other while it was deal ing with the uncertain neutral.
Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a neutral of this kind."
This observat on was made only two months after Hitler had given assurances to Yugoslavia that he would regard her frontier as final and inviolable. On the occasion of the visit to Germany of the Prince Regent of Yugoslavia on 1st June 1939, Hitler had said in a public speech:
"The firmly established reliable relationship of Germany to Yugoslavia now that owing to historical events we have become neighbors with common boundaries fixed for all time, will not only guarantee but can also represent an element of calm to our lasting peace between our two peoples and countries, nerve-racked continent.
This peace is the goal of all who are disposed to perform really constructive work."
On the 6th October 1939 Germany repeated these assurances to Yugoslavia, after Hitler and Ribbentrop had unsuccessfully tried to persuade Italy to enter the war on the side of Germany by attacking Yugoslavia. On the 28th October 1940 Italy invaded Greece, but the military operations met with no success. In November Hitler wrote to Mussolini with regard to the invasion of Greece, and the extension of the war in the Balkans, and pointed out that no military operations could take place in the Balkans before the following March, and therefore Yugoslavia must if at all possible be won ever by other means, and in other ways. But on the 12th November 1940 Hitler issued a directive for the prosecution of the War, and it included the words:
"The Balkans: The Commander-inChief of the Army will make preparations, for occupying the Greek mainland north of the Aegean Sea.
, in case of need entering through Bulgaria."
On the 13th December he issued a directive concerning the operation "Marita," the code name for the invasion of Greece, in which he stated:
"1. The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive.
Because of a dangerous situation in Albania, it is doubly necessary that the British endeavor be failed to create air bases under the protection of a Balkan front, which would be danger ous above all to Italy as to the Rumanian oilfields.
2. My plan therefore is (a) to form a slowly Increasing task force in Southern Rumania within the next month, (b) after the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to send a task force for the occupation of the Aegean north coast by way of Bulgaria and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland."
at which the defendants Ribbentrop, Keitel, Jodl and others were present, On the 20th January 1941, at a meeting between Hitler and Mussolini, Hitler stated:
"The massing of troops in Rumania serves a threefold purpose.
(a) an operation against Greece;
(b) Protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey;
(c) Safeguarding the guarantee to Rumania ...
It is desirable that this deployment be completed without interference from the enemy.
Therefore, disclose the game as late as possible.
The ten dency will be to cross the Danube at the last pos sible moment, and to line up for attack at the earliest possible moment."
On the 19th February 1941 an OKW directive re the operation "Marita" stated:
"On the 18th February the Fuehrer made the following decision regarding the carrying out of Operation Marita:
The following dates are envisaged:
Commencement of building bridge 28th February:
Crossing of the Danube, 2nd March."
On the 3rd March 1941, British troops landed in Greece to assist the Greeks to resist the Italians; and on the 18th March, at a meeting between Hitler and the defendant Raeder, at which the defendants Keitel and Jodl were also present, the defendant Raeder asked for confirmation that the "whole of Greece will have to be occupied, even in the event of a peaceful settlement, "to which Hitler replied, "The complete occupation is a prerequisite of any settlement." On the 25th March, on the Occasion of the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact at a meeting in Vienna, the defendant Ribbentrop, on behalf of the German Government, confirmed the determination of Germany to respect the 26th March the Yugoslav Ministers, who had adhered to the Tripartite Pact, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia at all times.
On the were removed from office by a coup d'etat in Belgrade on their return iron Vienna, and the new Government repudiated the pact. Thereupon on 27th March, at a conference in Berlin with the High Command at which the defendants Goering, Keitel and Jodl were present, and the defendant Ribbentrop part of the time, Hitler stated that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in regard to the contemplated attack on Greece, and even more so with regard to the attack upon Russia which was to be conducted later on. Hitler announced that he was determined, without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new Government, to make all preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. He stated that he would act with "unmerciful harshness."
On the 6th April German forces invaded Greece and Yugoslavia without warning, and Belgrade Was bombed by the Luftwaffe. So swift was this particular invasion that there had not been time to establish any "incidents" as a usual preliminary, or to find and publish any adequate "political" explanations. As the attack was starting on the 6th April, Hitler proclaimed to the German people that this attack was necessary because the British forces in Greece (who were helping the Greeks to defend themselves against the Italians) represented a British attempt to extend the war to the Balkans.
It is clear from this narrative that aggressive war against Greece and Yugoslavia had long been in contemplation, Certainly as early as August of 1939. The fact that Great Britain had come to the assistance of the Greeks, and might thereafter be in a position to inflict great damage upon German countries.
interests was made the occasion for the occupation of both THE AGGRESSIVE WAR AGAINST THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.
On the 23rd August 1939 Germany signed the non-aggression pact with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
The evidence has shown unmistakably that the Soviet Union on their pert conformed to the terms of this pact; indeed the German Government itself had been assured of this by the highest German sources. Thus, the German Ambassador in Moscow informed his Government that the Soviet Union would go to war only if attacked by Germany, and this statement is recorded in the German War Diary under the date of June 6th 1941.
Nevertheless, as early as the late summer of 1940, Germany began to make preparations for an attack on the USSR, in spite of the non-aggression pact. This operation was secretly planned under the code name "Case Barbarossa", and the former Field Marshal Paulus testified that on the 3rd September 1940, when he joined the German General Staff, he continued developing "Case Barbarossa", which was finally completed at the beginning of November 1940; and that even then, the German General Staff had no information that the Soviet Union Was preparing for war.
On the 18th of December 1940 Hitler issued directive No. 21, initialled by Keitel and Jodl, which called for the completion of all preparations connected with the realization of "Case Barbarossa" by the 15th May 1941. This directive stated:
crush Soviet Russia In a quick campaign before "The German armed forces must be prepared to the end of the war against England.
.. Great Caution has to be exercised that the intention of an attack will not be recognized."
Before the directive of the 18th December had been made, the defendant Goering had informed General Thomas, chief of the Office of War Economy of the OKW, of the plan, and General Thomas made surveys of the economic possibilities of the USSR including its raw materials, its power and transport system, and its capacity to produce arms.
In accordance with these surveys, an economic staff for the Eastern territories with many military-economic units (Inspectorates, Commandos, groups) was created under the supervision of the defendant Goering. In conjunction with the military command, these units were to achieve the most complete and efficient economic exploitation of the occupied territories in the interest of Germany.
The framework of tie future political and economic organization of the occupied territories was designed by the defendant Rosenberg over a period of three months, after conferences with and assistance by the defendants Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Funk, Goering, Ribbentrop, and Frick or their representatives. It was made the subject of a most detailed report immediately after the invasion.
These plans outlined the destruction of the Soviet Union as an independent State, and its partition, the creation of so-called Reich Commissariats, and the conversion of Esthonia, Latvia, Byelorussia and other territories into German colonies.