And I again weigh further corroboration of General Lahousen's evidence in a memoranda, which has been captured, in a conversation between the writer and Keitel. It is PS-795, and it becomes GB 64. That conversation with Keitel took place on the 17th of August, and from the memorandum I quote the first paragraph:
"I reported my conference with Jost to Keitel. He said that He agrees that I instruct the General Staff.
He says that he does not think much of actions of this kind.
However, he had planned the execution of this special action.
In be executed only by the Army."
week in August -- I mean at the end of the third week in August. On the 22nd of August, the Russian--German-Non-aggression Pact was signed in Moscow, and we have heard in Hitler's speech of that date to his commanders in chief what has gone down as a shock to the rest of the world. In fact, the orders to invade Poland were given immediately after the signing of that Treaty, and the H-hour was actually to be in the early morning of the 25th of August. Orders were given to invade Poland in the early hours of the 25th of August, and that I shall prove in a moment. ment was signed in Moscow, news reached England that it was being signed, and that, of course, the significance of it from a military point of view as to Germany apparently in the present circumstances was obvious, and the British Government immediately made their position clear in one last hope, and that one last hope, if it was a hope, was that the German Government might possibly think better, and I refer to Document TC 72 No. 56; it is the first document in the next to the last part of the Tribunal Document Book, in which the Prime Minister wrote to Hitler.
That is Document Book GB 55:
"Your Excellency.
"Your Excellency will have already heard of certain measures taken by His Majesty's Government, and announced in the press and on the wireless this evening.
"These steps have, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, been rendered necessary by the military movements which have been reported from Germany, and by the fact that apparently the announcement of a German-Soviet Agreement is taken in some quarters in Berlin to indicate that intervention by Great Britain on behalf of Poland is no longer a contingency that need be reckoned with. No greater mistake could be made. Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet Agreement, it can not alter Great Britain's obligation to Poland, which His Majesty's Government have stated in public repeatedly and plainly, and which they are determined to fulfill.
"It has been alleged that, if His Majesty's Government had made their position clear in 1914, the great catastrophe would have been avoided.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you going too far,
SIR GRIFFITH JONES: "It has been alleged that, if His Majesty's Government had made their position more clear in 1914, the great catastrophe would have been avoided. Whether or not there is any force in that allegation, His Majesty's Government are resolved that on this occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding.
"If the case should arise, they are resolved, and prepared, to employ without delay all the forces at their command, and it is impossible to forsee the end of hostilities once engaged. It would be a dangerous illusion to think that, if war once starts, it will come to an early end even if a success on any one of the several fronts on which it will be engaged should have been secured." try to solve the difficulty without the course to the use of force, and they suggested that a truce should be declared while direct discussions between the two governments, the Poland and German Governments, might take place. I quote in Prime Minister Chamberlain's language:
"At this moment I confess I can see no other way to avoid a catastrophe that will involve Europe in war. In view of the grave consequences to humanity, which may follow from the action of their rulers, I trust that Your Excellency will weigh with the utmost deliberation the considerations which I have put before you." Prime Minister Chamberlain, and that document is TC 72 No. 60, and it becomes GB 56. He started off by saying that Germany has always sought England's friendship, and goes on and says that, "Like every other State possesses certain definite interests which it is impossible to renounce." I quote the third paragraph as follows:
"Germany was prepared to settle the questions of Danzig, and of the Corridor by the method of negotiation on the basis of a proposal of truly unparalleled magnanimity. The allegations disseminated by England regarding a German mobilization against Poland, the assertion of aggressive designs towards Roumania, Hungary, etc., as well as the so-called guarantee declarations, which were subsequently given, had, however, dispelled Polish inclination to "negotiate on a basis of this kind which would have been tolerable for Germany also.
"The unconditional assurance given by England to Poland that she would render assistance to that country in all circumstances regardless of the causes from which a conflict might spring, could only be interpreted in that country as an encouragement thence-forward to unloosen, under cover of such a charter, a wave of appalling terrorism against the one and a half million German inhabitants living in Poland."
which I just referred:
"The atrocities which then have been taking place in that country are terrible for the victims, but intolerable for a Great Power such as the German Reich, which is expected to remain a passive onlooker during these happenings. Poland has been guilty of numerous breaches of her legal obligations towards the Free City of Danzig, has made demands in the character of ultimata, and has initiated a process of economic strangulation."
It goes on and says that "Germany will not tolerate a continuance of the persecution of the Germans," and the fact there is a British guarantee to Poland makes no difference to its determination to end this state of affairs. I quote from paragraph 7:
"The German Reich Government has received information to the effect that the British Government has the intention to carry out measures of mobilization which, according to the statements contained in your own letter, are clearly directed against Germany alone. This is said to be true of France as well. Since Germany has never had the intention of taking military measures other than those of a defensive character against England, or France, and, as has already been emphasized, has never intended, and does not in the future intend, to attack England, or France, it follows that this announcement, as confirmed by you, Mr. Prime Minister, in your own letter, can only refer to a contemplated act of menace directed against the Reich.
I, therefore, inform your Excellency that in the event of these military announcements being carried into effect, I shall order immediate moblization of the German forces."
If the intention of the German Government had been peaceful. If they really wanted peace and not war, what was the purpose of these lines, of these lines saying that they had never intended to attack England or France, and carry out no mobilization. In view of what we now have, what we know to be in those lines, what again was their intention, adding again the expression, of peaceful settlemtn of the Danzig question, when I quote again from the last paragraph:
"The question of the treatment of European problems on a peaceful basis is not a decision which rests on Germany, but primarily on those who since the crime committed by the Versailles distate have stubbornly and consistently opposed any peaceful revision. Only after a change of spirit on the part of the responsible Powers can there be any real change in the relationship between England and Germany. I have all my life fought for Anglo German friendship; the attitude adopted by British diplomacy - at any rate up to the present - has, however, convinced me of the futility of such an attempt. Should there be any change in this respect in the future, nobody could be happier than I." assistance was signed in London. It is unnecessary to read that document. The Tribunal will be wall aware of its contents where both governments undertake to give assistance to the other in the event of aggression against either by any third power. I quote document TC-73, No. 91 which becomes GB-57. I shall refer to a letter between the British Prime Minister, and refer also to a similar correspondence which took place a few days later between the French Prime Minister Daladier and Hitler.
I invite your attention to this because it is desired to show how deliberately the German Government was set about their pattern of aggression. "The French Ambassador in Berlin has informed me of your personal communication," written on the 26th August.
"In the hours in which you speak of the greatest responsibility which two heads of the Governments can possibly take upon themselves, namely, that of shedding the blood of two great nations, who long only for peace and work, I feel I owe it to you personally, and to both our peoples to say that the fate of peace still rests in your hands.
"You can doubt whether my own feelings towards Germany, nor France peaceful feelings--" I think that must be a mistake. It should be, "You cannot doubt".
THE PRESIDENT: "You cannot doubt what are my own feelings"
SIR GRIFFITH JONES: Yes, I am obliged to you sir.
"I cannot doubt" I think that should be. I think that must be a mistake. I think that must be it.
"You cannot doubt but what are my own feelings towards Germany, nor France's peaceful feelings towards your nation. No Frenchman has done more than myself to strengthen between our two nations not only peace, but also sincere cooperation in their own interests, as well as in those of Europe and of the whole world. Unless you credit the French people with lower sense of honor, than I credit the German Nation with; you cannot doubt that France loyaly fulfills her obligations towards other powers, such as Poland, which as I am fully convinced, wants to live in peace with Germany.
"These two convictions are fully compatible.
"Till now there has been nothing to prevent a peaceful solution of the international crisis, with all honor and dignity for all nations, if the same will for peace exists on all sides.
"Together with the good will of France I proclaim that of all her allies. I take it upon myself to guarantee Poland's readiness, which she has always shown to submit to the mutual application of a method of open settlement, as it can be imagined between the governments of two sovereign nations. With the clearest conscience I can assure you that among the differences which have arisen between Germany and Poland over the question of Danzig, there is not one which could not be submitted to such a method, the purpose of reaching a peaceful and just solution.
"Moreover, I can declare on my honor that there is nothing in France's clear and loyal solidarity with Poland and her allies, which could in any way prejudice the peaceful attitude of my country. This solidarity has never prevented us, and does not prevent us today, from keeping Poland in the same friendly state of mind.
"In so serious an hour, I sincerely believe that no high minded human being could understand it, if a war of destruction was started without a last attempt being made to reach a peaceful settlement between Germany and Poland. Your desire for peace could in all certainty work for this aim, without any prejudice to German honour. I, who desire good harmony between the French and the German people, and who am on the other hand bound to Poland by bonds of friendship, and by a promise, am prepared, as head of the French Government, to do everything an upright man can do to bring this attempt to a successful conclusion.
You and I were in the trenches in the last war. "You know, as I do, what horror and condemnation the devastations of that war have left in the conscience of the peoples; without any regard to its outcome. The picture I can see in my mind's eye of your outstanding role as the leader of the German people on the road of peace, towards the fulfilment of its task in the common work of civilization, leads me to ask for a reply to this suggestion.
"If French and German blood should be shed again, as it was shed 25 years ago, in a still longer and more murderous war, then each of the two nations will fight, believing in its own victory. But the most certain victors will be - destruction and barbarity."
THE PRESIDENT: I think we will adjourn now until two o'clock.
(Whereupon at 1300 hours the hearing of the Tribunal adjourned to reconvene at 1400 hours). Official transcript of the International Military Tribunal, in the matter of:
The
COLONEL STOREY: If it please the Tribunal, with the consent of Mr. Jones may I make an announcement to the Defense Counsel.
This evening at 7:30, in the courtroom there will be a showing of the remainder of the moving pictures which the United States intends to introduce in evidence. At 7:30, in the courtroom this evening, the remainder of the motion pictures which the United States will offer in evidence will be shown for the Defense Counsel. We urge that all of them come at 7:30.
DR. DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): I believe I should explain in the name of the defense that in regard to films it doesn't seem necessary to ask that the films be shown twice. We recognize the cooperation of the prosecution in this respect, but our evenings are very much taken up by the preparation of the defense and talking to our clients. ments. Documents have to be read in advance, but inasmuch as the witnesses are only coming up during the main proceedings, the movie will only be used during the main proceedings, and I don't really believe that the prosecution will have to take the trouble to show us the movies twice, the night before as well as the day after. only that we are so very much preoccupied with our preparations that we do not have the time to come at night. But I repeat that we recognize the cooperation of the prosecution very much indeed. I would like you to understand my words in this respect.
THE PRESIDENT: Do I understand that you think it will be unnecessary for the Defendants' Counsel to have a preview of the films, to see them before they are produced in evidence? Is that what you are saying?
DR. DIX: That is what I said, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, I am not sure that you were here when Dr. Dix began his observations, but I understand that what he says is that in view of the amount of preparation which the Defendant's Counsel have to undertake, they do not consider it necessary to have a view of these films before they are produced in evidence, but at the same time he wishes to express his gratification at the cooperation of the Counsel for the prosecution.
COLONEL STOREY: Very agreeable. It's all right with us. We were doing it for their benefit.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. GRIFFITH-JONES: When the Tribunal rose for the adjournment, I had just read the letter from M. Daladier of the 26th of August. On the 27th of August, Hitler replied to that letter, and I think it unnecessary to read the reply. The sense of it was very much the same as that which he wrote to the British Prime Minister in answer to the letter that he had received earlier in the week. in evidence as GB-58, so perhaps the Tribunal would treat both those letters as the same number. After that, nobdoy could say that the German Government was in any doubt as to the position that was to be taken up by both the British and French Governments in the event of German aggression against Poland.
But the pleas for peace did not end there. On the 24th of August, President Roosevelt wrote to both Hitler and to the President of the Polish Republic, I quote only the first few paragraphs of his letter:
"In the message which I sent you on the 14th April, I stated that it appeared to be that the leaders of great nations had it in their power to liberate their peoples from the disaster that impended, but that, unless the effort were immediately made, with good mil on all sides, to find a peaceful and constructive solution to existing controversies, the crisis which the world was confronting must end in catastrophe appears to be very near at hand indeed" Tribunal will forgive me if I read a little slower.
"To the message which I sent you last April I have received no reply, but because my confident belief that the cause of world peace which is the cause of humanity itself - rises above all other considerations, I am again addressing myself to you, with the hope that the war which impends and the consequent disaster to all peoples may yet be averted.
"I therefore urge with all earnestness - and I am likewise urging the President of the Republic of Poland - that the Government of Germany and Poland agree by common accord to refrain from any positive act of hostility for a reasonable stipulated period, and that they agree, likewise by common accord, to solve the controversies which have arisen between them by one of the three following methods:
"First, by direct negotiation;
"Second, by the submission of these controversies to an impartial arbitration in which they can both have confidence; or "Third, that they agree to the solution of these controversies through the procedure of conciliation."
have already indicated to the Tribunal, the answer to that was the order to his armed forces to invade Poland on the following morning.
That document is TC 72, No. 124, which becomes GB-59.
I put in evidence also the next document, TC 72, No. 126, GB-60, which is the reply to that letter from the President of the Polish Republic, in which he accepts the offer to settle the differences by any of the peaceful methods suggested. German Government, president Roosevelt wrote again:
"I have this hour received from the President of Poland a reply to the message which I addressed to your Excellency and to him last night."
"Your Excellency has repeatedly publicly stated that the aims and objects sought by the German Reich were just and reasonable.
"In his reply to my message the President of Poland has made it plain that the Polish Government is willing, upon the basis set forth in my message, to agree to solve the controversy which has arisen between the Republic of Poland and the German Reich by direct negotiation or the process of conciliation.
"Countless human lives can yet be saved and hope may still be restored that the nations of the modern world may even now construct the foundation for a peaceful and happier relationship, if you and the Government of the German Reich will agree to the pacific means of settlement accepted by the Government of Poland. All the world prays that Germany, too, will accept." appeals by the Pope which appear in the next document.
I'm sorry-- the President of Poland's reply becomes GB-61. to the Pope's appeal, which is TC 72, No. 139, on the same date, the 24th of August, which becomes GB-62. I don't think it is necessary to read that. It is an appeal in similar terms. And there is yet a further appeal from the Pope on the 31st of August, TC 72, No. 14, which becomes GB-63. It is 141; I beg your pardon. It is TC 72, No. 141. I think the printing is wrong in the Tribunal's translation:
"The Pope is unwilling to abandon hope that pending negotiations may lead to a just pacific solution such as the whole world continues to pray for."
I think it is unnecessary to read the remainder of that. If the Pope had realized that those negotiations, to which he referred as "pending negotiations", on the last days of August, which we are about to deal with now, were completely bogus negotiations, bogus in so far as Germany was concerned and put forward, as indeed they were, and as I hope to illustrate to the Tribunal in a moment, simply as an endeavor to dissuade England, either by threat or by bribe, from meeting her obligations to Poland, then perhaps he would have saved himself the trouble of ever addressing that last appeal. which I now turn were no offers in the accepted sense of the word at all, that there was never any intention behind them of entering into discussions, negotiation, arbitration, or any other form of peaceful settlement with Poland. They were just an attempt to make it rather easier to seize and conquer Poland than appeared likely if England and France observed the obligations that they had undertaken. a word those, last negotiations. was signed. On the 24th of August orders were given to his armies to march the following morning. After those orders had been given, the news apparently reached the German Government that the British and Polish Governments had actually signed a formal pact of nonaggression and of mutual assistance. Up until that time, it will be remembered, the position was that the Prime Minister had made a statement in the House and a joint communique had been issued -- I think on the 6th of April -- that they would in fact assist one another if either were attacked, but that no formal agreement had been signed. him, the news came that such a formal document had been signed and the invasion was postponed for the sole purpose of making one last effort to keep England and France out of the war -- not to and the war, not to cancel the war, but to keep them out.
Hitler issued a verbal communique to Sir Neville Henderson which, as the Tribunal will see, was a mixture of bribe and threat, with which he hoped to persuade England to keep out. Government's reply to that communique to Hitler. That reply stressed that the differences ought to be settled by agreement. The British Government put forward the view that Danzig should be guaranteed, and indeed any agreement come to should be guaranteed by other powers, which, of course, in any event would have been quite unacceptable to the German Reich. and not acceptable because once it had been made clear -- as indeed it was in that British Government's reply of the 28th of August -- that England would not be put off assisting Poland in the event of German aggression, the German Government really had no concern with further negotiation but were concerned only to afford themselves some kind of justification and to prevent themselves appearing too blatantly to turn down all the appeals to reason that were being put forward.
On the 29th of August, in the evening at 7:15 p.m., Hitler handed to Sir Neville Henderson the German Government's answer to the British Government's reply of the 28th. And here again in this document it is quite clear that the whole object of it was to put forward something which was quite unacceptable. He agrees to enter into direct conversations as suggested by the British Government, but he demands that these conversations must be based upon the return of Danzig to the Reich, and also of the whole of the Corridor. Poland had renounced the 1934 agreement, even then he had put forward as his demands the return of Danzig alone, and the arrangement for an extra-territorial Autobahn and railroad running through the Corridor to East Prussia. That was unacceptable then. To make quite certain, he now demands the whole of the Corridor, no question of an Autobahn or railway. The whole thing must become German. be accepted, he says, "On those terms I am prepared to enter into discussion, but to do so, as the matter is urgent, I expect a plenipotentiary with full powers from the Polish Government to be here in Berlin by midnight tomorrow night, the 30th of August."
This offer was made at 7:15 p.m. on the eveing of the 29th. That offer had to be transmitted, first, to London; and from London to Warsaw; and from Warsaw the Polish Government had to give authority to their Ambassador in Berlin. So that the timing made it quite impossible, if indeed it were possible, to get authority to their Ambassador in Berlin by midnight the following night. It allowed them no kind of opportunity for discussing the matters at all. As Sir Neville Henderson described it, the offer amounted to an ultimatum.
Plenipotentiary was expected to arrive, Sir Neville Henderson saw Ribbentrop, and I shall read to you the account of that interview, in which Sir Neville Henderson handed a further massage to Ribbentrop in reply to the message that had been handed to him the previous evening, and at which Ribbentrop read out in German a two or three page document which purported to be the German proposal to be discussed at the discussions between them and the Polish Government. He read it out quickly in German. He refused to hand a copy of it to the British Ambassador. He passed no copy of it at all to the Polish Ambassador. So that there was no kind of possible chance of the Poles ever having before them the proposals which Germany was so graciously and magnanimously offering to discuss.
On the following day, the 31st of August, Mr. Lipski saw Ribbentrop and could get no further than to be asked whether he came with full powers. When he did not -- when he said he did not come with full powers, Ribbentrop said that he would out the position before the Fuehrer. But, in actual fact, it was much too late to put any position to the Fuehrer by that time, because on the 31st of August-I am afraid I am unable to give you the exact time -- but on the 31st of August, Hitler had already issued his Directive No. 1 for the conduct of war, in which he laid down H-Hour as being a quarter to five the following morning, the 1st of September. And on the evening of the 31st of August, at 9 o'clock, the German radio published, broadcast, the proposals which Ribbentrop had read out to Sir Neville Henderson the night before, saying that these were the proposals which had been made for discussion, but that as no Polish Plenipotentiary had arrived, to discuss them, the German Government assumed that they were turned down. That broadcast at 9 o'clock on the evening of the 31st of August was the first that the Poles had ever, heard of the proposal, and they were the first in fact that the British Government or its representatives in Berlin knew about them, other than what had been heard when Ribbentrop had read them out and refused to give a written copy on the evening of the 30th.
After that broadcast, at 9:15, perhaps when the broadcast was in its course, a copy of those proposals was handed to Sir Neville Henderson for the first time. the timing of events during that last week, I would ask the Tribunal to refer briefly to the remaining documents in that document book. Defendant Goering which was taken on the 29th of August 1945.
DR. STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Goering): As the Defense Counsel of the Defendant Goering, I would like to mention to the . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Go on; I haven't heard what you said.
DR. STAHMER: As Defense Counsel of the Defendant Goering, I object to the presentation of the documents, which is an excerpt of a cross-examination of a witness.
The Defendant Goering is right here and can himself be heard as a witness on the subject which has been documented in this brief.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that your objection?
DR. STAHMER: Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not understand the ground of your objection, in view of Article 15 C and Article 16 B of the Charter. Article 15 C provides that the Chief prosecutors shall undertake, among others, the duty of the preliminary examination of all necessary witnesses and of the defendants; and Article 16 provides that in order to insure fair trial for the defendants, the following procedure shall be followed: B - During any preliminary examination of a defendant he shall have the right to give any explanation relevant to the charges made against him; C - A preliminary examination of a defendant shall be conducted in or translated into a language which the defendant understands. Those provisions of the Charter, in the opinion of the Tribunal, show that the defendants may be interrogated and that their interrogations may be put in evidence.
DR. STAHMER: I have only said it from the premise that the possibility exists to discuss, to cross-examine the witness, as would be as strong evidence as to summon the witness himself.
THE PRESIDENT: You certainly have the opportunity of summoning the Defendant for whom you appear to give evidence himself, but that has nothing to do with the admissibility of his interrogation -his preliminary examination.
MR. GRIFFITH-JONES: This extract is TC 90, which I put in as GB 64. I quote from the middle of the first answer. It is at the end of the 7th line.
THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment.
MR. GRIFFITH-JONES: TC 90, your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Does it come before TC 72?
MR. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes, it does. It comes before some of TC 72.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.
MR. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is immediately after the Pope's appeal.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
MR. GRIFFITH-JONES: The Defendant Goering says there: "On the day when England gave her official guarantee to Poland the Fuehrer called me on the telephone and told me that he had stopped the plannned invasion of Poland. I asked him then whether this was just temporary or for good. He said 'No, I will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention'".
THE PRESIDENT: Oughtn't you to read the question before the answer?
MR. GRIFFITH-JONES: I go back to the question: "When the negotiations of the Polish Foreign Minister in London brought about the Anglo-Polish Treaty at the end of March or the beginning of April, was it not fairly obvious that a peaceful solution was impossible?
"Answer: 'Yes, it seemed impossible after my conviction.'" I think that must be a bad translation -- "according to my conviction."
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. GRIFFITH-JONES: (continuing) "'but not according to the convictions of the Fuehrer. When it was mentioned to the Fuehrer that England had given her guarantee to Poland, he said that England was also guaranteeing Rumania, but then when the Russians took Bessarabia nothing happened, and this made a big impression on him. I made a mistake here. At this time Poland only had the promise of a guarantee. The guarantee itself was only given shortly before the beginning of the war. On the day when England gave her official guarantee to Poland the Fuehrer called me on the telephone and told me that he had stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then whether this was just temporary or for good. He said, "No, I will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention." So then I asked him, "Do you think that it will be any different within four or five days?" At this same time -- I don't know whether you know about that, Colonel -- I was in connection with Lord Halifax by a special courier outside the regular diplomatic channels to do everything to stop war with England.
After the guarantee I held an English declaration of war inevitable. I already told him in the Spring of 1939 after occupying Czechoslovakia. I told him that from now on if he tried to solve the Polish question he would have to count on the enmity of England. 1939, that is after the Protectorate.
"Question: 'Is it not a fact that preparations for the campaign against Poland were originally supposed to have been completed by the end of August 1939?
"Answer: 'Yes.
"And that the final issuance of the order for the campaign against Poland came some time between the 15th and 20th of August 1939 after the signing of the treaty with Soviet Russia?" -- The dates obviously are wrong there.
"Answer: 'Yes, that is true.
"Question: 'Is it not also a fact that the start of the campaign was ordered for the 25th of August, but on the 24th of August in the afternoon it was postponed until September the 1st in order to await the results of new diplomatic maneuvers with the English Ambassador?
"Answer: 'Yes.'" paragraph, where Goering is purporting not to want war with England. The Court will remember how, after the famous speech on the 22nd of August to his commanders-in-chief, Goering got up and thanked the Fuehrer for his exhortation and assured him that the armed forces would play their part. matter a little further, and we go on to Hitler's verbal communique, as it is called in the British Blue Book, that he handed to Sir Nevile Henderson on the 25th of August, after he had heard of the signing of the Anglo-Polish agreement, in an endeavor to keep England from meeting her obligations. He states, in the first paragraph, after hearing the British Ambassador he is anxious to make one more effort to save war.