"To the message which I sent you last April I have received no reply, but because my confident belief that the cause of world peace which is the cause of humanity itself - rises above all other considerations, I am again addressing myself to you, with the hope that the war which impends and the consequent disaster to all peoples may yet be averted.
"I therefore urge with all earnestness - and I am likewise urging the President of the Republic of Poland - that the Government of Germany and Poland agree by common accord to refrain from any positive act of hostility for a reasonable stipulated period, and that they agree, likewise by common accord, to solve the controversies which have arisen between them by one of the three following methods:
"First, by direct negotiation;
"Second, by the submission of these controversies to an impartial arbitration in which they can both have confidence; or "Third, that they agree to the solution of these controversies through the procedure of conciliation."
have already indicated to the Tribunal, the answer to that was the order to his armed forces to invade Poland on the following morning.
That document is TC 72, No. 124, which becomes GB-59.
I put in evidence also the next document, TC 72, No. 126, GB-60, which is the reply to that letter from the President of the Polish Republic, in which he accepts the offer to settle the differences by any of the peaceful methods suggested. German Government, president Roosevelt wrote again:
"I have this hour received from the President of Poland a reply to the message which I addressed to your Excellency and to him last night."
"Your Excellency has repeatedly publicly stated that the aims and objects sought by the German Reich were just and reasonable.
"In his reply to my message the President of Poland has made it plain that the Polish Government is willing, upon the basis set forth in my message, to agree to solve the controversy which has arisen between the Republic of Poland and the German Reich by direct negotiation or the process of conciliation.
"Countless human lives can yet be saved and hope may still be restored that the nations of the modern world may even now construct the foundation for a peaceful and happier relationship, if you and the Government of the German Reich will agree to the pacific means of settlement accepted by the Government of Poland. All the world prays that Germany, too, will accept." appeals by the Pope which appear in the next document.
I'm sorry-- the President of Poland's reply becomes GB-61. to the Pope's appeal, which is TC 72, No. 139, on the same date, the 24th of August, which becomes GB-62. I don't think it is necessary to read that. It is an appeal in similar terms. And there is yet a further appeal from the Pope on the 31st of August, TC 72, No. 14, which becomes GB-63. It is 141; I beg your pardon. It is TC 72, No. 141. I think the printing is wrong in the Tribunal's translation:
"The Pope is unwilling to abandon hope that pending negotiations may lead to a just pacific solution such as the whole world continues to pray for."
I think it is unnecessary to read the remainder of that. If the Pope had realized that those negotiations, to which he referred as "pending negotiations", on the last days of August, which we are about to deal with now, were completely bogus negotiations, bogus in so far as Germany was concerned and put forward, as indeed they were, and as I hope to illustrate to the Tribunal in a moment, simply as an endeavor to dissuade England, either by threat or by bribe, from meeting her obligations to Poland, then perhaps he would have saved himself the trouble of ever addressing that last appeal. which I now turn were no offers in the accepted sense of the word at all, that there was never any intention behind them of entering into discussions, negotiation, arbitration, or any other form of peaceful settlement with Poland. They were just an attempt to make it rather easier to seize and conquer Poland than appeared likely if England and France observed the obligations that they had undertaken. a word those, last negotiations. was signed. On the 24th of August orders were given to his armies to march the following morning. After those orders had been given, the news apparently reached the German Government that the British and Polish Governments had actually signed a formal pact of nonaggression and of mutual assistance. Up until that time, it will be remembered, the position was that the Prime Minister had made a statement in the House and a joint communique had been issued -- I think on the 6th of April -- that they would in fact assist one another if either were attacked, but that no formal agreement had been signed. him, the news came that such a formal document had been signed and the invasion was postponed for the sole purpose of making one last effort to keep England and France out of the war -- not to and the war, not to cancel the war, but to keep them out.
Hitler issued a verbal communique to Sir Neville Henderson which, as the Tribunal will see, was a mixture of bribe and threat, with which he hoped to persuade England to keep out. Government's reply to that communique to Hitler. That reply stressed that the differences ought to be settled by agreement. The British Government put forward the view that Danzig should be guaranteed, and indeed any agreement come to should be guaranteed by other powers, which, of course, in any event would have been quite unacceptable to the German Reich. and not acceptable because once it had been made clear -- as indeed it was in that British Government's reply of the 28th of August -- that England would not be put off assisting Poland in the event of German aggression, the German Government really had no concern with further negotiation but were concerned only to afford themselves some kind of justification and to prevent themselves appearing too blatantly to turn down all the appeals to reason that were being put forward.
On the 29th of August, in the evening at 7:15 p.m., Hitler handed to Sir Neville Henderson the German Government's answer to the British Government's reply of the 28th. And here again in this document it is quite clear that the whole object of it was to put forward something which was quite unacceptable. He agrees to enter into direct conversations as suggested by the British Government, but he demands that these conversations must be based upon the return of Danzig to the Reich, and also of the whole of the Corridor. Poland had renounced the 1934 agreement, even then he had put forward as his demands the return of Danzig alone, and the arrangement for an extra-territorial Autobahn and railroad running through the Corridor to East Prussia. That was unacceptable then. To make quite certain, he now demands the whole of the Corridor, no question of an Autobahn or railway. The whole thing must become German. be accepted, he says, "On those terms I am prepared to enter into discussion, but to do so, as the matter is urgent, I expect a plenipotentiary with full powers from the Polish Government to be here in Berlin by midnight tomorrow night, the 30th of August."
This offer was made at 7:15 p.m. on the eveing of the 29th. That offer had to be transmitted, first, to London; and from London to Warsaw; and from Warsaw the Polish Government had to give authority to their Ambassador in Berlin. So that the timing made it quite impossible, if indeed it were possible, to get authority to their Ambassador in Berlin by midnight the following night. It allowed them no kind of opportunity for discussing the matters at all. As Sir Neville Henderson described it, the offer amounted to an ultimatum.
Plenipotentiary was expected to arrive, Sir Neville Henderson saw Ribbentrop, and I shall read to you the account of that interview, in which Sir Neville Henderson handed a further massage to Ribbentrop in reply to the message that had been handed to him the previous evening, and at which Ribbentrop read out in German a two or three page document which purported to be the German proposal to be discussed at the discussions between them and the Polish Government. He read it out quickly in German. He refused to hand a copy of it to the British Ambassador. He passed no copy of it at all to the Polish Ambassador. So that there was no kind of possible chance of the Poles ever having before them the proposals which Germany was so graciously and magnanimously offering to discuss.
On the following day, the 31st of August, Mr. Lipski saw Ribbentrop and could get no further than to be asked whether he came with full powers. When he did not -- when he said he did not come with full powers, Ribbentrop said that he would out the position before the Fuehrer. But, in actual fact, it was much too late to put any position to the Fuehrer by that time, because on the 31st of August-I am afraid I am unable to give you the exact time -- but on the 31st of August, Hitler had already issued his Directive No. 1 for the conduct of war, in which he laid down H-Hour as being a quarter to five the following morning, the 1st of September. And on the evening of the 31st of August, at 9 o'clock, the German radio published, broadcast, the proposals which Ribbentrop had read out to Sir Neville Henderson the night before, saying that these were the proposals which had been made for discussion, but that as no Polish Plenipotentiary had arrived, to discuss them, the German Government assumed that they were turned down. That broadcast at 9 o'clock on the evening of the 31st of August was the first that the Poles had ever, heard of the proposal, and they were the first in fact that the British Government or its representatives in Berlin knew about them, other than what had been heard when Ribbentrop had read them out and refused to give a written copy on the evening of the 30th.
After that broadcast, at 9:15, perhaps when the broadcast was in its course, a copy of those proposals was handed to Sir Neville Henderson for the first time. the timing of events during that last week, I would ask the Tribunal to refer briefly to the remaining documents in that document book. Defendant Goering which was taken on the 29th of August 1945.
DR. STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Goering): As the Defense Counsel of the Defendant Goering, I would like to mention to the . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Go on; I haven't heard what you said.
DR. STAHMER: As Defense Counsel of the Defendant Goering, I object to the presentation of the documents, which is an excerpt of a cross-examination of a witness.
The Defendant Goering is right here and can himself be heard as a witness on the subject which has been documented in this brief.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that your objection?
DR. STAHMER: Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not understand the ground of your objection, in view of Article 15 C and Article 16 B of the Charter. Article 15 C provides that the Chief prosecutors shall undertake, among others, the duty of the preliminary examination of all necessary witnesses and of the defendants; and Article 16 provides that in order to insure fair trial for the defendants, the following procedure shall be followed: B - During any preliminary examination of a defendant he shall have the right to give any explanation relevant to the charges made against him; C - A preliminary examination of a defendant shall be conducted in or translated into a language which the defendant understands. Those provisions of the Charter, in the opinion of the Tribunal, show that the defendants may be interrogated and that their interrogations may be put in evidence.
DR. STAHMER: I have only said it from the premise that the possibility exists to discuss, to cross-examine the witness, as would be as strong evidence as to summon the witness himself.
THE PRESIDENT: You certainly have the opportunity of summoning the Defendant for whom you appear to give evidence himself, but that has nothing to do with the admissibility of his interrogation -his preliminary examination.
MR. GRIFFITH-JONES: This extract is TC 90, which I put in as GB 64. I quote from the middle of the first answer. It is at the end of the 7th line.
THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment.
MR. GRIFFITH-JONES: TC 90, your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Does it come before TC 72?
MR. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes, it does. It comes before some of TC 72.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.
MR. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is immediately after the Pope's appeal.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
MR. GRIFFITH-JONES: The Defendant Goering says there: "On the day when England gave her official guarantee to Poland the Fuehrer called me on the telephone and told me that he had stopped the plannned invasion of Poland. I asked him then whether this was just temporary or for good. He said 'No, I will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention'".
THE PRESIDENT: Oughtn't you to read the question before the answer?
MR. GRIFFITH-JONES: I go back to the question: "When the negotiations of the Polish Foreign Minister in London brought about the Anglo-Polish Treaty at the end of March or the beginning of April, was it not fairly obvious that a peaceful solution was impossible?
"Answer: 'Yes, it seemed impossible after my conviction.'" I think that must be a bad translation -- "according to my conviction."
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. GRIFFITH-JONES: (continuing) "'but not according to the convictions of the Fuehrer. When it was mentioned to the Fuehrer that England had given her guarantee to Poland, he said that England was also guaranteeing Rumania, but then when the Russians took Bessarabia nothing happened, and this made a big impression on him. I made a mistake here. At this time Poland only had the promise of a guarantee. The guarantee itself was only given shortly before the beginning of the war. On the day when England gave her official guarantee to Poland the Fuehrer called me on the telephone and told me that he had stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then whether this was just temporary or for good. He said, "No, I will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention." So then I asked him, "Do you think that it will be any different within four or five days?" At this same time -- I don't know whether you know about that, Colonel -- I was in connection with Lord Halifax by a special courier outside the regular diplomatic channels to do everything to stop war with England.
After the guarantee I held an English declaration of war inevitable. I already told him in the Spring of 1939 after occupying Czechoslovakia. I told him that from now on if he tried to solve the Polish question he would have to count on the enmity of England. 1939, that is after the Protectorate.
"Question: 'Is it not a fact that preparations for the campaign against Poland were originally supposed to have been completed by the end of August 1939?
"Answer: 'Yes.
"And that the final issuance of the order for the campaign against Poland came some time between the 15th and 20th of August 1939 after the signing of the treaty with Soviet Russia?" -- The dates obviously are wrong there.
"Answer: 'Yes, that is true.
"Question: 'Is it not also a fact that the start of the campaign was ordered for the 25th of August, but on the 24th of August in the afternoon it was postponed until September the 1st in order to await the results of new diplomatic maneuvers with the English Ambassador?
"Answer: 'Yes.'" paragraph, where Goering is purporting not to want war with England. The Court will remember how, after the famous speech on the 22nd of August to his commanders-in-chief, Goering got up and thanked the Fuehrer for his exhortation and assured him that the armed forces would play their part. matter a little further, and we go on to Hitler's verbal communique, as it is called in the British Blue Book, that he handed to Sir Nevile Henderson on the 25th of August, after he had heard of the signing of the Anglo-Polish agreement, in an endeavor to keep England from meeting her obligations. He states, in the first paragraph, after hearing the British Ambassador he is anxious to make one more effort to save war.
In the second paragraph he asserts again that Poland's provocations were unbearable, and I quote paragraph 2:
"Germany was in all circumstances determined to abolish these Macedonian conditions on her eastern frontier and, what is more, to do so in the interests of quiet and order, but also in the interests of European peace.
"The problem of Danzig and the Corridor must be solved. The British Prime Minister had made a speech which was not in the least calculated to induce any change in the German attitude. At the most, the result of this speech could be a bloody and incalculable war between Germany and Poland."
THE PRESIDENT: (interposing) And England.
MR. GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon -- "and England. Such a war would be bloodier than that of 1914 to 1918. In contrast to the last war, Germany would no longer have to fight on two fronts." One sees the threats -- veiled threats -- appearing in this paragraph. "Agreement with Russia was unconditional and signified a change in foreign policy of the Reich which would last a very long time. Russia and Germany would never again take up arms against each other.
Apart from this, the agreements reached with Russia would also render Germany secure economically for the longest period of war."
The Fuehrer had always wanted Anglo-German understanding. War between England and Germany could at best bring some profit to Germany but none at all to England.
Then we come to the bribe. "The Fuehrer declared the German-Polish problem must be solved and will be solved. He is however prepared and determined after the solution of this problem to approach England once more with a large, comprehensive offer. He is a man of great decisions, and in this case also he will be capable of being great in his action. And then magnanimously he accepts the British Empire and is ready to pledge himself personally for its continued existence and to place the power of the German Reich at its disposal on condition that his colonial demands, which are limited, should be negotiated by peaceful means." Obligations to Italy remain untouched. Russia. I quote the last two paragraphs:
"If the British Government would consider these ideas a blessing for Germany -
THE PRESIDENT: Why don't you read the first few lines of paragraph three?
MR. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes; I did summarize it, paragraph three. He also desired to express the irrevocable determination of Germany and never again to enter into conflict with Russia.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. GRIFFITH-JONES: I quote the last two paragraphs.
"If the British Government would consider these ideas a blessing for Germany and also for the British empire, a peace might result. If it rejects these ideas there will be war. In no case will Great Britain emerge stronger; the last war proved it. The Fuehrer repeats that he himself is a man of ad infinitum decisions by which he is bound, and that this is his last offer."
(A recess was taken from 1505 to 1525 hours.)
MR. GRIFFITH-JONES: I had just finished reading the offer to the British Government which was TC 72, No. 68, and which is G.B.65. lay behind that message, and taking it at its face value wrote to enter into discussions. And they wrote back on the 28th of August saying that they were prepared to enter into discussions. They agreed with Hitler that the differences must be settled, and I quote from paragraph four:
"In the opinion of His Majesty's Government a reasonable solution of the differences between Germany and Poland could and should be effected by agreement between the two countries on lines which would include the safeguarding of Poland's essential interests, and they recall that in his speech of the 28th of April the German Chancellor recognized the importance of these interests to Poland.
"But as was stated by the Prime Minister in his letter to the German Chancellor of the 22nd of August, His Majesty's Government consider it essential for the success of the discussions which would precede the agreement that it should be understood beforehand that any settlement arrived at would be guaranteed by other powers. His Majesty's Government would be ready if desired to make their contribution to the effective operation of such a guarantee."
I go to the last paragraph on that page, paragraph six. "His Majesty's Government have said enough to make their own attitude plain in the particular matters at issue between Germany and Poland. They trust that the German Chancellor will not think that, because His Majesty's Government are scrupulous concerning their obligations to Poland, they are not anxious to use all their influence to assist the achievement of a solution which may command itself both to Germany and to Poland." That of course knocked the German hopes on the head. They had failed by their tricks and their bribes to dissuade England from observing her obligations to Poland, and it was now only a matter of getting out of their embarrassment as quickly as possible and saving their face as much as possible. The last document becomes G.B.66. And I put in also Sir Neville Henderson's account of that interview, T.C. No. 75, which becomes G.B. 67.
Henderson emphasized the British attitude, and that they were determined in any event to meet their obligations to Poland. One paragraph I would quote, which is interesting in view of the letters that were to follow. Paragraph ten.
"In the end I asked him two straight questions: Was he willing to negotiate direct with the Poles? and; Was he ready to discuss the question of an exchange of population? He replied in the affirmative as regards the latter. There I have no doubt that he was thinking at the same time of a rectification of frontiers. As regards to the first, he said he could not give me an answer until after he had given the reply of His Majesty's Government the careful consideration which such a document deserved. In this connection he turned to Ribbentrop and said, 'We must summon Field Marshal Goering to discuss it with him.'" to him very solemnly the main note of the whole conversation, so far as he was concerned.
I pass to the next document, which is T.C. 72, No. 78, which becomes G.B.
Henderson at 7.15 P.M. on the 29th of August. The reply sets out the are returned to the Reich.
I quote particularly the next to the last paragraph on the first page of that Document:
"The demands of the German Government are in conformity with the always been recognized as being necessary; viz.
, return of Danzig and the national group in the territories remaining to Poland."
recognized for so lone. On the 28th of April, his demands consisted only I go to the second page, half-way down the page.
Perhaps I better start with the third paragraph:
"The British Government attach importance to two considerations:
(1) that the existing danger of an imminent explosion should be eliminated as quickly as possible by direct negotiation, and (2) that the existence "On this subject, the German Government makes the following "Though sceptical as to the prospects of a successful outcome, they direct discussions.
They do so, as has already been emphasized, salely And then to the last but one paragraph:
"For the rest, in making these proposals the German Government have never had any intention of touching Poland's vital interests of question ing the existence of ran independent Polish State.
The German Government, ment's offer of their good offices in securing the despatch to Berlin of a Polish Emissary with full powers.
They count on the arrival of this "The German Government will immediately draw up proposals for a Polish negotiators."
That was at 7.15 in the evening of the 29th of August, And as I have by midnight the following night.
That Document was GB 68.
The next document, Neville Henderson's account of the interval summarises what had taken place, and I quote particularly paragraph four:
"I remarked that this phrase sounded like an ultimatum, but after fully mobilized armies were standing face to face."
That was the interval on the evening of the 29th August.
That last Document becomes GB 69.
30th of August, at the time the Polish Emissary had been expected. I need not read at length.
The British Government reciprocated the desire for improved relations.
They stress again that they cannot sacrifice their interest to other friends in order to obtain an improvement in the ***** situation.
They understand, they say, that the German Government accepts guarantee.
They make a reservation as to the demands that the Germans Government immediately; and lastly, they understand that the German Government are drawing up the proposals.
That document, the account of the interview at midnight on the 30th of August, will be GB 70.
I beg your pardon.
That is the actual Document that Sir Neville Henderson handed to Ribbentrop at that interview.
For the account of the interview, we go to the next Document in the Tribunal's book, TC 72, Number 92, which becomes GB 71.
It is not a very long Document. It is perhaps "I told Herr von Ribbentrop this evening that His Majesty's normal contact, i.e., that when German proposals were ready to invite his Government with a view to immediate opening of negotiations.
I added that if basis afforded prospect of settlement His Majesty's Government "Herr von Ribbentrop's reply was to produce a lengthy document which he read out in German aloud at top speed.
Imagining that he would sixteen or more articles which ti contained.
Though I cannot therefore guarantee accuracy the main points were:"
and I need not reed out the main points.
I go to paragraph three.
"When I asked Herr von Ribbentrop for text of these proposals in "I observed that to treat matter in this way meant that request for yesterday.
This he denied, saying that idea of an ultimatum was figment of my imagination.
Why then I asked could he not adopt normal procedure and give me copy of proposals and ask Polish Ambassador to call on him, just as Herr Hitler had summoned me a few days ago, and hand them to him for communication to Polish Government?
In the most violent terms Herr von Ribbentrop said that he would never ask the Ambassador to visit him. He hinted that if Polish Ambassador asked him for interview it might be different. I said that I would naturally inform my Government so at once. Whereupon he said while those were his personal views he would bring all that I had said to Herr Hitler's notice. It was for Chancellor to decide.
"We parted on that note, but I must tell you that Herr von Ribbentrop's demeanor during an unpleasant interview was aping Herr Hitler at his worst. He inveighed incidentally against Polish mobolisation, but I retorted that it was hardly surprising since Germany had also mobilised as Herr Hitler himself had admitted to me yesterday."
Nevertheless, Neville Henderson didn't know at that time that Germany had also already given the orders to attack Poland some days before. The following day, the 31st of August, at 6:30 in the evening, Herr Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, had an interview with Ribbentrop. This Document, the next Document TC 74, No. 112, becomes GB 72, and is a short account:
"I carried out my instructions. M. von Ribbentrop asked if I had special plenipotentiary powers to undertake negotiations. I said no. He then asked whether I had been informed that on London's suggestion the German Government had expressed their readiness to negotiate directly with a delegate of the Polish Government, furnished with the requisite full powers, who was to have arrived on the preceding day, August 30. I replied that I had no direct information on the subject. In conclusion M. von Ribbentrop repeated that he had thought I would be empowered to negotiate. He would communicate my demarche to the Chancellor."
As I indicated already, it was too late. The orders had already been given on that day to the German Army to invade.
I turn to C 126. It is already in as GB 45. Other portions of it were put in, and I refer now to the letter on the second page for the order "Most Secret order." It is signed by Hitler and is described as his "Direction No. 1 for the conduct of the war," dated 31st of August, 1939.
Paragraph one:
"Now that all the political possibilities of disposing by peaceful means of a situation of the Eastern Frontier which is intolerable for Germany are exhausted, I have determined on a solution by force.
"The attack on Poland is to be carried out in accordance with the preparations made for 'Fall Weiss', with the alterations which result, where the Army is concerned, from the fact that is has in the meantime almost completed its dispositions.
"Allotment of tasks and the operational target remain unchanged.
"Date of attack - 1 September 1939 Time of attack - 04:
45 (inserted in red pencil) "This time also applies to the operation at Gdynia, Bay of Danzig and the Dirschau Bridge.
"In the West it is important that the responsibility for the opening of hostilities should rest unequivocally with England and France. At first purely local action should be taken against insignificant frontier violations." this Court, it is unnecessary to read. That evening, at nine o'clock, the German radio broadcast the terms of the German proposals about which they were so willing to enter into discussions with the Polish Government. It sets out the proposals at length. It will be remembered that by this time, neither Sir Neville Henderson nor the Polish Government, nor their Ambassador had yet been given their written copy of them, and it is indeed a document which is interesting to read, or to read extracts of it simply as an exhibition or an example of pure hypocrisy. I refer to the second paragraph. Further, the German Government pointed out that they felt able to make the basic points regarding the offer of an understanding available to the British Government by the time the Polish negotiator arrived in Berlin.
Now, we have heard the manner in which they did that. They then say that instead of the arrival of an authorized Polish personage, the first answer the Government of the Reich received to their readiness for an understanding was the news of the Polish mobilization, and only toward twelve o'clock on the night of the 12th of August, 1939, did they receive a somewhat general assurance of British readiness to help towards the commencement of negotiations.