certain circumstances our own ships might be flying other flags.
Q And for what purpose was this necessary? order?
Q Where?
Q Please, will you read it?
A There it says: "Beware of mistaking our own and enemy forces?"
Q Only that sentence. Did the submarines receive in this order the task to attack Norwegian forces? about that?
A Under Roman IV, A-2, it states: "Only attack enemy transports and forces."
Q What were enemies? It also says: "No attack on Norwegian and Danish forces without order unless they attack our own forces."
Q Please, will you compare the Figure C under Roman VI?
A Under Roman VI-C, it says: "Steamers may be attacked only when they have been ascertained indisputably as enemy and as troop transport." way political incicents were to be dealt with, or incidents which might have been caused by submarines?
Q In what way? to make an immediate wireless report and that that report was later on to be supplemented.
Q I don't think you quite understood my question. I asked you, did the Flag Officer Submarines receive information as to how an incident caused by a submarine would later on be settled before a neutral government?
A No. Generally speaking, no.
Q Can you remember any individual case where he was informed?
A I remember the case of the Spanish steamer "Monte Garbea". Later on I understood that Spain had been granted replacements and refunds for the damage they had suffered. I can't remember nowwhether that was official information or whether I just happened to have heard it.
Q. I should now like to discuss the dates of certain orders with you which I have already presented to the Tribunal. I shall show you the Standing Order 171. This is on page 159 in Vol. 3 of the document book. What is the data of origin, of that order?
Q. Please do.
Q. Please do.
A. That order must have originated in the winter of 1939-1940. Probably 1939.
Q. How do you come to that conclusion?
A. I come to that conclusion because under 4-A there is a remark regarding equipment for water bogs which was later on regarded as a general matter of fact. I also gather it from something which is mentioned under 5-B regarding the transfer of masks and lamps, something which was stated for the first time just then.
Q. Can you tell, us more exactly which month in 1939 this might have been issued?
A. I assume that it happened in November.
Q. I now submit to you another order, Standing War Order 122. It appears on page 226 in the fourth volume of my document book. Up to now all we know is that this order appeared before May, 1940. Can you tell us more exactly when it appeared?
A. The order must have been issued roughly at the same time as the first, that is to say, roughly November, 1939.
Q. Thank you very much. How in practice was the conduct of the submarine warfare by the Supreme Commander of Submarines carried out? Will you explain that to us?
A. All orders which were based on the questions of international law or some such other problems came from the Naval Command Staff, The Naval Command Staff had also reserved to themselves the right in really important largescale decisions such as, for instance, distribution of submarines in the Atlanti Theatre, the Mediterranean Theatre, and other Theatres. Within these various Theatres the Commandant of Submarines had, generally speaking, complete freedom regarding the use and employment of his boats.
Q. Were the principal orders for submarines given in wirting or verbally?
A. In writing.
Q. Weren't there also verbal orders?
A. The verbal, oral and personal command by the flag officer of submarines played a certain special part.
It extended to personal influence brought to bear on commanders, as well as explanation of such matters as were contained in written orders.
Q. On what occasions did that personal influencing take place?
A. In particular when reports were being made by the Commanders after each action they had been in. I think there were only a few commanders who did not report in person to the flag officer after they had been in action, and they reported in great detail.
Q. Was it accordingly possible that written orders might have been altered and in fact reversed orally?
A. Maybe that possibility did exist, but it didn't happen.
Q. During their personal reports was it possible that commanders might have stated an opinion different from that told them by the Supreme Commander?
A. Yes. Perfectly. In fact the flag officer did expressly demand the personal opinion from his commanders in each case so that he could maintain immediate personal contact with the commanders and so that he was in close contact with the experience had in action, and that he might be able to rectify matters which needed rectifying.
Q. This personal type of leadership, was that used so that certain matters might have been ordered verbally?
A. No. It is the view of the Prosecution that there was an order, apparently a spoken order, according to which any measures involving provisions of international law should not be entered in the log books, Was there such a general order of that type?
A. No; no general order of that type existed. In certain individual cases omitted from the logs.
Q. Which cases do you remember?
A. First of all, there was the case of the Athenia, and secondly, the sinking of a German boat which was coming through the blockade from Japan, sunk by a German submarine.
Q. Before I ask you about that in detail, I should like to know just what the reason was that such matters were to be left out of the logs.
A. The reason was to keep them secret. Logs of submarines were circulating amongst a large circle, that is to say, first of all in the training depots of the submarine department, and secondly, in a number of departments in the Supreme Command, It was necessary, therefore, that particular attention be paid to secrecy.
Q. How many copies of a log book of a submarine were being made?
A. I should say six to eight copies.
Q. Did the commission or removal of such an item from the log signify that all documents were destroyed everywhere or were there certain departments or staffs who would retain the document referring to that case.
A. The documents were presumably retained by the flag officer, submarines, and very probably the Supreme Command of the Navy.
Q. Was there a standing war order regarding the treatment of incidents?
A. Yes.
Q. What did it state?
A. It was ordered therein that immediate wireless reports would be furnished about such incidents, and that later on, that report must be supplemented either in writing or orally.
Q. Does this standing order contain indication that such incidents were not to be entered in the logs?
A. No.
Q. Will you now describe to me, please, just how such an alteration of the log book was carried out in the case of the Athenia?
A. In the case of the Athenia, Naval Lieutenant Lemp after his return reported that he had torpedoed this ship and that he had assumed that this had been an auxiliary cruiser. I cannot now tell you exactly whether this was the first indication which made it possible for me to understand this fact or whether it had been previously considered that under certain circumstances this ship might have been torpedoed by a German submarine. Lemp was sent to Berlin to make a report and absolute secrecy was ordered.
Q. By whom?
A. The Naval Command Staff, After provisionally such an order had been made in our department, I ordered that this fact was to be removed from the log of the submarine.
Q. And that, of course, was ordered by Admiral Doenitz
A. Yes, or at least I ordered it as his deputy, by his order.
Q. Did you participate in the further handling of this particular incident?
A. Only in so far as the question was considered, whether Lemp should be punished. As far as I can recollect, the Supreme Commander took disciplinary action and punished him because it was held to his credit that these were the first hours after the outbreak of war when he must have been considerably excited and wouldn't have stressed the character of the ship as conscientiously as he might have otherwise.
Q. Did I understand you correctly earlier as saying that the detailed documents regarding the events of the Athenia were retained both by the flag officer of submarines and the Supreme Command of the Navy?
A. I can say that with certainty only as far as the flag officer of submarines is concerned, And there that was the case.
Q. Earlier you mentioned a second case, where a log book had been altered; which case was that?
A That incident was as follows: A German blockade breaker of German origin, that is to say, a merchant vessel, which was coming back from Japan, was torpedoed in the North Atlantic in error by a German submarine and sank. This fact was left out of the log. German departments; is that right?
A Yes. The British had heard about the case from lifeboats which they found and, as as far as I know, the fact was not to become known to other members and blockade breaking vessels. according to which, until the autumn of 1942, German submarines were carrying out rescues, as far as that was possible without an impediment to the safety of the submarine and without interfering with the task that had been given, Does this correspond with your own experiences? so-called Laconia order which till requires clarification, I'm referring to document GB-199. AS you know, the Prosecution are calling this order an order to kill survivors. Who formulated this order?
THE PRESIDENT: Where is it?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: It is in the document book of the Prosecution on page 36, Mr. President.
A I cannot now tell you that for, certain. Generally speaking, such an order was arranged and discussed between the supreme commander, the first staff officer, and myself, and a decision was made by the supreme commander just how it was to be worde; and then one of us would draft it and formulate it. It is perfectly possible that I, myself, worded this order.
Q But, at any rate, Admiral Doenitz signed it, didn't he? Captain Hessler were opposed to this order. Can you, too, remember this, and, if so, why were you against it?
Q What was the sense and the aim of the order?
A It is clearly contained in it. It meant that an attempt to rescue was prohibited.
Q Why wasn't that forbidden with reference to the standing war order No. 154, which appeared-
THE PRESIDENT: Surely a written order must speak for itself, Unless there is some colloquial meaning in a particular word used in the order, the order must be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of the words.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I was not proposing to go into the question any further, Mr. President. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q I should like to repeat my last question now. Why, instead of issuing a new order, wasn't there simply a reference to the standing war order No. 154, which appeared during the winter of 1939 to '40?
I mean the order, Mr. President, which has the number GB-196, and which appears on page 33 of the document book of the Prosecution.
You remember that order, don't you? I've shown it to you.
A Yes, I do. That order at the time of the Laconia order had already been cancelled, Apart from that, a reference to an earlier order would have lacked the lively character which orders should have. principle not issue orders by referring to earlier orders?
A That was avoided whenever possible; that is to say, generally always. command matter, as top secret? nearly cost us two boats, and it contained a severe reprimand for the commanders in question. If such a severe reprimand was given, then it wasn't as I have it, to make it unknown to anyone, apart from the supreme command and the senior staff officer, that wasn't our custom.
THE PRESIDENT: Which is the severe reprimand? command is contained?
and in connection with what has been prohibited here. The sentence "Rescue is against the most primitive demands" contains it, and it is contained in the hardness which is demanded and in the statement that commanders are being accused of being soft-hearted. risked their boats in connection with the action of the Laconia and that they were endangering their boats?
or warlike behavior pointed out to them. You have told me so. You couldn't remember its exact wording to start with. How is it possible that you couldn't remember such an order? which, on the strength of that, one used to see them again and again. This order however, did not come amongst those. After it had been issued and until the end of the war, I never saw it again.
Q What did an order have to look like? What did its exterior have to look like if it had to come into such a collection?
Q What that contained in the order concerned? case that isn't so. ing of this order in fact would indicate that it didn't come into that particular collection of orders? the end of the war, did give lectures on this order? by the flag officer of submarines. He had the privilege of using those wireless messages for the collection of material which he needed for the instructions given to the reminders about to sail, no matter whether this order was headed as a new one or a reminder order. So that, apparently, he had this particular message amongst the material which he used to instruct commanders. any time? to which this order was meant to say that survivors should be shot?
has had any practical results or could have had any practical results on the loss of allied sailors?
A That's very difficult to judge. At that time something like eighty per cent of all submarinesattacks took place under such conditions or may have taken place under such conditions which made rescue impossible. That is to say either there were convoys or these attacks took place very near the coasts.
submarines. Whether rescuing attempts were possible in all other cases is some thing which cannot be said for certain. Quite probably, the situation was that the Allied sailors in the lifeboats felt safer tha, for instance, aboard a submarine. They were probably glad when, after attacking, the submarine disappeared. case of the Laconia itself, because during resuing attempts two submarines were attacked by aircraft with bombs. direction or the other.
Q. What do you mean, "one direction or the other"?
A. I mean whether it meant an increased or decreased number of losses amongst enemy seamen.
Q. There is one trend of thought which I haven't quite understood. You pointed to the fact that there were 13 captains and chief engineers who had be made prisoners after this order was issued. Do you mean by that that only in some few cases was it possible, without endangering the submarine, to carry out the order that such officers whould be taken out of the lifeboats?
A. That it was only in these cases is too strong an expression, but it we give you an indication regarding the number of cases where it was possible.
Q. I shall now show you the wireless message which went to Naval Lieutan Schacht. It is in the British Document Book of the Prosecution on page 36. This message, too, was made a top secret command order. What reason existed for that?
A. It is emphatically a severe reprimand for the commander.
Q. How far was that reprimand justified? Schacht hadn't had any instruc ions previously regarding the rescuing of survivors?
A. No, but it had been assume that it was clear to submarines that in to first place it was important that implies should be rescued and saved to become prisoners. Apart from that, during actions which had happened, there had been several indications that commanders should be particularly cautious. Afterwar came Schacht's report from which it appeared at the time that he had infringed just these orders.
Seen retrospectively, Schacht's action must have taken place before the order of the BDU, so that at least some part of the accusations against him weren't justified.
Q. After this order of September 1942, were there still rescues carried out by submarines in certain cases?
A. Yes.
Q. Did the Flag Officer Submarines object to these rescues?
A. I have no recollection of that.
Q. To your knowledge, did German submarines deliberately kill survivors?
A. The only case of which I heard after capitulation is that of Naval Lieutenant Eck. On one occasion, we had heard an enemy broadcast about that, which indicated that something of that sort had occurred.
Q. I now submit to you a document of the Prosecution, GB-203, which the Prosecution consider proof of the shooting of survivors. This is the war diar the log of the U-247; and I have printed an extract on page 74 of my document book, second volume. ing steamer. You have already seen this log or war diary. After his return, did the commandant report on this action?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he report anything on that occasion regarding the shooting of survivors?
A. No.
Q. According to the statement of a survivor by the name of McAllister, fishing steamer, the Moren Mary, had a gun aboard. Do you know whether fishi steamers had mounted guns fore or aft?
A. They were almost always in the bows.
Q. Can you ascertain, on the basis of this war diary and on the strengths of your recollection of the report of the commander, just how this incident do actually happen?
A. The submarine, first of all, appeared to encounter a number of fished steamers. An attempt was made to -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Is the witness trying to DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I am asking him to tell us the story on the strength reconstruct thisfrom the document, reconstruct the incident?
of his own memory and on the strength of the report of the commander, and I am asking him to tell us just how much he remembers while he is looking at the diary.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, he hasn't said whether he ever saw the commander.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Oh yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Well then, all he can tell us is what the commander told him.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, have him do that then.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, sir. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: you can tell us after having seen the diary.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. If he remembers anything about what the commander told him, he can tell us that, but the diary speaks for itself and he can't reconstruct it out of that. He may tell us what he remembers of what the officer said.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Very well, sir. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
A This was the report of the commander. He said that in extreme proximity to the coast, considering the conditions of the time, he sighted a group of fishing steamers, and after having failed in his attempts to torpedo them, he sank one of them with gunfire. That was particularly remarkable because, first of all, this incident occurred so close to the coas and also because the commander risked this artillery fight in spite of the fact that other vessels were in the neighborhood.
Q Were these other ships also armed fishing steamers?
surfaced 50 yards from the fishing steamer. According to your recollection, and considering your experience, is this possible?
A I can't recollect the details, but it is out of the question that any submarine commander would do that.
Q McAllister's evidence also states -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Wait a minute. Dr. Kranzbuehler, the Tribunal thinks that the witness oughtn't to express opinions of that sort. He ought to give us his evidence of any facts which he has. He is telling us that in his opinion it is impossible that a naval commander would ever bring his submarine up within 50 yards of another vessel.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: That is not a matter for him to say.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I was going to ask the witness next whether German submarines were shooting shells filled with wire, as Witness McAllister had stated. Is that a question which you will permit me to put?
THE PRESIDENT: What?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Shells which were filled with wire.
THE PRESIDENT: Wire?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Wire, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Is your question: Were submarine commanders ever furnished with wire to be used in their guns? Is that the question?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Not quite, the President. My question would be whether German submarines were equipped with shells which were filled with wire.
THE PRESIDENT: Shells which are filled with wire?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, that is the question I want to put. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
A Such shells didn't exist at all. wireless immediately?
A Do you mean the report by the submarine?
was received, reporting a submarine attack in that area. 0127. It is addressed to Matschulat, that is to your from the commandant, and it states: "English steamer reports attack by German submarine west of Cape Wrath." message of a British steamer about a submarine attack in that area had been received. War Order-511. This is in Volume 1 of my document book on page 46. When I presented this order, theTribunal wasn't quite clear about the significance of what appears under Figure 2, which I shall read.
"No taking on board in allowed of captains and officers of neutral ships which according to standing order No. 101, may be sunk (e.g. Swedish ships outside of Goeteborg traffic), because internment of these officers would contravene international law."
Can you first of all tell me on the basis of which experiences that figure "2" was included in the order? Germany, who had been the captain of a ship that had been sunk. We were worried that if this captain were to be released he might tell stories about what he had seen while he was interned aboard the submarine. It was for reasons of this order that difficulties of that kind should be avoided in the future. The captain from Uruguay had to be freed and was in fact freed. to standing order No. 101 may be sunk?
A May I please see the order for a minute? In the standing war order No. 101, the sinking of neutral ships is referred to and the following is ordered: First of all, within the blockade area, and as a matter of principle all neutral ships can be sunk with two important exceptions or, shall we say, two general exceptions. First of all, not sinkable in blockade areas with shi of certain neutral countries with which arrangements had been made regarding certain shipping channels; and secondly, not sinkable with such ships of certain neutral states of which it could be assumed that they weren't exclusively travelling for the enemy. Regarding the sinking outside blockade areas, the order was applicable according to which neutral ships could be sunk; first of all, when they weren't recognizable as being neutral and therefore had appeared as enemy vessels to the submarine in question; and secondly, if they weren't acting as neutrals.
Q As, for instance, when they were travelling in convoy? the presence of our submarines, for instance, by means of wireless.
Q Did this figure "2" mean that the captains of neutral ships were to be worse off in the future than captains of enemy ships or were they to be better off?
A This isn't a question of letter or worse, it is a question of capturing. They weren't to be captured, weren't to be taken prisoners because they couldn't be kept as prisoners. Whether this meant that they would be better or worse off is at least an open question.
Captains of enemy ships tried whenever possible to escape being taken along by the submarine because they probably felt safer in life-boats.
ships during the beginning of the invasion? concerned, the order applied that hospital ships were not to be attacked. Commanders operating in the invasion zones then reported that there was very considerable traffic of hospital ships.
Q From where to where?
A Between theinvasion area of Normandy and the British Isles. The Flag Officer submarines then had an investigation made by the appropriate department to discover whether this hospital traffic in its report strength was in accordance with the comparative figures. That was confirmed.
Q What do you mean by that? corresponded to the number of wounded, as we had expected. Then there was a special order stating that in the future, too, hospital ships were not to be attacked. was that in accordance with any other interests? Geneva Convention wasn't being recognized by our enemy, so that we didn't have any interest in respecting and preserving hospital shipping. has been sunk by a German submarine?
Q Did it happen the other way around?
A The German hospital ship Tubingen (Tuebingen) was, I think, sunk by a British aircraft in the Mediterranean, presumably because of mistaken identity.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, the question of German hospital ships which were sunk isn't relevant, is it?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I was going to show by it, Mr. President, that the possibility of mistaken identity does exist and that in fact because of such mistaken identity, a hospital ship has been sunk.
My proof is to mean therefore that you can't draw the conclusion from the sinking of a ship that it shouldn't have been sunk.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal quite realizes that mistakes may be made in sea warfare. It is a matter of common knowledge. Should we adjourn now?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, sir.
(A recess was taken.)
BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q. Admiral, you have known Admire Doenitz since the year 1934, and you have know him well since that time. You had many business dealings with him during that time. Did he participate in any political activity during that period of time?
A. Before he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, not at all, to my knowledge. As Commander-in-Chief of the Navy on occasion he gave speeches outside the Navy matters, however. He addressed dock workers. He spoke to the Hitler Youth at Stettin once. He spoke over the radio when we had an anniversary for heroes, and he spoke on the 20th of July. I remember no other occasions.
Q. Did these speeches have a direct connection to the tasks of the Navy, that is, when he addressed the Navy workers?
A. When he spoke before the ship workers, yes.
Q. And before the Hitler Jugend as well?
A. Yes.
Q. And what was the connection the?
A. At that time, as far as I recall, the speech was concerned with recruitment for the Navy.
Q. Did he select his staff officers according to ideological points of view or according to their military point of view?
A. Their military and personal capacity was the decisive point. Political considerations played no role at all.
Q. The question of whether Admiral Doenitz knew certain happenings outside the Navy, whether he had knowledge of these facts or whether he had to have knowledge, that is an important question before the Tribunal. Can you tell me in what circles he traveled?
A. Almost exclusively he remained within the circle of his own officers and officers of his own age, but, over and above that, as far as I know he had no other contacts.
Q. Does this hold true after his appointment to Commander-in-Chief of the Navy? Was there any change in that?
A. No. Then he was in contact more with people from other states, but on the whole his circle remained the same.