SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, there is nothing about civilian clothes in the English copy.
I don't want to make a had point, but it is not in my copy.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid I haven't got the document before me.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the English copy that I have simply says, "However, only the British seaman, Robert Paul Evans, born 14 January 1922, at London, could be arrested. The ethers escaped into Sweden."
THE PRESIDENT: What is the exact reference to the document?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that was document UK-57, and it is a report of the OKW, Office for Auslands Abwehr, of the 4th of January, 1944.
TEE PRESIDENT: Did Colonel Phillimore put it in this morning?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put it in, My Lord, certainly, in cross examining the defendant Keitel. It has been in before, My Lord,
THE PRESIDENT: I see, it has already been put in with thislot.
DR. SIEMERS: I should be must grateful to the Tribunal if themistake could be rectified in the English translation. The German photostatic copy of the original is available, and I presume that its wording must be the correct one. BY DR. SIEMERS: "Evans was in possession of a revolver holster as issued for wearing arms under the shoulder, and he had a knuckle-duster." What does this showin connection with the fact that he was wearing civilian clothes?
DR. SIEMERS: Sir David has just asked me to read the next sentence too: "Acts of force against international law could not be proved against him. Evans made detailed Statements regarding the action and, on the 19th of January, 1943, in accordance with the Fuehrer order, he was short." BY DR. SIEMERS: wearing civilian clothes? Does it show that he did not act as a soldier would act and should act in enemy territory?
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. The Tribunal considers that that is a question of law which the Tribunal has got to decide, and not a question for the witness.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well, in that case I shall forego having it answered. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q May I ask you to look at the following page of the document? That is a similar case, and I want you to look at it. that the Naval Command Staff were not informed about it. I now draw your attention to the sentence which you will find at the bottom of page 3, and I quote:
"After the explosives were used, the boats were sunk and the men tried to escape into Spain, with the help of the French civilian population." soldiers should? Grand Admiral Raeder and Grand Admiral Doenitz were considered by you to be guilty in this case, as he called it, of murder. How that we have clarified the cases further, I should like you to answer the question again.
way guilty.
DR. SIEMERS: I have no further questions.
DR. LATERNSER: I have a few questions concerning the Commando Order. BY DR. LATERNSER: garding this Commando Order. I wanted to ask you concerning your views regarding this Commando Order. Did you base your attitude on the assumption that as far as the international justification of the order was concerned--that is, whether or not it was investigated by the department concerned? investigated by the superior department, conceptions were regarding the handing over of a man to the SD. I wanted to ask you, did you have that conception at that time, or is this something which has only now arisen, now, when you have a certain amount of material at your disposal? material, that conception of mine was considerably influenced. ing over of a man to the SD meant certain death? troops.
Don't you know that in the case of some of the members of these troops, when the case was investigated, it was found that they had automatic arms and that, in particular, they were carrying pistols in such a manner that if the man would raise his arms in the event of capture, why that movement would automatically fire a shot, which would then hit the man who was standing opposite the man who was raising his hands? Do you know anything about that?
Q Didn't you see some pictures?
AAt the moment I can't remember that I have.
Q Did Germany also organize sabotage actions in enemy countries?
THE PRESIDENT: What has that got to do with it, Dr. Laternser?
DR. LATERNSER: I wanted to ascertain by this question whether the witness had knowledge of our own sabotage actions, and then I wanted to ask him whether he had seen reports about the treatment of our own sabotage troops.
THE PRESIDENT: That is the very thing which we have already ruled cannot be put.
You aren't suggesting that these actions were taken by way of reprisal for the way in which German sabotage units were treated? We are not trying whether any other powers have committed breaches of international law, or crimes against humanity, or war crimes; we are trying whether these defendants have.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I don't know which answer the witness is going to give, and since I don't know it--THE PRESIDENT: We wanted to know why you were putting the question. You said you were putting the question in order to ascertain whether German sabotage units had been treated in a way which was contrary to international law, or words to that effect. That is a matter which is irrelevant.
DR. LATERNSER: But Mr. President, it would show, at least, that the international law point of view applicable to such commando troops may have been in doubt, and that would have had a certain influence on the legislation being referred to and employed.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that the question is inadmissible. BY DR. LATERNSER: 1944 you were the chief of the operations department of the Naval Command Staff. Can you tell me anything regarding whether there weren't considerable German naval forces in the Black Sea, or whether there were transport ships?
Q what were they needed for mostly?
THE PRESIDENT: How does this arise out of the cross-examination? You are re-examining now, and you are only entitled to ask questions which arise out of the cross-examination. There have been no questions put with Referencing the Black Sea.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, during the examination I have discovered that for some considerable time the witness was to keep up the operational staff. I have gathered from that fact that he is one of the few sitnesses who can give me information regarding the possibility of a very severe and serious accusation raised by the British prosecution, and that is the accusation that 144,000 people had been transferred to German ships, and that at Sevastopol those ships had gone to sea and were blown up, whereby the prisoners of war in the ships were drowned To some extent this witness could clarify this question for me.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you know directly this witness began his evidence, what his position was, and you, therefore, could have cross-examined him yourself at the proper time. You are now re-examining, and because we cannot have the time of the Court wasted, you are only entitled to ask him questions which arise out of the cross-examination. In the opinion of the Tribunal, this question does not arise out of the cross-examination.
DR. LATERNSER: Dr. President, please, would you, as an exception permit met
THE PRESIDENT: No, Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal has given you great latitude and we cannot continue to do so.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
Tribunal intthe matter of: The United States of ting at Nurnberg, Germany on 14.
May, 1946, 1400
THE PRESIDENT: You have finished, have you not, Dr. Kranzbuehler, with this witness?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: And now I should like to call by next witness, Eberhard Godt
EBERHARD GODT, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the path) BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q Admiral Godt, when did you enter the Navy as an officer cadet? which positions?
A Since January 1938; first of all a first general staff officer attache to the chief of the submarines and shortly after the beginning of the war as chi of the operations department.
Q Chief of the operations department attached to the head of submarines? submarines through the staff of the commander of submarines?
Q How many officers did that staff consist of? four officers. There was one military officer and two administrative officers.
Q I shall now show you document GB 83. It is contained in the document book of the Prosecution on page 16 and it is a letter from the commander of submarines, dated the first of October 1939. It refers to bases in Norway and the date is 9 October How did this letter come about?
(witness handed document) other matter. On the occasion of that visit I was asked whether the flag officer of submarines was interested in bases in Norway and which demands he night be making in that connection.
for the use of the German Navy? Naval Command staff which originates from the same period.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I am thinking of the extract, Mr. President, which is contained on page 15 of the document book. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q That extract contains four questions and the questions (a) and (d) deal with technical details regarding these bases in Norway whereas (b) and (c) deal with the possibility as to whether such bases can under circumstances be obtained against the will of the Norwegians and how they might be defended. Which of these questions were put to you?
Q The first question is, what place in Norway can be considered as bases?
THE PRESIDENT: witness, will you make a pause between the question and your answer so that the interpreters can deal with it. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Which places in Norway can be considered as Bases? is, whether the question was answered and where it is answered?
A The question was answered under number 1 (c).
QQuestion No. 2 is: "Can bases be gained by military force against Norway's will if it is impossible to carry this out without fighting?" Was that question put to you? Officer Submarines?
Q The third question is: "What are the possibilities of defense after the occupation?" Was that question put to you?
Q Is it replied to in the letter? you now: "Will the harbors have to be developed completely as bases or have they already advantages suitable for supply positions?"
Q Was that fourth question put to you?
Q Was it answered?
Q What are the figures Roman II and III, what do they mean? they can be used as supply points now. extend these bases?
Q Please will you read the last sentence of the document? There it says: "Establishment of the possibility of supplying fuel in Narvik as an alternative." Isn't that the answer to the question whether a supply point is enough?
A Yes; I had overlooked that sentence.
question had been put to you and that you had answered them, whereas question 2 and 3 were not put nor answered? says: "Flag Officer Submarines considers such ports suitable for temporary harbors and for supplying purposes and considers them vary valuable for Atlantic submarines." Is the meaning of that remark that Admiral Doenitz had dealt with this question before your visit to Berlin or what is the cause for that remark? of the Operations Department. just then and did they come to you for the first time?
A No. We had dealt with the question of whether, in Iceland, for instance, an improvement of the supply position for U-boats might be brought about. whether one ought to start a war against the country concerned? of the Document Book of the prosecution. It is the operations order of the Flag Officer of U-boats dated the 30th of March, 1940, and it deals with the action against Norway. Is that true, that this is your operations order? come out?
Q You can see under Roman I Volume 4, there is a sentence which says: "Thenaval forces, when going into harbor and until the landing of troops, will probably meet the British fleet off Norway." That is Roman II, isn't it I beg your pardon. "They will fly the British flag until the troops have landed except presumably at Narvik," Are we here concerned with an order from the Flag Officer for U-boats to the vessels under his command?
A No. That paragraph appears under the heading about our own. combat forces.
Q And what is the meaning of this statement?
certain circumstances our own ships might be flying other flags.
Q And for what purpose was this necessary? order?
Q Where?
Q Please, will you read it?
A There it says: "Beware of mistaking our own and enemy forces?"
Q Only that sentence. Did the submarines receive in this order the task to attack Norwegian forces? about that?
A Under Roman IV, A-2, it states: "Only attack enemy transports and forces."
Q What were enemies? It also says: "No attack on Norwegian and Danish forces without order unless they attack our own forces."
Q Please, will you compare the Figure C under Roman VI?
A Under Roman VI-C, it says: "Steamers may be attacked only when they have been ascertained indisputably as enemy and as troop transport." way political incicents were to be dealt with, or incidents which might have been caused by submarines?
Q In what way? to make an immediate wireless report and that that report was later on to be supplemented.
Q I don't think you quite understood my question. I asked you, did the Flag Officer Submarines receive information as to how an incident caused by a submarine would later on be settled before a neutral government?
A No. Generally speaking, no.
Q Can you remember any individual case where he was informed?
A I remember the case of the Spanish steamer "Monte Garbea". Later on I understood that Spain had been granted replacements and refunds for the damage they had suffered. I can't remember nowwhether that was official information or whether I just happened to have heard it.
Q. I should now like to discuss the dates of certain orders with you which I have already presented to the Tribunal. I shall show you the Standing Order 171. This is on page 159 in Vol. 3 of the document book. What is the data of origin, of that order?
Q. Please do.
Q. Please do.
A. That order must have originated in the winter of 1939-1940. Probably 1939.
Q. How do you come to that conclusion?
A. I come to that conclusion because under 4-A there is a remark regarding equipment for water bogs which was later on regarded as a general matter of fact. I also gather it from something which is mentioned under 5-B regarding the transfer of masks and lamps, something which was stated for the first time just then.
Q. Can you tell, us more exactly which month in 1939 this might have been issued?
A. I assume that it happened in November.
Q. I now submit to you another order, Standing War Order 122. It appears on page 226 in the fourth volume of my document book. Up to now all we know is that this order appeared before May, 1940. Can you tell us more exactly when it appeared?
A. The order must have been issued roughly at the same time as the first, that is to say, roughly November, 1939.
Q. Thank you very much. How in practice was the conduct of the submarine warfare by the Supreme Commander of Submarines carried out? Will you explain that to us?
A. All orders which were based on the questions of international law or some such other problems came from the Naval Command Staff, The Naval Command Staff had also reserved to themselves the right in really important largescale decisions such as, for instance, distribution of submarines in the Atlanti Theatre, the Mediterranean Theatre, and other Theatres. Within these various Theatres the Commandant of Submarines had, generally speaking, complete freedom regarding the use and employment of his boats.
Q. Were the principal orders for submarines given in wirting or verbally?
A. In writing.
Q. Weren't there also verbal orders?
A. The verbal, oral and personal command by the flag officer of submarines played a certain special part.
It extended to personal influence brought to bear on commanders, as well as explanation of such matters as were contained in written orders.
Q. On what occasions did that personal influencing take place?
A. In particular when reports were being made by the Commanders after each action they had been in. I think there were only a few commanders who did not report in person to the flag officer after they had been in action, and they reported in great detail.
Q. Was it accordingly possible that written orders might have been altered and in fact reversed orally?
A. Maybe that possibility did exist, but it didn't happen.
Q. During their personal reports was it possible that commanders might have stated an opinion different from that told them by the Supreme Commander?
A. Yes. Perfectly. In fact the flag officer did expressly demand the personal opinion from his commanders in each case so that he could maintain immediate personal contact with the commanders and so that he was in close contact with the experience had in action, and that he might be able to rectify matters which needed rectifying.
Q. This personal type of leadership, was that used so that certain matters might have been ordered verbally?
A. No. It is the view of the Prosecution that there was an order, apparently a spoken order, according to which any measures involving provisions of international law should not be entered in the log books, Was there such a general order of that type?
A. No; no general order of that type existed. In certain individual cases omitted from the logs.
Q. Which cases do you remember?
A. First of all, there was the case of the Athenia, and secondly, the sinking of a German boat which was coming through the blockade from Japan, sunk by a German submarine.
Q. Before I ask you about that in detail, I should like to know just what the reason was that such matters were to be left out of the logs.
A. The reason was to keep them secret. Logs of submarines were circulating amongst a large circle, that is to say, first of all in the training depots of the submarine department, and secondly, in a number of departments in the Supreme Command, It was necessary, therefore, that particular attention be paid to secrecy.
Q. How many copies of a log book of a submarine were being made?
A. I should say six to eight copies.
Q. Did the commission or removal of such an item from the log signify that all documents were destroyed everywhere or were there certain departments or staffs who would retain the document referring to that case.
A. The documents were presumably retained by the flag officer, submarines, and very probably the Supreme Command of the Navy.
Q. Was there a standing war order regarding the treatment of incidents?
A. Yes.
Q. What did it state?
A. It was ordered therein that immediate wireless reports would be furnished about such incidents, and that later on, that report must be supplemented either in writing or orally.
Q. Does this standing order contain indication that such incidents were not to be entered in the logs?
A. No.
Q. Will you now describe to me, please, just how such an alteration of the log book was carried out in the case of the Athenia?
A. In the case of the Athenia, Naval Lieutenant Lemp after his return reported that he had torpedoed this ship and that he had assumed that this had been an auxiliary cruiser. I cannot now tell you exactly whether this was the first indication which made it possible for me to understand this fact or whether it had been previously considered that under certain circumstances this ship might have been torpedoed by a German submarine. Lemp was sent to Berlin to make a report and absolute secrecy was ordered.
Q. By whom?
A. The Naval Command Staff, After provisionally such an order had been made in our department, I ordered that this fact was to be removed from the log of the submarine.
Q. And that, of course, was ordered by Admiral Doenitz
A. Yes, or at least I ordered it as his deputy, by his order.
Q. Did you participate in the further handling of this particular incident?
A. Only in so far as the question was considered, whether Lemp should be punished. As far as I can recollect, the Supreme Commander took disciplinary action and punished him because it was held to his credit that these were the first hours after the outbreak of war when he must have been considerably excited and wouldn't have stressed the character of the ship as conscientiously as he might have otherwise.
Q. Did I understand you correctly earlier as saying that the detailed documents regarding the events of the Athenia were retained both by the flag officer of submarines and the Supreme Command of the Navy?
A. I can say that with certainty only as far as the flag officer of submarines is concerned, And there that was the case.
Q. Earlier you mentioned a second case, where a log book had been altered; which case was that?
A That incident was as follows: A German blockade breaker of German origin, that is to say, a merchant vessel, which was coming back from Japan, was torpedoed in the North Atlantic in error by a German submarine and sank. This fact was left out of the log. German departments; is that right?
A Yes. The British had heard about the case from lifeboats which they found and, as as far as I know, the fact was not to become known to other members and blockade breaking vessels. according to which, until the autumn of 1942, German submarines were carrying out rescues, as far as that was possible without an impediment to the safety of the submarine and without interfering with the task that had been given, Does this correspond with your own experiences? so-called Laconia order which till requires clarification, I'm referring to document GB-199. AS you know, the Prosecution are calling this order an order to kill survivors. Who formulated this order?
THE PRESIDENT: Where is it?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: It is in the document book of the Prosecution on page 36, Mr. President.
A I cannot now tell you that for, certain. Generally speaking, such an order was arranged and discussed between the supreme commander, the first staff officer, and myself, and a decision was made by the supreme commander just how it was to be worde; and then one of us would draft it and formulate it. It is perfectly possible that I, myself, worded this order.
Q But, at any rate, Admiral Doenitz signed it, didn't he? Captain Hessler were opposed to this order. Can you, too, remember this, and, if so, why were you against it?
Q What was the sense and the aim of the order?
A It is clearly contained in it. It meant that an attempt to rescue was prohibited.
Q Why wasn't that forbidden with reference to the standing war order No. 154, which appeared-
THE PRESIDENT: Surely a written order must speak for itself, Unless there is some colloquial meaning in a particular word used in the order, the order must be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of the words.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I was not proposing to go into the question any further, Mr. President. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q I should like to repeat my last question now. Why, instead of issuing a new order, wasn't there simply a reference to the standing war order No. 154, which appeared during the winter of 1939 to '40?
I mean the order, Mr. President, which has the number GB-196, and which appears on page 33 of the document book of the Prosecution.
You remember that order, don't you? I've shown it to you.
A Yes, I do. That order at the time of the Laconia order had already been cancelled, Apart from that, a reference to an earlier order would have lacked the lively character which orders should have. principle not issue orders by referring to earlier orders?
A That was avoided whenever possible; that is to say, generally always. command matter, as top secret? nearly cost us two boats, and it contained a severe reprimand for the commanders in question. If such a severe reprimand was given, then it wasn't as I have it, to make it unknown to anyone, apart from the supreme command and the senior staff officer, that wasn't our custom.
THE PRESIDENT: Which is the severe reprimand? command is contained?
and in connection with what has been prohibited here. The sentence "Rescue is against the most primitive demands" contains it, and it is contained in the hardness which is demanded and in the statement that commanders are being accused of being soft-hearted. risked their boats in connection with the action of the Laconia and that they were endangering their boats?
or warlike behavior pointed out to them. You have told me so. You couldn't remember its exact wording to start with. How is it possible that you couldn't remember such an order? which, on the strength of that, one used to see them again and again. This order however, did not come amongst those. After it had been issued and until the end of the war, I never saw it again.
Q What did an order have to look like? What did its exterior have to look like if it had to come into such a collection?
Q What that contained in the order concerned? case that isn't so. ing of this order in fact would indicate that it didn't come into that particular collection of orders? the end of the war, did give lectures on this order? by the flag officer of submarines. He had the privilege of using those wireless messages for the collection of material which he needed for the instructions given to the reminders about to sail, no matter whether this order was headed as a new one or a reminder order. So that, apparently, he had this particular message amongst the material which he used to instruct commanders. any time? to which this order was meant to say that survivors should be shot?