Official Transcript of the International Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, against Hermann Wilhelm Goering et al, Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 13 March 1916, 1000-1300, Lord Justice Lawrence presiding.
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal has made an order with respect to further proceedings on the charge against Organizations and the applications of members thereof. I don't propose to read that order, but the order will be posted on the Defense Counsel's information board and will be communicated to them and to the Prosecution.
Dr. Jahrreiss, had you finished your examination?
DR. JAHRREISS:Yes.
THE PRESIDENT:Very well. Does any other of the Defense Counsel wish to examine the witness?
ALBERTKESSELRING-resumed.
DIRECTEXAMINATION--continued. BY DR. KAUFFMANN:
QWitness, have you any recollection when the Defendant Kaltenbrunner first became publicly known?
AI have no knowledge of Kaltenbrunner becoming prominent. The first time I had known Kaltenbrunner was when he appeared as the successor to Canaris.
QHave you any recollection to the effect that he, Kaltenbrunner, in January, 1943, was made the Chief of the RSHA?
AI may have heard about that, but I have no certain recollection of it.
QKaltenbrunner states that in April, 1945, he was anxious to exclude the country of Austria from the war. Have you any recollection of that?
AI merely heard that Kaltenbrunner was one of these personalities who were working for an independent Austria, but any definite certain knowledge of that situation I have not.
Q Furthermore, Kaltenbrunner states that he, on the basis of an arrangement with the Red Cross at Geneva, which said that civilian internees should be led through the front and back to their homeland, that he had communicated that arrangement to your office--not to you personally--and that he had expressed the wish that a gap should be created in the fighting line to let these people through.
AIt is quite possible that such an application was actually made, but I did not gain any personal knowledge of it. I was away from my office a great deal.
QHave you, witness, any recollection when concentration camps were first instituted in Germany?
AYes. It was in 1933. I remember three concentration camps, the installing of which I cannot exactly remember when. I passed them quite frequently; I flew over them, and I am thinking of Dachau which was talked about a great deal, and Weimar which was a concentration camp over which I flew quite frequently, and I have no recollection of any other concentration camp, but perhaps I may add that, as to the rumors which were very frequent during these days of crisis I had no time to devote myself to such rumors since I was extremely busy.
QRegarding the internees in these camps, did you have any clear-cut picture regarding who would be brought to these concentration camps?
AI did have. I heard views on that-I cannot remember who from-which seem plausible to me. I was told that the National Socialist Revolution should be achieved without loss of blood and that political opponents should be put into a safe place until the construction of the new State was given a firm basis and then they should be returned to public life. That is my view, my knowledge of the situation, but from that I rather concluded--to answer your question--that these people were mostly persons who were opposed to the National Socialist views.
Q Have you ever thought about the problem of how, in your conception, people were treated in these camps; what was your idea about the treatment of these internees in the camps?
There may be a difference whether you are thinking of the first and earlier or later years?
AAbout the method of treatment in the camps I have no knowledge at all. During the earlier years, when I was still active in Germany, one heard rumors to the effect that treatment was normal. In the later years I was abroad, that is to say, in the war, and I was so far away that I gained no knowledge of these things and wasn't interested in it.
QIs it right therefore to assume, as far as the atrocities were concerned, which did actually occur, you had no positive knowledge?
ANo, did not have any positive knowledge, not even in March 1945, when I became Supreme Commander in the best; even then things, stories from concentration camps were completely strange to me. This I attributed to two facts. One, the personal attitude which I have expressed earlier, that I principally concerned myself with my own business, which was very considerable, and secondly, that within the State a Police State had developed which, in a hermetic way, closed itself off from the rest of the world.
Q Have you any clues from contact with your officers corps that there was more knowledge about these things then what just came to yourself?
AThe contact which was with my office was extremely a good one. I do not believe that any large number of officers could have existed who knew more about these things, but of course I can not answer that question for the individuals.
QDid you know that Hitler had decided to eliminate the Jewish people physically?
AThat is certainly not so.
QDid you not have frequent opportunities to talk to Hitler about whether this was a competent question?
AWhenever I was at headquarters then during the official part of the conversation and any military questions were talked about and asked about, no question was put to Hitler. When I was invited to a meal, then historical matters of general interest would be talked about, but very few political problems of the work on political questions never came up for question. I personally can not remember any instance where Hitler influence any of the other gentlemen with regard to making an act personal.
QDid you believe in Hitler's personality in a sense that Hitler was determined to leave the German nation for a better Germany, but with consideration of personal freedom and respect to human dignity. What was your conception about that?
THIS PRESIDENT:What relevancy is that of a witness belief upon a subject of that sort. What relevancy has it got to do with any part of the case of defendant Kaltenbrunner. The Tribunal considers these sort of questions are a waste of the Tribunal's time. BY DR. KAUFFMANN:
QIs it correct that in the leadership state, which existed in Germany, of course, any contradiction by a human being of an order was impossible?
AIn that form I would not deny that. One could certainly represent one's own views, but if one's own views were enacted by some decision than the absolute obedience became necessary, and that absolute obedience was demanded under certain circumstances with the application of the penal laws. In other words, the resistance to that order, or an order, was under my impression, or to my knowledge, a personality and attitude of Adolf Hitler which was quite adequate to the question that he was not to be mislead about anything.
QWould a person listing a final issued order, and who tried to resist such an order, would he not have to expect to lose his life?
ADuring the later years that was an absolute certainty.
QDid you at any time, and if so, when did you think the war could not be won?
ABeginning with the year of 1943, one had to consider the possibility that a gainful peace could not be achieved. I emphasize that one had to expect that possibility, considering certain measures of the organization as correct that state could have been changed.
QDid you ever discuss these questions on a" higher level, in other words, your objection to continuing the war?
AAt various times when I talked within my military sector I had referred to a number of constructions which night influence the end of the whole war, but as representative of a certain military fear I though I would not be entitled in my position to judge the whole military situation, since after all I did not know the situation regarding the production, regarding the organization, and regarding the manpower; that I could not judge these matters from ay small opinion of view. As I said before, I refused as an amateur to make a statement about a situation, which under certain circumstances might be regarded as an official statement, since this would have been like a statement of that man Field Marshall Kesselring.
THE PRESIDENT:Will you kindly explain to the Tribunal what relevancy the last two or three questions have to the case of Kaltenbrunner?
DR. KAUFFMANN:I want to show that Kaltenbrunner, that he could not resist an order, that is what he said. It would have meant loss of his life.
THE PRESIDENT:You asked the witness whether at any time during the war he thought how long the war would last. What has that got to do with Kaltenbrunner?
DR. KAUFFMANN:The prosecution accuses several defendants that they held the knowledge of the possibility of victory had Germany continued to fight, to extend the war in that manner, and that is the problem that I want to clarify in my questions.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it was put specifically against Kalten-
brunner. If it is your last question you may put it. BY DR. KAUFFMANN:
QDid I understand you correctly, Mr. Witness, then, what you are trying to explain is that the leading motive of your continuing to fight was your duty towards your country?
AThat is a matter of course, naturally. I had other courses as well, which were passed, one of which was that possibility of a political termination of the war was denied of peace officially, but that I had this knowledge, and that I am still convinced today, that this could be proved by the fact that I discussed -- that I took up negotiations together with Wolff, and and American, hoping that a political discussion in that way would reach to that end.
DR. KAUFFMANN:Mr. President, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT:Any other counsel for the defense. BY DR. PAECKMANN: Dr. Paeckmann, Counsel for the defense for the SS.
QWitness, Dr. Kauffmann asked you whether the officers' corps had knowledge of the condition and installment of concentration camps. Do you know that within the Army force, so called National Socialist instruction courses were conducted?
AYes, I know of that.
QMay I ask you whether you know that during one of the National Political courses of instruction, which were had from 15th to 23rd December, 1937, and I am referring now to document No. 1992APS, that during that course the establishment of concentration camps was talked about by Himmler, before the officers, who had said something like this: Naturally, we take a difference between those who may be there for a few months, and for educational purposes, and those who will be there for a long time. Now I skip a few sentences, and I come to the one part which is important to me: The order begins by having these people living in clean barracks, and something like that can only be achieved only with German help. There is hardly any other nation would be so human, we ask you, as we are. Laundry is frequently changed. These people are instructed to wash twice a day, and use the tooth brush is advised, to some of them it is sometimes not known to them before. Do you know that in this way it is entirely different from the fact that the Army was instructed in this way?
A As I said earlier, we did not concern ourselves with such questions, and this lecture by Himmler is unknown to me.
DR. PAECKMANN:Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT:Does any other Defense Counsel wish to ask any questions? Then the Prosecution may cross examine.
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:
QYou understand, witness, in giving your testimony, as to the definition of the High Command of the General Staff, as that definition is included in the Indictment, you are accused as a member of that group, do you not?
AI understand.
QAnd that you are testifying here virtually as one of the Defendants?
AI understand.
QYou have spoken of the establishment in Germany of a police state by the National Socialist Party, and I want to ask you whether it is not the fact that the police state rested on two institutions, very largely, first, the secret police, and, secondly, the concentration camp.
AThe assistance by the police is an established fact to me, and the concentration camp was a means to achieve that.
QAnd both the secret police and the concentration camp were established by Hermann Goering, is that not a fact known to you?
AThe secret state police was created by Hermann Goering, but whether-
QYour lectures will be reserved for your own Counsel, and I shall ask to have you so instructed. Just answer my questions. Wasn't the concentration camp also established by Hermann Goering?
AI don't know.
QYou don't know that. Did you favor the police state?
AI considered it as something abnormal under German conception that as a state would keep certain things away from public knowledge.
QDid you ever do anything or can you point to anything that you did in public life to prevent that abnormal condition coming to Germany?
AI can't remember anything like that, except that during conversations with my superiors I may have brought the point up for discussion, but I emphasize particularly that I confined myself to my tasks in my spheres.
QDo you want this Tribunal to understand that you never knew that there was a campgin on by this state to persecute the Jews in Germany? Is that the way you want your testimony to be understood?
APersecution of the Jews was not known to me.
QIsn't it a fact that Jewish officers were excluded from your army and from your command?
AJewish officers didn't exist.
QIsn't it a fact that certain officers of your army, certain officers of the Luftwaffe, took steps to aryanize themselves in order to escape the effect of Goering's decrees? Did you know about that?
AI heard rumors to that effect.
QAnd aryanizing, where the father was suspected of Jewish ancestry, consisted in showing that the normal father was not the actual father, didn't it
AI admit that, but there are other cases as well.
QYes, It might be that the mother was suspected of Jewish ancestry.
ABut in certain exceptional cases certain facts were overlooked.
QYes. Bid you know anything about the Jewish riots, anti-Jewish riots of November 9th and 10th in Germany in 1938?
AAre you talking about the action "Mirror" (Spiegel)? I am not sure what you are talking about.
QI am talking about the riots in which synagogues were burned, which made Goering so very angry. Didn't you hear about that in 1938?
ANo, I didn't hear anything about it.
QWhere were you in 1938?
AIn 1938 I was in Dresden.
QIn November?
AIn November I was in Berlin.
QIn Berlin. And you never heard about the anti-Jewish riots of the 10th and 11th of November, 1938?
A I have only heard about the so-called action Spiegel (Mirror).
QWhat was that? You have me down. I don't know anything by that name.
AThat was the smashing of shop windows, and that, I believe, took rather large proportions in Berlin.
QYou did hear, then, about the anti-Jewish riots?
AAbout that, yes.
QAnd did you hear that Hermann Goering issued a decree confiscating the insurance that was to make reparations to those Jews who owned shops? Did you hear about Goering's action in that respect?
AI didn't quite understand. May I ask to have it repeated?
QDid you hear about the decree passed by Hermann Goering a few days later, November the 12th, to be exact, confiscating the insurance of the victims of those raids and fining the Jewish community a billion reichsmarks?
AIt is possible that I heard about it at the time, but I now have no certain recollection.
QBut you did hear about it. You did not regard those things as persecution?
AThis action Glass I certainly must regard that as an atrocity against the Jews.
QYou have stated, as I understand you, based on your experience with Hitler, that it was permissible for officers to differ with him in opinion so long as they obeyed his orders. Is that what you want understood?
AI have to apologize, but I didn't quite understand the last half of that sentence. May I please ask to have it repeated?
QI have understood from your testimony this morning that you felt perfectly free to disagree with Hitler and to make suggestions to him and give him information, but that after his mind was made up and an order issued it had to be obeyed. That is to say -
AYes.
QThat is to say, an officer was at all times at liberty to go to Hitler and give him technical information, such as the state of the preparedness of his branch of the service?
A Generally speaking, no. For that purpose the leaders of those army sectors were the only people admitted for that purpose.
QSo the only channel through which information as to the state of the air force would reach Hitler was through Hermann Goering, is that a fact?
AHermann Goering and, from time to time, Secretary of State Milch, who was his deputy at onetime or another.
QIf Hitler was about to engage in a war for which the Luftwaffe was unprepared, based on your information of the situation, would it or would it not have been possible for the Luftwaffe officers to have advised Hitler of that fact?
AWe had complete confidence in the Reichsmarshal and we know that he was the only person who had a certain amount of influence upon Adolf Hitler. In that way we knew, since we always knew his peaceful attitude, that we were perfectly secure, and we relied on it.
QThere came a time when you went into the East, did you now, as a commander? You went into Poland and you went into Soviet Russia, did you not?
APoland and Russia, yes.
QAnd was it not understood among the officers in those Polish and Russian campaigns that the Hague Regulations would not be applied to Soviet Russia as to the treatment of prisoners of war?
AThat wasn't known to me, no.
Q You have testified that the Luftwaffe was purely a weapon of defense, is that your testimony?
AYes.
QWhat was the German strength at the beginning of the Polish campaign in various types of planes?
AAs I was not a member of the Central Board I can only give you an approximation on my own responsibility, without guaranteeing for the historical certainty of these figures. All told I would say we had approximately three thousand aircraft. As far as I can remember now there were between thirty and forty fighter groups, bomber groups-the same thing applies to fighters, and there were ten groups of dive bomber fighters, about thirty aircraft, which would drop to about six or seven aircraft and to carry on there were ten to twelve groups of different bombers, including fighters and torpedo bombers. Also included in that figure were reconnaissance pianos and a certain number of naval aircraft.
QAnd the proportion of bombers to fighters was approximately two to one, was it not?
AThe proportion of bombers to fighters was about one to one or one point two, or one point three to one. I said thirty to forty and about thirty fighter groups. If I include the destroyer aircraft, then the figure would be one to one.
QThat is the way you make up the total of about three thousand units?
AApproximately three thousand. The reasonwhy I can give you that figure is because during these months of quiet reflection I made certain calculations. Without that, of course, I would give the historic truth in that connection.
QNow, do you count as a weapon of defense the bomber, or do you treat that as an offensive weapon?
AI must include the bomber just as the dive bomber and the fighter aircraft amongst the defensive weapons, and I must regard it just as much as an offensive weapon.
I explained yesterday that no matter whether defensive or offensive warfare is concerned, it is the task of an air force to be offensive to achieve the aims of a deep military sector.
I have also explained that an air force which only has light aircraft is doomed to be destroyed since it cannot hit at the bases of the enemy production and since it cannot hit against military movements, in various sectors.
QIn other words, the Luftwaffe was a defensive weapon if you were on the defensive and an offensive weapon if you were on attack?
AI am afraid the last half of the sentence I did not understand.
QThe Luftwaffe would serve as a defensive weapon if you were on the defensive and as an offensive weapon if you were on attack, isn't that true?
AYou could put it like that, but I would express it differently. As I say, the air force, because of its make-up, is an offensive weapon, no matter whether it is being used during defense or for attack.
QI think you have improved on my sentence. Now, in the Netherlands, in Poland-
AMay I just say something else on the subject?
QYes.
ANamely, that I said yesterday at the very end that the leading characteristic of an offensive air force is the long distance four-engine bombers which can carry great weight, and Germany had none of these.
QHow did it come that Germany had none of those?
AFirstly, because we were, in fact, in a period of risk. We were only confining ourselves to the absolute essentials regarding the Air force.
Secondly, we tried, in keeping with our characteristics, to build as many precision aircraft; in other words, different bombers, and I am here thinking of the JU-88 as a typical example of that.
QYou were examined by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, were you not, on the 28th of June, 1945? Do you recall that?
A That is quite possible, yes.
QWell, it is quite certain, is it not?
AI have been interrogated quite a lot.
QNow, I ask you whether on the 28th of June, 1945, you did not say to the officer examining you on behalf of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey this: "Everything had been d one to make the German Air Force from the point of view of airmanship, aircraft, flak, air corp signals and so forth, the most formidable in the world. This effort led to the facts that at the beginning of the war, or in 1940, at the latest, from a fighter viewpoint, from a dive bomber viewpoint, from a combat viewpoint, we had particularly good aircraft even if the standard was not uniform entirely." Did you not state that?
AThat is still my view today, that as far as material was concerned, fighters, dive bombers and bombers, we did in fact have a certain lead before other nations.
QNow, as to the failure to have the number of four-engine bombers; that was because of your peaceful intentions, was it, or was it because of mistake in judgment as to what the requirements of war would be?
ATo that I must say the following. It would have been insanity on the part of the Air Force loaders to produce an air force within three to four years. In 1940, at the earliest, did the possibility exist to have an effective air force which would comply with all requirements. For that reason, in my view, it was an amazing achievement of organization to be leading, even being restricted.
QI understood you to give as one of the indications of your unaggressive intentions the fact that you had not an adequate number of four-engine bombers at the outset of the war. Did I misunderstood you?
AThat is only an excerpt from the whole story. The strength of the Air Force was particularly in comparision with the small States to be regarded as sufficient.
Certainly not, however, in comparision with large opponents who were fully armed in the air.
I have an example which transpired after considerable discussion with the Reichsmarshal before the beginning of the Russian campaign. I asked for a strengthening of the fighter and dive bomber section. For certain reasons that was refused; certain reasons being shortage of material and I could also gather from the conversation that the Reichsmarshal did not agree with my views.
QDid you not testify to the Bomber Investigating Commission of the United States that you intended to build a longrange heavy bomber but -
"We had developed the AG-111 and the JU-88 and they were actually put into the fighting as long-range heavy bombers. The JU-88 was then used in the French campaign and against England.
"Questions: The JU-88 is not really a long-range bomber."
Your answer: "It was considered a long-range bomber at that time but unfortunately we had a low opinion of the fourengine aircraft and an erroneous belief that proved to be a mistake in the course of later years."
Is that true?
AThat is my view.
QAnd the reason you did not build the four-engine aircraft, was your low opinion of it?
AMay I say the following: That was the conception of a service department on a lower level but the decisions would have been made by the highest service department.
QThe highest made a mistake about the utility of the four-engine bomber?
AWell, looking at the situation retrospectively, I must say that the absence of the four-engine bomber turned out extremely awkward.
Q And that the highest authority in air production was Hermann Goering.
He was the head of the whole plan of aircraft production, was he not?
AYes, that is correct but that erroneous conception of certain war measures did exist temporarily.
QYou were in the Polish campaign, you have said?
AYes.
QIs it not a fact that the German Air Force made the decisive contribution to that campaign as to the time taken to conquer Poland?
AFrom the point of view of the Air Force officers I must agree with that conception but the Army officers do not quite share it.
QWell, you are testifying now as to your opinion. And in that campaign you developed the technique of low level attacks by fighters, light bombers and dive bombers against marching columns and the dive bomber, the light bomber and the fighters all contributed to the success of that movement.
AI must admit that. The beginning of the short range fighting technique was certainly found during the Polish campaign.
QI turn now to the French campaign. You were in the air in the French campaign, were you not?
AYes.
Q And the Air Force contributed decisively to the success of that campaign, didn't it?
AFrom the point of view of an Air Force officer, I must also agree with that view and call it correct.
QAnd you testified, did you not, that Dunkirk would not have been such a catastrophe if the Luftwaffe had not been there? That is true, isn't it?
ADunkirk, did you say? I didn't quite understand.
QYes, Dunkirk.
AYes. That is certainly my view. It would have increased if bad weather hadn't kept us back a bit.
QThat is, the catastrophe would have increased for the English except for bad weather. You had the Air Force to do a better job at Dunkirk than you did from your point of view?
AWe were kept down for about two days.
QYou were one of the principal advocates of the plan to invade England, were you not?
APersonally, I am of the opinion that if the war against England could have been brought to a successful end, then it could only have been achieved for certain by invading.
QAnd you had an adequate air force after having defeated Poland, defeated Holland, defeated Belgium, and defeated France, so that you advocated proceeding with an invasion of England, did you not?
ATo that I shall give an explanation,
QFirst tell me if that is true. THE PRESIDENT: Witness will you please understand that you must answer the question first, and give an explanation afterwards. Every question, or nearly every question. admits of either an affirmative or negative answer, and you will kindly give that answer and wake your explanation afterwards. BY MR. JUSTICE JACKSON.
QDid you not advocate the invasion of England, and was not the Air Force ready to invade England?
AThe Air Farce was, subject to certain conditions under consideration of the existing air situation at that time, ready to fulfill that take
QAnd you recommended very strongly to the Reichsmarshal that the in vision take place immediately after Dunkirk, didn't you?
AYes, and I still presented that view later on, too.
QAnd the preparations of the Luftwaffe for this invasion were complete, and the invasion was only called off because the procurement of sea-going craft was not sufficient, is that not true?
AYes, certainly, but I have to supplement the previous statement by saying that of course a certain interval between the French campaign and the English campaign would have had to be available to replenish the materials necessary for the Air Force.
QNow, you also told the Strategic Bombing Survey that Hitler had ordered not only the bombing of military targets, including industrial production, but also the bombing of political targets. Is that true?
AAfter a certain date, yes.
QThat is, to paralyze the government of the enemy. That is what you meant by a political target, did you not?
AThat is what I mean tinder political aims, but I answered the questions differently. I understood it differently. What I wanted to say was that that order became effective after a later date.
QYou attended the speech made by Hitler in August of 1939?
AYes, certainly
QAt that time you were informed that the attack on Poland would commence immediately or very soon?
ADuring that conference, the final decision to commence the Polish campaign had not yet been reached. Certainly, negotiations were still in progres and we were all still hoping that they would bring favorable results.
QYou were ordered on the 15th of August to get the Luftwaffe in readiness for an attack on Poland?
AThis order as such is not known to me in detail, but months ahead, in a certain general defensive way, we did make preparations, always thinking, of course, of a defensive situation. That is something which I must regard and state as being absolutely certain.
QYou expected Poland to attack Germany in the air? Is that your point?
A At any rate, that was a possibility which we took into consideration and expected.
The whole political situation was too difficult for us to come to a certain judgment about it all.
QYou have said that you never held conferences with Party leaders or talked politics or had any contacts with politicians, in substance, have you not?
ABasically, yes.
QWasn't your immediate superior the number two politician of Germany? Didn't you know that?
AI did, but I must emphasize that the conversations which I had with the Reichsmarshal were 99 per cent concerned with military and organization problems.
QBut you know that he, at all times, was one of the leading men in Nazi politics?
ACertainly.
QYou testified that you knew of the order to shoot Soviet Commissars?
ACertainly.
QAnd that you did not approve it and did not carry it out.
AI didn't answer in that sense yesterday, no.
QWhat did you answer?
AI said the following, that the Air Force, which was not fighting on the ground, was not concerned by this problem, and that an official notification of that order is no longer in my recollection.
QWho executed that order? Who was expected to execute it?
AI was only in Russia until November 1941 and I can't answer your question.
QDid you ever hear of the SS?
AYes, of course.
QAnd isn't it a fact that the execution of that order was committed to the SS?
AI knew nothing about that.
QWhat did you think the SS existed for?
AIn my opinion, the SS, as far as it was used in military operations, was a section of the Army, was a sort of guard of the Army.
Q The SS was to guard the Army or to guard whom:
AThe SS divisions were, from the point of view of human numbers and materials, well above the average as far as equipment or normal army divisions were concerned.
QWho was commanding the SS?
AThe SS was commanded by Himmler. As far as these divisions were used within the Army, they were tactically under the commanders of the Army groups to which they were attached.
QSo far as they had special missions, they were under the command of Himmler, is that right?
AYes, certainly. There was a very clear way from them up there.
QYou testified yesterday that you did not consider Hitler's commando order binding on you, and that you did not carry out that order, is that right?
AIn the military sector in the Mediterranean, yes.
QWas that because the order left discretion in your hands, or because you just took discretion into your hands?
AI made those reservations myself, firstly for various considerations, and secondly because I had an ambiguous task which could not easily be included in the general administrative leadership.
QWell then, the extent to which an order of that kind was carried out depended somewhat on the character and courage of the officer who received it, didn't it?
AI would like to express it slightly differently. These orders could be interpreted -- that commando order, for instance -- because it was certainly quite possible for the supreme commander to carry out an operation as a commando or as a militarily perfectly justified one.
QYou were in command of the forces in Italy at this time, were you not, at the time of the commando order?
AWith certain divisions. I didn't have full powers until September '43.
QI will ask to have you shown Document 498 in evidence as Exhibit 501.
THE PRESIDENT:Is that 498-PS?
MR. JUSTICEJACKSON: 498-PS, sir, I'm sorry. BY MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:
QI call your attention to Paragraph 6 of that order which reads as follows:
"I will hold responsible, under military law, for failing to carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this order, or acted against this order where it was to be executed."
You see that paragraph in the order?
AI just read it, yes.
QNow, did you ever report that you were not carrying out this order or did you deceive your superior officers as to whether it was being carried out
AIn one special case that question was treated very decisively at headquarters. This concerned the commando action where Adolph Hitler ordered the shooting of certain people in spite of the fact that we, my troop and I, wanted to spare them. I think that in this connection, Jodl, as an intermediary, achieved decisive results, namely that this point was eventually forgotten and that consequently these people were kept alive, both in hospitals and prisoner of war camps.
But as far as deceiving -- as you just said -- is concerned, I wouldn't talk about that. I wouldn't call it that since I, in my military sector, considered these orders as side orders, and this commando order certainly allowed for several interpretations.
QIn other words, the extent to which one of these orders was carried out depended on the commanders in charge, is that right, that Hitler couldn't depend on it that an order as emphatic as this would be carried out by his commanders? Was that the state of the German army?
ANo, not that, the situation can be explained like this: If, on the part of an army, such an operation is regarded as a commando operation and reported above in the sense of that order, then the necessary measures would have to be carried out, but that depended on the way of reporting by the units concerned, and I already had an opportunity yesterday to explain that an added coordinated conception did eventually set in. Where the carrying out of tactical moves were concerned, it was recognized what commando actions were within the framework of this order.
QYou testified today, and another witness has testified here, that if an order of Adolph Hitler was resisted, it meant death. You are also testifying that an absolute order to execute commandos, under threat of punishment if you filed, left you discretion to do it or not, and I want you once and for all to tell the Tribunal which is the fact, and then we will leave that subject.