As a conspirator, he had to camouflage himself especially will. To a certain degree, this had to be done by practically everyone who lived under this regime in Germany. As far as these photographs are now concerned, then these are easily a compulsory consequence of every social and thereby also socially representative membership in a body so that for better or for worse one becomes a victim of the camera with the members of it. If I am once a number of a government, then I cannot avoid being photographed with these people on the ocasion of their meetings. Thus such pictures result as Schacht between Ley and Streicher. And the scene about the reception of Hitler at the depot viewing such pictures ex post, these pictures are not a joy to the observer; certainly not to Schacht either, Put they do not prove anything. In a natural evaluation of a normal, average experience of life I consider these pictures without any value as evidence either pro or contra.
social intercourse with Adolf Hitler's governments, and this not only through their diplomatic corps. I wish to assure you that the defense is in a position to produce much more gretesque pictures, which do not look as natural as Schacht being photographed together with men who were his high standing colleagues in the third Reich. To produce such pictures, however, might not be a very tactful move of the defense, but a defense counsel must also take upon himself the odium of indiscretion, should it be necessary in order to investigate the truth in all seriousness. I do not believe that I have to do it in this case, because the irrelevance and insignificance of such a presentation of evidence through pictures of representative events seems to be obvious. me to argue now appears to be that Schacht, after his retirement as Minister of Economy, and still more after his retirement as President of the Reichsbank in January 1939, remained Minister without portfolio until 1943. Schacht declared that this had been stipulated by Hitler as a condition for his release from the ministry of economy. Hitler's signature, as head of the State, was necessary for his dismissal. Had Schacht refused to remain as Minister without portfolio, he would surely have been arrested sooner or later as politically suspect, and thus been deprived of all means of action against Hitler. between him and Schacht concerning the continuation of Schacht as Minister without portfolio. In these deliberations it was justly of importance, that Schacht could be of more use to the group of conspirators as a scout or a patrol if he remained in this position, to outward, appearances at least, within the Reich Government. Even as Minister without portfolio, Schacht remained exposed to great danger, as demonstrated by his an Gisovius' declarations, and as becomes obvious from Ohlendorfe's statement that Schacht, already in 1937 was on the black list of the State Police. which have been discussed here, particularly his remarks about Schacht after the attempted assassination on 20 July.
I would also remind once more of the memorandum of Hitler of 1936, which he gave to Speer in 1944 and which says that he saw in Schacht a saboteur of his rearmament plans. It has been declared and proved by Lammers, that Schacht tried later on to get rid even of this nominal position. Lammers and Schacht have proved furthermore that this position was without any substantial importance. Therefore my nicknaming it "Fancy Dress Major", that means a major without a battalion and command authority, a sham-major. Schacht could not get rid of the position without scandal, the same as with the position of Reich Bank President. Schacht therefore had to maneuver in such a way that he would be thrown out. He succeeded in this, as I explained, as Reich Bank President, through the well-known memorandum of the Board of Directors of the Reich Bank and the refusal of credits by the Reich Bank in November 1938, contained therein. As far as his position of Minister without portfolio was concerned, he succeeded through his defeatist letter of November 1942. In the meantime he made use of the time for the attempted "coup d'etat" in autumn 1938 and for the various other attempted "coups d'etat" until 20 July 1944, the last one landing him in a concentration camp. Minister without portfolio. For his proved conspirational activity against Hitler during all this time, eliminates of hand and logically the supposition that he had furthered Hitler's warplans and war strategy during this time. There remains only space, and this also only in the vacuum of abstraction, for a political rperoach against the Schacht of the years 1933-1937, But this, too, is campensated by the extraordinarily courageous attitude of Schacht after this period. In order to obtain the just appreciation for fact, may I remind you of the interesting statement of Gisevius, that he, who had looked with a certain scepticism upon Schacht's original attitude, not in a criminal but political sense, had then been completely reconciled with Schacht by the extraordinary courage which Schacht displayed as opponent an conspirator against Hitler s ince 1938. I mean therefore that the fact of Schacht remaining as Minister without portfolio does not incriminate him directly or indirectly not according to penal law anyhow, right from the start, but also not morally, if one takes into consideration his behaviour as a whole, his motives and the accompanying circumstances and conditions.
afore mentioned memorandum of the Board of Directors of the Reichsbank, an opposition to war is not evident from the Memorandum, but only technical currency and the testimony of von Vocke. And the presentation of facts by Schacht himself would not even be necessary to refute this argumentation. Vecke declared quite unequivocally, in his capacity as closest collaborator, that Schacht win to limit and sabotage rearmament from the moment when he recognized its dimensions as a danger of war. The sworn affidavits of Huelse and the sworn affidavits of all the collaborators of Schacht in the Reich Ministry of Economy combine with this testimony of Vecke in that sense. I need not quote then individually. They are known to the Tribunal. The Tribunal does not need the commentary of a defense counsel. They speak for themselves. If the Prosecution now finally argues concerning the text of the Memorandum, which, it as true, actually only deals with financial problems, then I cannot omit the remark, that such of history and the general experiences of life into consideration. Naturally as I have already said, the Board, of Directors of the Reich Bank could only operate with arguments which came under their department, particularly so if one had to deal with a Hitler. One beats the bag but one really means the donkey. had not made public its true purpose in this memorandum namely to avert the danger of war and to combat Hitler's will of aggression, then it would have removed the effect of a specialist departmental influence from itself. Hitler very well understand the purpose of this memorandum when he shouted, after reading it :"That is mutiny." With this Adolf Hitler recognized what can be said alone of Schacht as conspirator. He was never a mutineer and conspirator and world peace, but, so far as he was a conspirator and mutineer, he was this only against Adolf Hitler and his government. to Appendix or Appendage No II, which I should like to insert at this moment, because the matter that is dealt with here did not reach me until after I had submitted my final speech for translation.
Hitler. colleage Nelte in the epithets "Freekecat and drawing-room revolutionary " . Now history teaches that the quality of the tailor does not play any role in the case of the revolutionary. And as far as the drawing room is concerned, then the shacks have no revolutionary preference over the palaces. I only can to mind the political drawing-rooms of the great French Revolution or for instance (one of the many) the elegant officers' club of the feudal Preebrascher regiment under many a Czar. Even if the Gentlemen and of the opinion that Sch and his accomplices themselves should have done the shooting, then I can only say : Well, if it had only been that easy. Schacht would have loved to do the shooting himself; he exclaimed here spontaneously. But it would not go with power which would have pushed on during the confusion coming for certain afterwards and which could bring the attempt to a revolutionary success.
Therefore generals with troops were necessary. I do not wish to repay General Jodl with the same coin and therefore do not say "a necessary evil". contradicted by the social composition of the revolutionaries of 20 July. As I stated before all this is irrelevant for the decision of the Tribunal But my client has a moral right that his defense counsel does not completely ignore this polemic which took place in the spot light of the world public.
In summing up it must therefore be said : was bound to seize power. Previous to this Schacht had expressively warned the foreign countries of this development, and therefore had not contributed to it. After the seizure of power only two roads were open to him, as to every Germans. He either had to estrange himself or he had to enter the movement actively. The decision at these crossroads was a purely political one without any criminal aspect. Just as we respect the reasons which caused the foreign countries to collaborate with Hitler much more intensively and pre-Germanically than with the previous democratic governments of Germany, so we must recognize the good faith of all these Germans who believed themselves to be able to serve the country and humanity better because of the greater possibilities of exerting their influence within the movement, therefore either within the party or within the apparatus of officialdom, than by grumblingly standing aside.
To serve Hitler as minister and President of the Reichsbank was a political decision, about whose political correctness one can now ex post facto argue, which however, ked any criminal character. Schacht has always remained loyal to the motivating reason for his decision, namely to combat any radicalism from an influen tial position . Nowhere in the world did a warning signal appear for him. He only saw that the world trusted Hitler much longer than he himself, and permitted Adolf Hitler honors and foreign political successes, which hampered Schacht's work when it had already for a long tine been directed at removing Adolf Hitler and his government. He led this struggle against Adolf Hitler and his government with a courage and a consequence which must make it appear as a pure miracle that it was only after 20 July 1944 that the fate of the concentration camp and the danger of losing his head, either through the People's Tribunal or through an act of the SS, reached him. He is sufficiently clever and self-critical to refrain from escaping the realization that, from the purely political consideration, the picture of his character will waver in history, or at least in the nearest future, confused by the favor and hatred of the parties. He humbly resigns himself to the judgment of history even then, if one historian or another will label hispolitical line as incorrect. With the pride of a good conscience he resigns himself to the ju gment of this High Tribunal. He stands before his judges with clean hand. He also stands before this Tribunal with the confidence, as he has already expressed in a letter which he addressed to this Tribunal before the beginning of the proceedings, in which he expresses that he would regard with gratitude the exposing before this Tribunal and before the whole world publicity of his actions and activity and its motivating reasons. He stands before this Tribunal with confiedence because he knows that the favor and hatred of the parties will not have any effect in this Tribunal. In all self-recognition of the relativity of all political actions in such difficult times, he is still selfcognizant and full of confidence with regard to the criminal charges which have been raised against him, and this with justification. Because, no matt who would have to be found guilty of being criminally responsible for this war and the atrocities and inhumane acts committed in it, Schacht, according to the evidence which has been kept here with minute exactness can shout the words to every culprit , which Wilhelm Tell shouts to the Kaiser-assassin Parricida :"I raise my clean hands to Heaven, and curse you and your deed."
I therefore request the findings to be established to the effect, that Schacht is not guilty of the accusation which has been raised against him and that he therefore is to be acquitted.
THE PRESIDENT: I call on Dr. Candleholder for the defendant Doenitz.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, gentlemen of the bench:
"War is a cruel thing and it brings in its train a multitude of injustices and misdeeds."
With these words of Plutarch's, Hugo Grotius begins his examination of the responsibility for war crimes and they are as true today as they were 2000 years ago. At all times acts were committed by belligerents, which were war crimes or were considered as such by the other side. But the conclusions drawn from this fact were always to the prejudice of the vanquished parties, and never to that of the victors. The law which was applied here was necessarily the right of the stronger. up regulating warfare, in maritime wars the conceptions of the parties engaged have always clashed on the point of international law. Nobody knows better than British statesmen how much these conceptions are dictated by national or economic interests. Fisher and Lord Edward Grey. Therefore, if ever in history a naval power would have had the idea to prosecute a defeated enemy admiral, and this on grounds of his own conception of the rules of naval warfare, the sentence would have been pronounced simultaneously with the indictment. war which has been called criminal. Thus the Tribunal is confronted with a decision regarding conceptions of law which are necessarily as divergent as the interests of a naval power from the interests of a land power. Not only the fate of both admirals is connected with this decision. It is also a question of an honorable name for hundreds of thousands of German seamen, who believed in serving a good cause and who do not deserve to be branded by history as pirates and murderers. It is to these men, the living as well as the dead, that I feel bound by duty when I undertake to reject the accusation against German naval warfare.
Which are these accusations? They are divided into 2 large groups: Unlawful sinking of ships and premeditated killing of shipwrecked personnel. of ships.
Two reports by Mr. Roger Allen of the British Foreign Office, made in the fall of 1940 and spring of 1941 form the nucleus of that accusation. I do not know to whom and for what purpose these reports were made. According to their form and contents they seen to be serving propaganda purposes, and for this very reason I believe their value as evidence to be very low. Even the prosecution submitted only part of the accusations made therein. The reports trace only one-fifth of the total of supposedly unlawful attacks to submarines whereas four-fifths are ascribed to mines, airplanes or surface craft. The prosecution omits these fourfifths and this reserved attitude may be explained from the fact that the use of these combat means on the British side differs in no way from that on the German side. exist a difference between the principles followed by the German Naval Operations and these of our enemies. At any rate the public in enemy countries and many neutral countries believed so during the war and partly still believes it today. Propaganda dominated the field. At the same time the mass of all critics neither knew exactly which principles were valid for German Uboat warfare, nor on which factual and legal foundations they were based. It shall be my task to attempt to clarify this.
The reports by Mr. Roger Allen culminate in the assertion that the German U-boats from the summer of 1940 on torpedoed everything coming before their periscopes. Undoubtedly the method of submarine warfare stiffened gradually under the pressure of the measures directed against Germany. This war, however, never did degenerate into a wild shooting melee governed by the law of expediency alone. Much of what might have been useful for a U boat was left undone until the last day of the war because it had to be regarded as legally inadmissible, and all measures which the German Naval High Command is being accused of today by the prosecution, were the result of a development in which both sides partook through measures and counter measures as in all military developments.
German submarine warfare at the beginning of this war. These regulations were literally incorporated into article 74 of the German Prize Ordinance, which even Mr. Roger Allen calls a reasonable and not inhumane instrument. As a draft this prize ordinance was sent in 1938 to the two U-Boat flotillas and to the UBoat training school and served as foundation for the training of the commanders. Stopping and examining of merchant vessels was performed as a tactical task. In order to facilitate for the commander in economic warfare the quick and correct evaluation of his legal position towards a ship and the cargo of the enemy and the neutral, the prize disc was constructed which through simple manipulations indicates the articles of the prize ordinance to be applied. Insofar as preparations had been made at all for econom warfare through submarines they were based exclusively on the German prize ordinance and thus on the London Protocol. tion at the time the war broke off. The combat instructions for U-Boats of 3 September 1939 ordered clearly and distinctly that submarine warfare be carried on in accordance with the prize ordinance. Accordingly sinking were permissible only after stopping and examinations unless the ship attempted to escape or offered resistance. Some examples were submitted to the Tribunal from the abundance of possible instances showing the chivalrous spirit with which the German submarine commanders complied with the issued instructions. Especially, the care given to the crows of ships sunk lawfully after stopping and examination was carried out in part to an extent which could scarcely be justified on military grounds Life boats were towed over long distances and, thereby, the few available U-boats were diverted from their combat Mission.
Enemy ships which could have been sunk lawfully were permitted to go free in order to send the crews of ships previously sunk to part aboard then. It is, therefore, only correct if Mr. Roger Allen stated that the German U-Boats during the first weeks of the war adhered strictly to the London regulations.
Why was this procedure not kept up? Because the conduct of the enemy made such a procedure militarily impossible and created at the same time the legal prerequisites for its modification. the war started, U-Boat reports reached the commander of the Uboat fleet at the Naval High Command stating that hardly an enemy ship submitted voluntarily to stopping and examination. The merchant vessels were not content with their attempt to escape, be it through fleeing or be it by changing their course, to bear directly upon the U-boat thus forcing it to dive. On the contrary every sighted U-boat was reported at once by radio and subsequent; in the shortest space of time, it was attacked by enemy air planes or naval forces. The complete armament of the enemy merchant vessels, however, settled the matter. As early as 6 September 1939 a German U-boat was shelled by the British Steamship "Manaar and that was the starting signal for the great struggle which took place between the U-boats on the one hand and the armed merchant vessel equipped with guns and depth charges on the other hand, as equal military opponents. the adversary, I have presented the Tribunal with some examples which I do not wish to repeat. They unequivocally show that a further action against enemy merchant ships according to the regulations governing prize Ordinance was no longer possible from the military standpoint and meant suicide for the submarine. Nevertheless the German High Command continued, for long weeks, to proceed according to the regulations governing Prize Ordinance. Only after it was established that everytime there was any action on the part of enemy merchant ships, and especially of armed action, it was not a question of an individual case of a generally ordered measure, the order was given on 4 October 1939 to attack all armed enemy merchant ships without warning.
of this submarine warfare against armed merchant vessels should have been discontinued. In the last war the most terrible weapons of warfare were ruthlessly employed on both sides both on land and in the sir. In view of this experience, the thesis can hardly be upheld today that in naval warfare one of the parties waging war can be expected to give up using an effective weapon after the adversary has taken measures making the use of it impossible in its previous forms. In any case, such a renunciation could only be considered if the novel utilization of the weapon were undeniably illegal. But this is not the case for the utilization of German submarines against enemy merchant shipping, because the measures taken by the enemy did not only change the military situation but also the legal one.
utilized for battle does not come under the provisions granting protection against sinking without warning, as provided by the London Pact for merchant ships. I wish to stress the fact that the merchant ship is not thereby denied the right to carry weapons and to fight. From this fact the conclusion was drawn, as reflected in the well-known formula: "He who uses weapons himself must expect weapons to be used against him." tion of the London Protocol as dishonest. It admits only the closest literal interpretation and considers the sinking of a merchant ship as admissible only if the latter has offered active resistance. It is not the first time that fundamental differences of opinion exist between contracting parties, with respect to the interpretation of a treaty and the extremely different interpretations of the meaning of the Potsdam Agreement of 2 August 1945 provide a very timely example. Diversity of conception, therefore, does not allow for the conclusion that the one or the other party has acted dishonestly during the signing or the subsequent interpretation of a treaty. I will endeavour to show how unjustified this reproach is in respect also of the German interpretation of the London Submarine Protocol. tion, namely that of "merchant vessdl" and "offer of active resistance." prehensive expose. I can only touch the problems and due to lack of time I must also limit myself when mentioning scientific sources. I shall preferentially refer to American sources, because the interests of naval strategy of this nation were not fixed to the same extent as those of the European nations and therefore its science can probably claim great objectivity. declaration which was signed at the London Naval Conference of 1930. The committee of jurists appointed at that time, expressed its opinion concerning the greatly disputed definition of a merchant vessel in the report of 3 April 1930;
"The committee wishes to place on record that the expression 'merchant vessel' where it is employed in the declaration is not to be understood as including a merchant vessel which is at the moment participating in hostilities in such a manner as to cause her to lose her right to the immunities of a merchant vessel." vessel, flying a merchant flag, may lay claim to being treated as a merchant vessel in the sense of the London agreement. Beyond this, the explanation has few positive aspects because the question of by which kind of participation in hostilities a vessel looses her right to the immunity of a merchant vessel is again subjected to the interpretation of the individual contracting parties. The London Conference, as far as I can see, did not consider this ticklish question any further and one probably does not go wrong by assuming, that this astonishing reserve is based on experiences which the same powers had gathered in Washington 8 years ago. of the First World War, and, therefore, it is no wonder that the naval power, Great Britain, which during the World War had suffered most from German submarine warfare, now tried to outlaw and abolish altogether by International Law the submarine warfare against merchant shipping. The resolution named after the American main delegate, Root, which in its first part substantially corresponded to the London text of 1930, served that aim. But in the second part the Root-Resolution goes further and stipulates chat any commander, who, no matter whether he acted with or without higher orders, violated the rules established for the sinking of merchant vessels should be punished as a war criminal like a pirate. Finally it was recognized, that under the conditions stipulated in the resolution submarine warfare against merchant shipping was impossible, and was therefore renounced altogether by the contracting powers. The Root-Resolution designates these principles as an established part of International Law. As such, it was accepted by the delegates, but none of the 5 participating naval powers, USA, England, France, Japan and Italy ratified it.
is of the greatest importance for the interpretation of the London Protocol, namely the definition of the word "vessel". Here the two fronts in the entire U-boat question became clearly evident. On the one side there stood England, on the other France, Italy and Japan, while the US took the position of a mediator. According to the protocol of the Washington conference the Italian delegate, Senator Schanzer, initiated the advance of the weaker naval powers by expressly emphasizing that a merchantman, regularly armed, may be attacked by a submarine without preliminaries. In a later session Schanzer repeated his statement that the Italian delegation applied the term of "merchantman" in the resolution only to unarmed merchant vessels. He explicitly declared this to be in accordance with the existing rules of International Law.
The French delegate, M. Sarraut, at that time received instruction from the Foreign minister Briand to second the reservations of the Italian delegate. He thereupon moved to have the Italian reservations included in the records of the session. that he thought it was clear that merchant vessels, engaged in giving military assistance to the enemy, ceased in fact to be merchant vessels. It can, therefore, be seen that in 1922, 3 of the 5 powers represented expressed the opinion that armed merchant vessels should not be regarded as merchant vessels in thesense of the agreement. difference of opinion, a way-out was found which is typical for conferences of this kind. Root closed the debate with the statement that in his opinion the resolution held good for all merchant ships as long as the ship remained a merchant vessel. with this compromise a formula was created which, to be sure could represent a momentary political success, but which, however, would carry no weight in the case of war. For it was left to every participating power to decide whether or not it would grant the armed merchant vessels the protection of the resolution in case of war. because the same powers took part in them as participated in the London Naval Conference of 1930.
The London conference was thecontinuation of the Washington conference and what had been discussed and included in the records at the first one had its full importance for the second one.
Science, too, and by no means only German, but especially American and French science, based its examinations on the close connection of both conferences and it was precisely for that reason that they declared the result achieved in the question of submarines to be ambiguous and unsatisfactory. Were I only want to point to Wilson's summarizing report on the London Naval Treaty. concept "merchant vessel" the uncertainty connected with the words "Active resistance" is pointed out, and it is these very words with which an exception from the protection of the merchantman is connected, on exception which likewise is not contained in the actual text of the London agreement, but which nevertheless, is generally recognized. I am referring to merchantmen in an enemy convey If the London agreement is interpreted literally, the opinion would have to be upheld that merchantmen in an enemy convey must also not be attacked without warning, but that an attacking battle ship would just have to put out of action the escort vessels first and then stop and search the merchantmen afterwards. However, this militarily impossible demand evidently is not made by the Prosecution, either. It says in the report of the British Foreign Office which has been mentioned several times: "Ships sailing in enemy conveys are usually deemed to be guilty of forcible resistance and therefore liable to be sunk forthwith." "active resistance", an interpretation, which results in no way from the treaty itself but is simply a consequence of military necessity and is thus dictated by common sense. ship be held just as guilty of forcible resistance as the conveyed ship. Let us take an extreme instance-in order to make the matter quite clear. An unarmed merchant ship of 20,000 tons and with a speed of 20 knots which is conveyed by a trawler with, let us say, 2 guns and a speed of 15 knots, may be sunk without warning, because it placed itself under the protection of the trawler and thereby made itself guilty of active resistance. If, however, this same merchant ship does not have the protection of the trawler and instead the 2 guns or even 4 or 6 of them are placed on its decks, enabling it to use its full speed, should it not in this case be found just as guilty of offering active resistance as before?
Such deductions really seem to me against all common sense. In the opinion of the Prosecution the submarine would first have to give the merchantship which is far superior to it in fighting power, the order to stop and wait until the merchantship fires its first broadside at the submarine.
Only then would it have the right to use its own weapons. Since, however, a single artillery hit is nearly always fatal for a submarine although it harms a merchant ship very little as a rule, the result would be the almost certain destruction of the submarine.
"When you see a rattlesnake rearing its head you do not wait until it jumps at you but you destroy it before it gets the chance."
These are Roosevelt's words in which he justified his order to the United States Naval Forces to attack German submarines. The reason seemed sufficient to him to order the immediate use of arms even without the existence ofa state of a war. It is a solitary instance in war, however, to grant one or two armed opponents the right to fire the first shot and to make it the other's to wait for the first hit. Such an interpretation, however, is contradictory to any military reason. It is no wonder, therefore, if in view of such divergent opinions the experts on International Law, even after the London Treaty and the signing of the London Protocol of 1936, consider the treatment of the armed merchant vessels in naval warfare to be an unsolved question. In this instance, too, I should like to point to only one scientific source which enjoys especially high authority. It is the draft of an agreement on the rights and duties of neutrals in naval warfare, an agreement which leading American professors of International Law, such as Jessup, Herchard and Charles Warren published in the "American Journal of International Law" of July 1939, simultaneously giving reasons, which furnish an excellent idea of the most recent state of opinion.
Article 54 of this draft corresponds literally to the text of the London Agreement of 1936 with one noticeable exception: the term "Merchant Vessel" is replaced by"unarmed vessel". The next article then continues:
"In their action with regard to enemy armed merchant vessels, belligerent war ships, whether surface or submarine, and belligenent military aircraft are governed by the rules applicable to their action with regard to enemy war ships."
This opinion is first based on the historical development. At the time when it was customary to arm merchant vessels, that is until the end of the last century, there was no question of any protection for the merchant vessel against immediate attack by an enemy warship. With the introduction of armor plating the warship became so superior to the armed merchant vessel that any resistance on the part of the latter was rendered futile and the arming of merchant ships therefore gradually ceased.
"As merchantmen lost effective fighting power they acquired a legal immunity from attack without warning." to the defenseless and harmless merchant vessel. In respect of which the American expert on International Law Hyde stated in 1922, i.e. after the Washington conference and the afore-mentioned Root resolution on U-boat warfare:
"Maritime states have never acquiesed in a principle that a merchant vessel so armed to be capable of destroying a vessel of war of any kind should enjoy immunity from attack at sight, at least when encountering an enemy cruiser of inferior defensive strength." mentioned American authorities after the signing of the London Agreement and shortly before the outbreak of the war to form the opinion that armed merchant ships are not protected from attacks without warning. also rejected as inapplicable. It is well known that the American Secretary of State Lansing in his mote to the Allies on 18 January 1916 took the point of view that any kind of armament aboard a merchant vessel will make its fighting strength superior to that of a submarine and that such an armament is therefore of an offensive nature.
declared that mounting guns on the stern could be taken as proof of the defensive character of the armaments. This standpoint was adopted in some international agreements and drafts as well as by British jurists in particular. It does not do justice to the practice of naval warfare. in the bows, e.g. as a matter of principle on steam-propelled fishing boats. Furthermore, the anti-aircraft weapons of the merchant vessel which were especially dangerous for the submarine were frequently placed on the bridge, and could, therefore be used in all directions. Besides which there can be no discrimination between defensive and offensive armaments on the basis of the way the weapons are placed. which these weapons are meant to be employed. Soon after the war had started the orders of the British Admiralty had already fallen into German hands. A decision of the Tribunal has made it possible for me to submit them. They are contained partly in the"Confidential Fleet Orders" and chiefly in the "Defense of Merchant Shipping Handbook". They were issued in 1938. They, therefore, do not deal with counter measures against illicit German actions, but, on the contrary, they were already issued at a time when in Germany warfare in accordance with the London Agreement was the only form of submarine warfare taken into consideration. from the first day of the war according to orders received from the British Admiralty. These involved the following points in respect of submarine warfare:
1). the report of submarines by radio telegraphy.
2). the use of naval artillery.
3). the use of depth charges.