I want to take precautions explicitly against a misunder-
standing that I intend to appear as an accuser or critic in any way. I only present all this from the viewpoint that the indirect evidence submitted by the prosecution is not valid. member of the Reich Cabinet, and this from the time of his dismissal in January 1933 as Minister of Economy, at least as Minister without portfolio until January 1943. The prosecution makes the Reich Cabinet responsible for the belligerent invasions of Hitler, namely as criminally responsible. This argumentation has an attractively convincing power on somebody who reckons with the normal concept of a Reich Cabinet. The effect disappears once it has been ascertained that the so-called Reich Cabinet was not such in the ugual sense of a constitutional State. Penal judicial establishments must not, however, be based on outward appearances and form, on a fiction, but only on actually established conditions. This makes it necessary to penetrate sociologically the nature of the Hitler regime, and to examine if a member of the Reich Cabinet, hence of the Reich Government, as such, in this his capacity, has to bear the same criminal responsibility as if he was in another normal State structure, be it a democratic republic or a democratic monarchy or a constitutional monarchy or an absolutistic, but nevertheless rightfully in the State established monarchy or some other state legal structure which bears the character of a somehow lawful legislative State. We can therefore not omit to fathom the actual sociological structure of the Hitler regime. We have heard excellent and profound explanations about the Fuehrer order in this connection from the mouth of Professor Jahrreis. Here, to , I want to avoid repitition and only quote from the following abbreviated form: a misunderstanding, that, if I speak here about the Hitler regime, I am doing this without any connection with the persons sitting in the defendant's dock, naturally with the exception of Schacht. For the latter, I am doing this in the negative sense, that he did not belong to the Regime as such, in spite of the fact that he was a member of the Reich Government and president of the Reich Bank.
I leave the question completely open as to whether any of the other defend-
ants shouldbe considered a member or supporter of the regime. That question is subject only to the judgment of the Tribunal and its valuation by the respective competent defense counsel. someone who lived in Germany during the Hitler regime it as difficult to differentiate between the seeming and the apparent distribution of power and the actual influences of this power but that this is bound to surpass the ability to judge of people who lived outside of Germany, and only be made possible through findings obtained by the presentation of evidence before this Tribunal. We have established here that the Reich Cabinet which Hitler termed a club of defeatists, was convened for thelast time in 1938 -- and that it met for the last time, for deliberation and to make decisions -- in 1937, and that Hitler intentionally withheld all matters of political importance from the Reich Cabinet, as is also brought out by the so-called Hessbach Minutes of 10 November 1937. During this meeting the Fuehrer called the attention of these present -- Schacht, of course, was not present and did notlearn about the Hessbach Minutes until he came here -- that the subject matter of the meeting was of such great importance that it would result in full Cabinet meetings in other countries, but that just because of its great significance he had decided not to discuss the matter within the circles of the Reich Cabinet. Reich Cabinet can no longer be considered the architects and supporters of the political aspirations of the Reich. The same holds true for the members of the Reich Defense Commission, which in itself was nothing but a bureaucratic routine affair. Because of this, Hitler also, in the spring of 1939, explicitly excluded the Reich Defense Commission from further war preparations in the following words: "Preparation takes place on the basis of peace legislation."
Despotism and tyranny had reached their purest form in 1938. It is a characteristic quality of the Fascist as well as the National Socialist regime to concentrate formation of the political will in thehead of the Prty, who, with the help of this Party, subjugates and masters this Party and State.
Justice Jackson also recognized this when he stated, on 23 February, 1946, that the apex of power existed outside of the State and in a power group outside the Constitution.
To speak, in the case of such a regime, of a responsible Reich Government and of free State citizens, who through various organizations could exert influence on the formation of political will, would mean proceeding from entirely wrong hypotheses. Only inconceivable greatness always gain irresponsible influence on the head of State and Party in such regimes. The formation of the political will can be recognized in its crystallized form only in the head of the State himself; near to him and behind him it becomes opaque. It is another characteristic of such a regime -- and again this belongs to the chapter of its inner untruthfulness -that behind the facade of seemingly absolute harmony and union, several power groups fight each other. Hitler not only cordoned such contrasts, he even encouraged them and in part used them as a basis for his power. during the war in contrast with the First World War, I, on the contrary wish to stress that hardly at any time during its history was the German nation so torn internally as it was during the Third Reich. The apparent unity was merely the stillness of a churchyard enforced through terror. The conflicts between the individual high functionaries of the German people, which we have here reflect the inner strife-torn condition of the German nation, hidden artificially only through the terror wielded by the Gestapo. between Himmler and Frank, between Himmler and Keitel, between Sauckel and Seldte, between Vehrmacht and SS, between SF and Justice, between Ribbentrop and Neurath, and so forth. The list could be continued as desired. Even ideologically the Party in itself was divided into strongly pronounced contrasts which became clear already at the very beginning of the presentation of evidence from Goering's testimony. These contrasts were fundamental, and they were not bridged by Hitler but rather deepened. They were the keyboard of his source of power on which he performed. The Ministers were not responsible, governing persons, such as any other State where Law is the foundation; they were nothing but employees with specialized training we had to obey orders.
If a specialist such as Schacht did not wish to submit to this, it resulted i conflict and resignation from his department. department, because they were not exclusively competent for it. A Minister, i accordance with Constitutional Law must, first of all, also have access to the Chief of State, and he must have the right to report at any time. He must be in a position to reject interference and influences by a third irresponsible Party. called Ministers of Adolf Hitler. Schacht was surprised by the Four-Year Plan. Similarly, the Minister of Justice was surprised by such extremely important laws as the Nurnberg Decree. The Minister was not in a position to appoint his staff independently. The appointment of every civil service employee needed the consent of the Party Chancellery. Meddling and influence by all possible agencies and persons of the various Chancelleries - Chancellery of the Fuehrer, Party Chancellery etc.,- asserted themselves. They, however, were agencies placed above the Ministires and they could not be controlled. Special deputies governed through the departments. Ministers- yes, even the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, as we have heard from Lammers- had to wait for months for an audience, while for Messrs. Bormann and Himmler it was a coming and going to and from Hitler all the time. as regards the circles of which they are composed, have at all times been difficult to comprehend. They are not the irresponsible influences exerted over Hitler and affecting him.
Colonel-General Jodl described to us here how Hitler's spontaneous actions having the most serious consequences could be traced back to influences of that type, through entirely obscure third persons, due to mere accidents, conversations at a tea party, etc., For the objective facts this bears out what I already mentioned in the beginning. The very fact of the existence of such conditions eliminates even the possibility of the planning of a crime such as a war of aggression, within a clearly defined circle of persons or, for that matter, within the so-called Reich government. But where there is no planning possible, there is also no plot possible, no conspiracy, of which the most striking characteristic is the common planning, though with various roles.
Let us assume themost widely conceived interpretation of the public fact of the conspiracy. I am following Justice Jackson. He who takes part in a counterfeiters' plot is guilty of conspiracy, even though he may have written only a letter or acted as bearer of the litter. He who participate in a plot for robbing a bank is guilty of murder if, in the wake of the pla ning, a third party in the group of planners committed murder. At all time however, the prerequisite is a body of persons capable of executing a comm plan. Such a thing was not possible for Adolf Hitler's Ministers; it was not possible at all under Hitler. From this it fellows that no plotters could participate in the crime of having forced upon his own people and the world a war of aggression except those who served Hitler as assistants.
The power situation of the third Reich as depicted thus permits ffense such as conspiracy.
Whether such accomplicity or such committed by Hitler exists for the individual defendants personally To investigate this is my task only for the person of Schacht.
A collective crime such as conspiracy (" conspiracy",) on the basis of the actual conditions already established is however excluded as inconceivable and unrealizable. But even if this were not the case, the subjective aspect of the deed is completelylacking in the case of Schacht. Even when the objective facts of a conspiracy exist within a circle in the prisoners' dock, and even with the most liberal interpretation of the concept of conspiracy, the conspirator must accept a plan of conspiracy and the aim for conspiracy in his volition, at least in the form of the delus eventualis. significance from comparison with a pirate ship. In the abstract every crow member of the pirate ship, even in an subordinate position is an outlaw. But someone who did not even know that he was on a pirate ship, but believed himself to be on a peaceful merchant vessel, is not guilty of piracy. He is also innocent if after realizing the pirate character of the ship, he has done everything to prevent the execution of piracy as well as to leave the pirate ship.
Schacht did both. As far as the latter is concerned, scientific Theory on conspiracy also recognizes that he is not guilty who has withdrawn from the conspiracy by a positive act before attainment of the goal of the conspiracy, even in case he cooperated previously in the preparation of the plan for conspiracy as was not done by Schacht.
In this connection, I also consider in my favor Mr. Justice Jackson's answer when I put up for discussion within the compass of Schacht's interrogation whether the persecution of the Jews is also charged to Schacht.
Mr. Justice Jackson affirmed this in case Schact ad helped prepare the war of aggression before he withdrew from his plan for aggression and its group of conspirators and went over inreservedly to the opposition group, that is to the conspiracy against Hitler. This desertion would then be the positive act mentioned by me above where by a person at first participating in a conspiracy could separate himself from it. desired to participate in the preparation for a war of aggression. As already explained, this accusation of the subjective fact of the conspiracy has been proved neither by direct nor by indirect evidence previously. From 1938 on at the latest, it has been proved that from this time on Schacht waged the most conceivably severe battle against any possibility of war in such a form that he attempted to overthrew the carrier of this danger of war, the carrier of the
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will recess.
(A recess was taken)
DR. DIX: I beg your pardon for having been delayed. I was prohibited from coming in. the matter of the Putsch; and I should like to continue. of Schacht's course of action. It is beyond doubt that, according to human reckoning to a successful putsch before the outbreak of war putsch after the outbreak of war would at least have shortened the duration of the war. Therefore, such sceptical considerations about the political value of those putsch attempts do not render any proof against the seriousness of putsch plans and intentions. Those are all that counts. For they prove first of all that one who has seen pursuing them since 1938 and, ( if one thinks of the attempt ith Kluge, ) even since 1937, could impossibly have had warlike intentions.
One does not try to overthrow a regime, because it involves longer of war, if one has oneself worked for the war previously. One does this only if by all ones actions, even that of inancing armament, one wished to foster peace.
For this reason, These proven repeated putsch attempts on the part of Schacht do not perhaps have the legal significance of a so-called active repentince for a previously shown criminal behavious, but they are ex post of proof that he cannot be accused even before 1938 of consciously working for war, because the latter is logically and psychologically incompatible with Schacht's activity of conspiracy against Hitler.
These putsches thus prove the credibility of Schacht in respect 15 July A LJG 18-1 to his representation of the reasons and intentions which caused him to enter actively into the Hitler government and to finance an armament to the extent of the financial aid he granted, namely to the amount of 12 billions.
They prove ex post the purely defensive character of this financing of armament; they prove the credibility of Schacht's contention of producing besides this defensive effect tactically a limitation of armament. But if one believes this description of Schacht, then one cannot speak of Schacht 's cooperation in instigating a war of aggression, at least in its subjective aspect.
This credibility is also proved by another circumstance. Schacht has contradicted the testimony of Gisevius and my questioning along the same line that he had admired Hitler at the beginning and had unreservedly considered him an ingenious statesman. He described this in his interrogation as an erroneous assumption. He said that he had recognized from the beginning many a weakness of Hitler, especially his sketchy education, and only hoped to be in a position to control the disadvantages and dangers resulting from them. By this, purely objectively speaking, Schacht hereby made his defense more difficult, but he is wise enough to have recognized this. Thus wha t he consciously lost hereby for his defense in the technique of evidence and surrendered, he is gaining in respect to his credibility upon objective recognition of evidence based on psychological experience. For he deserves increased credibility who serves the truth by contradiction oven when the suggested untruth or the halftruth is more advantagious to him technically and tactically by way of evidence. Schacht as a leader in the activities of the various conspiracies about which Gisovius testified precisely on the basis of the credible testimony of Gisovius. But if Mr. Justice Jackson presented in the cross examination to Schacht photographs and films which superficially document a close connection with Hitler and his paladins, then this could only have happened in order to put doubt on the seriousness of his active opposition to Hitler.
I therefore must deal briefly with 15 July A LJG 18-2 this photographic argument anyhow.
Mr. Justice Jackson has related this accusation with another one in quoting speeches which show superficially even during the putsch period a great devotion on the part of Schacht toward Adolf Hitler. This accusation is on the same level. I believe that this argument can stand up neither before the experience of life nor before the observation of history. History teaches us that conspirators in particular, especially if they belong to the closer circle of dignitaries of the threatened head of state, for purposes of camoufalge show a special devotion. Now has it over been observed that such people show their intentions to the threatened victim in a contradictory loyalty. One could accumulate and cite from history. which concerns itself with the murder of Czar Paul by his first minister Count Palen. The Czar trusts to the very end the devotion of Count Palen which is shown ostentatiously even at the time when the latter is already sharpening the murder knife. And in the historical documents left behind, there is an instruction by Count Palen to the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, very shortly before the attempt, in which Count Palen cannot do enough to speak about " Notre auguste Emperour ". Significantly, this drama boars the title "The Patriot". to the servant of the nation. It approaches the psychological truth much more if one would utilize a presumptive devotion assumed for the sake of appearances and assurances of loyalty during this period more in favor of the objective credibility of the description of Schacht than vice versa.
As a conspirator, he had to camouflage himself especially will. To a certain degree, this had to be done by practically everyone who lived under this regime in Germany. As far as these photographs are now concerned, then these are easily a compulsory consequence of every social and thereby also socially representative membership in a body so that for better or for worse one becomes a victim of the camera with the members of it. If I am once a number of a government, then I cannot avoid being photographed with these people on the ocasion of their meetings. Thus such pictures result as Schacht between Ley and Streicher. And the scene about the reception of Hitler at the depot viewing such pictures ex post, these pictures are not a joy to the observer; certainly not to Schacht either, Put they do not prove anything. In a natural evaluation of a normal, average experience of life I consider these pictures without any value as evidence either pro or contra.
social intercourse with Adolf Hitler's governments, and this not only through their diplomatic corps. I wish to assure you that the defense is in a position to produce much more gretesque pictures, which do not look as natural as Schacht being photographed together with men who were his high standing colleagues in the third Reich. To produce such pictures, however, might not be a very tactful move of the defense, but a defense counsel must also take upon himself the odium of indiscretion, should it be necessary in order to investigate the truth in all seriousness. I do not believe that I have to do it in this case, because the irrelevance and insignificance of such a presentation of evidence through pictures of representative events seems to be obvious. me to argue now appears to be that Schacht, after his retirement as Minister of Economy, and still more after his retirement as President of the Reichsbank in January 1939, remained Minister without portfolio until 1943. Schacht declared that this had been stipulated by Hitler as a condition for his release from the ministry of economy. Hitler's signature, as head of the State, was necessary for his dismissal. Had Schacht refused to remain as Minister without portfolio, he would surely have been arrested sooner or later as politically suspect, and thus been deprived of all means of action against Hitler. between him and Schacht concerning the continuation of Schacht as Minister without portfolio. In these deliberations it was justly of importance, that Schacht could be of more use to the group of conspirators as a scout or a patrol if he remained in this position, to outward, appearances at least, within the Reich Government. Even as Minister without portfolio, Schacht remained exposed to great danger, as demonstrated by his an Gisovius' declarations, and as becomes obvious from Ohlendorfe's statement that Schacht, already in 1937 was on the black list of the State Police. which have been discussed here, particularly his remarks about Schacht after the attempted assassination on 20 July.
I would also remind once more of the memorandum of Hitler of 1936, which he gave to Speer in 1944 and which says that he saw in Schacht a saboteur of his rearmament plans. It has been declared and proved by Lammers, that Schacht tried later on to get rid even of this nominal position. Lammers and Schacht have proved furthermore that this position was without any substantial importance. Therefore my nicknaming it "Fancy Dress Major", that means a major without a battalion and command authority, a sham-major. Schacht could not get rid of the position without scandal, the same as with the position of Reich Bank President. Schacht therefore had to maneuver in such a way that he would be thrown out. He succeeded in this, as I explained, as Reich Bank President, through the well-known memorandum of the Board of Directors of the Reich Bank and the refusal of credits by the Reich Bank in November 1938, contained therein. As far as his position of Minister without portfolio was concerned, he succeeded through his defeatist letter of November 1942. In the meantime he made use of the time for the attempted "coup d'etat" in autumn 1938 and for the various other attempted "coups d'etat" until 20 July 1944, the last one landing him in a concentration camp. Minister without portfolio. For his proved conspirational activity against Hitler during all this time, eliminates of hand and logically the supposition that he had furthered Hitler's warplans and war strategy during this time. There remains only space, and this also only in the vacuum of abstraction, for a political rperoach against the Schacht of the years 1933-1937, But this, too, is campensated by the extraordinarily courageous attitude of Schacht after this period. In order to obtain the just appreciation for fact, may I remind you of the interesting statement of Gisevius, that he, who had looked with a certain scepticism upon Schacht's original attitude, not in a criminal but political sense, had then been completely reconciled with Schacht by the extraordinary courage which Schacht displayed as opponent an conspirator against Hitler s ince 1938. I mean therefore that the fact of Schacht remaining as Minister without portfolio does not incriminate him directly or indirectly not according to penal law anyhow, right from the start, but also not morally, if one takes into consideration his behaviour as a whole, his motives and the accompanying circumstances and conditions.
afore mentioned memorandum of the Board of Directors of the Reichsbank, an opposition to war is not evident from the Memorandum, but only technical currency and the testimony of von Vocke. And the presentation of facts by Schacht himself would not even be necessary to refute this argumentation. Vecke declared quite unequivocally, in his capacity as closest collaborator, that Schacht win to limit and sabotage rearmament from the moment when he recognized its dimensions as a danger of war. The sworn affidavits of Huelse and the sworn affidavits of all the collaborators of Schacht in the Reich Ministry of Economy combine with this testimony of Vecke in that sense. I need not quote then individually. They are known to the Tribunal. The Tribunal does not need the commentary of a defense counsel. They speak for themselves. If the Prosecution now finally argues concerning the text of the Memorandum, which, it as true, actually only deals with financial problems, then I cannot omit the remark, that such of history and the general experiences of life into consideration. Naturally as I have already said, the Board, of Directors of the Reich Bank could only operate with arguments which came under their department, particularly so if one had to deal with a Hitler. One beats the bag but one really means the donkey. had not made public its true purpose in this memorandum namely to avert the danger of war and to combat Hitler's will of aggression, then it would have removed the effect of a specialist departmental influence from itself. Hitler very well understand the purpose of this memorandum when he shouted, after reading it :"That is mutiny." With this Adolf Hitler recognized what can be said alone of Schacht as conspirator. He was never a mutineer and conspirator and world peace, but, so far as he was a conspirator and mutineer, he was this only against Adolf Hitler and his government. to Appendix or Appendage No II, which I should like to insert at this moment, because the matter that is dealt with here did not reach me until after I had submitted my final speech for translation.
Hitler. colleage Nelte in the epithets "Freekecat and drawing-room revolutionary " . Now history teaches that the quality of the tailor does not play any role in the case of the revolutionary. And as far as the drawing room is concerned, then the shacks have no revolutionary preference over the palaces. I only can to mind the political drawing-rooms of the great French Revolution or for instance (one of the many) the elegant officers' club of the feudal Preebrascher regiment under many a Czar. Even if the Gentlemen and of the opinion that Sch and his accomplices themselves should have done the shooting, then I can only say : Well, if it had only been that easy. Schacht would have loved to do the shooting himself; he exclaimed here spontaneously. But it would not go with power which would have pushed on during the confusion coming for certain afterwards and which could bring the attempt to a revolutionary success.
Therefore generals with troops were necessary. I do not wish to repay General Jodl with the same coin and therefore do not say "a necessary evil". contradicted by the social composition of the revolutionaries of 20 July. As I stated before all this is irrelevant for the decision of the Tribunal But my client has a moral right that his defense counsel does not completely ignore this polemic which took place in the spot light of the world public.
In summing up it must therefore be said : was bound to seize power. Previous to this Schacht had expressively warned the foreign countries of this development, and therefore had not contributed to it. After the seizure of power only two roads were open to him, as to every Germans. He either had to estrange himself or he had to enter the movement actively. The decision at these crossroads was a purely political one without any criminal aspect. Just as we respect the reasons which caused the foreign countries to collaborate with Hitler much more intensively and pre-Germanically than with the previous democratic governments of Germany, so we must recognize the good faith of all these Germans who believed themselves to be able to serve the country and humanity better because of the greater possibilities of exerting their influence within the movement, therefore either within the party or within the apparatus of officialdom, than by grumblingly standing aside.
To serve Hitler as minister and President of the Reichsbank was a political decision, about whose political correctness one can now ex post facto argue, which however, ked any criminal character. Schacht has always remained loyal to the motivating reason for his decision, namely to combat any radicalism from an influen tial position . Nowhere in the world did a warning signal appear for him. He only saw that the world trusted Hitler much longer than he himself, and permitted Adolf Hitler honors and foreign political successes, which hampered Schacht's work when it had already for a long tine been directed at removing Adolf Hitler and his government. He led this struggle against Adolf Hitler and his government with a courage and a consequence which must make it appear as a pure miracle that it was only after 20 July 1944 that the fate of the concentration camp and the danger of losing his head, either through the People's Tribunal or through an act of the SS, reached him. He is sufficiently clever and self-critical to refrain from escaping the realization that, from the purely political consideration, the picture of his character will waver in history, or at least in the nearest future, confused by the favor and hatred of the parties. He humbly resigns himself to the judgment of history even then, if one historian or another will label hispolitical line as incorrect. With the pride of a good conscience he resigns himself to the ju gment of this High Tribunal. He stands before his judges with clean hand. He also stands before this Tribunal with the confidence, as he has already expressed in a letter which he addressed to this Tribunal before the beginning of the proceedings, in which he expresses that he would regard with gratitude the exposing before this Tribunal and before the whole world publicity of his actions and activity and its motivating reasons. He stands before this Tribunal with confiedence because he knows that the favor and hatred of the parties will not have any effect in this Tribunal. In all self-recognition of the relativity of all political actions in such difficult times, he is still selfcognizant and full of confidence with regard to the criminal charges which have been raised against him, and this with justification. Because, no matt who would have to be found guilty of being criminally responsible for this war and the atrocities and inhumane acts committed in it, Schacht, according to the evidence which has been kept here with minute exactness can shout the words to every culprit , which Wilhelm Tell shouts to the Kaiser-assassin Parricida :"I raise my clean hands to Heaven, and curse you and your deed."
I therefore request the findings to be established to the effect, that Schacht is not guilty of the accusation which has been raised against him and that he therefore is to be acquitted.
THE PRESIDENT: I call on Dr. Candleholder for the defendant Doenitz.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, gentlemen of the bench:
"War is a cruel thing and it brings in its train a multitude of injustices and misdeeds."
With these words of Plutarch's, Hugo Grotius begins his examination of the responsibility for war crimes and they are as true today as they were 2000 years ago. At all times acts were committed by belligerents, which were war crimes or were considered as such by the other side. But the conclusions drawn from this fact were always to the prejudice of the vanquished parties, and never to that of the victors. The law which was applied here was necessarily the right of the stronger. up regulating warfare, in maritime wars the conceptions of the parties engaged have always clashed on the point of international law. Nobody knows better than British statesmen how much these conceptions are dictated by national or economic interests. Fisher and Lord Edward Grey. Therefore, if ever in history a naval power would have had the idea to prosecute a defeated enemy admiral, and this on grounds of his own conception of the rules of naval warfare, the sentence would have been pronounced simultaneously with the indictment. war which has been called criminal. Thus the Tribunal is confronted with a decision regarding conceptions of law which are necessarily as divergent as the interests of a naval power from the interests of a land power. Not only the fate of both admirals is connected with this decision. It is also a question of an honorable name for hundreds of thousands of German seamen, who believed in serving a good cause and who do not deserve to be branded by history as pirates and murderers. It is to these men, the living as well as the dead, that I feel bound by duty when I undertake to reject the accusation against German naval warfare.
Which are these accusations? They are divided into 2 large groups: Unlawful sinking of ships and premeditated killing of shipwrecked personnel. of ships.
Two reports by Mr. Roger Allen of the British Foreign Office, made in the fall of 1940 and spring of 1941 form the nucleus of that accusation. I do not know to whom and for what purpose these reports were made. According to their form and contents they seen to be serving propaganda purposes, and for this very reason I believe their value as evidence to be very low. Even the prosecution submitted only part of the accusations made therein. The reports trace only one-fifth of the total of supposedly unlawful attacks to submarines whereas four-fifths are ascribed to mines, airplanes or surface craft. The prosecution omits these fourfifths and this reserved attitude may be explained from the fact that the use of these combat means on the British side differs in no way from that on the German side. exist a difference between the principles followed by the German Naval Operations and these of our enemies. At any rate the public in enemy countries and many neutral countries believed so during the war and partly still believes it today. Propaganda dominated the field. At the same time the mass of all critics neither knew exactly which principles were valid for German Uboat warfare, nor on which factual and legal foundations they were based. It shall be my task to attempt to clarify this.
The reports by Mr. Roger Allen culminate in the assertion that the German U-boats from the summer of 1940 on torpedoed everything coming before their periscopes. Undoubtedly the method of submarine warfare stiffened gradually under the pressure of the measures directed against Germany. This war, however, never did degenerate into a wild shooting melee governed by the law of expediency alone. Much of what might have been useful for a U boat was left undone until the last day of the war because it had to be regarded as legally inadmissible, and all measures which the German Naval High Command is being accused of today by the prosecution, were the result of a development in which both sides partook through measures and counter measures as in all military developments.
German submarine warfare at the beginning of this war. These regulations were literally incorporated into article 74 of the German Prize Ordinance, which even Mr. Roger Allen calls a reasonable and not inhumane instrument. As a draft this prize ordinance was sent in 1938 to the two U-Boat flotillas and to the UBoat training school and served as foundation for the training of the commanders. Stopping and examining of merchant vessels was performed as a tactical task. In order to facilitate for the commander in economic warfare the quick and correct evaluation of his legal position towards a ship and the cargo of the enemy and the neutral, the prize disc was constructed which through simple manipulations indicates the articles of the prize ordinance to be applied. Insofar as preparations had been made at all for econom warfare through submarines they were based exclusively on the German prize ordinance and thus on the London Protocol. tion at the time the war broke off. The combat instructions for U-Boats of 3 September 1939 ordered clearly and distinctly that submarine warfare be carried on in accordance with the prize ordinance. Accordingly sinking were permissible only after stopping and examinations unless the ship attempted to escape or offered resistance. Some examples were submitted to the Tribunal from the abundance of possible instances showing the chivalrous spirit with which the German submarine commanders complied with the issued instructions. Especially, the care given to the crows of ships sunk lawfully after stopping and examination was carried out in part to an extent which could scarcely be justified on military grounds Life boats were towed over long distances and, thereby, the few available U-boats were diverted from their combat Mission.