tion of the Jews should be carried out only in agreement with the SD and through the SD, and that you could not permit wild actions.
A Right. Do you want me to state my views, Mr. Prosecutor?
Q Well, I want to ask you this. Then you knew all about it, and I understood you to say that you did anyway, on your direct examination. You knew about the deportation of the Jews, and you were doing your part to see that the SD carried it out. That is the only point I am trying to make with you, and I assume that you agree. in Vienna. They were then taken to Poland and unloaded, but no preparations had been made. Therefore, there were serious difficulties, and I fought against that. When there were complaints, I told Himmler about it -- that is when Buerckel had complained. I said that if such actions took place, then they ought to be carried out by the SD, because I was under the impression that in such a case the matter would have been taken care of and preparations would have been made more efficiently. Of course, when I say that today it sounds very bitter or very tragic, but at that time I thought that at least emergency quarters would be provided. Apart from that, I knew, from the 9th of November, 1938, how such things were being carried out. The Party advanced, and then the State had to take overthese things and carry them out.
Q Yes. At any event, you knew that Kaltenbrunner at that time was deporting, or had charge of the transporting of the Jews out of Austria.
A I do not recall Kaltenbrunner in that connection. I think that was done by the Party alone. I think the Party alone did that. I believe Kaltenbrunner was in no way included.
Q Didn't you say the SD, and wasn't that under Kaltenbrunner in Austria, at that time? run by Kaltenbrunner; Globocnik ran them.
Q Well, they were under Kaltenbrunner, were they not? He was the head of the whole police system in Austria at that time.
and how much influence he had I couldn't say, but I think it was very little. a lot, didn't you? You now know that he had a lot to do with it.
Q You mean to say you haven't heard here that Kaltenbrunner had anything to do with the removal of the Jews?
A I shall leave that to Kaltenbrunner. As far as my observations are concerned, I don't know, because I was no longer in Austria.
Q Well, I am not going to labor it, but that isn't what I asked you. I asked you if you haven't heard in this court toom, that Kaltenbrunner had much to do with the removal of Jews.
Q Certainly. You relate that back to your letter, don't you? And don't you know now that he had something to do with the removal of Jews at the time you wrote the letter? in this document -- Kaltenbrunner had nothing to do with that, in my opinion, because that was a wild action carried out by the Party, or, respectively, Gauleiter Globocnik. the confiscation of property that you asked for in Vienna?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you seen these documents? They are new: your letter to Lammers his reply back to you, and the order which was issued at your request. Those are three documents.
A. Yes.
Q. Your letter to Lammers is dated the 23rd of October 1938, and it is 3448-PS, USA-886.
Lammers' reply to you is dated the 24th day of October 1938 and it is 3447-PS, which becomes USA-887. not, which you requested?
A. Yes. I testified yesterday, or the day before, that I cooperated in this decree.
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now?
MR. DODD: I can finish in five minutes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well go on, then.
MR. DODD: I would like to finish up, and I think I can do it.
Q. Mr. Defendant, when did you first learn about the many Austrians who were dying in the concentration camps after the Anschluss?
A. Of the Austrians who died in concentration camps, if at all, then in this court room; but of numerous Austrians who were in concentration camps, I knew that some political opponents were in concentration camps, but they were gradually being released, or at least some of them.
Q. Didn't you know that they were being killed in Buchenwald as early as 1939, Didn't you know some of the people who knew about their deaths? Now think a minute before you answer this. Didn't you know about the deaths in Buchenwald of people who had been your political opponents?
A. I do not remember, Mr. Prosecutor.
Q. You never heard a word about it?
A. I don't mean to say that. If you five me a name, then I shall tell you at once what the situation is.
Q. I know if I tell you the name you will tell me you heard it, I suppose.
However, I am asking you first if you didn't in fact know that some of them were dying in these camps. That is all I want to know, It was pretty common knowledge in Austria, was it not,
A. I shall most certainly admit that there is a possibility that I was told that one or another died, even as early as 1938 or 1939.
Q. Well, you still continued to go on with the Nazis although at least you know that vast number of you fellow countrymen were being thrown into concentration camps. Didn't that make any difference to you ? Whatever you thought before the Anschluss, you certainly knew what they were doing after it.
A. That a large number were supposed to have died is out of the question and I didn't know about that. That there were a few one or another, who died, that could not possibly have affected me to such an extent because, between 1934 and 1938, at least as many National Socialists had died in the concentration camps of Dr. Dollfuss and Fatherland Front; that is to say, the Austrian State.
Q. Well now, wouldn't you agree with me that conditions were very bad in Austria after the Nazis took over, and they went from bad to worse,and you knew it and everybody else knew it ? Or do you want to take the position that they improved? I would just like to know what your opinion is.
A Yes, I will tell your openly. If, of course, you hear the leaders of the opposition, then it wasterrible. However, if you saw the people up until 1939, then you could see that they lived. Unemployment disappeared, and there was quite a different spirit. But then, of course, the war made that situation worse and turned it into an impossible one. in Poland, whatever is established as having gone on in Poland? That is, joint responsibility with Frank? Do you accept that as his deputy?
Q Of course. I certainly don't mean after you left there. I am only talking about the time that you were there. crimes came to my knowledge without my interfering or stopping them.
MR. DODD: I just want to read into the record one sentence from a document which has already been offered inevidence, Mr. President. It is document 2233-PS. From that document, page 1, paragraph 4, I would like to read this, because part of it was read by the defense, but this part was left out. It is under the small Arabic figure three;
"The necessary police and other actions arising from this will be under the immediate direction of the Chief of the Security Police; every arbitrary action is to be strictly thwarted." this witness has testified. BY MR. DODD:
Q The record whows that you, indeed, Mr. Defendant, were present at the time that the defendant Frank discussed this AB action and made this statement which I have just read into the record. Certainly you don't deny responsibility for whatever was done under the AB Action, do you? Because you did know about that. I spoke especially about the AB Action.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, document 2233-PS, which is USSR-223, is now available in the French. It is already in evidence and has been accepted by the Tribunal, but a French copy was not available at the time it was offered.
It has now been completely translated into the French, and I offer it to the Tribunal for assistance in the French.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, you said that the document of the 11th of November, 1937, 3369-PS, was a new document. Did you give it a number?
MR. DODD: Just a moment, Mr. President, and I will check that.
I meant to offer it, and I fear that I did omit doing so. That wuld become USA-889. It was a new document, and I did intend to offer it.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn, and we will reconvene at ten past two.
(A recess was taken until 1410 hours.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1415 hours, 12 June 1946.) BY DR. STEINBAUER (Counsel for the defendant Seyss-Inquart):
Q. Witness, the French prosecutor asked you whether you were the deputy of the governor-general, Frank, and for that reason, knew Auschwitz. Can you tell us where Auschwitz was?
A. Auschwitz was not in the region of the governor-general, but rather in the area which belonged to the Gau Upper Silesia (Oberschlesien).
Q. Thank you. Then the same prosecutor confronted you with the testimony of a witness, a girl of 20 years of age, a Miss Kunze, 4594-PS. According to this testimony, you allegedly repeatedly sent reports to Himmler.
A. In the evenings when I was confronted with this matter, I was rather tired at the contradiction contained therein, and said that under Paragraph 3 certain reports are mentioned which are not to be connected with me. This witness asserted that reports from me went to Himmler dealing with the Jewish question and with the security police. That is utter nonsense, and the results as shown contradict this. the Jewish question was concerned. I perhaps sent two or three letters to Himmler -- at the most, four -- and these letters concerned themselves with highly individual cases. They went from my staff to the staff of Himmler; but they never went by way of the security police.
Q. That is sufficient. Thank you. We shall now return to another point Further, you were confronted with the testimony of a Dr. Karl Georg Schoengart in connection with the question of the shooting of hostages.
A. Yes. Dr. Schoengart was the successor to Rauter; and it is correct that he came to me after he had inspected the scene of these acts. He told me that Himmler was demanding the shooting of 540 hostages. All of them were prominent Dutchmen. I was aghast; and Schoengart said immediately that that was completely out of the question, anyway.
we had to react in some way and do something. He then told me that a number of cases of death sentences was on hand. The sentences were to be carried out within the next few days. Those people were to be shot. He suggested that these people be shot and that an announcement be made to that effect.
Q. Did you and the Wehrmacht commanders in the Netherlands issue warnings to the population dealing with international law?
A. I believe there is a document available which contained a warning on my part against sabotage acts in which I threatened that in the case of anyone not observing these laws the property of the saboteurs would be threatened. I said further that the population should take note of these matters.
DR. STEINBAUER: I should like to call the attention of the High Tribunal to the fact that this warning is contained in 1163-PS. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q. Further, I have to confront you with a document which is an interrogatory of the defendant General Christiansen, in which he says that you were the one who issued the order for the shooting of hostages.
A. I believe that there General Christiansen does not say that. He does admit that he issued the order; but what he means is that I, so to speak, was urging behind the scenes. I made my statement yesterday, but perhaps the witness Wimmer can give us more exact details on this, a man who was present at this discussion, as Christiansen himself states.
DR. STEINBAUER: Last evening I once more studied the question, since the resolution of the Court remained in my mind to the effect that this interrogatory by the witness, which is really incriminating, was accepted and admitted by the Court. In my opinion, according to Point 21 of the Charter, something else should apply here. I believe that a matter like that has no probative value. It is possible that Christiansen would be judged and sentenced by the British, and it might result that his interrogatory and his statements are not correct. Commissioner Munt, which I have already submitted.
BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q. Then I have a further suggestion. The French prosecutor asserted that the Dutch general secretaries were left by the Dutch government, and that you were not justified in interfering with the sovereignty of the Netherlands. Please comment on that.
A. I know nothing about that, and I believe it seems to be of little significance,,anyway. The Netherlands capitulated, and they capitulated for the entire region except Seeland. The reulations and the stipulations were military. Apart from that, it was unconditional surrender. I believe that on the basis of international law I was entirely justified in taking over the government and taking it into my own hands.
DR. STEINBAUER: May it please the High Tribunal, in this connection, I should like to submit a document which deals with this question and takes issue with it. This is the document of the judge of the highest court of the Netherlands of the 12th of January 1942. In my final speech I shall refer to this. It will be submitted to the High Tribunal in four languages. It has been sworn to, and the prosecution agrees. The exhibit number is 96. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q. Then further, the French prosecutor asserted that you carried out these mass shootings and deportations of civilian workers, and the transporting of Jews, so that the biological power of the Netherlands would be decreased.
A. I believe that I can cite concrete examples which show that I did exactly the opposite. It is certain that during a war, losses among the population do arise, and perhaps if I had given more attention or put up a greater resistance, I might have prevented something. That this did not take place, I regretted. But two figures are decisive: the mortality figure and the population increase. the official vital statistics, went from 10-plus to 10; and in the years 19141918 there were 12 per thousand, and rose to 17 per thousand. That was an increase of 50%, even though the Dutch people were under their own government, were not in the war, and were not under a blockade. According to the statistic which I received from the Netherlands vital statistics bureau, from 1914 to 1918, there was a decrease of perhaps one half, and in the year of my administration, up until 1944, the increase of population rose from 20 per thousand to 25 per thousand.
That is about a one-fourth increase.
First of all, we see the will to live among the Dutch population. But it is also a consequence of the measures which my civilian administration issued.
DR. STEINBAUER: In order to prove the figures just cited by my client, I should like to submit a report of the Netherlands Central Statistics Bureau. I received this by way of the general secretary, but it is not sworn to in the German and English versions. I should like to add that in these statistics -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) Dr. Steinbauer, how do you show the relevance of this?
DR. STEINBAUER: Since in the indictment and in the proceedings here it is claimed that Seyss-Inquart had the intention of germanizing the Dutch people to break the resistance. He also is held responsible for the poor state of health of the population and for the mortablity rate. These were assertions made in Dutch government reports. and I received this answer from the Dutch government. In fact, they answered my questions very well. They included the word "victims". I wanted to be completely in line with the truth and submit everything as I received it.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you putting that in then? Are you offering that in evidence?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, I should like to submit it the way I received it from the General Secretary. That is No.106.
THE WITNESS: I should like to add that the reduction of the birth rate in the years 1941-1918 is shown at a lower figure that the report which I received in 1945.
Q I have two questions regarding Austria. The first question is: The American prosecutor has charged that you had given Muehlmann notes to take to Berchtesgaden. Can you say what the notes contained?
A Yes. It was the outcome of the discussion which I had had with Dr. Schuschnigg and, above all, the agreement of Dr. Jury, Dr. Reinthaler and Dr. Fischboeck was also included on how the experts on the Fatherland front were incorporated; on all things that we had agreed on, things which Hitler, at Berchtesgaden, did not have to put through for us here. Austrians, after the Anschluss, starved in concentration camps -- after the Anschluss. You answerered, no, that you did not know. But in Austrian concentration camps people died you know. Here in this room, I believe, in the course of time, you have become familiar with conditions in German concentration camps. Were the two identical? have been possible that I heard that Austrians died in Austrian concentration camps. Those things that we heard about German concentration camps, the Austrian collection camps can in no way be compared with the German concentration camps.
DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have concluded my examination in chief of the Defendant, and with the permission of the High Tribunal, I should like to call my first witness, General Glaise-Horstenau. BY MR. BIDDLE: land warfare were obsolete. Do you remember?
Q Did you consider that they were all obsolete?
Q Which ones did you consider were obsolete? protection of the civilian population was obsolete because of technical developments for certain warlike measures of complete blockade. Bomb attacks were interested primarily with the construction of the civilian population and, consequently, they were to justifiable only if the civilian population was considered a war potential, just like the troops at the front; and if that is the case, then the civilian population of the occupied countries must be considered in such a way.
Q And when you say "considered in such a way", you mean therefore Germany had the right to use the civilian population to fight the war, make ammunition and so forth; isn't that the conclusion?
Q When was that conclusion reached?
Q Never mind the increase of the bombing attacks. Just give me the date. When was it reached?
A The end of '41, beginning of '42.
Q All right. Now there are two other short questions. You said that you told the Fuehrer that you would not act as a Trojan horse, is that right?
A Yes. Yes, of course. horse? It was completely obvious to me that I could be misused for such purpose; that behind my back, behind my ministerial post, a situation could be prepared so that Austria would be overrun. the Fuehrer for some time, did you? had previously. But I avoided that.
Q You had had this thought for some time?
had had the thought I suppose? possibility was quite clear to me.
Q That your actions might be misconstrued?
A First of all; and secondly, that the fact of my activity could be exploited in a way that I did not intend.
Q Of course. Well, you represented both sides at the same time and that was always a difficult position, was it not?
Q Well nos, let's take up this matter of declaring forfeited property of enemies of the state. You made those declarations I presume, did you not, as Commissioner? rity to do that? did -
Q Now wait a minute. I didn't ask you about the practice. It was made up under a decree, was it not? That practice was under a decree?
Q And that decree applied to all occupied countries, did it not?
A I don't think so. This decree I announced in the Netherlands myself; the measures in the Netherlands came about on the basis of my directive.
Q I understand that. I don't want to get you confused. Your action was taken under a decree of the Fuehrer, was it not, giving you that authority; is that right?
Q Of a directive of the Fuehrer, right?
Q Is that directive in evidence? Has it been put in evidence?
A I don't think so.
Q A right. Now tell us what was in it. What was in that directive? who were enemies of the Reich was to be confiscated. Even in Austria I issued a decree similar to this. The first one was issued in the Reich itself That was the model. discretion to make the determination of who was an enemy of the Reich, did you not? That was your decision under the decree? determine.
Q Well, the police didn't have to go to the courts to get that determination surely, did they?
A No. Either the police directly made a decision like that or the people were put at the disposal of the court and the court sentenced the people on the basis of that, and then on the basis of that judgment the confiscations were made. decree. What other property, of what other groups, was confiscated in the Netherlands under that directive of the Fuehrer? I don't mean individuals; I mean groups?
AA the moment I can't think of any others, although there were a few other groups.
Q But, in effect, see if I state the practice correctly. The police would decide that an individual or group of individuals, on account of their words or their actions, were enemies of the Reich, and then their property would be confiscated; is that right?
A Yes. And the decisive factor was Heydrich.
Q The decisive factor was Heydrich?
Q And you carried through Heydrich's decisions; right?
A Yes, I carried through Heydrich's decisions when it came to to confiscation of furtunes.
and the Bibelforschers, the Bible Students belonged to that group.
Q Oh, the Bible Students bellnged to the group, too? since they were evenies of the Reich?
A They probably didn't have very much, but what they had was confiscated because of their attitude, that they refused to serve in the war effort.
Q They refused -- let me get this straight. This is interesting. The Bible Students refused to fight or to serve in the German war effort and therefore their property was confiscated. Is that right?
A Not quite, not quite. The Bible Students in Germany refused to serve in the German Army. First of all they were prohibited and then this prohibition was expanded for all other regions.
Q Wait a minute. I am not talking about that. I am talking about the Netherlands. Was that true in the Netherlands?
A Yes; but this group was not prohibited in the Netherlands because they refused to serve in the German Army but rather, they were prohibited on general principles. We were against this group.
Q Oh, I see, on general principles. As pacifists, you were against them so you confiscated their property; right?
THE PRESIDENT: Will you return the defendant to the dock?
EDMUND GLAISE HORSTENAU, A witness, took the stand and testified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: and will withold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath). THE PRESIDENT: You may sit dorm. BY DR. STEINBAUER (Counsel for the defendant Seyss-Inquart):
Q Witness, what position did you have in the Austrian Hungarian monarchy?
A I was born in 1882 in Braunau in upper Austria. I came of an officer's family of French descent. In 1918 I was a Major in the Austrian Army, and in the Austrian headquarters I was an expert on politics and the press.
Q What position did you have then in the Austrian Republic?
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Witness, will you kindly pause after the question has been asked you. Don't answer it absolutely immediately. Otherwise, it gives the interpreters no opportunity. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q What position did you have in the Austrian Republic? ives at the University, a historian and author. Among other things, I was the author of a basic work about the collapse of old Austria, a book -
Q (Interposing) Witness, I am sorry to interrupt you, but we want only your public positions. I am interested in knowing about them only.
What public positions did you have?
A Director of Archives. Then, I was minister in the Cabinet of Schuschnigg, guarantor of the July agreement and then during the March days of 1938, I was in the Cabinet of Seyss-Inquart. registration inspector, and from 1941 on, became a military diplomat and was on duty at Zagreb. However, I had no command at the front. During September 1944 I was dismissed from my post in Zagreb because, being an old Austrian, I acted against the official politics and was one of the basic opponents of Ustacha.
Another reason was that I was supposed to have called the head of the state who was elected by us, by the name of Ante Pavelic, a"criminal object". cient if you just answer the question. The Tribunal does not want to know very much about the Anschluss, but rather how it came about, and therefore I shall have to ask you briefly as to the July Putsch of 1934. Were you in any way connected with Councillor Schuschnigg?
Q What was the economic situation that obtained then? the average figure of unemployment. Out of 6 million inhabitants, 400,000 were unemployed, and that means, with their families more than a million were in the misery of unemployment.
Q What possibilities were there regarding the expansion of the economic area? always received no as an answer. When Austria wanted the Anschluss, the answer was no. If Austria wanted to call the Habsburgs back, the answer was no. If Austria wanted to enter a German customs union in order to expand her economic area, the answer was no. Men like Briand spoke of a Danube Federation. We and our neighbors received only cold shoulders. That is the Austrian tragedy. and what were the means of this party? cratic Party led by Otto Bauer, who, the year previously, had considered the Anschluss to be the only possible thing for the Austrian proletariat. Later the National Socialist Party crowded to the front, but that was at the end of the '20's, and the party was unified and subordinated itself to the leadership of Hitler.
Q Who was the then leader of the NSDAP in Austria?
A. The leaders themselves changed frequently. Hitler, however, in the person of -- I can't think of his name. Who was this man? In 1933 it was Dr. Habicht.
Q. And after him, is it correct that it was Captain Leopold?
A. After him, Captain Leopold rose to the leadership of the party.
Q. And how did the Austrian National Socialists stand with respect to Hitler?
Q. We know about the famous agreement of the 11th of June of 1936. After this agreement, you met Seyss-Inquart. What did he tell you about his political objectives?
A. I met Seyss-Inquart shortly before this agreement. I do not remember exactly what he told me about his political objectives at that time. In general, it coincided with that which he later set up as his political objective?
Q. And what was that briefly?
A. The party, not as an organization, but only as the bearer of ideas, was to be incorporated into the Dollfuss regime. These men were to act in the government,
Q. Did you yourself deal with the Fuehrer Hitler, or did you talk with him?
A. Apart from the March days of 1938, I had three opportunities to speak with Adolf Hitler.
Q. When did Seyss-Inquart enter the government?
A. Seyss-Inquart entered the government the 12th of February 1938.
Q. Did he visit Adolf Hitler?
A. As far as I can remember, he visited Adolf Hitler on the 17th of February.
Q. Did he tell you about his visit with Hitler? Did he tell Schuschnigg and the other members of the cabinet what had taken place?
A. Certainly he told Schuschnigg and he told me as well.
Q. Did he collaborate in the planned plebescite which was to take place on the 13th of March 1938?
A. At that time, without knowing about the plebescite, I left on the 6th of the month to be gone for two weeks. Therefore, I cannot give you a reliable answer to this question.
Q. But do you know whether this plebescite had been decided upon in the Ministerial Council with the consent of Seyss-Inquart? Did he tell you about that subsequently?
A. To my knowledge, the plebescite was not a matter which concerned the Ministerial Council.
Q. Were the National Socialists in agreement? Did they agree to the plebescite?
A. As far as I found out on my return from my leave, certainly not.
Q. Now, it was know or became known that Schuschnigg wanted to have a plebescite. Where were you and what did you witness or experience at that time?
A. On the 6th of March, as I have already said, I went to Stuttgart on leave, something I had planned for a long time. I gave a lecture, and the subject of my speech was -
Q. We are interested only in the facts.
A. Then I undertook a private visit to Landau so that I could visit friends, my French friends, and there Buerckel, whom I had told nothing about my arrival, visited me. While with Buerckel I heard over the radio the speech made by Schuschnigg at Innsbruck. Immediately it was obvious to me that the scheduled plebescite would bring about certain grave counter-measures on the part of Hitler, and I decided to go to Vienna at once, to fly back, in fact.
Buerckel was to have arranged this. However, I called over the phone and talked to the Reichschancellery and Hitler expressed the wish that I should come to Berlin. To the American interrogator I gave the reasons for complying with his request, and subsequently here I found out why Hitler had called me to Berlin. I heard from the words of an absolutely authentic witness that he did not want me to return to Austria. He knew that I was an enemy of all solutions by force.
During the night of the 9th to the 10th, I arrived at Hitler's and entered a discussion which lasted for two and a half hours, a speech which assumed no concrete proportions. He arrived at no concrete decision, and told me that during the course of the day, at 11 in the morning, to be exact, he would have me called in. In fact, he had me called at 8 in the evening in order to give me the draft of a resignation for Seyss-Inquart to offer to Schuschnigg and the notes for a radio speech. He declared that he could not bring these notes to Austria himself, and he wanted it to be taken care of in the regular way by courier.