A Who said that--I? and at that time I think Klausner had not yet been nominated, because I myself mentioned to Hitler that he ought to agree to Klausner's becoming the leader of the Austrian Nazis. and Germany, because if as Zernatto indicates, this agreement was broken a few days after the meeting, then when you went to Berlin and talked about a Trojan Horse you know that Hitler had already started his illegal activity in Austria, if, indeed, it was before you went there. Hitler's but several peoples'. They never ceased, and it was my intention to bring this illegal work into a form which we could control from Austria, something which I also told Schuschnigg. I said that the Austrian Nazis will not do anything without Hitler.
Q That is not the point. I am not going to labor it further. I am going to ask you one other question about your meeting with Hitler. You surely know by the 17th how badly Schuschnigg and Schmidt had been treated at Berchtesgaden. Did you say anything to Hitler about that in the course of two and a half hours' conversation with him?
A No. For the policy of the Fatherland Front from 1934 I was not responsible. It was a reaction to the suppression of the National Socialists in Austria.
Q Well, all right. Now we come down to the 8th day of March. That is the day that Schuschnigg told you about the plebiscite that he intended to hold in a few days. the copy of it to Hitler, was it not? to Hitler?
A I don't know, but I would not have thought about it for a minute because after 12 February 1938, I had to inform the Reich.
Q You certainly also had to inform Schuschnigg, didn't you, as his State Counsellor that you were sending a copy of this very important letter to Hitler? You did not tell Schuschnigg about that, isn't that true? I certainly had informed Zernatto; that I was right there is no doubt.
Q We will see about that. The next night you had a meeting with Schuschnigg and Schmidt and Scubl, I guess in the Chancellory office. You never mentioned the fact to anyone of them there that you had already communicated with Hitler by special courier; do you remember that meeting?
AActually I do not have a clear picture of it. I only remember the meeting of March 10, but that possibly -- very probably -- is like that. Klausner; right after that meeting you went right down the street and saw your associates. Did you tell them what Schuschnigg had said to you and what you had said to Schuschnigg in the conversations a little earlier?
A On 10 March, is that right?
Q But your courier was back from Berlin, wasn't he; Globocnik had returned from Berlin?
A Yes. Globocnik came back and informed us that Berlin was refusing to agree to this plebiscite and that the following day I would receive a message indicating Hitler's attitude. give instructions for the mobilization of the Party in Austria to be ready to put on demonstrations or to seize power the next day. You were there when he laid out his plans. Do you remember that?
A I think that is an exaggeration on Rainer's part. I only remember that Klausner said "Well, then we shall have to be in touch with you tomorrow." That of course demonstrations might happen, that was so natural that everybody was aware of it. If that matter was not cleared up, then and there, there would be serious demonstrations, but the government also knew that. that these demonstrations were not spontaneous at all, as I thought you were trying to convey to the Tribunal, but that they were wellplanned out by your associates.
A That the actions were not spontaneous? Certainly they were not.
Q They were not?
Q All right. Now then, when Horstenau came back from Berlin on the next morning -- 11 March -- he told you about the planned or the talk of military events in Berlin, didn't he?
A Horstenau?
A Yes, and we told Dr. Schuschnigg the same thing. same morning. hours, I reported all details, and the letter was merely a confirmation of them.
Q The letter was an ultimatum, to Schuschnigg, wasn't it, and it was written by you at the direction of your political superior, Klausner?
A No. Rainer has stated that, but that again is one of his statements. Mr. Prosecutor, if an ultimatum can be mentioned in this connection, then I would have given it orally beforehand because when I was leaving Dr. Schuschnigg I asked him to reply to me by two o'clock in the afternoon, and I said that in the event of his refusal Glaise and I would have to resign, but at that time I had not even spoken to Klausner yet. report, in this document, 812-PS, you say is untrue. He also says there -
A Untrue? No, but slightly exaggerated.
Q All right. I just want to get your views, I repeat, because you will not be available after he comes to the stand. He also says that he talked with you about the seizure of power in the event that Schuschnigg refused your ultimatum. Do you say that is so or not so?
A I don't remember. I don't think so. possible steps for the taking over of Austria and handing it over to Germany? Is that true or not? wards. your view, I think. saying that there was a bad situation in Austria, that that telegram was actually brought back by Glaise Horstenau. He says that in the same document. What do you say to that?
Q Well, how is it incorrect, if it isn't correct? You indicate that there is some truth in it.
A Yes. I received Hitler's letter through a courier, not through Glaise Horstenau. In that letter there was a draft for a telegram.
on the telephone, and the same one that Keppler referred to when he talked to Dietrich on the telephone, isn't it?
Q Well, finally, let me ask you this about that particular day. This radio speech that you made was really made at the direction of Goering, was it not? He told you -
Q -- to make a statement, didn't he?
A No, not at all. There is no question of it. with you. It is 1957 hours that night, where he told you to make a statement to the people, and about three minutes later you went on the radio and made it. What do you mean that Goering did not tell you to do it?
A Yes, but Goering asked me to do something quite different. He asked me to state that there was a provisional government now to take over power. That is what I believe. I introduced myself as Minister of the Interior and Security and I demanded that the people should remain quiet and should not put up any resistance to the arrival of German troops, which was exactly what Schuschnigg had said a half hour before me. you talked to Goering?
A Yes; I talked to the Reichsmarshal -- Field Marshal Goering such a lot that I don't want to implicate him or myself in anything that you might have concluded from telephone calls. I believe that I did not do any of these things.
your selling out Austria to Germany? He certainly had a great interest in what happened there that day, did he not?
A Yes, but I don't think your expression "selling out" is very suitable. Goering had obvious interests to bring this thing to a final decision in some fantastic way. the building, and that you thought they were there because Miklas and Schuschnigg did nothing to remove them, that they could very easily have removed them. Now, the truth of the matter is that you were the minister for security, and it was your responsibility to remove them, was it not?
A No, I was not in the buildings. Apart from that, there was Dr. Scubl, and one word from Dr. Miklas or Dr. Schuschnigg would have sufficed, whereupon 300 men from the guard battalion would have arrived to put the matter right. You couldn't expect me, at that moment, to proceed against the National Socialists. your finger would have sufficed, would it not, to get them out of there? They were your National Socialist SS men; beside the fact that you were the head of the police.
A Whether they would have obeyed me or not, I don't know. I didn't have command over the National Guard Battalion. Certainly, indubitably, I could have exercised my influence and it might have been successful, but these men who were there did not mean anything very much in my eyes.
Q The place was surrounded with them, was it not? They were not only in the building, but they were outside of it and on the roofs of the neighbouri building. You remember all that? the time. here in your behalf, and see what he says about it. that he wrote about that historical night? Are you familiar with that?
A Oh yes; you can call it more than an article.
Q Yes. He called it "Hours of historical Decision."
MR. DODD: This is 4004-PS, Mr. President, USA-883. BY MR. DODD: gives from the one that you have given to this Tribunal, is it not? If you know the article, and you say you do. He says, you know, that Kaltenbrunner commanded 700 SS men there that night, and that Lukesch had 6,000 SA men within half an hour, and they received the order to advance and occupy the Federal Chancellery and to hold the ring and the building until the National Socialist Government was proclaimed; and that 40 SS men, under Kaltenbrunner's adjutant, Rinner, received the order to force their way into and occupy the French Chancellery, and so on.
He says that you are the man who ordered that Rinner be let in. That is very important, and I would like to know what you say about that. Rinner was in command of the 40 SS men, that you say somebody else should have removed. You will find that he says:
"It was going on 10 o'clock when the commanding officer of the guards reported to the Minister of Security, Dr. Seyss, who happened to be in our room, that a man accompanied by 40 others demanded to be let in through the gate, invoking higher orders.
I quickly informed Dr. Seyss that these were Rinner and his 40 men who had been detailed for the occupation of the Federal Chancellery. Dr. Seyss ordered that Rinner be brought upstairs. I shall never forget this moment. Escorted by a guardsman as tall as a lamp-post, Felix Rinner, the famous Austrian track champion", and so on. quarters that night, and you are the man, actually, who let him in.
A That is an article of victory, written in the mood of victory. All I can say is that these National Socialists, in black trousers and white shirts, were noticed by me. I saw that they were in the corridors and I asked, "What goes on?" But this dramatic account that I had opened the gate -- well, let's wait and see whether Rainer confirms that.
Q Well, I understand that; we look forward to it as well as you do. responsibility, gave the order to open the gate and let those men in. But you say that isn't so. That is all I want to know.
A No, no; that is quite new and strange to me.
Q Well, I think we can pass on. There isn't any truth at all, I expect, is there, in this whole article by Rainer? Or is there something that you might admit is true? You know he is going to be your witness.
A I am extremely interested to see what he says here. This is a somewhat poetical account of these events. The basis is probably quite correct, but there is a lot of victory celebration attached to it. question, that Guido Schmidt, in testimony which we have here and which I will be glad to present to you, says that the place was surrounded by these SS men and that they were in there with your knowledge. What do you say to that? He is also going to be your witness. around the Chancellery. Whether they were SS or SA or what, that I don't know. There were a lot of women amongst them.
but I told Dr. Schuschnigg as early as that morning that if we could not agree, then he would have to expect large-scale demonstrations from the Party.
Q Now, one other matter. Did you tell the Tribunal, or did I understand you correctly when I heard you testify that Miklas resigned without any request from you? That is, President Miklas, who was then the Bund President of Austria. Is it your testimony that he resigned without any request from yo he would not do that, he would resign, and according to the Constitution his rights would then pass on to me. He said he was not goint to try to beat developments. I don't think I told him to resign; I merely demanded that he sign the law. he says that you demanded it. Now do you remember, or have you forgotten, or do you say that is untrue?
A No; I consider that is out of the question because I clearly remember how he said: "I can't sign the law, but I shall not stand in the way of developments. If you confirm to me that it is necessary that the Anschluss be carried out, then I shall resign and you will have my powers." If he understood that as a demand from me to resign, then I don't want to contradict him. I don't want to make his position any more difficult, because I confess that I was in favor of the Anschluss. like. In any event, it is his testimony before the court in Vienna, on the 30 day of January 1946. It is document 3697-PS, and it becomes USA-884. If you would like to see it, you may. He says just about what I put to you, that you talked around it a good deal, said it was very distasteful for you, but nevertheless you were bound to comply with the order from Germany and therefore he had to resign. Himmler, about Buerckel? One of them is in evidence, and I want to ask you if you remember the other one. Do you remember the letter that you wrote to Himmler in which you said that it was not true that you were interfering with the deportation of the Jews, that you had only insisted that they be turned over to Kaltenbrunner's men, the SD?
A I think that has also been submitted. I know I have seen it in this court room. evidence; however, I wish to do so.
tion of the Jews should be carried out only in agreement with the SD and through the SD, and that you could not permit wild actions.
A Right. Do you want me to state my views, Mr. Prosecutor?
Q Well, I want to ask you this. Then you knew all about it, and I understood you to say that you did anyway, on your direct examination. You knew about the deportation of the Jews, and you were doing your part to see that the SD carried it out. That is the only point I am trying to make with you, and I assume that you agree. in Vienna. They were then taken to Poland and unloaded, but no preparations had been made. Therefore, there were serious difficulties, and I fought against that. When there were complaints, I told Himmler about it -- that is when Buerckel had complained. I said that if such actions took place, then they ought to be carried out by the SD, because I was under the impression that in such a case the matter would have been taken care of and preparations would have been made more efficiently. Of course, when I say that today it sounds very bitter or very tragic, but at that time I thought that at least emergency quarters would be provided. Apart from that, I knew, from the 9th of November, 1938, how such things were being carried out. The Party advanced, and then the State had to take overthese things and carry them out.
Q Yes. At any event, you knew that Kaltenbrunner at that time was deporting, or had charge of the transporting of the Jews out of Austria.
A I do not recall Kaltenbrunner in that connection. I think that was done by the Party alone. I think the Party alone did that. I believe Kaltenbrunner was in no way included.
Q Didn't you say the SD, and wasn't that under Kaltenbrunner in Austria, at that time? run by Kaltenbrunner; Globocnik ran them.
Q Well, they were under Kaltenbrunner, were they not? He was the head of the whole police system in Austria at that time.
and how much influence he had I couldn't say, but I think it was very little. a lot, didn't you? You now know that he had a lot to do with it.
Q You mean to say you haven't heard here that Kaltenbrunner had anything to do with the removal of the Jews?
A I shall leave that to Kaltenbrunner. As far as my observations are concerned, I don't know, because I was no longer in Austria.
Q Well, I am not going to labor it, but that isn't what I asked you. I asked you if you haven't heard in this court toom, that Kaltenbrunner had much to do with the removal of Jews.
Q Certainly. You relate that back to your letter, don't you? And don't you know now that he had something to do with the removal of Jews at the time you wrote the letter? in this document -- Kaltenbrunner had nothing to do with that, in my opinion, because that was a wild action carried out by the Party, or, respectively, Gauleiter Globocnik. the confiscation of property that you asked for in Vienna?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you seen these documents? They are new: your letter to Lammers his reply back to you, and the order which was issued at your request. Those are three documents.
A. Yes.
Q. Your letter to Lammers is dated the 23rd of October 1938, and it is 3448-PS, USA-886.
Lammers' reply to you is dated the 24th day of October 1938 and it is 3447-PS, which becomes USA-887. not, which you requested?
A. Yes. I testified yesterday, or the day before, that I cooperated in this decree.
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now?
MR. DODD: I can finish in five minutes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well go on, then.
MR. DODD: I would like to finish up, and I think I can do it.
Q. Mr. Defendant, when did you first learn about the many Austrians who were dying in the concentration camps after the Anschluss?
A. Of the Austrians who died in concentration camps, if at all, then in this court room; but of numerous Austrians who were in concentration camps, I knew that some political opponents were in concentration camps, but they were gradually being released, or at least some of them.
Q. Didn't you know that they were being killed in Buchenwald as early as 1939, Didn't you know some of the people who knew about their deaths? Now think a minute before you answer this. Didn't you know about the deaths in Buchenwald of people who had been your political opponents?
A. I do not remember, Mr. Prosecutor.
Q. You never heard a word about it?
A. I don't mean to say that. If you five me a name, then I shall tell you at once what the situation is.
Q. I know if I tell you the name you will tell me you heard it, I suppose.
However, I am asking you first if you didn't in fact know that some of them were dying in these camps. That is all I want to know, It was pretty common knowledge in Austria, was it not,
A. I shall most certainly admit that there is a possibility that I was told that one or another died, even as early as 1938 or 1939.
Q. Well, you still continued to go on with the Nazis although at least you know that vast number of you fellow countrymen were being thrown into concentration camps. Didn't that make any difference to you ? Whatever you thought before the Anschluss, you certainly knew what they were doing after it.
A. That a large number were supposed to have died is out of the question and I didn't know about that. That there were a few one or another, who died, that could not possibly have affected me to such an extent because, between 1934 and 1938, at least as many National Socialists had died in the concentration camps of Dr. Dollfuss and Fatherland Front; that is to say, the Austrian State.
Q. Well now, wouldn't you agree with me that conditions were very bad in Austria after the Nazis took over, and they went from bad to worse,and you knew it and everybody else knew it ? Or do you want to take the position that they improved? I would just like to know what your opinion is.
A Yes, I will tell your openly. If, of course, you hear the leaders of the opposition, then it wasterrible. However, if you saw the people up until 1939, then you could see that they lived. Unemployment disappeared, and there was quite a different spirit. But then, of course, the war made that situation worse and turned it into an impossible one. in Poland, whatever is established as having gone on in Poland? That is, joint responsibility with Frank? Do you accept that as his deputy?
Q Of course. I certainly don't mean after you left there. I am only talking about the time that you were there. crimes came to my knowledge without my interfering or stopping them.
MR. DODD: I just want to read into the record one sentence from a document which has already been offered inevidence, Mr. President. It is document 2233-PS. From that document, page 1, paragraph 4, I would like to read this, because part of it was read by the defense, but this part was left out. It is under the small Arabic figure three;
"The necessary police and other actions arising from this will be under the immediate direction of the Chief of the Security Police; every arbitrary action is to be strictly thwarted." this witness has testified. BY MR. DODD:
Q The record whows that you, indeed, Mr. Defendant, were present at the time that the defendant Frank discussed this AB action and made this statement which I have just read into the record. Certainly you don't deny responsibility for whatever was done under the AB Action, do you? Because you did know about that. I spoke especially about the AB Action.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, document 2233-PS, which is USSR-223, is now available in the French. It is already in evidence and has been accepted by the Tribunal, but a French copy was not available at the time it was offered.
It has now been completely translated into the French, and I offer it to the Tribunal for assistance in the French.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, you said that the document of the 11th of November, 1937, 3369-PS, was a new document. Did you give it a number?
MR. DODD: Just a moment, Mr. President, and I will check that.
I meant to offer it, and I fear that I did omit doing so. That wuld become USA-889. It was a new document, and I did intend to offer it.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn, and we will reconvene at ten past two.
(A recess was taken until 1410 hours.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1415 hours, 12 June 1946.) BY DR. STEINBAUER (Counsel for the defendant Seyss-Inquart):
Q. Witness, the French prosecutor asked you whether you were the deputy of the governor-general, Frank, and for that reason, knew Auschwitz. Can you tell us where Auschwitz was?
A. Auschwitz was not in the region of the governor-general, but rather in the area which belonged to the Gau Upper Silesia (Oberschlesien).
Q. Thank you. Then the same prosecutor confronted you with the testimony of a witness, a girl of 20 years of age, a Miss Kunze, 4594-PS. According to this testimony, you allegedly repeatedly sent reports to Himmler.
A. In the evenings when I was confronted with this matter, I was rather tired at the contradiction contained therein, and said that under Paragraph 3 certain reports are mentioned which are not to be connected with me. This witness asserted that reports from me went to Himmler dealing with the Jewish question and with the security police. That is utter nonsense, and the results as shown contradict this. the Jewish question was concerned. I perhaps sent two or three letters to Himmler -- at the most, four -- and these letters concerned themselves with highly individual cases. They went from my staff to the staff of Himmler; but they never went by way of the security police.
Q. That is sufficient. Thank you. We shall now return to another point Further, you were confronted with the testimony of a Dr. Karl Georg Schoengart in connection with the question of the shooting of hostages.
A. Yes. Dr. Schoengart was the successor to Rauter; and it is correct that he came to me after he had inspected the scene of these acts. He told me that Himmler was demanding the shooting of 540 hostages. All of them were prominent Dutchmen. I was aghast; and Schoengart said immediately that that was completely out of the question, anyway.
we had to react in some way and do something. He then told me that a number of cases of death sentences was on hand. The sentences were to be carried out within the next few days. Those people were to be shot. He suggested that these people be shot and that an announcement be made to that effect.
Q. Did you and the Wehrmacht commanders in the Netherlands issue warnings to the population dealing with international law?
A. I believe there is a document available which contained a warning on my part against sabotage acts in which I threatened that in the case of anyone not observing these laws the property of the saboteurs would be threatened. I said further that the population should take note of these matters.
DR. STEINBAUER: I should like to call the attention of the High Tribunal to the fact that this warning is contained in 1163-PS. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q. Further, I have to confront you with a document which is an interrogatory of the defendant General Christiansen, in which he says that you were the one who issued the order for the shooting of hostages.
A. I believe that there General Christiansen does not say that. He does admit that he issued the order; but what he means is that I, so to speak, was urging behind the scenes. I made my statement yesterday, but perhaps the witness Wimmer can give us more exact details on this, a man who was present at this discussion, as Christiansen himself states.
DR. STEINBAUER: Last evening I once more studied the question, since the resolution of the Court remained in my mind to the effect that this interrogatory by the witness, which is really incriminating, was accepted and admitted by the Court. In my opinion, according to Point 21 of the Charter, something else should apply here. I believe that a matter like that has no probative value. It is possible that Christiansen would be judged and sentenced by the British, and it might result that his interrogatory and his statements are not correct. Commissioner Munt, which I have already submitted.
BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q. Then I have a further suggestion. The French prosecutor asserted that the Dutch general secretaries were left by the Dutch government, and that you were not justified in interfering with the sovereignty of the Netherlands. Please comment on that.
A. I know nothing about that, and I believe it seems to be of little significance,,anyway. The Netherlands capitulated, and they capitulated for the entire region except Seeland. The reulations and the stipulations were military. Apart from that, it was unconditional surrender. I believe that on the basis of international law I was entirely justified in taking over the government and taking it into my own hands.
DR. STEINBAUER: May it please the High Tribunal, in this connection, I should like to submit a document which deals with this question and takes issue with it. This is the document of the judge of the highest court of the Netherlands of the 12th of January 1942. In my final speech I shall refer to this. It will be submitted to the High Tribunal in four languages. It has been sworn to, and the prosecution agrees. The exhibit number is 96. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q. Then further, the French prosecutor asserted that you carried out these mass shootings and deportations of civilian workers, and the transporting of Jews, so that the biological power of the Netherlands would be decreased.
A. I believe that I can cite concrete examples which show that I did exactly the opposite. It is certain that during a war, losses among the population do arise, and perhaps if I had given more attention or put up a greater resistance, I might have prevented something. That this did not take place, I regretted. But two figures are decisive: the mortality figure and the population increase. the official vital statistics, went from 10-plus to 10; and in the years 19141918 there were 12 per thousand, and rose to 17 per thousand. That was an increase of 50%, even though the Dutch people were under their own government, were not in the war, and were not under a blockade. According to the statistic which I received from the Netherlands vital statistics bureau, from 1914 to 1918, there was a decrease of perhaps one half, and in the year of my administration, up until 1944, the increase of population rose from 20 per thousand to 25 per thousand.
That is about a one-fourth increase.
First of all, we see the will to live among the Dutch population. But it is also a consequence of the measures which my civilian administration issued.
DR. STEINBAUER: In order to prove the figures just cited by my client, I should like to submit a report of the Netherlands Central Statistics Bureau. I received this by way of the general secretary, but it is not sworn to in the German and English versions. I should like to add that in these statistics -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) Dr. Steinbauer, how do you show the relevance of this?
DR. STEINBAUER: Since in the indictment and in the proceedings here it is claimed that Seyss-Inquart had the intention of germanizing the Dutch people to break the resistance. He also is held responsible for the poor state of health of the population and for the mortablity rate. These were assertions made in Dutch government reports. and I received this answer from the Dutch government. In fact, they answered my questions very well. They included the word "victims". I wanted to be completely in line with the truth and submit everything as I received it.