I had numerous conversations with Major von Albedill who is aide to the German Military Attache and was formerly on duty in the Military Attache's Service in the General Staff of the German Army, and he acquainted me with the background on Finland, since Major-General Rossing the Military Attache was seriously ill and receiving treatment at the Miron resort in Tyrol.
"In the course of these conversations von Albedill told me that already in September 1940, Major-General Rossing, acting on an order of Hitler and the German General Staff, arranged a visit of Major-General Talwel, the Plenipotentiary of Marshal Mannerheim, to the Fuehrer's Headquarters in Berlin where he reached agreement with the German and the Finnish General Staffs concerning joint preparations for aggression and for war against the Soviet Union.
"In this connection, I remember that in November 1941 when I visited General Talwell at his headquarters in the neighborhood of Aunosa, he informed me that acting on Marshal Mannerheim's personal order, even as far back as September 1940, he established the first liaison with the German High Command on the subject of the joint preparation for the German and the Finnish attack on the Soviet Union."
I ask your permission to conclude presentation of the evidence relating to the relationship between Germany and her satellite, Finland, Inasmuch as I repeat, Buschenhagen's testimony, this testimony of Buschenhagen before the Tribunal has been covered, so I do not have to cover it again.
Buschenhagen's statement disposes of all attempts to assort that the war waged by Finland was a separate war and was dissociated from the war aims of fascist Germany. Finland's entry into the war had been envisaged by the war plans of the fascist conspirators and corresponded to the aggressive intentions of the Finnish rulers.
The Finns, like the other satellites of Germany, waged war in order to acquire entire regions and republics of the Soviet Union.
In USSR Exhibit L-221, which is on page 141 of the document book, Hitler spoke at the conference of 16 July 1941, of the Finnish claims to Eastern Carelia and the Leningrad region.
Rumania and Finland were the two German satellites directly and with full detail mentioned in the plan "Barbarossa".The part these countries played in the plans of German fascism was determined not only by the desire to utilize their war-potential, which without doubt bore its proper weight, but also by their geographical position as operational bases on the flanks of the Soviet Union.
The documents presented to the Tribunal bear witness to the fact that the inclusion of these countries in the preparation for aggression against the USSR was carefully concealed by the fascist conspirators, just as all the preparations in connection with case Barbarossa were.
The third satellite of Germany, Hungary, is not mentioned at all in plan Barbarossa.
However, this cannot be taken to mean that the participation of Hungary in the aggression against the Soviet Union had not been planned by the fascist conspirators.
I ask permission to refer to the testimony of Paulus, even though he testified this afternoon before the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT:You aren't going to give us Paulus' affidavit over again, are you, because we have already had Paulus' evidence in full.
MAJOR GENERAL ZORYA:Yes, his testimony was given by Colonel Pekrovski under USSR 182. That is the record of the interrogation of Paulus by General Rudenko. A copy of this record may be presented to the Tribunal now and, furthermore, it is on page 143 in the document book.
THE PRESIDENT:We have got his actual evidence.
MAJOR GENERAL ZORYA:Yes, but I really need one particular paragraph out of his testimony in order to show connection of the subsequent documents relative to Hungary in connection with the rest of my presentation. It is just a few lines.
THE PRESIDENT:It must surely be cumulative, is it not?
MAJOR GENERAL ZORYA:What was presented to the Tribunal, I could express in my can words in two sentences.
THE PRESIDENT:Is it in any way different from what Paulus already said?
MAJOR GENERAL ZORYA: Yes. Pardon me! They tell me now this has been already presented by Colonel Pokrovski and I will make a variation.
I shall not present it now, and I go on further. I have in mind those paragraphs of the affidavit of Paulus, where he mentioned that Hungary had aims for aggression towards helping Germany and, on the other hand, I want to draw your attention that Paulus said that Hitler, in disclosing his plans, was much more reticent about Hungary than his other satellites, because he considered Hungarians too talkative. Of course, Paulus adds that the essential reason for this was Hitler's desire not to give Hungary a chance to seize the oil lands of Drogobych. Later on, after the start of the military operations, the OKH gave orders to seize this oil district by Germany before the Hungarians could come in. Further, Paulus discloses the scope. That has already been presented by Colonel Pokrovski, so I want to refer to the fact that the testimony of Paulus gives the position and somewhere revealed the relations between Hungarian and German aggression.
In connection with this, I consider it is necessary to return to the deposition by Ruediger which has been presented to the Tribunal under Document USSR 294.
Dealing with the occupation of Carpatha-Ukraine by Hungary in 1939, Ruszkiciay-Ruediger testified on page 2, paragraph 3 of the Russian text. The deposition can be found on page 101 in the document book. I cite;
"....This had taken place....not long before the outbreak of the German-Polish war. It seemed then as if economic advantages and the escape from the restrictions of the Trianon Treaty were for Hungary the objectives of the occupations.
"But from the time when the region of Carpatho-Ukraine acquired a common boundary with Soviet Russia...this region which we had occupied began to take on a different significance for us.
"It was clear to us, the higher officers, that the political leadership of both Germany and Hungary considered this region also stragegically important for future military operations against Soviet Russia."
On page 9 Ruszkiciay-Ruediger tells us of a conference which took place at the end of March 1941, in the course of which the Hungarian Minister of War, Warts, outlined the objectives for the war with Yugoslavia.
Among other objectives Warta blankly pointed to the necessity of eliminating Yugoslavia as a probable ally of the Soviet Union.
However a more complete picture of the German-Hungarian relationship, which intended the preparation of an attack on the Soviet Union, is contained in the statement by the Hungarian Major-General Stephen Ujszaszy.
From 1 May 1939 to 1 July 1942 Ujszaszy was the Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Hungarian General Staff. In his official capacity during these years he had inside information on the secrecy which shrouded this preparation.
Some of the things which he knows he related to us in the document which I offer in evidence as exhibit USSR-155. I ask you to accept this document as evidence.
I will read into the record that part of Ujszaszy's statement which may clarify the question at iss ue. I am beginning from page 2 of the Russian Text. This corresponds to page 149 of the document book. That is part 2, Preparation of Germany and Hungary for War Against Soviet Russia. Paragraph 1 of this statement, I quote:
"In November 1940, the German Military Attache in Budapest, Colonel Guenther KRAPPE of the German General Staff, was received in audience by the Chief of the Royal Hungarian General Staff, Colonel-General Henry Wert. KRAPPE came with a letter from the Chief of the General Staff of the German Army, Colonel-General Halder.
"In that letter Holder informed Wert that in the spring of 1941, Yugoslavia would have to be compelled, by force if necessary, to adopt a definite position in order to forestall at a later date, the throat of a Russian attack from the rear.
"In this preventive war, possible against Yugoslavia, and certain against Russia, Hungary will have to take port in her own interests.
"Wert replied that he agreed with Halder but added that the Hungarian army was insufficiently armed and at that moment wasnot ready for war against Soviet Russia, Simultaneously, he asked Germany to supplement Hungary's armaments.
"Regarding Halder's letter and this answer I was informed by Colonel General Wert.
"After that, a Hungarian armament commission was invited to go to Berlin. It consisted of loading specialists, officers from the Ordnance Department of the Royal Hungarian Ministry of Defense (Honved) and left for Berlin in December 1940.
The Hungarian requests were as follows:
THE PRESIDENT:General, couldn't you pass on to December, 1940, where Field Marshal Keitel invites the Hungarian Minister of Defense to conic to Berlin. It is just a few sentences down.
MAJOR GENERAL ZORYA:Yes, I am referring to this:
In December 1940, the Chief-of-Staff, of the OKW, Fieldmarshal Wilhelm KEITEL, invited the Hungarian Minister of Defense, Colonel-General Carl Barta, to come to Berlin in order
a) to discuss personally the problem of armament;
b) to elaborate a plan of military and political collaboration between Germany and Hungary for the spring of 1941.
This invitation was transmitted to Budapest through the Royal Hungarian military attache in Berlin, Colonel Alexander Homlok of the General Staff, At the same time, I received a similar invitation from Admiral Canaris, Chief of the Foreign Section of the "Abwehr" of the OKW.
I omit Ujseascy's long list of the persons who accompanied Barth on his trip and read further - on page 4, line 7 from the top of the Russian text of the document, page 51 in the document book.
"... an agreement was reached on the following:
... In the spring of 1941, the position of Yugoslavia mil become clear, the threat of an attack by Soviet forces from the rear will be removed. For this purpose, the Hungarian Konved army will be supplied with field howitzers, modern tanks and armoured cars for equipping one mechanized brigade.
Far the war against Russia, Hungary must put at Germany's disposal 15 strategic units including 3 mechanized, one cavalry and one tank units; she must also complete by 1 June, 1941 the erection of fortification in CarpathoRussia, assist the advance of the German Troops in the areas adjacent to the Hungarian-Yugoslav and the Hungarian-Soviet frontiers end secure the bringing up of supplies through Hungary. The details for the preparation of operations will be worked out later by representatives of the German General Staff to be sent to Hungary.
As a political compensation for her participation in the war, Hungary will receive territory in Yugoslavia and in Russia, the ancient princedom of Galitz, and the foothills of the Carpathian mountains as far as the river Dniestr.
In March 1941 Eberhard Kinzel, a Colonel of the German General Staff, visited Budapest. The purpose of this visit was to make final arrangements for the attack on Yugoslavia.
This is what Ujszaszy has to say in this connection. Page 5 of the Russian text, 3rd paragraph from the bottom. Page 152 in the document book.
"Colonel Kintzel arrived in Budapest in March 1941, bringing with him a letter from Colonel-General Halder to Colonel General Wert.
In this letter there was an insistent demanded by Germany that Hungary was to participate in the probable war against Yugoslavia by the mobilization of the following army corps, First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Army Corps; and in the war against Soviet Russia by the mobilizing of fifteen strategic units, including two cavalry divisions, two mechanized brigades, and one infantry brigade.
"The letter also announced the imminent arrival in Budapest of the German General Staff mission, headed by Lieutenant-General Paulus, which was to discuss the combined operations and the movement of German troops to Yugoslavia through Hungary.
"Replying to this letter, Colonel-General Wert invited the German mission to Budapest, promised consent to the participation of Hungary in the war against Yugoslavia, and to produce, for this purpose, three Army Corps; that is, the First, Fourth, and Fifth.
"Concerning war against Soviet Russia, he agreed in principle, promising at least to mobilize the Sight Army Corps, Kopitze, as well as the mechanized operational units demanded by Halder.
"Regarding this correspondence, I was informed personally by the Colonel of the German General Staff, Kinzel."
THE PRESIDENT:General, speaking for myself, I can't see that it makes the slightest difference to this Tribunal whether Hungary was going to put one army corps or two army corps or three army corps against the Russians. It is absolutely clear from what you have already read, if we believe it, that Field Marshal Keitel, in December 1940, was demanding that Hungary should put at Germany's disposal, for the war against Russia, certain units. What does it matter if subsequent negotiations alter the number of units?
It seems to me that this evidence which is given is entirely cumulative. It doesn't add anything in the least to what you have already given us, and it seems to me that you could go on to the next document, which is USSR 150. Everyghing up to there is simply the negotiations between members of the German and Hungarian General Staffs as to exactly what units of the Hungarian Army were to be used.
GENERAL ZORYA: I quite agree with the President that the evidence could be limited so far as the discussion is concerned.
But the document which I am reading into the record now, document 155--there is certain information contained in this document, and this information pertains not only to the number of mechanical units which Hungary pledged to give Germany in case of war with Russia, but there is also some indication as to what methods, in the preparationfor war, were bring used by the fascist clique in Hungary when they were conspiring with Hitler's conspirators.
I thought it was necessary to pause on those methods, and that is the reason why I would like to have permission to quote certain passages out of this document.
What I have in mind now, for instance, is classifications, and the mention of how much the Soviet Union was supposedly against Hungary.
You will see, at page 155 in the Document Book, at the middle of page 8 of the Russian text, where Major-General Ujzaszi says:
"Major-General Laszlo, as the chief of the operational group and my immediate superior, ordered the second section of the General Staff to prepare a report that would confirm the presence and maintain, on the Hungarian border, that there are concentrated fourteen Soviet operational units, including eight motorized. This report was prepared by Colonel Cornell Ridai of the personnel Unit.
"I want to note the fact that the intelligence operations of the second section of the Royal Hungarian General Staff established the presence on the Hungarian border of actually only four Soviet operational units. This circumstance I duly and factually reported to Colonel-General Wert and Major-General Laszlo, but the latter ordered my truthful and factual report to be altered to get what he desired."
Further, Ujzaszi relates the provocative plans of the militarist clique in Hungary, the fulfillment of which involved the creation of an incident for an attack on the Soviet Union.
Ujzaszi states -- at page 10, line 4 from the top of the document, page 157 in the Document Book:
"These plans emanated from Lieutenant-General Fuetterer and his assistant Lieutenant-General Frimond, and Major-General Laszlo. They proposed that, if necessary, the German aircraft, camouflaged as Russian aircraft, should bomb the eastern border districts of Hungary with bombs of Russian origin."
And finally, Ujzaszi describes the last days preceding the attack on the Soviet Union. That is page 11 of the document, page 158 in the Document Book. I am quoting from the middle of page 61 -- that is for the interpreters.
"On 24 June 1941, as far as I remember at 12:30 noon, I was informed that the Soviet planes were bombing Raho in Carpathian Russia, and they were strafing, with machine-guns, trains in its vicinity.
That same day, after midday, the news came in that Soviet aircraft were bombing Koschitze. The Crown Council, the Regent presiding, met the same evening, and, 'on the basis of Soviet Russia's provocation', decided to declare war on that country.
"I am convinced that those were German planes with Russian markings and insignia. My conclusions are based on the following:
"Lieutenant-General Fuetterer and the German propaganda publicized this bombing too widely and too much.
"Major-General Laszlo immediately gave me orders, through Propaganda Subsection of Section 2 of the Royal Hungarian General Staff, to get photographs of the found fragments of the 'Soviet bombs' and to publish those photographs in the press of the fascist countries.
"Lieutenant-General Fuetterer, Major-General Laszlo, and LieutenantColonel Arimond spread, by a whispering campaign, the rumor that Slovakian pilots who were in the Russian Service bombed Kosice, and successful hits must be explained by the fact that these pilots know the terrain well."
That is as it was entioned on the 24th of June, 1941, at 12:30 p.m.
We have a document that establishes that long before this moment the participation of Hungary against Soviet Union was decided. This is a document presented to the Tribunal, which is the deposition of Ruskiscai Ruediger, giving the reasons for the Hungarian assault on the Soviet Union. It may be that Tuediger's viewpoint is not shared by everybody, but still, as the testimony of the Vice Minister of War, naturally this statement is of great value.
On page 10 of the Russian text of his testimony, Ruediger states that approximately at the end of Kay 1941, he received an order to supply, first of all, the troops which were located and concentrated in the Carpathian Ukraine; and two days afterwards a secret meeting took place, a meeting of the Army Corps Commanders, at the headquartersof Colonel-General Wert, Chief of the General Staff, The commanders were informed then about the forthcoming attack on the Soviet Union.
I quote from the testimony of Ruskiscai Ruediger, at page 9 of the Russian text.
I am quoting only the underlined passages, in order to save time.
I quote:
"General Wert, Chief of the General Staff, briefed us on the military and political situation. It appears that in the forthcoming attack of Germany against the Soviet Union, Roumania and Hungary will take active part on the side of Germany."
Ruskiscai Ruediger further points out that:
"The decision to declare war was taken by the Council of Ministers, after Premier Bardoshy and Minister Barta made their reports, and it was ratified by the Crown Council. The question was not submitted to Parliament. This decision did not produce any surprise, as it was the result of the voluntary military, factual collaboration with Germany which had existed for many years.
"The Hungarian General Staff and the political leadership of Hungary, beginning with the aggression against Czechoslovakia, considered Germany as the mainstay in their plans of revision. Afterwards followed the occupation on Trans-Carpathian Ukraine, and the strategic organization of this region as a military base for an attack on Soviet Russia."
Ujzaszi, in his report, mentioned the German military attache in Budapest, Krappe. The former Lieutenant-General of the German Army, Gunther Krappe, was really the German military attache, in Budapest from November 1939 until 30 April 1941. After that, Krappe was in command of the Tenth Corps of SS troops of the Army Group "Visla,", and was taken prisoner by the Red Army units.
I beg the Tribunal to accept as evidence, as an exhibit, USSR-150, a statement made by Krappe in January of this year. It should be noted that the main circumstances mentioned in Krappe's statement coincide with those in Ujzaszi's report.
I shall read only a few excerpts from Krappe's document, at page 4 of the document, and page 165 in the Document Book.
"In October 1940, I was ordered by the OKH to report on the conditions of fortifications in the region bordering Russia, that is, Carpathian Ukraine. The Chief of the Operations Section, Colonel Laszlo, reported to me that so far there were only simple anti-tank obstacles placed from one to two kilometres in depth, and that the construction of the barracks for quartering troops had just begun.
The necessary surveys for the con-
struction of reinforced concrete pillboxes along the border and the highways would be made during the winter, and in the spring of 1941 it would be possible to start the actual construction. It appeared to be a matter of some 6,000,000 pengo.
"General Wert gave me permission for an automobile trip through Mukachevo to Ujoksky Pass. The results of the inspection trip and the information obtained from Colonel Laszlo were communicated by me to Berlin, Sometime later Colonel Laszlo informed me that the necessary sums for the building of these fortifications had been appropriated.
In order to save time, I shall briefly express the further testimony of Colonel Laszlo. An agreement was reached with War Minister von Barta to organize military units of the German army. In connection with this a nevi mission arrived which was charged with the project of communications. At the same time there was received the permission to establish communications system for military needs, and, furthermore, a whole series of German officers were attached to the Hungarian Army in order to exchange their experiences and act as instructors.
"Beginning with December 1940, the industry of Hungary fully turned over to increase German military potential. General Leeb, the Chief of Armament Department, was in charge.
In concluding the presentation of evidence concerning the building up by the fascist war criminals of an aggressive bloc against the Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics, I consider it necessary to make a few comments of a general order, deriving from these documents.
The actual measures on the part of the fascist conspirators for the inclusion of Rumania, Finland, and Hungary in the preparations for the predatory attack on the Soviet Union began at least in September 1940, when a military mission was sent to Rumania.
The negotiations accompanying military preparations for aggression against the Soviet Union in each of these countries proceeded without difficulties, and in the main they were concluded during the period September - December 1940. The negotiations were conducted by the general staffs of the German and the satellite armies. The subjects of the negotiations in each case were matter. Of a purely military character, such as the reconditioning of the troops, the transportation of military units, the coordination of strategic plans, deciding on the number of divisions needed to attack the Soviet Union, etc.
The character of such negotiations testifies to the fact that there ecisted between the Fascist Government of Germany and the governments of Rumania, Finland, and Hungary, a mutual consent with regard to aggression against the Soviet Union long before the negotiations began.
And finally, the documents submitted establish that each of these countries in one way or another was promised by the Fascist conspirators some territory belonging to the Soviet Union.
I would, now like to point out one more fact.
In order to grasp fully the consequences of the predatory Fascist attack on the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, it is not enough to stop at the plan "Barbarossa", or that is a strategic plan; plan for a military attack; plan for commencing aggression. And following it was the so-called "assimilation and "organisation" of the occupied territories. The plans for the "assimilation" and "organisation", which were plans for the destruction of the civilian population and the plundering of the occupied districts of the Soviet Union, were also made in advance in the same way as the plan "Barbarossa", was made in advance.
The Soviet Prosecution declares that the documents in the possession of the Tribunal, and specifcally such documents as the "Directives for Special Areas" dated March 13, 1941, U.S. Exhibit No. 447-PS, signed by the Defendant Keitel; "Order for the Application of Military jurisdiction and procedure in Area Barbarossa," dated May 15, 1941, U.S. Exhibit C-50, also signed by Keitel; "Propaganda Directive for Plan "Barbarossa," U.S. Exhibit C-26, and others, represent destruction of not only legal but also moral standards of conduct of the Fascist usurper hordes on temporarily-occupied Soviet territories; this destruction having been premeditated and planned long prior to the attack on the Soviet Union.
Even before the attack on the Soviet Union, the Hitlerites decided and outlined in the appropiate paragraph of these instructions, directions, and orders the methods of dealing with the civilian population, and the orders and means for plundering the Soviet land and reducing it to a colonial region of the Third Reich.
And when the war broke out and the secret became obvious, the Fascists felt no embarrassment in transferring all these problems to the pages of their press.
I submit to the Tribunal as USSR. Exhibit 59 an article published on the 20th of August, 1942, in "Das Schwarze Korp," an SS paper and organ of the Reichsfuehrer of the SS. It was openly written in this article entitled, "Should They Be Germanised?" - - Page 150 of the document book -
"The Reichsfuehrer of the SS chose the following slogan for one of the editions of the newspaper "Deutsche Arbeit" devoted to the problems of resettlement in the East.
"Our objective is not Germanization in the East in the old sense of the term, that is, imposing upon the population the German language and the German laws, but to ensure that only people of really German blood inhabit the East."
This negation of Germanization is not new. However, expressed by the Reichsfuehrer of the SS, acting as State Minister for the strengthening of the German nation, it becomes and order. Such is the exact meaning of this order.
The refusal to Germanize the populations of occupied territories, and the assertion that "The East should only be inhabited by people of really German blood," signified in practice the mass extermination of Soviet citizens, their deportation to slave labor, the destruction of centuries' of Russian culture, and of our cites and villages.
I shall confine myself to that which has already been stated, as this theme, or rather these several themes, have been elaborated and will be presented to the Tribunal by my colleagues.
On June 22, 1941, after lengthy preparations, the German-Fascist hordes crashed on the Soviet Union.
170 divisions, concentrated on the borders of the Soviet Union from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea, started the invasion. The military problems of the attack were formulated in the plan "Barbarossa."
"The German armed forces should be ready for a defeat of Russia by means of a fast-flowing operation even prior to the end of the war with England.
"To this end the army will have to utilize all units at its disposal, except those which will have to guard the occupied territories against unexpected developments." Another version of "Barbarossa" foresaw the necessity of annihilating the Red Army simply to forestall the possibility of the speedy retreat inland of its combat units, and to provide the German-Fascist invaders with the possibility to reach speedily a line of combat which would put the German regions out of the range of the Soviet Air Force.
As in ultimate aim, the plan "Barbarossa" provided for the strengthening of the Astrakhan-Archangel line, the destruction from the air of the Ural industry, the seizure of Leningrad and Kronstadt, and as a decisive finale, the capture of Moscow.
THE PRESIDENT:Would that be a good time to break off?
(The Tribunal adjourned until 13 February 1946 at 1000 hours).
Official transcript of the International Military Tribunal in the matter of The United States of America, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against Hermann Wilhelm Goering et al, Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany on 13 February 1946, 1000-1300, Lord Justice Lawrence presiding.
GENERAL ZORYA:Your Honors, yesterday afternoon I dealt with the question of Plan Barbarosa, which provided for the attack on the Red Army and its combat fighting units, and speedy achievement of the means by which Soviet aviation could not bomb German regions.
The final aim, according to Plan Barbarosa, was fortification of the Astrakhan-Archangel Line, the destruction of the Ural industry, the seizure of Leningrad and Kronstadt, and, as a decisive finale, the capture of Moscow.
The political aims which determined the military plans have been formulated by the Hitlerites in the many documents which were read into the record in this courtroom. But these aims were stated particularly clearly and cynically at the meeting in Hitler's headquarters on July 16, 1941. This document was presented by the American prosecution as Exhibit No. L-221, and it is at page 141 in the Document Book.
At this meeting Hitler, Goering, Rosenberg, Keitel, and other fascist conspirators, were deciding, as they thought, the subsequent fortunes of the Soviet Union.
The Crimea, together with the adjoining regions of the Ukraine, the Baltic regions, the Bielostok Forests, and the Kola Peninsula, were to "join" Germany. The Volga colonies were also to become a part of the Reich. The Baku area was envisaged as a German military colony. Bessarabia and Odessa were to be handed over to Roumania, while Finland acquired Eastern Karelia, Leningrad, and the Leningrad District.
As is well known, the Hitlerites alwaysstrove to prevent their real piratical aims from receiving publicity. At the same meeting at General Headquarters, on July 16, 1941, Hitler, for instance, said that it was important not to reveal their aims to the whole world, not to complicate their path by unnecessary declarations, and, in giving reasons for their actions, to start from tactical intentions.
The defendant Rosenberg stated, on the 20th of June, 1941, at a conference regarding the Eastern question -- the record of which was presented by the American Prosecution as Exhibit 1058-PS--that tactics were very important and that political aims would be determined as the occasion arose, when one slogan or another could be given publicity.
That particular paragraph you will find on page 15 of the Russian text of the document, which corresponds to page 201 in the Document Book.
Taking this circumstance into consideration, Your Honors, it appears of value for our investigation to turn to some statements by the fascist war criminals which refer to the period when they considered it possible to make public some of their political aims.
In 1941-42 the fascist hordes broke through territories of the Soviet Union and approached Moscow. Battles were waged on the banks of the Volga.
The specter of a "Great Germany" ruling the world appeared as a beacon before the eyes of the Hitlerite conspirators. The opportunity arrived about which defendant Rosenberg had spoken when, from the standpoint of the fascist criminals, it was possible that certain political slogans could be made public.
I present to the Tribunal, under number USSR-58, a document from the archives of the defendant Rosenberg's office relating to questions of German policy in the occupied regions of the Caucasus. Once again I ask to refer to this document. I refer to page 203 in the Document Book, and page 9 of the Russian text, the translation of this document.
Rosenberg, on the 27th of July, 1942, solved this Eastern problem in this way, and I quote:
"The Eastern problem consists in bringing the Baltic peoples under the influence of German culture and in preparing widely conceived military frontiers for Germany. The Ukraine problem consists in securing Germany's and Europe's food supply and the Continent's supply of raw materials.
"The problem of the Caucasus is primarily a political problem, and its solution means the expansion of Continental Europe, under German leadership, from the Caucasin Isthmus to the Near East."
On November 27, 1941, the defendant Ribbentrop made a report on the international situation. The text of this report was published in Volume 329-A of the Hamburger Freudenblatt. I present this report as Exhibit No. USSR-347.
Ribbentrop, in this report, said:
"I should like to summarize the consequences of this defeat of Soviet Russia, and of the occupation of the greater part of European Russia in 1941, as follows:
"1. With regard to the war, England's last ally on the continent has thereby ceased to be a significant factor, Germany and Italy, with their allies, thus become unassailable in Europe.
Besides this, colossal forces have become free for other purposes.
"2. In the economic field, the Axis powers, together with their friends, which means the whole of Europe, have achieved independence from countries overseas. Europe has once for all been freed from the threat of blockade. The grain and raw materials of Russia in Europe can fully cover the needs of Europe. Its war production will serve Germany's war economy and that of her allies, as a result of which Europe's war potential will increase still more. The organization of this vast area is already in full swing. Thus, two decisive prerequisites for the victory of the Axis and its allies over England have been created."
I shall take the liberty of presenting another document on this same subject. It is Gobbels' speech in Munich, published on 19 October 1942, in the main organ of the Nazi party, the "Voelkischer Beobachter" South German edition.
The text of this speech is presented to the Military Tribunal as Exhibit USSR 250. That is on page 205 in the Document Book.
In his address Goebbels said:
"We have captured the most important grain-producing, coal-mining, and metallurgical regions of the Soviet Union. We today possess what the enemy has lost. And since what the enemy is short of has come to us, it is of double value. In the past we were a people without space, but today this is no longer the case. Today we have only to shape this space which our soldiers have conquered to make it useful to us, and this requires a definite period of time. But if the British contend that we have lost the war because we have lost time, this contention only shows how completely they fail to understand the situation. Time works only against those who have no space and raw materials. If we make use of time to organize the space conquered by us, the time will work not against us, but for us."
Your Honors, that which Ribbentrop, Goebbels and Rosenberg said about exploiting the space captured by the soldiers, took on, at the OKW, the shape of plans for further aggression.
In this respect the following document -- which I now submit to the Tribunal under No. 57 USSR 336 -- appears interesting. I ask you to accept this as evidence. This document is a letter from the German Naval War Staff to the commanding Generals of Groups West, North and South. This document was discovered in German archives by the allied troops.
The letter, which you will find on page 210 in the Document Book, is entitled "Objectives for the further conduct of war upon termination of the campaign in the East."
It is numbered 01345-41, and it is dated August 8.
In those days the fascist conspirators considered that victory over the Soviet Union was really only a question of time, and therefore they planned for further aggression.
This letter which I am about to quote begins with the following words: