Q How large was the area of Einsatzgruppe B approximately? a whole Army corps. Thus it consisted of the areas of first 6, later 5, and 4 Armies and then extended back. The territory began in the north east in the Kalinin, which is north of Moscow. The boundry went farther south and down to the area near Orel. From there the border went from east to west, down south west of Gomel in the Pripet Marshes and from there a line south to north to the Delta of the Dyna and from there a line from the west to the east to Kalinin. I once placed this territory on the map of central Europe and this square covered the following area: The points of the square were Kiel in the North-east, Vienna in the South-east, Paris in the south west and London in the north west.
DR. GAWLIK: Your Honor, I ask that the defendant may rise and point this teritory out on the map.
THE PRESIDENT: He may do so.
THE WITNESS: Kalinin -- there is Moscow. North of Moscow is the Volga. North from Moscow is Kalinin, near the Volga and there its borders cross the M of Moscow down through Podolsk, down to about Tula, which is near Orel. Then the border went through Kursk. South of Kursk, Cherkassy, then along the Pripet Marshes down to the old Polish border and then north outside of the territory, Borisov is still included, then up near the source of the Dune River and then across the lake up there back Kalinin.
Q. Were you subordinated to the Chief of the Security Police and SD?
A. Yes.
Q. Where you also subordinated to any other agencies?
A. Yes. To the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group Center, the Commander of the Rear Army Center and the Higher SS and Police Leader Central Russia.
Q. To what extent were you under the command of the Commanderin-Chief of Army Group B?
A. Not Army Group B, but Army Group Center. The Commander-inChief of Army Group Center was my superior as far as march-routes housing, food, and these matters were concerned. Furthermore, I had to report to the Commander-in-Chief and as far asthe tactical situation demanded it I had to accept orders from him.
Q. To what extent were you subordinated to the command of the Commander of the Rear Area?
A. In the same manner, only restricted to the Rear Area.
Q. To what extent were you subordinated to the Higher SS and Police Leader?
A. The Higher SS and Police Leader exercised a sort of supervision over all parts of the SS and Police units in his area.
Q. Did you give the Einsatzkommandos and special detachments under your command, any special orders to execute Jews, Gypsies, and Communist functionaries?
A. No.
Q. On the basis of what orders did the Einsatzkommandos and Special Kommandos carry out executions of Jews, Gypsies, and Communist functionaries?
A. On the basis of the order handed down by the Chief of the Security Police and SD, and by Gruppenfuehrer Streckenbach.
Q. Witness, was this order handed down to you during your time of service with the Einsatzgruppe B?
A. No, this order had already been handed down before the Einsatzkommandos and Special Kommandos went to Russia.
Q. And who wasthen commanding officer of Einsatzgruppe B -- in order to determine this once and for all?
A. The first Chief of Einsatzgruppe B was my predecessor, Nebe.
Q. On the basis of this order was every member of the Communist party to be killed?
A. No. Only insofar as they exercised any endangering activity.
Q. Could you have prevented the execution of this order?
A. No, I could not.
Q. Can you give any more reasons for this?
A. Yes, I had no possibility of preventing the execution of a Fuehrer Order. This would have brought the most severe measures in its wake against me. Furthermore, I would not have been able to change anything in the order if I had disobeyed it.
Q. Perhaps you can express more clearly what would have happened to you if you had attempted to prevent the execution of this order, already given to the Einsatzkommandos and Special Kommandos.
A. I would have been put before an SS and Police Court, and certainly would have been sentenced to death; but I think it would have been even more probable that Himmler would have given the order to have me shot if I had refused to obey the order.
Q. From Document Book III-B, page 1 of the English text, page 1 of the German text, I submit to you Exhibit 112, Document NO-4150. This if your affidavit of the 27th of June 1947. Are the statements in this affidavit correct?
A. Yes, I already said that with one exception -- 1942, instead of 1940 -- outside of this, they are correct.
Q. Under number 4 of this affidavit, you stated the following: "I know that while I wasits chief, Einsatzgruppe B--- or, as the case may be -- the Einsatzkommandos, Sonderkommandos and other units under its control carried out executions."
Is this statement correct?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Did Einsatzgruppe B itself - that is, the staff - carry out any executions?
A. No, this was not its job.
Q. What were the other units outside of the Einsatz- and Special Kommandos Which carried out executions?
A. That was the independent detachment Smolensk.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Gawlik, I don't quite understand your differentiation between the affidavit and the interpretation that you are attempting to derive from it. How, paragraph 4 states that "Einsatzgruppe B carried out executions" -- leaving out the intervening phraseology. Noe, you are having the witness to say Einsatzgruppe B did not carry, out executions. How do you interpret that from this very clear statement in the affidavit?
DR. GAWLIK: Your Honor, shall I explain this, or shall the witness explain?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I would like to have the witness explain it, under your direction.
A. (By the witness) The Einsatzkommandos and Special Kommandos belonged to Einsatzgruppe B. If the Einsatzkommandos and Special Kommandos carried out executionsthey are to be counted as total executions of Einsatzgruppe B as a total unit. But I was asked by Dr. Gawlik whether the staff of Einsatzgruppe B -- the 60 men - carried out any executions. To that I answered No, - it was not its task, it was not the mission of the staff to carry out executions.
THE PRESIDENT: But the Einsatzgruppe B was responsible for the executions. The staff was responsible for the executions. They may not have actually pulled any trigger, but the Einsatzgruppe B was in charge of executions assigned to that action group.
A. (By the witness) No, Your Honor, it was not this way. I already said in the beginning that the area of Einsatzgruppe B was very large, -- and I believe Dr. Gawlik will come back to this during the trial -- it was, therefore, not possible to give express orders to each pendently, to a large extent. The largo distances forced them to do it; so did the lack of communications; and also local subordination to the army or to the Commander of the Rear Area.
THE PRESIDENT: You knew that there was an order which required the Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos to perform executions? Answer that, please.
A. (By the witness) Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and these Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos came under your jurisdiction in Einsatzgruppe B?
A. (By the witness) Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, so that the only distinction you were drawing is between the trigger men and the headquarters? Lot me put it in another way -
A. (By the witness) No, Your Honor -- I am describing the situation asit was. In Pretsch and in Schmieberg I don't know exactly how it was -- I was not there -- the Einsatzgruppen chiefs and the leaders of the Einsatzkommandos and Special kommandos were given these orders, and on the basis of these orders they acted.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. And they were under your supervision and control. You were the superior officer of those Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos?
A. (By the witness) Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and what you are telling the Tribunal is that you and your staff did not actually participate in an execution?
A. (By the witness) No.
DR. GAWLIK: Your Honor, he wants to say even more than that.
He wants to say that he did not give any order for those executions because the order already was existing for the Einsatzkommandos and Special Kommandos at the time when he took over the Einsatzgruppe.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR FERENCZ: Excuse me, Your Honor. I believe the defendant is on the stand, and we will hear from him what he intends to say, and not his defense counsel. We object to defense counsel explaining what defendant wants to say.
DR. GAWLIK: This is the moment, Your Honor, which I have already mentioned before, When I raised an objection against some additions which the Prosecution made in their presentation of evidence, and them at that time Your Honor was kind enough to tell me that if I would make such additions Your Honor would tell the Prosecution the very same thing.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I assure you that my kindness, as you very kindly termed it, will carry over to this point -- and therefore you are absolved from any sin. BY DR. GWLIK:
Q. We were under number 4 of this Document NO-4150. I ask you now, - Did the Einsatzgruppe B itself - that is, its staff - carry out any executions?
A. No. The staff did not carry out any executions. That was, as I said, not its mission.
Q. What were the missions and the activities of the Einsatz and Special Kommandos?
A. The Einsatz and Special Kommandos had the mission to keep order and security in the entire army area, in the rear of the combatting army.
Q. What were the activities and missions of the staff?
A. The staff was to busy itself with personnel questions, administrative questions, organizational matters; it had the motor questions under it; food, housing.
Furthermore, it had to accept the reports from the Kommandos; it had to compile collective reports and send them to Berlin, to the Main Office, end to other agencies.
independently?
A They had to work completely independently. This was because of the great distances, the very bad communications, and the various orders commands of the army and their localities, or the commander of the rear area. Kommandos active as a result of orders given to them by the staff? detection in building up indigenous police; in reporting all necessary domestic information; and other such matters. police? police--to see that order and security were maintained, that crime be prevented. Furthermore, the indigenous police was used also in partisan detection, and it also fought partisans. gruppe B?
A The Commandos and detachments had to do this. The detachments were called "Troops", with Einsatzgruppe B- therefore, "Troop Detachment Smolensk" for instance.
page 1 of the English and German text, Exhibit 112, Document 4150. This is your affidavit of the 27th of June 1947. Under number 5 it says: "Einsatzgruppe B received from the Reich Security Main Office Berlin, two or three gas vans but these were shortly afterwards passed on to Einsatzgruppe in the south. As far as I know Einsatzgruppe B did not use these vans.
Are these statements correct?
Q Did you ask for these gas vans?
Q Who ordered the assignment of these gas vans?
A I don't know; probably some agency in the RSHA.
Q Did you know about this order?
Q Could you have prevented the assignment of these gas vans?
Q How long were these gas vans with Einsatzgruppe B? give you the exact period.
Q What happened to those gas vans?
A I don't know whether they were used for the purpose assigned to them. I know I saw one of them, that once one of those gas vans was used to carry wood, I don't know whether they were used for original purpose. I did not hear of any such case.
Q Who ordered that the gas vans be given away? of the German, I submit to you exhibit of Ott, of the 24th of April 1947. Ott speaks of an execution in this affidavit, which took place in the surroundings of Bryansk.
Did you order the execution near Bryansk? it?
Q Could you prevent the carrying out of this executions? the execution?
Q On the basis of what orders were the valuables collected? I took over the Einsatzgruppe.
Q Who gave this order?
A Ott must be mistaken here. I already said that this order already existed when I took over Einsatzgruppe B.
THE PRESIDENT: Do I understand, Dr. Gawlik, that it is your intention, or your client's intention, to repudiate the affidavit of Ott?
DR. GAWLIK: Yes, in this respect, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I notice in the defendant's own affidavit, in paragraph 7, the affidavit of June 27, 1947, that he says, "I am aware that the administration chiefs collected valuables and money belonging to the persons intended for execution. The money and valuables were remitted to the Ministry of Finance." It would appear from this statement that he know beforehand, before the executions, that the valuables were to be collected.
DR. GAWLIK: Perhaps he can asnwer that question.
THE WITNESS; There was an order that the valuables of those people to be executed were to be collected by the administrative cheifs and were to be sent back to the staff of Einsatzgruppe B with a letter. The staff of Einsatzgruppe B, that is, Department II, the Administration, now was to send these valuables on to the RSHA, later to an agency of the Reich Finance Ministry in Mogilew, or Borisow, I don't know exactly which place it was.
THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn't parts of this affidavit be correct in that incident where he says that the valuables which were collected from these people were sent to Einsatzgruppe B. This was ordered by command of Naumann.
If you were commanding Officer at the time, and it was the procedure to send these valuables to your staff headquaters, and there was no indication on your part that this order was rescinded, then, in fact, you did order the sending of the valuables?
THE. WITNESS: Yes, I actually had these valuables passed on as was ordered.
THE PRESIDENT: You ordered that the valuables be sent from the places of execution to your headquaters?
THE WITNESS: No, that had already been ordered when I took ever the command. That already was customary before.
THE PRESIDENT: And you know that that order was in effect?
THE WITNESS: Yes, I know that.
THE PRESIDENT: And you carried on the procedure which had been established prior to your asking over Einsatzgruppe B?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: So, therefore, Ott is correct in saying that it was by your command, because you were the current commander.
THE WITNESS: Yes, Ott meant the chief of Einsatzgruppe B. Of course, I assume that he didn't know whether Nebe ordered it, or whether I did. Therefore, he probably used my name.
THE, PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. GAWLIK: Your Honor, may I make a short statement about my presentation of evidence, to make it more comprehensible. The defendant does not dispute that he knew about this. But Tribunal II in the verdict against MILCH has already stated that knowledge alone is net punishable, but the defendant must either have participated, he must have killed himself, or he must have given an order to kill, or he must have the had the possibility to intervene in this order, or committed a sin of omission. That is the line of my evidence. The knowledge alone is not being disputed here.
THE PRESIDENT: You are just about two months ahead of the time for that argument. That comes at the end of the trial.
BY DR. GAWLIK: page 10 of the German text, the Exhibit No. 59, Document NO-2825. This concerns the Situational Report, 14 November 1941, under No. IX, on page 14 of the German Document Book -- I don't know what page of the English Document Book, it is page 15. It says the liquidations during the report period reached the following figure: 45,467. What was the report prior which this situational report of 14 November 1941 covered?
Q Where does it say that? next to the last paragraph, 23 October. The other dates are all older. This is the latest date given there.
Q Perhaps you can give the other dates too? 14th, 17th, 21st, 9th, 19th and 23rd of October. 1941, there are reports still missing?
A It also said here that under the last paragraph No. IX, "According to reports at hand the reports of SKM, Sonderkommando-XVII and Sonderkommando-IX, and the OKW, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, are still missing, and you may see that these three kommandos will appear in yet later reports. One can see from the documents that between the events that happened in Russia, and the appearance of this in that situational report, between these two there is a lapse of a period of four or five weeks. After I have looked at the documents, it appears to me that the time is even greater than five weeks. gruppe-B?
A The report period runs down to 23 October, that was Nebe's time.
Q The Prosecution has said the following about this document: "This report describes the activity which probably took place before Naumann took over command." That is page 155 of the German report. Please comment on this.
A This activity didn't only probably take place, but definitely it took place before. is a report which was made out by Naumann two weeks after he took over Einsatzgruppe B. Is that correct?
A No, that is not correct. I have already said I did not take over the command until 30 November. of the people mentioned in this document?
Q Were you in Smolensk during this period?
Q Were you in Russia at all during this time? the liquidation of 45,000 persons has been described by the Einsatzgruppe, the defendant Naumann must have known the purpose and the functions of this unit whose command he took over and held. I will ask you, therefore, did you know of this report of 14 November 1941? mentioned in this document when you took over the command? situational report? Streckenbach, which took place during my first visit in Russia, I am sorry - during my first visit in Berlin, after I had taken over the Einsatzgruppe-B. At that time Streckenbach told me that various Einsatzgruppen reported figures which were considerably exaggerated, and, I remember that he really said some people don't seem to be concerned about a zero or two.
He mentioned in accordance with this the name of my predecessor. pecially the special action named under figure five, in then against forced labor inmates in the camp in Megilow. Tell me when this liquidation took place for the record? the document.
Q Did you hear anything about those liquidations? liquidation of inferior people? I know. If this happened at the time, Nebe was in command, I can not explain how Nebe happened to give such orders.
Q Now I submit to you a document from volume II-B. It is on page 36 of the English, page 31 of the German text. It is Exhibit No. 62, Document No. NO-2824. Did the liquidations covered by this report take place during the time you were in command of Einsatzgruppe-B?
A No, it was before my time. When commenting on the previous document I already stated that between the events in Russia and their the appearance of the situational report, a period of four to five weeks elapsed. This difference can be explained by the fact that after the event in Russia reports had to be made out by the detachment, and the detachment had to pass on this document to kommando, when the occasion presented itself, not immediately and the kommando had to gather up these reports from the various detachments, and had to collect them into the Einsatzgruppe, that is, to the staff of the Einsatzgruppe. That was not possible every day, the transport and gasoline situation made it impossible; thus a vehicle was used only when the various numbers of requests made that justifiable.
The Einsatzgruppe then collected these various reports, summarized them, and then when the opportunity arose sent them on to Berlin, to the RSHA. Thus, it can be explained that between the event in Russia and the appearance of the report, a considerable time elapsed. document? executions took place, or had to take place during the time before you took over the Einsatzgruppen-B? No. 149, and I don't know where it is to be found. English, page 17 of the German, Exhibit No. 114, Document NO-2833. Your Honor, this is the report of 22 December 1941, the operational report of 22 December 1941, that is document NO-2833, from volume III-B. This bears the number 149, Whereas the other operational report which I am supposed to comment on bears No. 148. This was made out earlier, as can be seen from the date. It was made out three days earlier, that is, on 19 December, whereas the other was made out on 22 December. This report No. 149, shows on page 23, the date 18 November and on page 24, 21 November. If the report of 22 December mentions dates like the 18th and 21st of November in its report, then the dates of the report on 19 December must be still earlier.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Gawlik, shall we take our afternoon recess now, please.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will recess for fifteen minutes.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session. BY DR. GAWLIK: 62 from Document Book II-B, page 36 of the English text, Document NOKW-2824. The Prosecution showed by this document that sixteen insame people and Russian children were shot. Can you state something about this, please? English, page 17 of the German text, Exhibit 114, Document NOKW-2833. It says, "Operation Report of 22 December, 41". The executions mentioned in this operation report, did they occur during your time when you were in charge of Einsatzgruppe B? are mentioned in the report. These events, therefore, occurred before my time. charge as Chief of Einsatzgruppe B? it was absolutely necessary that Einsatzgruppe B beled very well, and to get to know all the conditions out there in detail. For that reason I started immediately, and in time to visit all kommandos and partkommandos, to get to know my men, the chiefs of the kommandos and of the part-kommandos, to get to know my men, the chiefs of the kommandos and of the part-kommandos, to get acquainted with the country and the people, to get to know the security position, to know what the area looked like, to know the means of communication, how the population liked us and how the kommandos were manned out there. This was necessary because I needed this knowledge in order to be able to give orders eventually which were required according to the situation. page 52 of the German text, Exhibit 66, Document NO-3276. It concerns an operation report, No. 194, of 21 April 1942.
Did you order the executions mentioned in this document?
Q Were you present during these executions? intended missions?
Q Could you have stopped these executions from being carried out? were carried out by the Sonderkommandos and the Einsatzkommandos? under the Fuehrer order, membership in partisan bands and other crimes which are mentioned where various Army orders applied.
Q Did you give any orders for this?
Q What do you want to add to this operation report?
A I know this operation report. I know the paragraph on the previous page, 55 of the German text. I recognize the article about information on partisans exactly. On the other hand, the listing, in the form as submitted here, I have not seen before. I, therefore, presume -
Q One moment, Witness, please. Will you please state which listing? etc., are named. I do not know this list in this form. I would remember it because rather large figures are mentioned. I presume that these reports were put together in Berlin from various small reports because I would remember those figures. of the Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos, did that consist merely in killing Jews, gypsies and Soviet functionaries for racial reasons or because of their political opinions?
Q What was the main task of the Einsatzgruppe? before my time, in such a way that the partisan fighting became the most important part, as it affected the security of the roar area. The Einsatagruppen and the Einsatzkommandos, the active parts of them, on principle had to collect intelligence concerning partisan warfare. This activity in time finally took up the time of the Einsatzkommandos more and more.
Q Is this shown in this document, Exhibit 66, NO-3276? they appear in record. "Police Activities" it reads: "At the time of reporting the Einsatzgruppe B" - it says "3" here, it is meant to be "B" - "has shifted its activity, even more so than hitherto, towards the field of partisan detection. While in the larger areas of the command the security situation may be described as satisfactory, pressure by partisans in the flat country is not only continuing but increasing, so that the possibility of military operations on a larger scale in the near future must be reckoned with."
Q Are these statements correct?
A. Yes, they are right.
Q. Can you complete these answers?
A. From my own knowledge?
Q. Yes, from your own knowledge.
A. Yes, The situation in the central Army area became such that the entire area could not be crossed by German troops at all, in which roads such as the Reichstrasse, the main roads from Vitebsk to Lebel, from Vitebsk to Polotsk, from Polotsk to Lebel, and many others were blocked for any traffic because the partisans had blown up all the bridges on this road and had thrown trees across the road. The partisans shot at every German vehicle they could see. Sometimes it was not even possible, in areas where there were woods, to pass through in single vehicles. We had to organize convoys where ten, twenty, thirty and fifty vehicles traveled together, mostly protected by tanks, in order to be able to move at all in some cities and places. If the partisans came across single vehicles or a number of vehicles and shot at them, they plundered and attacked them. In attacking these vehicles the people riding in them were killed. They were hit on the head. They cut off their noses, their ears, and other parts of the body, or they cut swastikas on their back, and even in winter, if they were not dead, they left them lying wounded, left them freezing, undressed them, and I could tell lots of things. This knowledge I have partly from reports, partly from discussions with eye witnesses and survivors. Even Einsatzgruppe B did not escape these losses, and one day Einsatzgruppe B lost thirty-one men in Rshev, south of Mogilew. It was the middle of the winter. We found the men, again, one badly wounded. For weeks or even months he was in the hospital recovering.