Just as in the present trial, the prosecutors of the four signatory powers of the London Agreement, in the trial against Hermann Goering and others, have regarded the "common plan or the conspiracy" as an independent count of the indictment and as a major count in the center of the indictment. The indictment described the purpose of this common plan as not only a preparation for a war of aggression but also the planning of war crimes against humanity. The prosecution is opposed to this and the International Military Tribunal also has decided, in its verdict of 20 September 1946, that the statute does not warrant an extension of the common plan of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. The International Military Tribunal, in No. 6 of its verdict, has stated the following:
"Count I of the indictment covers not only the conspiracy for the purpose of conducting aggressive warfare, but also the conspiracy for committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. Apart from the conspiracy of conducting aggressive warfare, the statute does not describe any kind of conspiracy as an especial crime. Article 6 of the statute provides for:
"Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices who have taken part in the execution of the common plan or common conspiracy for perpetrating one of the above crimes are responsible for all deeds which have been perpetrated by any persons in carrying out such a scheme.
"According to the opinion of the Court, these words do not add a particular new crime to the crimes already enumerated. The words serve to establish the responsibility of those persons who are associated with a common plan. The Tribunal will therefore disregard the charges contained in Count One of the indictment, that the defendant took part in a conspiracy for perpetrating war crimes and crimes against humanity, and consider solely the common plan to prepare, start, and carry out wars of aggression."
Thus there can be no doubt that, according to the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at any rate, this does not constitute a common conspiracy for the commission of war crimes or crimes against humanity.
Moreover, the question should be examined whether the Control Council Law No. 10 of 20 December 1945 provides sufficient legal basis for Count I of the indictment. This question must be answered in the negative for the following reasons.
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 8 August 1945 has become, by Article I of the Control Council Law, an integral part of this law. As a law of the four signatory powers of the London Agreement of 8 August 1945 it is without doubt a legal source of special importance. For this reason, therefore, it must be considered improbable that a law of the Control Council could contradict the regulations of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal or the interpretation which the Charter had acquired through the International Military Tribunal. Moreover, it should be added here that every law should be considered as a complete unity in itself. Considering the regulation placed at the head of this Control Council law that the Charter of the International Military Tribunal was an essential and inseparable part of this law, it must be regarded as out of the question for this law to make statements which contradict the Charter.
We may, therefore, consider that the Control Council law does not present sufficient reasons for Count I of the indictment from a legal point of view. And indeed this law mentions only in single place a common plan or conspiracy, namely, in paragraph II, figure 1, section a, when defining the conception of crime against peace. On the other hand the characteristics of a war crime or crime against humanity, as defined from the point of view of criminal law in paragraph II, figure I, sections b and c, contain no adequate further explanation of the conception in the sense of a common plan or conspiracy. Paragraph II, figure 2, of the Control Council Law No. 10, which describes in detail the characteristic symptoms for determining participation, also gives no indication that the common plan for the commission of a war crime or a crime against humanity constitutes an independent criminal offense.
This refers especially to figure 2, section D. Here anyone connected with the planning or perpetration of any of the crimes mentioned under figure 1 is threatened with punishment. From the working of the law and especially of the English text it is clear that this cannot mean the legal institution of the "common plan or conspiracy" in the technical sense. The wording of the Control Council Law No. 10 and its connection with the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, as well as with the interpretation which the Charter has acquired through the verdict of this Military Tribunal, allow us to conclude with certainty that this Law at any rate cannot present a legal basis for Count I of the indictment.
To supplement Control Council Law No. 10 of 20 December 1945, the US Military Government of Germany issued Decree No. 7 which is concerned with the constitution and authority of certain military courts. As can be seen from the heading of this decree itself, it is not intended to introduce new legal standards but only to regulate the constitution of these military courts and to make public directions for procedure. Nevertheless, Article I contains the statement that these military courts are to be authorized to judge and punish persons "indicted for an act punishable under Article II of Control Council Law No. 10 or of conspiring to commit such a crime". Therefore, the question arises of whether Article I of Decree No. 7 of the Military Government of Germany can be regarded as a sufficient legal basis for Count I of the indictment, since Control Council Law No. 10 excludes this possibility. This question, too, is to be answered in the negative for the following reasons:
The composition and purport of Decree No. 7 show clearly that it is only designed to supplement Control Council Law No. 10 as far as questions of legal procedure and organization are concerned. Such a possibility has been envisaged in Control Council Law No. 10 itself.
Article II, Number 2, of this statute states that provisions of the Control Council law shall not encroach upon or limit the authority of any court of law already set up or which may in future be set up by the zone commanders within their zone. If one proceeds from the assumption, and, indeed, any other interpretation could be defended only with difficulty -
that it is one of the tasks of the Control Council to issue uniform legal regulations and to guarantee the uniformity of the law for the whole of the territory of the German Reich occupied by the signatory persons of the Potsdam Agreement of 2 August 1945, then one must exclude completely the possibility that individual Zone Commanders could have the right to change and enlarge penal regulations issued by the Control Council for Germany and obligatory for the whole of the occupied territory. Article II, Number 2 of Control Council Law No. 10 can only be interpreted to mean that the Zone Commanders shall have the right to issue regulations for punishment and for procedure in those cases in which no exhaustive provisions have as yet been made by the Control Council for Germany. From the wording of the Control Council Law it is clear that only the common plan to wage an a g g r e s s i v e w a r shall be punishable. Had it been the intention of the Control Council to make equally punishable a general intention directed towards the committing of war crimes or of crimes against humanity, then it would have said so and would have admitted a provision similar to that contained in Article II, Number 1, Section a) to Sections b) and c) too, where the legal definitions of war crimes against humanity are given. Argumentum e contrario it must be concluded that this, precisely, was not the intention of the Control Council.
If one admitted the right of the Zone Commanders to change on their own authority the penal laws of the Control Council, this would constitute a violation of one of the fundamental principles which were obviously decisive factors in the constitution of the Control Council, namely the maintenance of the uniformity of the law throughout the whole of the occupied territory.
It is one of the principles of any legal system that particular and subsidiary penal law cannot contradict g e n e r a l penal provisions. With regard to this contradiction, the law issued by the Control Council for Germany must take precedence, and only this law can be recognized as a legal basis for the passing of judgment inasmuch as one is convinced that a law published after the act has been committed can be quoted as justification for punishment.
And thus we arrive ar another question which arises as much from Control Council Law No. 10 as from Decree No. 7 of the Military Government of Germany in as far as these contain regulations governing penalties. It is one of the principles of any legal system and part of our conception of justice that penal law cannot be retrospective. An act can only be judges according to laws which were valid at the time when the act was committed. Control Council Law No. 10 as well as the Decree No. 7 of the Military Government of Germany were issued long after the act. Both these laws therefore violate the principle that the theoretical and the practical validity of the law much be identical. This principle goes further than the principle "nulla poena sine lege" in so far as it excludes the application of a theoritical penal law even, when in practice it does not contradict the law valid at the time when the act was committed, but the law which contains the threat of punishment and which is intended to stand as the basis for the judgement, was issued only after the act was committed.
In point of fact, however, the provisions of Control Council Law No. 10 are also in a material respect contradictory to the law applicable to the defendants at the time of the deed. The same applies to the definitions of crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity contained in Article II, paragraph 1, as well as the forms of participation defined in detail under No. 20.
Thus law No. 10 of the Control Council violates the principle: nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poens sine lege, which is contained in all laws of the civilized states, and which means that deed can only be punished if the liability to punishment and the punishment itself were legally determined before the offense was committed. There is no need to enter into the history of this sentence. It is sufficient to point out that it is contained in Article 39 of the Magna Charta of King John dated 1215. From there the sentence passed into the North American Petitions of Rights, and in Europe the wording in Article 39 of the French Declaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen dated 26 August 1789, is still regarded as a prototype. Today the sentence nulla poena sine lege seems to be an internationally acknowledged component of our conception of law. In view of this it can be assumed that the sentence applies not only to individual offenses but also to the general regulations of penal law which concerns the personal responsibility of the offender, the limits of the punishable acts, and the participation in them. There can be no doubt that not only Article II, paragraph 1 of Control Council Law No. 10 contains criminal regulations contradictory to the criminal regulations, which were binding for the defendant before 8 May 1945, but that also the limits of the punishable act and the responsibility for the actions of another are considerably more comprehensive in Article II, paragraph 2 of the Control Council Law than in the corresponding regulations of the German penal code. In our case, the sentence nulla poena sine lege means nothing more than the assumption that the defendants are to be judged fundamentally and in the details of the execution according to German penal law.
This was in force at the decisive time, and they were bound by it The degree of their responsibility was determined by it, and to-day too this must be referred back to that time. The Tribunal will have to consider this question in its judgement unless it wishes to run the risk of violating a general principle of justice, whose validity was clearly recognized in the verdict of the International Military Tribunal.
It will be the task of the defense to demonstrate in detail the principles according to which the defendant directed the Economic and Administrative Main Office and whether these principles and their actual application can be used at all to form the framework for a common plan as charged against all defendants in the indictment.
With regard to the fact that according to the indictment these defendants were not the only participants in the common plan, but that various other persons were also involved it will also be necessary within the framework of the defense to examine the position of the Economic and Administrative Main Office within the Reichsfuehrung SS, and its relation to other main offices of the SS. -- But even now it seems to be necessary to examine the law concerning the common plan (count I of the Indictment) and it's applicability to this case.
Counts II and III of the Indictment.
War crimes and crimes against humanity:
1) The economic and administrative main office.
This office which was directed by the Defendant Oswald Pohl, was one of the twelve main offices of the Reichsfuehrung SS, which was directly subordinated to the Reichs.
fuehrer SS Himler. As the title of this office shows, its tasks were mainly the settlement of administrative affairs. Until 3 March 1942 - the day on which the formerly independent inspection of the concentration camps was incorporated into the economic and administrative main office, as department D-the economic and administrative main office had no more to do with the administration of the concentration camps than with the administration of any other institution of the SS. The inspector of the concentration camps was immediately subordinated to Reichsfuehrer SS Himler and, for a certain time to the Fuehrungshauptamt without influencing the administration of these camps very much. Obviously this subordination was only a formal one and it will be the task of the defense to present the reasons why the inspectorate of the concentration camps was for many years directly subordinated to Reichsfuehrer SS Himler and also why the subordination to the chief of the Fuehrungshauptamt was only a formal one. These reasons, which will have to be examined individually, also prevented the inspectorate of the concentration camps being attached years before the outbreak of war to the office to which, according to their nature, they should have belonged, namely the State Secret Police Office or the Reich Security Main Office which was formed in 1939.
2) Up to 3 March 1942 the work of the economic main office was to carry out duties, which had to be performed within the framework of the administration of the Waffen SS as a part of the Wehrmacht and as they were performed in the Army, for example, by the Army administrative office. To that belonged in Department A, the economic system of the general SS, the accounts and pay section, personnel and legal section. Department B dealt with matters concerning the food section, the clothing section, the accommodation section, the transport system and similar things.
Department C dealt with building, while the department W directed and controlled the economic section. Here, too, it may be added that, for example, the undertakings which were under the direction and supervision of the high command of the army were considerably larger and more extensive than those which were under the direction of department V. It will be the task of the defense to present in detail the basic principles, which were observed with regard to the direction of the various departments and offices of the economic and administrative main office, where particular attention will have to be given to certain special tasks, as these were carried out, for example, by the Chief of department C, SS Obergruppenfuehrer DR. Kammler within the limits of his special staff. This special staff had, particularly during the last years of the war, to carry out tasks which far exceeded the general sphere of authority if the economic and administrative main office, and which were carried out partly under the immediate direction and orders of Hitler, Speer, Himmler and other offices.
3) The main point of the presentation of the evidence by the defense will be the examination of the question: what results had the incorporation of the inspectorate of concentration camps in the economic and administration main office as department D on the economic and administrative main office itself as well as on its chief, the defendant Oswald Pohl. The starting point of this examination will be the examination of those reasons which really led to the inspectorate of the concentration camps being taken away from the Fuehrungshauptamt, into which it was incorporated for purposes of organization until 3 March 1942, and being subordinated to the defendant Oswald Pohl as chief of the economic and administrative main office.
This will prove that this subordination of the Inspector of concentration camps to the defendant Oswald Pohl and the incorporation of the inspectorate into the economic and administrative main office was caused exclusively by the in satisfactory state of the German labor market during that time. It is no accident that at the same time, namely 12 March 1942 Gauleiter Sauckel was promoted Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation (Arbeitseinsatz) and that the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan Goering transferred to him the authority which was his due in his capacity within the framework of the labor allocation. The incorporation, for purposes of organization, of the Inspectorate of concentration camps in the economic and administrative main office was forced only by the economic necessity, of incorporating the labor inside the concentration camps into the general mobilisation and of employing them usefully and of excluding every uneconomical utilization of labor as was in may instances the case in the camps up to this time. It will also be the task when presenting the evidence to set forth in detail those measures which the defendant Oswald Pohl adopted in the performance of his task and also which directives had been given him.
But already at this time the attention should be drawn to a fact which to a large part follows from the very evidence offered by the prosecution itself; namely that the tasks of the defendant Oswald Pohl were r e s t r i c t e d and that general administrative and executive matters connected with these camps were not within his competence but were still handled directly by the agencies which had been in charge of them before. This applies in particular to the position of the Inspectorate of the Concentration Camps itself. It was by no means so that after 3 March 1942 when the Inspectorate of the Concentration Camps had been incorporated into the WVHA, it had the same standing within this main office as the other subdivisions which for many years had been charged with certain specialized functions and therefore had that standing within the larger body as a matter of course. The fact has to be stressed even now that the administrative incorporation of the Inspectorate of the Concentration Camps into the WVHA was only intended for the duration of the war and that this incorporation did by no means change the independent position of the Inspector of the Concentration Camps - with the exception of labor allocation matters. Also, the Inspectorate of the Concentration Camps did not move its offices to the office building of the WVHA in Berlin, even after 3 March 1942 but they remained at Oranienburg. It is a fact which we shall prove that the Inspectorate of the Concentration Camps, even after its incorporation into the WVHA did not lose any part of its independence and within the WVHA was always looked upon as a foreign body.
Even the very evidence submitted by the prosecution shows clearly that nearly all matters not immediately connected with labor allocation were handled by the offices of the Inspectorate of Concentration Camps without the chief of the WVHA or the other subdivisions or offices of the WVHA being concerned with them.
The defense will consider it as its task to prove in detail the manner and the extent of the operation which developed between the defendant Oswald Pohl and the Inspector of the Concentration Camps with regard to labor allocation.
The evidence of the prosecution shows, moreover, that the administrative incorporation of the Inspectorate into the WVHA, did not effect any changes in the competences still appertaining to the Secret State Police (Gestapo) and the other offices of the Reich Security Main Office. This applies in particular to the commitment to, and the release from, concentration camps, both of which were exclusively a matter of the Reich Security Main Office and upon which the WVHA had no influence at all.
As part of the evidence the prosecution showed several films which were to show the general conditions in these camps after the collapse of Germany in May 1945. The fact, however, that the conditions shown in those films can not be regarded as typical for the general conditions in these camps before and during the war does not need special emphasis. The heavy air raids of the allied Air Forces against the German home-front and especially the lines of communication, resulted in a collapse of the communication system and the economic life as such, which heavily aggravated conditions of life in Germany even outside the camps. The conditions in the camps were bound to become more intolerable as more and more concentration camps were evacuated upon the approach of the Allied Armies, that more and more concentration camps were evacuated which had the result that in the few remaining camps the prisoners were over-crowded to such an extent that it became impossible to carry out sufficient feeding and even limited hygienic conditions for any length of time.
The defendant Oswald Pohl and the Office under him can not be held responsible for this decline in the living conditions in the camps. Through an order of the Reichsfuehrer-SS, the concentration camps came under the jurisdiction of the responsible Higher SS and Police Fuehrer, in in whose district the camp was located, in the so-called "A-Case" - that is when threatened by the enemy. He alone had to decide whether the inmates of the camp were to be evacuated or whether the camp with all prisoners was to be turned over to the advancing Allied Troops.
4.) The inclusion of the labor strength of the prisoners in the armament economy was the immediate cause and purpose of the organizational coordination of the Inspectorate of the Concentration Camps into the WVHA. The defendant Oswald Pohl does not deny having done everything possible to utilize the labor strength of the prisoners in a manner beneficial to the conduct of the war, and he does not deny that in doing so he made demands, with regard to the hours worked which made considerable demands on the capacity for work. The following has, however, already been pointed out by the evidence of the defense:
The collapse of the offensive of the German Armies before the gates of Moscow in the Winter 1941/1942 and the entry of the United States into the war had the result that Germany had to make plans for a long war. If, up to Spring 1942 any doubts should have existed as to the length of the war and the dangers to the living conditions of the German people caused through this war, these doubts would have to be removed definitely through the political and military developments which have arisen. These developments placed before the Government of the Reich the necessity, of drawing all possible labor strength from the German people.
Naturally, at a time when all German workers were in the factories daily for twelve hours or more and in which women with four or five children were given home work to do for the armament industry, the prisoners from the concentration camps would be drawn on for carrying out essential war work.
On the other hand, the evidence will show that the defendant Oswald Pohl did everything which could be undertaken by the Ministry by issuing appropriate regulations and by improving food and general conditions in the camps to maintain the labor strength. When, despite this, the working conditions in the camps and workshops steadily declined it was due largely to circumstances which were outside the jurisdiction of the defendant Oswald Pohl and which will be examined in detail in the presentation of evidence by the Defense.
In those examinations it will also be necessary to examine the conditions and circumstances under which the armament plants of private economy employed the prisoners of the concentration camps and which conditions had to be fulfilled before Department D and the Commandants of the camps could hand over manpower to these concerns.
It will then be the task of the legal summing-up, after presentation of all the evidence, to investigate the reasons excluding the illegality of the act and the guilt of the defendant which can be offered in defense of the defendant's conduct regarding the question of the allocation of labor in those cases as well in which foreign labor and prisoners of war were assigned, and their final justification in those particular circumstances which were caused by the war and wartime conditions.
5.) An extensive part of the prosecution evidence material refers to Department W and the economic undertakings of the WVHA. It is difficult to tell from many of the documents put forward by the prosecution as to how far they should be considered as material evidence in the judgment of the conduct of those defendants and with regard to the charges brought against them. It seems all the more necessary that the defense should set forth in detail the reasons which the Reichsfuehrung of the SS set forth, as opposed to the general economic principles announced by the Staatsfuehrung which amount to the same thing as the support of private enterprise, even in founding economic concerns and in entering into competition with private economy.
In this connection there will also be an opportunity of investigating the property and other law conditions with regard to those concerns, and of examining the question of who owned the business shares of the Deutsche Wirtschaftsbetriebe (German economic plants) G.m.b.H. and who financed this holding company and the other undertakings which it controlled.
At this point it should be mentioned that of the total investments in these concerns, both in money and in kind, 38 millions came from Reich sources and only 7 millions were provided by the National Socialist Party. The defendant Oswald Pohl was not the actual owner of the DWB shares, but was only the trustee.
6.) The defendant Oswald Pohl is accused in the indictment of being particularly responsible for carrying out medical experiments in the concentration camps. The evidence in this case and in the proceedings before Military Tribunal No. 1 has shown that in actual fact experiments were made on prisoners in the concentration camps in the interests of the German Wehrmacht. The evidence has also shown, however that the defendant Oswald Pohl did not participate directly in carrying out these experiments.
It will be the task of the defense to use the evidence to investigate thoroughly of which experiments the defendant Pohl was aware, whether and to what extent he supported the experiments and if, by reason of his position it would have been possible for him to prevent the experiments from being carried out.
7.) The defendant Oswald Pohl is also accused in the indictment of responsibility for and participation in the so-called final solution of the Jewish question. The evidence in Case No. 1 against Hermann Goering and others before the International Military Tribunal showed that the order for the extermination of the Jews was given as early as the summer of 1941, that is to say, at a time when the WVHA had no connection, administratively or otherwise, with the camps where these measures were carried out. But the evidence before the International Military Tribunal has also shown that there were special agencies and persons who were charged with the execution of this order, as for instance the Office IV B of the Reich Security Main Office under SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Eichmann and SS-Gruppenfuehrer Glebocnik, - who had no connection, administratively or otherwise, with the WVHA, and all of whom received their orders immediately from Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, all necessary measures having been taken to guarantee the greatest possible secrecy. In this connection I refer to the statements of the witnesses Wislizeny, Hoess and Morgen before the International Military Tribunal. It may be pointed out also, even now that the extermination camps Treblinka, Belsec, Maidaneck and others did not belong into the domain of the inspection of the concentration camps, and therefore even after 3 March 1942 were not subordinated to the defendant Oswald Pohl, not even nominally or administratively.
I also should like to add that the WVHA, as directed by the defendant Pohl, was only an administrative office which had no executive organs whatsoever, and that an immediate participation in a number of acts which constitute the object of the indictment, would appear impossible if it were for that reason only.
8.) Extensive evidence was submitted by the prosecution in connection with the action Reinhardt. Several agencies were in charge of the execution of this action, among them the higher SS and Police leader East and the SS and police Fuehrer Globocnik.
The WVHA as such had at first nothing to do with this matter. It was brought into it only when the action was approaching its end, and certain enterprises near Lublin had to be taken over by the WVHA and, beside the audit of the received assets, negotiations with several other supreme Reich offices as for instance the Reich Finance Ministry and the Reichsbank, had to be conducted for the purpose of assuming title to these assets.
It will be the object of the evidence of the defense to establish in detail the participation of the defendant Oswald Pohl in the wind-up of this action and to examine the legal aspects resulting in this connection.
9.) The prosecution also submitted extensive evidence in order to prove a participation of the defendant Oswald Pohl in the measures which led to the obliteration of the Warsaw ghetto. The evidence of the prosecution proves that the establishment of the Warsaw ghetto and its transformation into a concentration camp was in the first place the task of the Higher SS and Police Leader East. The documents submitted by the prosecution show, moreover, that the obliteration of the Warsaw ghetto was carried out by the director of the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler under the military supervision of the Higher SS and Police Leader East by the SS and Police Leader Warsaw, Juergen Stroop, who also submitted an extensive report on it.
In this connection it should also be mentioned that in the proceedings before the International Military Tribunal the prosecution made an effort to hold the former Governor General Hans Frank directly responsible for the obliteration of the Warsaw ghetto.
although the correspondence submitted now in this trial indisputably shows that neither the administration of the Government General nor the Governor General himself had anything to do with it, but that the obliteration of the Warsaw ghetto was an action which was carried out exclusively by the security police and the SD under the military direction of the competent local SS and Police Leaders, and with which neither the administration of the Government General nor that of the WVHA had anything to do.
The defense will consider it its task to ascertain by questioning the defendant Oswald Pohl himself whether the Reichsfuehrer SS informed him in advance of the existing intentions and plans and whether his position within the organization of the SS would have given him the possibility or power to prevent the obliteration.
No. 10) The defendant Oswald Pohl moreover is accused of being particularly responsible for the execution of the so-called euthanasia-program in the concentration camps. This program, which was executed in the concentration camps under designation "14 f 13", was initiated by a decree of Hitler of 1 September 1939. In this decree Reichsleiter Bouhler and the later Reich Commissioner for Public Health, Dr. Karl Brandt, were ordered "under their responsibility, to extend the authority of physicians to be appointed individually, in a manner that patients who, to the best of human knowledge, are incurable, can be granted the euthanasia, the prerequisite being a most discerning evaluation of their condition." The evidence in the proceedings before Military Tribunal I has shown that this program was discontinued again in autumn 1941, due to numerous letters of protest, above all from dignitaries of the churches.
POHL OPENING STATEMENT The rest of evidence submitted by the Defense in this trial deals with the period before 3 March 1942, that is, a period in which the concentration camps were not yet included as Amtsgruppe D in the WVHA with a time limit, - for the duration of the war - and with a view to the fulfillment of certain tasks in connection with the labor supply and the conduct of the war.