At page 30 the affidavit of Gerhard Wiebeck, NO-2331 will be Prosecution Exhibit No. 517, that is NO-2331, Prosecution Exhibit No. 517. He was a member of the State Police, and he describes conditions at Dachau, and certain activities of defendant Georg Loerner.
At page 34 the affidavit of Karl Abraham, which is document NO-2127, will be Prosecution Exhibit No. 518. Abraham was an SS man, and he described his position in office D-3 of the WVHA. In the affidavit he also describes the extraction of gold from concentration camp inmates from the dead bodies of the inmates.
The last affidavit is NO-2332, which is an affidavit of Dr. Oskar Schiedlausky, that will be Exhibit No. 519.
The last two documents in the book are included to show the Court the authentic signature of Dr. Ding Schuler. The first document NO-578, which will be Prosecution Exhibit No. 520, is a clinical history of fifteen persons who were innoculated in the typhus station in Buchenwald, which is signed by Ding, and the last document in Book 21, NO-257, which will be Prosecution Exhibit No. 521, is an affidavit signed by Schuler.
DR. SEIDL: Dr. Seidl for the defendant Oswald Pohl. Your Honor, I object to the admission of Document NO-257, as Exhibit. That is a statement of Schuler's, which was not sworn to, and, therefore, cannot be regarded as an affidavit.
MR. ROBBINS: I think that the document shows on its face that it was sworn to. The last paragraph says "I swear by God, the Almighty, that I will say nothing but the pure truth and will add and withhold nothing." Signed, "Dr. Erwin Schuler". This was signed before Pfc Harry Ilsen. Now I believe Ilsen is the translator who subscribed and sworn to before Fred W. Hofstetter, Captain in the Infantry.
DR. SEIDL: In the German copy of the document book this statement is not contained. Therefore, I would like to ask the Prosecution to show us the original of the affidavit of Dr. Schuler's.
THE SECRETARY GENERAL: I don't have the document.
MR. ROBBINS: I was told this was delivered to the Secretary General. Apparently it was not. In order to save time, I suggest I get the document at the first recess, and show it to Dr. Seidl.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. ROBBINS: Except for a few formal matters, which I indicated earlier, this completes the presentation of evidence for the Prosecution, and we would like to rest our case at this time.
THE PRESIDENT: With the leave to make any corrections, or any additions which may appear necessary, the Prosecution now rests. The defense may open.
(Whereupon the Prosecution rests its case)
DR. SEIDL: Dr. Seidl for the defendant Oswald Pohl. Your Honor, approximately twelve days ago I wrote my opening speech, and gave it to the Secretary-General with four copies, and I hope that the Tribunal and the Interpreters hava sufficient number of the documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Do the Interpreters have this copy in German?
THE INTERPRETER: No, Your honor, we do not.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has no copy, and the Interpreters have no copies.
DR. SEIDL: Yesterday Mr. Wartena of the Secretary-General's office told me yesterday that the first eight opening speeches had already been translated, and I assumed that the Secretary-General's office had already produced the necessary copies both for the Tribunal and the Interpreters. I myself did not receive any translation.
THE PRESIDENT: We are inquiring now at the Secretary-General's office to see where the copies are.
DR. FRITSCH: Dr. Fritsch for the defendant Hans Baier. As we are forced to make this pause, in a way I would appreciate if Your Honor would give us the possibility to clarify certain matters of which the defense counsel seem to have difficulty.
Therefore, I would appreciate if this Tribunal could possibly take care of these difficulties with necessary orders. The first point I wish to mention here concerns the records. Today, we did not receive all the records from the various sessions. I, for instance, have received records for only four days of court proceedings. The fact we do not have these records makes our work rather difficult. We were not able to prepare ourselves, and, therefore, we were not able to bring our secretaries along to this courtroom, because we thought we would get the records in time. Within the following few days, of course, the difficulties will be much greater when we start examining witnesses and defendants. Therefore, I would like to ask this Tribunal to give special orders to whom it may concern that these things are well taken care of in the future.
THE PRESIDENT: What other difficulty do you have? What other points do you wish to raise?
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honor, I thought that you wanted to elucidate on that point, that is the reason why I stopped.
THE PRESIDENT: We will have to find out why you have not received the transcript of the testimony, and you may be sure we will do everything we possibly can to get the transcript in your hands.
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honor, as second point, I would like to mention the following: This Tribunal with reference to some witnesses who had given affidavits for the Prosecution has granted them to us for our cross examination. They are among others the witnesses Pister, Grimm and Barnewald. These witnesses are at the present moment indicted at Buchenwald trial in Dachau. I can very well see the difficulties which will arise in trying to bring these witnesses to Nurnberg, and in order to cross examine them before this Tribunal. According to my opinion, however, such a possibility must exist, so the defense could be in a position to represent their clients as well as they can. I have been informed, that inspite of the fact these witnesses are granted us by this Tribunal, these witnesses cannot be brought here.
I would like to ask the Tribunal to make some statement about this matter, and, if possible, to issue the necessary orders that all the witnesses insofar as they are requested, be put to our disposal for cross examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give me the names of those witnesses who are now in Dachau, the ones you mentioned.
DR. FRITSCH: Barnewald, Pister, Grimm, bchwartz.
THE PRESIDENT: We'll make the necessary inquiries and see whether it is possible to procure these witnesses. If it is possible in any way, they will be brought here.
DR. FRITSCH: Your honor, I have a third request. In this prison, upon orders from the Prosecution, a man by the name of hr. Karoly was turned in. I inquired yesterday of M. Hart if this Dr. Karoly, is here for the Prosecution. Mr. Hart told me that he could not tell me that. I can understand that. However, I have the basic request that the Tribunal issue an order to tne effect that in such cases of witnesses who are no longer used by the Prosecution and who are still in the prison at Nurnberg may be examined by the Defense without a commissioner.
THE PRESIDENT: If there is a witness in the Nurnberg jail that you wish to call, all you have to do is ask for it.
DR. FRITSCH: Yes, Your honor. I have done that already and I also received permission to speak to that witness, in the presence of a commisioner, however. It is a matter of course that it is very important for the Defense, Your Honor, to be able to examine a witness without a commissioner, and I do not see any reason not to grant us this request if this is a witness who will no longer be used by the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: The rules of this Tribunal provide that witnesses shall only be interviewed in the presence of a commissioner. This is for the purpose of keeping the inquiry, keeping the interrogatory within proper bounds. Do you have any objection to the presence of tne Commissioner while you interview the witness?
DR. FRITSCH: No, Your honor. However, I would appreciate it if you would forgive my speaking so frankly. I do not see why the Defense with respect to a witness who has been brought to Nurnberg by the Prosecution without any reason for this trial can talk to the witness without the commissioner.
Of course, these things can be discussed much more freely without a commissioner, and the witness will come out of his reserved attitude.
May I say a few more things about that matter, Your Honor? The main thing, of course, is also the time which we lose by having a commissioner. On the average, I need from 10 to 15 days before I can examine one of these witnesses who is here in the jail, if he has to be examined in the presence of a commissioner.
THE PRESIDENT: Why is there that delay?
DR. FRITSCH: Due to the application, Your Honor. The application takes from 10 to 15 days in order to come through.
THE PRESIDENT: In order to avoid that dealy, the Tribunal will be glad to have one of the members of the Tribunal act as the commissioner, take the testimony right in this courtroom, and one of the judges will act as commissioner, and you can do that tomorrow if you want without any dealy, but the rule of the Court requires the presence of the commissioner, and I cannot change that, but we make this offer to you that any witness that you wish to interrogate can be done before a member of this Tribunal acting as a commissioner. Is that satisfactory?
DR. FRITSCH: Yes, Your Honor, it is.
THE PRESIDENT: This, of course, can be done after court hours; if you wish.
DR. FRITSCH: Very well, Your Honor. Thank you.
DR. SEIDL: Your honor, in view of the fact that a recess is necessary here in the proceedings, I take the liberty of bringing before this Tribunal a request which has nothing to do with the proceeding but which refers to work of the Defense and concerns the noon pause for Defense Counsel. Defense Counsel in other tribunals-
THE PRESIDENT: I know what you are going to say, Dr. Seidl, This Court will recess from 1230 until 1:45, one hour and a quarter, beginning today.
DR. SEIDL: Thank you, Your Honor.
DR. HEIM (Counsel for defendant Hohberg): In connection with the statement made by the Defense Counsel for defendant Baier, I would like to add the following. I made a request that Graf Schwerin von Krosigk, who is in jail at the moment, be placed at my disposal for informational purposes. I interviewed Graf Schwerin von Krosigk in the presence of a commissioner. On the basis of the discussion I had, I drew up an affidavit, and the Secretary General set a new date on which I could have this affidavit signed in front of the commissioner. A day before this deadline, Graf Schwerin von Krosigk was simply released from the jail without my being informed of it and was taken to some other place which is unknown to me. In that I see difficulties for the Defense, and I would appreciate it if the Tribunal would give the necessary orders that in the future the Defense be notified in time of the departure of a witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Did the witness leave before he signed the affidavit?
DR. HEIM: Yes, Your Honor, one day before the day he was supposed to sign the affidavit, he was transferred to some other place.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you know where he was transferred to?
DR. HEIM: No, his present whereabouts is unknown to me.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the name of the witness?
DR. HEIM: Graf Schwerin von Krosigk, the former Reich Finance Minister.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Robbins, do you know where this witness is now?
MR. ROBBINS: No, Your Honor, I am not informed about, that. I will find out an inform the Tribunal. I feel certain that this was an oversight. I am sure that it was not done to prevent the Defense Counsel from getting an affidavit signed.
THE PRESIDENT: Whether done intentionally or not, that was the result. He is deprived of the benefit of this witness' affidavit. Will you find out and report to the Tribunal where this witness now is? If he cannot be located, we shall treat the statement as a sworn statement anyway.
DR. HEIM: Thank you very much, Your Honor.
DR. RATZ (For defendant Hermann Pook): With reference to the examination of the witnesses I would like to say the following: The witness Dr. Reuther was granted me by the Tribunal and he is now in Nuernberg. He was repeatedly interviewed by me. The same witness, without my being notified, was removed by the prosecution and examined by the prosecution and today, as I was told, he will be re-examined. These are difficulties for the defense and this procedure by the prosecution is not permissible. I would appreciate it if you would forbid such action in the future.
THE PRESIDENT: We don't understand what it is you are complaining about. Has the witness disappeared?
DR. RATZ: Your Honor, the witness was examined without my being notified of it. That is, the witness was granted me by the Tribunal; he is my main defense witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh. In counsel's statement this seems to be irregular. The rule provides that defense counsel shall be notified if one of their witnesses is to be interviewed. The prosecution would have the same right.
MR. ROBBINS: This is another instance where I had no knowledge of the procedure. I assure the court I will check into this and if I can prevent its happening I will certainly do so in the future.
THE PRESIDENT: You have the name of the witness, Mr. Robbins?
MR. ROBBINS: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
DR. RATZ: Dr. Reuther is his name, spelled as R-E-U-T-H-E-R.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal now has a transcript of the opening statement of Dr. Seidl in both English and German on behalf of the defendant Pohl. You may proceed, Dr. Seidl.
DR. SEIDL (For defendant Oswald Pohl):
Mr. President. Your Honors.
In the indictment which was served on him on 13 January 1947 the defendant Oswald Pohl is charged on all four counts of the indictment.
In Count I of the indictment he is charged with having participated in a common plan with the intent of perpetrating war crimes and crimes against humanity. In Counts II and III of the indictment he is charged with personal responsibility in the perpetration of war crimes and crimes against humanity, while in Count IV of the indictment he is charged with having been a member of an organization which was found to be felonious by the International Military Tribunal.
Count I of the Indictment The Common Plan or the Conspiracy.
In Count I of the indictment the defendant Oswald Pohl is charged between January 1933 and April 1945, together with the other defendants and several other persons following a common plan, with having participated in an illegal manner and with malice aforethought, in an agreement to perpetrate war crimes and crimes against humanity, as they are defined in the Control Council Law No. 10, paragraph II.
The indictment contains no statements which are based on facts and which reveal in detail the existence of such a scheme with regard to its period of initiation and its purpose. The indictment is restricted essentially to legal arguments in general, the center of which is the Economic and Administrative Main Office under the defendant Oswald Pohl.
The indictment itself contains no reference to the legal provisions on which, in Count I of the indictment, the maintained common plan has its legal basis. Therefore, the question as to whether the Control Council Law No. 10 can provide legal reasoning for this count of the indictment must be examined. In consideration of the fact that the Control Council Law No. 10 of 20 December 1945 paragraph I of the London Agreement, dated 8 August 1945, relating to the persecution and punishment of major war criminals of the European axis powers, has been incorporated as an inseparable part of this law, the statute for the International Military Tribunal must also be referred to when examining this question, since this statute, on the other hand, represents an essential part of the London Agreement of 8 August 1945.
Just as in the present trial, the prosecutors of the four signatory powers of the London Agreement, in the trial against Hermann Goering and others, have regarded the "common plan or the conspiracy" as an independent count of the indictment and as a major count in the center of the indictment. The indictment described the purpose of this common plan as not only a preparation for a war of aggression but also the planning of war crimes against humanity. The prosecution is opposed to this and the International Military Tribunal also has decided, in its verdict of 20 September 1946, that the statute does not warrant an extension of the common plan of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. The International Military Tribunal, in No. 6 of its verdict, has stated the following:
"Count I of the indictment covers not only the conspiracy for the purpose of conducting aggressive warfare, but also the conspiracy for committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. Apart from the conspiracy of conducting aggressive warfare, the statute does not describe any kind of conspiracy as an especial crime. Article 6 of the statute provides for:
"Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices who have taken part in the execution of the common plan or common conspiracy for perpetrating one of the above crimes are responsible for all deeds which have been perpetrated by any persons in carrying out such a scheme.
"According to the opinion of the Court, these words do not add a particular new crime to the crimes already enumerated. The words serve to establish the responsibility of those persons who are associated with a common plan. The Tribunal will therefore disregard the charges contained in Count One of the indictment, that the defendant took part in a conspiracy for perpetrating war crimes and crimes against humanity, and consider solely the common plan to prepare, start, and carry out wars of aggression."
Thus there can be no doubt that, according to the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at any rate, this does not constitute a common conspiracy for the commission of war crimes or crimes against humanity.
Moreover, the question should be examined whether the Control Council Law No. 10 of 20 December 1945 provides sufficient legal basis for Count I of the indictment. This question must be answered in the negative for the following reasons.
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 8 August 1945 has become, by Article I of the Control Council Law, an integral part of this law. As a law of the four signatory powers of the London Agreement of 8 August 1945 it is without doubt a legal source of special importance. For this reason, therefore, it must be considered improbable that a law of the Control Council could contradict the regulations of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal or the interpretation which the Charter had acquired through the International Military Tribunal. Moreover, it should be added here that every law should be considered as a complete unity in itself. Considering the regulation placed at the head of this Control Council law that the Charter of the International Military Tribunal was an essential and inseparable part of this law, it must be regarded as out of the question for this law to make statements which contradict the Charter.
We may, therefore, consider that the Control Council law does not present sufficient reasons for Count I of the indictment from a legal point of view. And indeed this law mentions only in single place a common plan or conspiracy, namely, in paragraph II, figure 1, section a, when defining the conception of crime against peace. On the other hand the characteristics of a war crime or crime against humanity, as defined from the point of view of criminal law in paragraph II, figure I, sections b and c, contain no adequate further explanation of the conception in the sense of a common plan or conspiracy. Paragraph II, figure 2, of the Control Council Law No. 10, which describes in detail the characteristic symptoms for determining participation, also gives no indication that the common plan for the commission of a war crime or a crime against humanity constitutes an independent criminal offense.
This refers especially to figure 2, section D. Here anyone connected with the planning or perpetration of any of the crimes mentioned under figure 1 is threatened with punishment. From the working of the law and especially of the English text it is clear that this cannot mean the legal institution of the "common plan or conspiracy" in the technical sense. The wording of the Control Council Law No. 10 and its connection with the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, as well as with the interpretation which the Charter has acquired through the verdict of this Military Tribunal, allow us to conclude with certainty that this Law at any rate cannot present a legal basis for Count I of the indictment.
To supplement Control Council Law No. 10 of 20 December 1945, the US Military Government of Germany issued Decree No. 7 which is concerned with the constitution and authority of certain military courts. As can be seen from the heading of this decree itself, it is not intended to introduce new legal standards but only to regulate the constitution of these military courts and to make public directions for procedure. Nevertheless, Article I contains the statement that these military courts are to be authorized to judge and punish persons "indicted for an act punishable under Article II of Control Council Law No. 10 or of conspiring to commit such a crime". Therefore, the question arises of whether Article I of Decree No. 7 of the Military Government of Germany can be regarded as a sufficient legal basis for Count I of the indictment, since Control Council Law No. 10 excludes this possibility. This question, too, is to be answered in the negative for the following reasons:
The composition and purport of Decree No. 7 show clearly that it is only designed to supplement Control Council Law No. 10 as far as questions of legal procedure and organization are concerned. Such a possibility has been envisaged in Control Council Law No. 10 itself.
Article II, Number 2, of this statute states that provisions of the Control Council law shall not encroach upon or limit the authority of any court of law already set up or which may in future be set up by the zone commanders within their zone. If one proceeds from the assumption, and, indeed, any other interpretation could be defended only with difficulty -
that it is one of the tasks of the Control Council to issue uniform legal regulations and to guarantee the uniformity of the law for the whole of the territory of the German Reich occupied by the signatory persons of the Potsdam Agreement of 2 August 1945, then one must exclude completely the possibility that individual Zone Commanders could have the right to change and enlarge penal regulations issued by the Control Council for Germany and obligatory for the whole of the occupied territory. Article II, Number 2 of Control Council Law No. 10 can only be interpreted to mean that the Zone Commanders shall have the right to issue regulations for punishment and for procedure in those cases in which no exhaustive provisions have as yet been made by the Control Council for Germany. From the wording of the Control Council Law it is clear that only the common plan to wage an a g g r e s s i v e w a r shall be punishable. Had it been the intention of the Control Council to make equally punishable a general intention directed towards the committing of war crimes or of crimes against humanity, then it would have said so and would have admitted a provision similar to that contained in Article II, Number 1, Section a) to Sections b) and c) too, where the legal definitions of war crimes against humanity are given. Argumentum e contrario it must be concluded that this, precisely, was not the intention of the Control Council.
If one admitted the right of the Zone Commanders to change on their own authority the penal laws of the Control Council, this would constitute a violation of one of the fundamental principles which were obviously decisive factors in the constitution of the Control Council, namely the maintenance of the uniformity of the law throughout the whole of the occupied territory.
It is one of the principles of any legal system that particular and subsidiary penal law cannot contradict g e n e r a l penal provisions. With regard to this contradiction, the law issued by the Control Council for Germany must take precedence, and only this law can be recognized as a legal basis for the passing of judgment inasmuch as one is convinced that a law published after the act has been committed can be quoted as justification for punishment.
And thus we arrive ar another question which arises as much from Control Council Law No. 10 as from Decree No. 7 of the Military Government of Germany in as far as these contain regulations governing penalties. It is one of the principles of any legal system and part of our conception of justice that penal law cannot be retrospective. An act can only be judges according to laws which were valid at the time when the act was committed. Control Council Law No. 10 as well as the Decree No. 7 of the Military Government of Germany were issued long after the act. Both these laws therefore violate the principle that the theoretical and the practical validity of the law much be identical. This principle goes further than the principle "nulla poena sine lege" in so far as it excludes the application of a theoritical penal law even, when in practice it does not contradict the law valid at the time when the act was committed, but the law which contains the threat of punishment and which is intended to stand as the basis for the judgement, was issued only after the act was committed.
In point of fact, however, the provisions of Control Council Law No. 10 are also in a material respect contradictory to the law applicable to the defendants at the time of the deed. The same applies to the definitions of crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity contained in Article II, paragraph 1, as well as the forms of participation defined in detail under No. 20.
Thus law No. 10 of the Control Council violates the principle: nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poens sine lege, which is contained in all laws of the civilized states, and which means that deed can only be punished if the liability to punishment and the punishment itself were legally determined before the offense was committed. There is no need to enter into the history of this sentence. It is sufficient to point out that it is contained in Article 39 of the Magna Charta of King John dated 1215. From there the sentence passed into the North American Petitions of Rights, and in Europe the wording in Article 39 of the French Declaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen dated 26 August 1789, is still regarded as a prototype. Today the sentence nulla poena sine lege seems to be an internationally acknowledged component of our conception of law. In view of this it can be assumed that the sentence applies not only to individual offenses but also to the general regulations of penal law which concerns the personal responsibility of the offender, the limits of the punishable acts, and the participation in them. There can be no doubt that not only Article II, paragraph 1 of Control Council Law No. 10 contains criminal regulations contradictory to the criminal regulations, which were binding for the defendant before 8 May 1945, but that also the limits of the punishable act and the responsibility for the actions of another are considerably more comprehensive in Article II, paragraph 2 of the Control Council Law than in the corresponding regulations of the German penal code. In our case, the sentence nulla poena sine lege means nothing more than the assumption that the defendants are to be judged fundamentally and in the details of the execution according to German penal law.
This was in force at the decisive time, and they were bound by it The degree of their responsibility was determined by it, and to-day too this must be referred back to that time. The Tribunal will have to consider this question in its judgement unless it wishes to run the risk of violating a general principle of justice, whose validity was clearly recognized in the verdict of the International Military Tribunal.
It will be the task of the defense to demonstrate in detail the principles according to which the defendant directed the Economic and Administrative Main Office and whether these principles and their actual application can be used at all to form the framework for a common plan as charged against all defendants in the indictment.
With regard to the fact that according to the indictment these defendants were not the only participants in the common plan, but that various other persons were also involved it will also be necessary within the framework of the defense to examine the position of the Economic and Administrative Main Office within the Reichsfuehrung SS, and its relation to other main offices of the SS. -- But even now it seems to be necessary to examine the law concerning the common plan (count I of the Indictment) and it's applicability to this case.
Counts II and III of the Indictment.
War crimes and crimes against humanity:
1) The economic and administrative main office.
This office which was directed by the Defendant Oswald Pohl, was one of the twelve main offices of the Reichsfuehrung SS, which was directly subordinated to the Reichs.
fuehrer SS Himler. As the title of this office shows, its tasks were mainly the settlement of administrative affairs. Until 3 March 1942 - the day on which the formerly independent inspection of the concentration camps was incorporated into the economic and administrative main office, as department D-the economic and administrative main office had no more to do with the administration of the concentration camps than with the administration of any other institution of the SS. The inspector of the concentration camps was immediately subordinated to Reichsfuehrer SS Himler and, for a certain time to the Fuehrungshauptamt without influencing the administration of these camps very much. Obviously this subordination was only a formal one and it will be the task of the defense to present the reasons why the inspectorate of the concentration camps was for many years directly subordinated to Reichsfuehrer SS Himler and also why the subordination to the chief of the Fuehrungshauptamt was only a formal one. These reasons, which will have to be examined individually, also prevented the inspectorate of the concentration camps being attached years before the outbreak of war to the office to which, according to their nature, they should have belonged, namely the State Secret Police Office or the Reich Security Main Office which was formed in 1939.
2) Up to 3 March 1942 the work of the economic main office was to carry out duties, which had to be performed within the framework of the administration of the Waffen SS as a part of the Wehrmacht and as they were performed in the Army, for example, by the Army administrative office. To that belonged in Department A, the economic system of the general SS, the accounts and pay section, personnel and legal section. Department B dealt with matters concerning the food section, the clothing section, the accommodation section, the transport system and similar things.
Department C dealt with building, while the department W directed and controlled the economic section. Here, too, it may be added that, for example, the undertakings which were under the direction and supervision of the high command of the army were considerably larger and more extensive than those which were under the direction of department V. It will be the task of the defense to present in detail the basic principles, which were observed with regard to the direction of the various departments and offices of the economic and administrative main office, where particular attention will have to be given to certain special tasks, as these were carried out, for example, by the Chief of department C, SS Obergruppenfuehrer DR. Kammler within the limits of his special staff. This special staff had, particularly during the last years of the war, to carry out tasks which far exceeded the general sphere of authority if the economic and administrative main office, and which were carried out partly under the immediate direction and orders of Hitler, Speer, Himmler and other offices.
3) The main point of the presentation of the evidence by the defense will be the examination of the question: what results had the incorporation of the inspectorate of concentration camps in the economic and administration main office as department D on the economic and administrative main office itself as well as on its chief, the defendant Oswald Pohl. The starting point of this examination will be the examination of those reasons which really led to the inspectorate of the concentration camps being taken away from the Fuehrungshauptamt, into which it was incorporated for purposes of organization until 3 March 1942, and being subordinated to the defendant Oswald Pohl as chief of the economic and administrative main office.