A That means that I with my unit in tactical matters, that is, in tactical military matters are subordinate to one certain command of staff.
Q We then further know of a subordination of a general military nature. Do you agree with me in that, that subordination of a general military nature means that the unit in question is subordinate in personnel and disciplinary matters, to that unit to which it is subordinate in military matters "truppendienstlich"
A Yes.
Q One unit which is subordinate in matters of a general military nature to some other unit, then this other unit will issue punishments which may be necessary promotions and awards.
A That is correct.
Q We know, therefore, those two different kinds of subordination -the tactical one and the one that is of a general military nature. Is that correct?
A Yes.
Q Do we know any other kinds of subordination?
A I might find it necessary to mention a third kind, and that is the subordination in administrative matters. That has nothing to do with tactics, and likewise nothing to do with personnel or other directions.
Q Yes. But this administrative subordination will then have nothing to do with any military matters at all.
A That is correct.
Q There are, therefore, no other kinds of subordination from a military point of view than the two which we have mentioned just now?
A Yes.
Q Witness, I ask you now to take a look at the chart which is suspended behind you, and I am asking you, to begin with, to just look at the upper row. That is, up to and including OKO, OKM, and OKH. Does this sketch show the organization within the top leadership correctly?
THE PRESIDENT (JUDGE WENNERSTRUM): Would the guard please move the microphone over there? (Motioning to the Witness Stand)
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, may we object to this question for the simple reason that this witness has not been called by the Prosecution for the purpose of certifying to anything surrounding the OKW, the OKH or the OKL because he himself has never been a member of that office. Secondly we believe that we get somewhat off the beaten track of that which we have covered in the direct examination if the witness be permitted to talk about matters that he has no direct knowledge of.
THE PRESIDENT (JUDGE WENNERSTRUM): Over-ruled.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q Witness, I had put the question merely for the top row.
A This sketch, in my opinion, does not show clearly enough there on the spot where it says OKW that the Quartermaster General should be mentioned as well, as he belonged to the OKH as well as to the OKW.
Q May I ask you, was for instance the OKH subordinate to the OKW?
A No.
Q Then, to begin with, the line would be wrong which is drawn in black between OKH and OKW?
A That would only concern the Quartermaster General in the OKH, not the operational staff in the OKH.
Q That would then be the first mistake, that OK* could not issue any orders to the OKH?
A I am not informed whether there were not certain spheres where the operational staff of the OKW could issue directives to the OKH as well. At least, where the Quartermaster General was concerned.
Q Keitel, for instance, could he issue orders to the Commander in Chief of the Army, that is, to OKH on his own accord?
A Only as deputy of Hitler.
Q I did not ask like that. I said on his own account, could he give an order to the OKH?
A I cannot testify to that; I do not know that exactly.
Q What was the OKH as a staff? Whose staff was it?
A The OKH was an operational staff under the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Hitler.
Q It was then not a command agency?
A Not in the customarily accepted sense, no.
Q How would this sketch have to look if it were correct? How would it have to show the OKW?
A The OKW could remain as it is, only the black connection between OKH and OKW would have to be drawn differently, in my opinion.
Q The same would apply then for the two black connecting lines that run between OKW and OKM, and OKW and OKL?
A I assume that, but I cannot say for sure how that turned out in practice. I do not believe that the OKL would have agreed to be subordinate in any way to the OKW and Keitel.
Q Who was the OKH directly subordinate to?
A The OKH was directly subordinate to Hitler.
Q Who was the OKM directly subordinate to?
A I cannot say that with certainty.
Q Who was the OKL directly subordinate to?
A In my opinion, likewise to Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT (JUDGE WENNERSTRUM): Pardon me just a moment. May I inquire of the Prosecution if they have an extra one of these photographs of the Chart "D" to which reference has been made in the present examination?
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, the only Exhibit Chart "D" we have is in the basic information handbook which was submitted to the Court, and we have no extras here. At present we are not prepared on this particular subject; however, I have given Dr. Laternser my own copy and suggested to him that he should give this to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT (JUDGE WENNERSTRUM): That can be followed, or I will give my copy to the witness, Dr. Laternser, so that the witness may be seated. It may be a bit easier. May I inquire of the witness whether he knows the photograph which he has represents the chart shown on the wall, to which he previously testified?
THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor, that is right.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q Now, witness, if the OKW, and I think we agreed to that, did not have any power of command toward subordinate military units, what, then -- how then could OKW orders be regarded? Where did those orders originate?
A Maybe I can express it thus. We had so-called OKH combat areas. That is, for the main part, the Eastern Front, for instance, in the campaign against Russia. And we had other OKW theaters of war. Those were all other theaters of war -- France, Italy, the Balkans, etc. Those Supreme Commanders, the OK*, and operational staff could give them orders of a tactical operational nature.
Q But who alone in the OK* could give these orders?
A These orders were given for Hitler by the operational staff of the Wehrmacht, by Keitel, or by his Chief Jodl, or Warliment.
Q Do you agree with me that OKW orders are Hitler orders?
A In the bulk, yes. Certainly. But I could imagine that there were orders signed by Keitel which perhaps had not been read by Hitler. Maybe they had not even been submitted to him, but since I've never worked on that staff myself, I cannot give definite testimony as to these matters.
THE PRESIDENT (JUDGE WENNERSTRUM): We'll take our afternoon recess at this time.
(THE COURT RECESSED AT 1500)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
Q I now want to talk about the conditions that always existed in the Balkans, before your activity in the Balkans, who had the highest amount of authority in the Balkans?
A It was the Army Group E.
Q Who was the Commander in Chief of Army Group E?
A That was General Loehr.
Q What other rank did General Loehr hold at first when he was Commander in Chief of Army Group E, and Commander of the Southeast?
A Commander in Chief South East.
THE PRESIDENT: The interpreter either is not speaking loud enough or it is not coming through.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, shall I repeat the last questions?
Q Witness, we had determined before you took up your position in the Balkans the highest authority was Army Group E, at that time Commander in Chief of Army Group E, as you said was General Loehr? I now asked you what other title General Loehr also held?
A It was my opinion that other than that he held the title of Commander in Chief Southeast, and as far as I can remember it is clear to me he was the Armed Forces Commander.
Q Now, I want to deal with the time when you were working in the Balkans; you said yesterday and also today that the jurisdiction of the Commander Southeast and the Military Commander of the Armed Forces Southeast were the sane geographically; now when two agencies were supposed to deal with the same subject then the tasks would have to be separated very clearly; what was the main task of the Commander in Chief Southeast?
A The main task of the Commander in Chief Southeast was the defense of the entire Balkan Region, particularly the defense of the Coast line
Q Would you consider it right if I say that his main task was a strategic task?
A Yes, that would be right.
Q And you, Witness, as Commander in Chief Southeast wars in charge as you already said, you were in charge of the orders concerning the territory, is that right?
A Yes.
Q Who was in charge of Army Group F, or as the other title is, the Commander in Chief Southeast?
A Commander in Chief Southeast was subordinate immediately to the Army Staff, and therefore to the Supreme Commander, Hitler.
Q In other words, Army Group F was immediately under Hitler?
A No, in other words one should say the operational staff was an intermediate between the Commander in Chief and Hitler himself.
Q This operational staff of the Wehrmacht was not allowed to give any orders?
A I personally cannot decide that, but I assume that was the case.
Q Would you please look at Document NOKW 1010, it concerns Exhibit 351, and is in Document Book 14; on page 3 of this document book please note number One. Do you agree with me, after looking at this document, that Army Group F was immediately subordinate to Hitler?
A No, I want to keep up my former limitation. Otherwise, for example, the Commander in Chief of the South cast, Field Marshal von Weichs would have had immediate contact with Hitler, by phone for example, if he wanted to discuss anything concerning the conduct of the War.
In practice, however, these discussions if conducted by the Commander in Chief himself were carried out by the Chief himself, probably Jodl or probably with Keitel.
Q. Witness, in what capacity did Jodl or Keitel speak then?
A. I cannot say that because I was not in a position to do so.
Q. Then I would like to ask you again who was in charge of Army Group F.
A. In my opinion the Army Group F, in spite of this order, was subordinate to the operational staff of the Wehrmacht.
Q. And to whom were you subordinate as Military Commander Southeast?
A. As Military Commander I was subordinate to the Quartermaster General in his capacity OKH/OKW. However, mixups in this position occurred as proven by Jodl's and Keitel's interference, these two personalities of the operational staff of the Wehrmacht.
Q. In other words, you wish to say that was the result, witness, that you in your capacity as Military Commander Southeast and Field Marshal von Weichs as Military Commander of Army Group F had the same supreme commander?
A. I must agree to that.
Q. May I have the document book back, please? Witness, as Military Commander Southeast to whom were you responsible to report?
A. To the Quartermaster General of the OKH and OKW.
Q. You said yesterday that in Field Marshal von Weichs you saw a most responsible person concerning tactical matters in the Balkans and security.
A. Yes.
Q. Who in the Balkans was responsible for peace, quiet, and order?
A. I would like to say that we two were responsible, concerning the manner of combat, according to the document as submitted, it has been explained very clearly we took part in order and peace. Otherwise, combat would have been impossible.
Q. Were you not responsible for this as Military Commander Southeast?
A. According to the directives, I was told in the headquarters that it was not final at all.
I was responsible for peace and order and it was my task as commander. In practice, however, these directives could not be carried out because we had no strict limits of territories where Weichs' responsibility and my responsibility were separated.
Q. We will try to determine that, witness, whether that existed or not. In the Balkans who had the executive power?
A. Having seen the documents today, it is clear to me that the Military Commander Southeast was responsible.
Q. And you were the Military Commander Southeast. What does this executive power consist of?
A. Executive power generally is the same as the task to look after peace and order in the occupied territory. May I point out, however, that in the directive which I received there was a passage that orders could be given to me at the time through the commander of the Second Panzer Army, as well something which never was carried out in practice.
Q. Apparently this is contradictory in part of the explanations of Document NOKW-1010, Exhibit 351. Please look at page 5, No. I, where I marked it. Please look at it.
A. I was not informed of this order myself in my position as Military Commander Southeast. It must be a mistake. It is obvious anyway because there a very clear task is given to me. Subordination is emphasized here, under the OKW, that would be the operational staff of the Wehrmacht under another name.
May I add that this order was issued and is said to have been issued at the end of October and apparently it was sent to other offices for examination and later probably became a definite order. It was, therefore, the end of October and it became necessary to clear the matter up and these various matters which overlapped.
Q. You said before that you were responsible for order, peace, and quiet in the Balkans.
A. Yes, with the limitation that I was given directives on that subject by the Commander in Chief Southeast, Field Marshal von Weichs.
Orders were given to me.
Q. Witness, on what do you base this right of the Commander in Chief Southeast to give orders?
A. I base this on the intention to intervene by the Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht to see that, if I should have taken wrong measures, the Commander in Chief would have been in a position to intervene.
Q. Who could give orders to another agency?
A. Actually, only the superior agency.
Q. Was the Commander in Chief Southeast your superior agency?
A. I have tried to answer this with yes and no before. According to the directives, as I was told at headquarters, I was an independent commander in chief in my capacity as Military Commander. The directives themselves later made objections possible not only for the army group but also for the commander of the Second Panzer Army in Serbia.
Q. Witness, what directives do you mean by that when you say that such a power of veto was given to the Commander in Chief Southeast?
A. The official description of these directives I believe is service regulations. The Commander in Chief Southeast and I as Military Commander received them separately.
Q. What was superior to these directives, or what was contained in these directives?
A. It is very difficult, after many years, to state this correctly. It would be very good if these directives were at hand.
Q. May I -- do you mean by that a passage already quoted once by the prosecution, which appears possibly in No. 2, page 3 of Document NOKW-1010? It is up to you to decide this.
A. No, these directives or orders are service regulations.
A No. These directives of service regulations already existed when I came there in August '43; while this directive is dated 30 October.
Q Now, witness, the next subordinate command was very clearly not subordinate to the military command.
A No official subordination of my command had not been ordered.
Q You said yesterday that about 70 to 80 thousand men were under your command, in your capacity as military commander southeast?
A That's right approximately.
Q Would you give orders to these troops independently without asking Army Group F first?
A I was entitled to this. It was part of my responsibility.
Q And when you did this, this was a tactical measure, was it not?
A Yes, after reporting this to the Army group.
Q Witness, you said before, you were responsible for order and peace, and that you were able to employ the troops under your command technically for your own purposes.
Would it not have been better then to say that von Weichs was Supreme Commander concerning strategical matters in the Balkans?
A That is correct.
Q You said yesterday that in the summer of '44 an order for retaliation measures was given. Do you mean by that, this directive which I would like you look at? It concerns your Honor OKW document # 172, Exhibit 379.
A No, this is not the order I quoted. The order I mean was issued on the 1st of July 1944, when the chief of the general staff was no longer Feertsch but General Winter.
But looking at this order is based on this order as well. This order of December, I cannot remember at all. It is possible that it might have been sent to my office when I was on leave in January. The only retaliation measure I know is that of July.
Q Would you look at this order again, particularly at the opening words, where it is explained that this order was issued with the approval of the Military Commander Southeast?
A Yes, I believe that is the explanation. It indicates that Neubacher was responsible for conducting the political fight in the Balkans against the communist danger, and that during discussions which we had together in Weissen Schloss with the Commander-in-chief we discussed the execution of such an order and agreed to it. But the formulation the Commander-in-chief Southeast used for these directives, I personally cannot remember and I cannot say that he is orientated about that purpose.
At that time, on the 22nd of December, Loehr acted as deputy because I was on leave. That I discussed retaliation measures with Loehr when deputying Weichs, that is not true.
Q When did the first discussion take place between Fieldmarshal von Weichs, Neubacher and you, about retaliation measures?
A It started immediately after I had arrived as stated in my diary. We had five discussions, the first days of September about these matters.
Q During this discussion, was it considered that a basic order should be issued concerning retaliation measures?
A No, in September, these matters were not considered it necessary by us, as we were both new there.
Q In other words, you wish to *y about issuing order, which I just submitted to you, you did not know anything?
A I do not remember.
Q Witness, you said that you remember an order of similar content, which you received in July?
A I know this so clearly because the officer who dealt with it, Lt. Col. Ratjen came to me and reported to me, because he wanted, to harmonize this order with that of the general staff, and we worked on it in detail because the difficulty insisted of the fact that they had to find an order which served all, and could be applied to everything that happened in the Balkans or anywhere else because of repeated retaliation measures by the Army Group.
I cannot state the cause however.
Q Could you tell us whether the No. of this order was 296/43, of the 22nd of December?
Witness, would you please look at Document NOKW 469, which bears the date 20 June '44, and where at the bottom there is a remark in which General Winters in his own handwriting, that this order 296/43, should be looked up?
MR. RAPP: Your Honors, we really submit that the Court please instruct defense counsel to give us the exhibit numbers of documents that defense counsel is referring to, if you please.
PRESIDENT WENNERSTRUM: Dr. Laternser, if you will kindly follow that, it will be appreciated.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, unfortunately I am not in a position to give the number of the exhibit yet because this document NOKW 469has not been submitted to this Tribunal as yet. I am conscious of the fact, but I also know that I am entitled during cross-examination to submit to a witness any document which I have in may possession.
PRESIDENT WENNERSTRUM: Very well.
Q May I ask you to look at this document, NOKW 496?
A I now see why in July, another order was issued, because the Army Group writes here to Neubacher, that the incidence in Greece, was the cause for the retaliation order of December, of which they wished to remind us. And the Army group, owing to this, ought that this old order of date and following that on the first of July, or the second or third of July a new directive was issued for the entire southeast by the army group.
I believe that is how it was connected actually on the first of July an improved order was issued.
Q What you said now, that a new order was issued, is something you presumed, is it not?
A No, I don't presume that. I knew that for sure, just because this general staff officer reported to me personally and discussed these matters with me in detail
Q. But this document, NOKW-496, shows according to General Winter's remark that this original order of the 22nd of December was to be pointed out again and used again.
A. That's right.
Q. I now have another last point. In what capacity were you in the East?
A. As Commander in Chief of XIII Corps.
Q. To whom were you subordinate at the time?
A. The Commander in Chief of the Second Army.
Q. And who was the Commander in Chief?
A That was General Field Marshal von Weichs.
Q How was the order from the Commissar treated?
A The Commissar's order -- you probably asked concerning me or concerning Weichs?
THE PRESIDENT (JUDGE WENNERSTRUM): Pardon me just a minute. We're interested in the examination and the questioning. You're overlapping a little bit. If you will both the witness and the examiner, will give the Interpreter time to make the interpretation, it will be helpful, and to the Tribunal.
A The Commissar's order arrived, as I recall, about two weeks before, and I was still subordinate to the 4th Army at the time.
Q Another question please. You received the Commissar's order from the 4th Army?
A Yes, from the 4th Army.
Q And who was the Commander in Chief of the 4th Army at the time?
A Field marshal von Kluge
Q How did you deal with the Commissar's order?
A I did not hand the Commissar order in writing, but my two division chiefs commanders were called to me. I informed them of the contents of this ordering that they should not carry out this order, That took place, and both division commanders agreed with me.
Q Concerning this Commisar's, did you discuss it with Field Marshal von Weichs?
A But I do not remember the discussion, but owing to my relations with Weichs, no doubt we discussed this subjects which touched us personally, and I can't think it could have been any different than that we fully agreed.
Q Do you know about anything further about this concerning Field Marshal von Weichs?
A I only remember that one of my division commanders at that time, General Loch, once told me, while in captivity, that he discussed this matter with Weichs once, and that Weichs informed him, he also believed it to have been an order which I didn't receive; however he based it again on the fact that Weichs took over the 4th Army. This took place about the 1st of June 1941.
Q And on what was this order to be based?
A That the Commissar's order should not be complied with.
Q I have no further questions.
BY DR. RAUSCHENBACH:
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: Dr. Rauschenbach for the Defendant Foertsch. Witness, on the 8th of January of this year you gave an affidavit to the Prosecution, the document which Dr. Laternser has submitted to you as NOKW-611, which the Prosecution identified as Exhibit No. 440-a. On page 6 of the German version of the affidavit you said that the Higher SS and Police Chiefs often were ordered to the Army. I now ask you to what time does this refer. Does it refer to the time when General Winter, as successor of General Foertsch, was Chief of the Army Group, or does it refer also to that time when General Foertsch himself was Chief?
A In my opinion, as far as I remember the matter at the time, Foertsch was Chief.
Q In such discussions was Meissner present?
A Yes, sometimes Meissner was present during such discussions which Neubacher and I had with the Field Marshal. However, I heard from Meissner himself that he repeatedly was called to the Commander in Chief of the Army Group, without my being informed previously. What was the subject of these discussions I can not say. I can't remember either whether and what Meissner told me anything about it.
Q What was your impression about these discussions? Was there actual cooperation between Meissner and the Chief of the Army Group, or were there differences?
A No. Concerning cooperation between Foertsch and Meissner, I wish to say the opposite.
Q. And how did they show it itself?
A. By very cool methods concerning these discussions whenever I took part.
Q. Did you have the impression, therefore, that with General Foertsch and the Police Chief Meissner there were differences - tensions?
A. Whether there were tensions I can't say now. In any case I had the impression that they were not very good friends, as the rest of us.
Q. In this affidavit you also said that General Winter, the successor of defendant General Foertsch, fully cooperated with the Reichsfuehrer SS and approved of it.
A. I came to this conclusion because I know that Winter had a very long discussion with Himmler, which must have been in the summer or early autumn of 1944, about which he was very deeply impressed after returning, and the result of which we found out very soon, because suddenly the thought arose that the military administration in the occupied territories was to be taken from my command and to be transferred to the Police Chiefs and SS chiefs.
Q. And to make it quite clear, that was at the time when General Foertsch was no longer in charge?
A. Yes.
Q. From your own observations can you add anything about General Foertsch's attitude toward the Reichsfuehrer SS?
A. No, I can't say anything about that. I can't remember now.
Q. Do you remember whether there were any direct connections?
A. I don't know.
Q. Another matter. You said yesterday during your cross examination by the prosecution that the Chief of the General Staff, General Winter, was responsible for keeping the War Diary, particularly about the correctness of the contents.
A. This statement is based on my experience of many years and practice as Commander in the High Command.
Q. You did this of your own initiative?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know how it was actually done in Army Group F?
A. I don't know anything about that.
DR. RAUSCHENBACH: I have no further questions, Your Honor.
BY DR. SAUTER:
Q.- I would like to ask you, before answering to wait a moment to give the interpretor a chance to translate. Witness, in the beginning of the cross-examination you were asked about conditions in the Balkans and the war there, about its peculiarities and other similar things, and you said approximately that cruelties were every day occurances but were not reported to you. In any case such was the case in Serbia. You added that until the end Serbia was a comparatively peaceful area. I don't know, witness, whether I understood your statement correctly. For days now we have heard that many thousands of retaliations were made for possible violations, that thousands and thousands of Serbs and natives, partisans and similar people were shot and hanged. Do you really want to say that this territory down there was so peaceful? It seems to me that there have been contradictions. Please state your opinion about these contradictions.
A.- I repeatedly pointed out that conditions, after we took over the command in August 1943; were considerably improved. Many attempts for retaliation measures had to be made because there were very high numbers of violations I think mostly during the years 1941 and 1942. Among us too at the beginning at least there were a number of very bad violations, even in the Serbian territory, which I want to point out as I know a lot about that. But later, already in the fall, late fall, and in winter it was considerably improved and I believe that it is mostly owing to the fact that the Mihajlovic bands from their position which they first took towards us slowly came around and tried to come to an agreement with us. That is what they decided. In that way, about the turn of the year, a great number of occasions were given for such violations. There were also, of course, in 1943 and 1944 many violations which occurred. Only I believe that the extent in the years '42-'43, at least, as it appears to me when I went down there, was very much higher.