Generally speaking, I wanted to ask you this, the contents of these affidavits is that correct, or is your testimony here correct in case there are discrepancies between those two?
A If there are discrepancies that which I have said here in this courtroom is valid.
Q Now, we will talk about something else. Before you took over the position as commander in chief Southeast you were as you said yesterday, received in Hitler's headquarters, is that correct?
A Yes.
Q At the occasion of this introduction were you told that up until now the dealings with the bands in the Balkans had not been strong enough, is that correct?
A Yes, that is correct.
Q And then towards the end of 1943 you were in the Balkans, is that correct?
A Yes.
Q How then was the general situation in the Balkans at that time when you took over your office; I ask you now to describe the situation to the Court?
A In doing this I have to rely on my memory alone, and as I remember the picture today, I had the impression then that out of all the territories in the Balkans the relatively most quiet was the Serbian area. To me as a man who up to then had never been in the Balkans, the situation there at least, as it was described to me, was rather shocking. The uncertainty and the excesses of bands of all kinds was so much a matter of course so that as I have mentioned here once before, I saw in the daily reports about 50 cases which had happened somewhere in this gigantic area. It was absolutely clear to me that with purely military gains, the usual method of combat and the usual administrative methods one could not succeed in the course of time.
I was certain therefore that my attitude which I mentioned yesterday, which was in opposition to all these reprisals and retaliation measures could not possibly be fully established. Especially difficult it was for us soldiers, the interference of all kinds of authorities which were not subordinated to the Wehrmacht, but who were very ambitious to play their own part; all other officers, and that from this side on the part of these, I might say, hostile observers, I, as well as all other officers who had anything to do with administrative matters, would have to overcome great difficulties. And in this attitude of mind, I found myself not mistaken, at least during the first few months.
Q Witness, what other individual political opinions or divisions were there in the Balkans?
A That is very hard to answer briefly. Each country had its own individual political trends, which in detail I think are quite known.
Q I ask you to mention these individual tendencies since I cannot assume that they are well-known to all.
A If I am to start with Serbia, there were the well-known tendencies Mihajlovic, Tito, and -- independent of the two of them -independently operating, Communist and the so-called National Cetnik Bands. In Greece there was the EAM and how the other band leaders were called. I am not able to recollect today. There too were tendencies within the population, and against the German Wehrmacht.
Who fought against whom, then, of the indigenous units?
A. In the Serbian area the Mihailovic or the Chetnik bands as Enemy No. 1 fought the units of Tito; as Enemy No. 2 they fought us, the occupation force. This was told us quite openly by the Chetnik band leaders.
Q. The reports about the activities of the Chetnik bands -- did they come to you as Military Commander-in-Chief Southeast?
A. Yes, as far as they concerned the Serbian area.
Q. Did you not also receive reports from the other military commanders?
A. From the other military commanders I received the monthly reports which I already mentioned and probably - I cannot say that with certainty but that would only be natural - reports from especially extensive retaliation measures in case they became necessary.
Q. We are not talking about reprisal measures just yet. I am interested how high you estimate or can you tell us the number of attacks or attempts which happened daily by any one band in the Balkans.
A. If I could judge on the basis of the reports which I got from the Serbian area, it would have to be at least two to three times as much -- that is more than 100 per day.
Q. And what method did those bands observe or carry out when they made their raids or attacks?
A. Of course, this was different. There were more or less harmless band attacks, for instance, when a man was shot at during the night and nothing else happened, but very frequently these attacks were combined with considerable brutalities.
I myself, as late as September 1944, at the occasion of an attack in which I found myself involved, established that within 20 minutes three German trucks near Topola - that is on the main highway of Serbia were attacked in the bright daylight, robbed and the men on them were killed in a most inhuman manner. In the subsequent struggle with this band I established clearly with my own eyes--
JUDGE BURKE: There is a little conflict. If you would speak a little less rapidly, it would be easier for the interpreters to follow and there would be no overlapping.
A. I established with my own eyes that women who were not classed as soldiers took part in these surprise attacks.
Q. To what extent did they participate?
A. They had weapons in their hands and participated in the fight in which I and the man accompanying me also had to take to arms. Only by chance an armored car passed us and this band, about 350 men strong who were equipped with machine guns, could be made to flee and we could escape with our lives.
Also, in other instances the troop reported to me repeatedly that in their own fights similar occurrences happened.
Q. For any special atrocities which might have been committed by the bands, do you remember anything there?
A. I have heard a lot about them but I have no clear proof. I did not experience anything like that myself.
Q. What, for instance, were reported to you about the atrocities?
A. Well, there again the murdering of prisoners, wounded among them, and on the part of the Chetnik band leaders this concept that they would butcher every prisoner they took after a short interrogation was quite frankly admitted to me.
After all, these were older people who, when mentioning these cruelties, did not seem to have the slightest feeling about them.
Q. Was it, for instance, reported to you that German soldiers had been robbed of their eyesight?
A. These things had been reported to me among others, but personally, as I mentioned before, I did not experience anything like that and, therefore, feel a little skeptical towards such statements.
Q. Was it frequently reported to you -- that is, spectacular cruelties?
A. No, I do not think that spectacular cruelties were a matter of daily routine; at least, I did not know so.
I do not believe either, since I have to talk about the Balkan-Serbian area, that these things happened there because Serbia was right up to the end a relatively quiet, peaceful area. As proof of this, it may serve that I myself, right up to the last days, used to tour across the country completely alone without anybody accompanying me.
Q. From where did the bands get their weapons?
A. The Chetnik bands - that is, the National Chetniks - received their arms up to the winter and spring of 1944 doubtlessly through English support.
Q. And in what manner did they get these arms?
A. Through a nightly airplane transport which could be carried out quite undisturbed.
Q. How often did these English planes fly over - every night?
A. One might say almost every night. At any rate, we could hear the noise of the motors nearly every night. Since it could not concern any German planes, one had to assume that they were English planes, which was also confirmed by reports from the troops.
Q. The prosecution said again and again that these bands were a regular army. Did you know whether the bands wore uniforms?
A. This again I explained in the memorandum just mentioned, that up to July 1944, when the Americans started their extensive support, the Tito bands or units were clothed in a very unsoldierly manner and one therefore could not talk of a uniform.
Q. What, for instance, did they wear?
A. I might almost answer this by saying, "What did they not wear?" They wore costumes of all kinds. In these matters it was a rather strange sight for our rather spoiled eyes.
Q. The prosecution will mention a few other points in this connection later. The prosecution further puts special emphasis on the fact that in the course of these bandit fights German losses were always considerably smaller than the losses of the bands. How can you explain that?
How do you derive this fact and how can you explain the contents of the reports to this effect?
A. From my own area of command and from my personal impressions from the bandit fights, I cannot consider this conception correct. We supposed that we inflicted some losses to the bands in military actions but a certainty of the number was made very difficult from the fact that the bands generally took their dead along as well as their wounded.
Q Therefore the report of German units or departments which participated in this fight, could be derived generally from estimates?
A Yes.
Q Witness, is not the army inclined to estimate the enemy losses higher?
A That is a matter of course, especially as reports are coming in from various sides and it may so happen that enemy killed or wounded were even counted twice.
Q As far as losses are concerned, is it not possible that an important part is played by the fact that bands were less well-trained militarily than the German troops?
A That may well be the case. But to that, - I can't give any clear answer.
Q In what relation - according to your records - what was the relation of the German losses in the band war and the losses of the bands?
A If one can talk of any comparison by figures at all, I would like to say that it was more or less equal on both sides. I emphasize again that my knowledge is only derived from conditions in Serbia.
Q If now an attempt, or a surprise attack had been carried out, what difficulties occurred then in seizing the guilty persons?
A It could again and again be established that after s surprise attack, the entire neighborhood of the locality of the attack, including the villages around, were completely devoid of all inhabitants, a fact which was very understandable, because nobody wanted to appear as a helper, a guilty person; nobody wanted to be taken.
Q Now how was the terrain in the Balkans; were they suitable for disappearing and submerging?
A I believe that there was hardly a better terrain anywhere else for band war, as in the Balkans, so rich in clifts. Added to this is the lack of all roads and what reads there are they, are terribly bad, so that the pursuing forces find it very difficult to keep up with the enemy.
Q Are the other conditions of the geographical nature that which the bands might appreciate?
A Yes. If I may add to the geographical conditions, perhaps the population, the population, which, of course, in this territory, was a great help to the bandits. We can only make a small difference here, whether these were a Chetnik or Tito bands.
Q Now witnesse, we want to talk about the question of subordination. What kind of subordination do we know, or rather did we know, in the German Wehrmacht?
A There is really only one subordination, that is the subordination to the next Superior command.
Q Didn't you at any time hear something about a tactical and troop subordination?
A That would be a definition which is really included into the concept of subordination, as such.
Q Yes. I may put it perhaps like that: a complete subordination exists when a unit is subordinated to a higher command tactically and militarily.
A That's undoubtedly clear.
Q There were no other kinds of subordination?
A That would then been a special exception, in an individual case.
Q Yes, but that would then be either tactically or militarily?
A Yes, if I am talking theoretically -
Q Will you please let the Prosecution talk first.
MR. RAPP: If your Honors will permit, it is far from me to even pass any criticism on the interpreters, but I think there may be some serious mistakes in the translation, when the word, "truppenmassig" is translated as "military subordination", or "tactical subordination".
If Dr. Laternser would possibly talk a little bit slower, the interpreters may have better time to choose from a larger vocabulary of words, more adequate with the word presented either by the witness or the defense counsel.
DR. LATERNSER: I thank Mr. Rapp for this remark.
PRESIDENT WENNERSTRUM: May I also suggest that the counsel ask the question of the witness, and let the witness then answer, and if the counsel will then wait for the interpreter there will not be overlapping.
DR. LATERNSER: I shall observe this, your Honor. Thank you, very much.
Your Honor, may I ask how the interpreters translated the word "truppendgeien stalich"?
PRESIDENT WENNERSTRUM: Do the interpreters have any translation for this word?
INTERPRETER: We had a little difficulty with the word in German. It is rather an expert concept to say, "truppenmaessig unterstellt". A troop is a military unit. "Truppenmaessig unterstellt" would be subordinate in all military matters. I can only use my own logic in this case.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, don't the interpreters have glossary, I know of one having been compiled where all expert military terms are translated correctly. In case there would appear a difference in term then my examination of the witness would have little sense, because the differences which I want to establish could then not be established.
MR. RAPP: If I possibly could be of help, I suggest to Dr. Laternser that - so far as I know German the same result I believe Dr. Laternser is driving at, could be achieved by dropping this particular term in describing exactly what he is driving at. That way we may got around controversial terms in the translation.
PRESIDENT: WENNERSTRUM: Naturally the Tribunal must depend upon the interpreters, and in case there is some objection to the question of their interpretation, we will proceed the suggestion that Dr. Laternser could use some other term in covering the situation, why possibly that might help the situation.
You may proceed.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q We had talked about the various kinds of subordination. You said, or rather you were in agreement with me, that there was a subordination of a tactical nature, and also a subordination, generally, in every respect, or, do you not agree with me?
A. No, I do not agree with you. The concept of the military subordination only applies to a limited circle, to a limited task of a troop unit. May I explain this with an example. For instance, the staff of the military commander of Greece, could have been subordinated to me in everything, since I was the Military Commander-in-Chief Southeast. However, doubtlessly, it was subordinate to me in tactical matters, at least for special tasks of the Army Group E. However, so far as I recollect, in the spring of 1944, or rather since the spring of 1944, it was subordinate to the Army Group E, generally speaking, in military matters.
Q You mean now, Mr. Witness, the military commander of Greece? Witness, I am asking you so that we can get on, and can clarify these rather involved situations, and I am trying to make this clear to the Tribunal too. We will start all over again.
You know of a tactical subordination. What does that mean?
A That means that I with my unit in tactical matters, that is, in tactical military matters are subordinate to one certain command of staff.
Q We then further know of a subordination of a general military nature. Do you agree with me in that, that subordination of a general military nature means that the unit in question is subordinate in personnel and disciplinary matters, to that unit to which it is subordinate in military matters "truppendienstlich"
A Yes.
Q One unit which is subordinate in matters of a general military nature to some other unit, then this other unit will issue punishments which may be necessary promotions and awards.
A That is correct.
Q We know, therefore, those two different kinds of subordination -the tactical one and the one that is of a general military nature. Is that correct?
A Yes.
Q Do we know any other kinds of subordination?
A I might find it necessary to mention a third kind, and that is the subordination in administrative matters. That has nothing to do with tactics, and likewise nothing to do with personnel or other directions.
Q Yes. But this administrative subordination will then have nothing to do with any military matters at all.
A That is correct.
Q There are, therefore, no other kinds of subordination from a military point of view than the two which we have mentioned just now?
A Yes.
Q Witness, I ask you now to take a look at the chart which is suspended behind you, and I am asking you, to begin with, to just look at the upper row. That is, up to and including OKO, OKM, and OKH. Does this sketch show the organization within the top leadership correctly?
THE PRESIDENT (JUDGE WENNERSTRUM): Would the guard please move the microphone over there? (Motioning to the Witness Stand)
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, may we object to this question for the simple reason that this witness has not been called by the Prosecution for the purpose of certifying to anything surrounding the OKW, the OKH or the OKL because he himself has never been a member of that office. Secondly we believe that we get somewhat off the beaten track of that which we have covered in the direct examination if the witness be permitted to talk about matters that he has no direct knowledge of.
THE PRESIDENT (JUDGE WENNERSTRUM): Over-ruled.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q Witness, I had put the question merely for the top row.
A This sketch, in my opinion, does not show clearly enough there on the spot where it says OKW that the Quartermaster General should be mentioned as well, as he belonged to the OKH as well as to the OKW.
Q May I ask you, was for instance the OKH subordinate to the OKW?
A No.
Q Then, to begin with, the line would be wrong which is drawn in black between OKH and OKW?
A That would only concern the Quartermaster General in the OKH, not the operational staff in the OKH.
Q That would then be the first mistake, that OK* could not issue any orders to the OKH?
A I am not informed whether there were not certain spheres where the operational staff of the OKW could issue directives to the OKH as well. At least, where the Quartermaster General was concerned.
Q Keitel, for instance, could he issue orders to the Commander in Chief of the Army, that is, to OKH on his own accord?
A Only as deputy of Hitler.
Q I did not ask like that. I said on his own account, could he give an order to the OKH?
A I cannot testify to that; I do not know that exactly.
Q What was the OKH as a staff? Whose staff was it?
A The OKH was an operational staff under the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Hitler.
Q It was then not a command agency?
A Not in the customarily accepted sense, no.
Q How would this sketch have to look if it were correct? How would it have to show the OKW?
A The OKW could remain as it is, only the black connection between OKH and OKW would have to be drawn differently, in my opinion.
Q The same would apply then for the two black connecting lines that run between OKW and OKM, and OKW and OKL?
A I assume that, but I cannot say for sure how that turned out in practice. I do not believe that the OKL would have agreed to be subordinate in any way to the OKW and Keitel.
Q Who was the OKH directly subordinate to?
A The OKH was directly subordinate to Hitler.
Q Who was the OKM directly subordinate to?
A I cannot say that with certainty.
Q Who was the OKL directly subordinate to?
A In my opinion, likewise to Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT (JUDGE WENNERSTRUM): Pardon me just a moment. May I inquire of the Prosecution if they have an extra one of these photographs of the Chart "D" to which reference has been made in the present examination?
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, the only Exhibit Chart "D" we have is in the basic information handbook which was submitted to the Court, and we have no extras here. At present we are not prepared on this particular subject; however, I have given Dr. Laternser my own copy and suggested to him that he should give this to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT (JUDGE WENNERSTRUM): That can be followed, or I will give my copy to the witness, Dr. Laternser, so that the witness may be seated. It may be a bit easier. May I inquire of the witness whether he knows the photograph which he has represents the chart shown on the wall, to which he previously testified?
THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor, that is right.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q Now, witness, if the OKW, and I think we agreed to that, did not have any power of command toward subordinate military units, what, then -- how then could OKW orders be regarded? Where did those orders originate?
A Maybe I can express it thus. We had so-called OKH combat areas. That is, for the main part, the Eastern Front, for instance, in the campaign against Russia. And we had other OKW theaters of war. Those were all other theaters of war -- France, Italy, the Balkans, etc. Those Supreme Commanders, the OK*, and operational staff could give them orders of a tactical operational nature.
Q But who alone in the OK* could give these orders?
A These orders were given for Hitler by the operational staff of the Wehrmacht, by Keitel, or by his Chief Jodl, or Warliment.
Q Do you agree with me that OKW orders are Hitler orders?
A In the bulk, yes. Certainly. But I could imagine that there were orders signed by Keitel which perhaps had not been read by Hitler. Maybe they had not even been submitted to him, but since I've never worked on that staff myself, I cannot give definite testimony as to these matters.
THE PRESIDENT (JUDGE WENNERSTRUM): We'll take our afternoon recess at this time.
(THE COURT RECESSED AT 1500)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
Q I now want to talk about the conditions that always existed in the Balkans, before your activity in the Balkans, who had the highest amount of authority in the Balkans?
A It was the Army Group E.
Q Who was the Commander in Chief of Army Group E?
A That was General Loehr.
Q What other rank did General Loehr hold at first when he was Commander in Chief of Army Group E, and Commander of the Southeast?
A Commander in Chief South East.
THE PRESIDENT: The interpreter either is not speaking loud enough or it is not coming through.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, shall I repeat the last questions?
Q Witness, we had determined before you took up your position in the Balkans the highest authority was Army Group E, at that time Commander in Chief of Army Group E, as you said was General Loehr? I now asked you what other title General Loehr also held?
A It was my opinion that other than that he held the title of Commander in Chief Southeast, and as far as I can remember it is clear to me he was the Armed Forces Commander.
Q Now, I want to deal with the time when you were working in the Balkans; you said yesterday and also today that the jurisdiction of the Commander Southeast and the Military Commander of the Armed Forces Southeast were the sane geographically; now when two agencies were supposed to deal with the same subject then the tasks would have to be separated very clearly; what was the main task of the Commander in Chief Southeast?
A The main task of the Commander in Chief Southeast was the defense of the entire Balkan Region, particularly the defense of the Coast line
Q Would you consider it right if I say that his main task was a strategic task?
A Yes, that would be right.
Q And you, Witness, as Commander in Chief Southeast wars in charge as you already said, you were in charge of the orders concerning the territory, is that right?
A Yes.
Q Who was in charge of Army Group F, or as the other title is, the Commander in Chief Southeast?
A Commander in Chief Southeast was subordinate immediately to the Army Staff, and therefore to the Supreme Commander, Hitler.
Q In other words, Army Group F was immediately under Hitler?
A No, in other words one should say the operational staff was an intermediate between the Commander in Chief and Hitler himself.
Q This operational staff of the Wehrmacht was not allowed to give any orders?
A I personally cannot decide that, but I assume that was the case.
Q Would you please look at Document NOKW 1010, it concerns Exhibit 351, and is in Document Book 14; on page 3 of this document book please note number One. Do you agree with me, after looking at this document, that Army Group F was immediately subordinate to Hitler?
A No, I want to keep up my former limitation. Otherwise, for example, the Commander in Chief of the South cast, Field Marshal von Weichs would have had immediate contact with Hitler, by phone for example, if he wanted to discuss anything concerning the conduct of the War.
In practice, however, these discussions if conducted by the Commander in Chief himself were carried out by the Chief himself, probably Jodl or probably with Keitel.
Q. Witness, in what capacity did Jodl or Keitel speak then?
A. I cannot say that because I was not in a position to do so.
Q. Then I would like to ask you again who was in charge of Army Group F.
A. In my opinion the Army Group F, in spite of this order, was subordinate to the operational staff of the Wehrmacht.
Q. And to whom were you subordinate as Military Commander Southeast?
A. As Military Commander I was subordinate to the Quartermaster General in his capacity OKH/OKW. However, mixups in this position occurred as proven by Jodl's and Keitel's interference, these two personalities of the operational staff of the Wehrmacht.
Q. In other words, you wish to say that was the result, witness, that you in your capacity as Military Commander Southeast and Field Marshal von Weichs as Military Commander of Army Group F had the same supreme commander?
A. I must agree to that.
Q. May I have the document book back, please? Witness, as Military Commander Southeast to whom were you responsible to report?
A. To the Quartermaster General of the OKH and OKW.
Q. You said yesterday that in Field Marshal von Weichs you saw a most responsible person concerning tactical matters in the Balkans and security.
A. Yes.
Q. Who in the Balkans was responsible for peace, quiet, and order?
A. I would like to say that we two were responsible, concerning the manner of combat, according to the document as submitted, it has been explained very clearly we took part in order and peace. Otherwise, combat would have been impossible.
Q. Were you not responsible for this as Military Commander Southeast?
A. According to the directives, I was told in the headquarters that it was not final at all.
I was responsible for peace and order and it was my task as commander. In practice, however, these directives could not be carried out because we had no strict limits of territories where Weichs' responsibility and my responsibility were separated.
Q. We will try to determine that, witness, whether that existed or not. In the Balkans who had the executive power?
A. Having seen the documents today, it is clear to me that the Military Commander Southeast was responsible.
Q. And you were the Military Commander Southeast. What does this executive power consist of?
A. Executive power generally is the same as the task to look after peace and order in the occupied territory. May I point out, however, that in the directive which I received there was a passage that orders could be given to me at the time through the commander of the Second Panzer Army, as well something which never was carried out in practice.
Q. Apparently this is contradictory in part of the explanations of Document NOKW-1010, Exhibit 351. Please look at page 5, No. I, where I marked it. Please look at it.
A. I was not informed of this order myself in my position as Military Commander Southeast. It must be a mistake. It is obvious anyway because there a very clear task is given to me. Subordination is emphasized here, under the OKW, that would be the operational staff of the Wehrmacht under another name.
May I add that this order was issued and is said to have been issued at the end of October and apparently it was sent to other offices for examination and later probably became a definite order. It was, therefore, the end of October and it became necessary to clear the matter up and these various matters which overlapped.
Q. You said before that you were responsible for order, peace, and quiet in the Balkans.
A. Yes, with the limitation that I was given directives on that subject by the Commander in Chief Southeast, Field Marshal von Weichs.
Orders were given to me.
Q. Witness, on what do you base this right of the Commander in Chief Southeast to give orders?
A. I base this on the intention to intervene by the Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht to see that, if I should have taken wrong measures, the Commander in Chief would have been in a position to intervene.
Q. Who could give orders to another agency?
A. Actually, only the superior agency.
Q. Was the Commander in Chief Southeast your superior agency?
A. I have tried to answer this with yes and no before. According to the directives, as I was told at headquarters, I was an independent commander in chief in my capacity as Military Commander. The directives themselves later made objections possible not only for the army group but also for the commander of the Second Panzer Army in Serbia.
Q. Witness, what directives do you mean by that when you say that such a power of veto was given to the Commander in Chief Southeast?
A. The official description of these directives I believe is service regulations. The Commander in Chief Southeast and I as Military Commander received them separately.
Q. What was superior to these directives, or what was contained in these directives?
A. It is very difficult, after many years, to state this correctly. It would be very good if these directives were at hand.
Q. May I -- do you mean by that a passage already quoted once by the prosecution, which appears possibly in No. 2, page 3 of Document NOKW-1010? It is up to you to decide this.
A. No, these directives or orders are service regulations.