Hans Groben, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows:
JUDGE BRAND: Will you raise your right hand and repeat this oath after me:
I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
JUDGE BRAND: You may be seated.
EXAMINATION
BY DR. KOESSL: May it please tho Court, the witness Groben gave two affidavits which concern my client. I ask you first to be allowed to under take the cross-examination on the affidavit in book 3-I; we are concerned with document NG 532, exhibit 224.
Q Witness, will you please first of all, state your first and last name, and your profession?
A Hans Groben, Counsel of the District Court in Nurnberg, Langerichtsrat.
Q Witness, you had frequently the opportunity to take part in cases of penal procedure, where Rothaug was the presiding judge of the Special Court. Did you ever experience it, and observe that Rothaug during the trial urged and insisted upon changing the actual facts -- distorting the actual facts and to falsify the events?
A No, I never experienced that.
Q You, thus, wrote in your affidavit, that Rothaug interrupted defendants and witnesses in order to change the subject; you did not, by that, mean to say that Rothaug in regard to the finding out of the actual events, which were the basis of the case, made any difficulties of any kind?
A No, I said he wanted to deviate.
Q Witness, did you ever experience it, that the verdict by Rothaug, were contested either by the nullity plea or by the extraordinary objections or through the reopening of the case.
A Yes
Q Did you experience a case, in which a sentence of Rothaug was squashed in favor of the defendant?
A Yes, by the method of reopening of the case.
Q What was the sentence which had been pronounced against the defendant after the reopening of the case, after the sentence had been examined?
A The defendant, because of obvious lack of guilt, in the final proceedings, that is without all examinations, was acquitted.
Q Witness, did you hear remarks of the gentlemen of the Senat of the District Court of Appeal or similar high judges, which attacked the legal correctness of the judgment of the sentences which the Special Court had pronounced with Rothaug presiding.
A I do not understand your question.
Q I wanted to ask you what the high judges and other legal jurists, in general, said about the legal basis and reasoning, and the legal value of the verdict of the Special Court which were pronounced with Rothaug presiding?
A Personally, I had very little connections with high judges outside of the court, but I can answer your question to the extent that the judgment about the legal qualities of these verdicts, in the decisions of the Penal Senat of the District Court of Appeal, was expressed there in which the senate after complaints against the refusal of the reopening of the case, decided that the sentence could not be objected to aside from the legal point of view.
Q You are also speaking witness, about the following: That Rothaug, in general, was of the opinion that a death sentence which he had pronounced must be executed?
A Yes.
Q Is this supposed to mean that Rothaug was of the opinion that it was his point of view, that the judge should always have the courage to stand by his decisions, or do you ascribe a different meaning to the sentence?
A No, by the sentence, I want to express that it was in accordance with the entire tendency of Rothaug, that he wanted to see sentences he had pronounced executed; that was part of his entire National Socialist ideology.
Q Now, what significance was attached to the sentence from the point of view of proceedings and what did the judges think of the pardon process and of the decisions of the pardon authorities.
A In the German clemency regulations, it is laid down that after every sentence, regardless of what court has pronounced it, the court has to examine whether a clemency plea could be considered; that is, for example, also there are forms that are ready, that the decisions are made in advance whether the sentence can be executed. This is, however, first of all, merely a formal matter. In the case of a death sentence, of course, a prerequisite for the execution, is that the highest pardoning authorities -- that was in the Third Reich, first of all, Hitler, then it was delegated during the war to the ministry of Justice, that this pardoning authority had to decide whether it wanted to make use of the right to grant a pardon or not. Personally, I always expected and hoped that the Ministry would put a stop to it here, and would express its disapproval of this jurisdiction in a number of cases, by means of demonstration, making use of the right of issuing a pardon. Unfortunately we were, again and again, disappointed in that respect.
Q Can you name the cases in which there was a clemency plea?
A Should I name the cases?
Q I mean where you know that pardons were actually granted?
A Without doubt; for instance, I remember one case, Follert, that was a case of arson on circumstantial evidence. The defendant, after the verdict confessed his guilt, and later he was pardoned. He had a penitentiary sentence of longer duration.
Q If I understood you correctly, Rothaug, first of all, on the basis of circumstantial evidence, pronounced the death sentence -- even though the defendant denied it?
A Yes.
Q Did they now find out whether the defendant actually committed the crime?
A Naturally, that was the interesting point in the case. We were concerned with purely circumstantial evidence which was the basis of the sentence, and, after the defendant had already been sentenced to death, he confessor before, I believe, a police official or prison official, that he had been the one who had committed the arson.
Q In spite of that he was pardoned?
A I have told you that already.
Q Now, I have a further question: As far as the law against public enemies, the application of the decree against public enemies is concerned, the question which you answered here in your affidavit, you said that in regard to the decree against public enemies, Rothaug applied it also to Jews and Poles.
A Before the so-called Penal Code against Poles and Jews was issued.
Q Just a moment please.
A I spoke only about the application to Poles.
Q You spoke only in regard to Poles?
A Yes.
Q You yourself, now, in regard to the application of the decree against public enemies, applying it against Poles -- you objected to it on a train trip?
A Not only on a train trip, but repeatedly.
Q Can you tell me whether Rothaug, in this case, was supported by the verdicts of other courts, especially of the Reich Supreme Court?
AAfter this controversy I could notice that the Reich Supreme Court did not approve of my opinion.
Q And thus Rothaug had the right conception, according to the jurisdiction of the Reich Supreme Court?
A I was never convinced of the correctness of this jurisdiction.
DR. KOESSL: I have no further questions in regard to this particular affidavit, Your Honor. Therefore I ask for permission to turn to the second affidavit. I am now coming to document NO-554, in document bock III-C, Exhibit 153. It is the document which treats of the Katzenberger case.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
BY DR. KOESSL:
Q Witness, in this affidavit you speak of the Katzenberger case. In what capacity did you get into contact with the Katzenberger case?
A I was investigating judge at the local court in Nurnberg during the time from the 1st of January 1939 until October of 1941. I believe there is a typographical error in my affidavit here. My affidavit says "1 September 1939."
Q That is 1 September 1939?
A No, that is incorrect; it should be 1 January 1939.
Q At the beginning of the affidavit?
A Yes; it says in the affidavit 1 September; the correct date would be 1 January.
THE PRESIDENT: I suppose there is no objection to that being changed right in the exhibit?
MR. WOOLEYHAN: No.
BY DR. KOESSL:
Q Please continue, witness.
A In this capacity--of course, today I can no longer state the exact time with certainty. In any case, during the first half of 1941 Katzenberger was brought to me by the police under the suspicion of having violated the law for the protection of German blood.
Q You considered the reasons for suspicion which were compiled at that time as sufficient for you to issue the required warrant for arrest? Is my conception correct?
AAccording to the German code of legal procedure, a warrant for arrest is issued when there is a great deal of suspicion that the accused has committed the crime with which he is charged. Thus, if I issued a warrant for arrest, the final determination of the question of guilt has in no way been prejudiced.
Q You say now that Katzenberger himself said that he saw that a great deal was against him at the moment. Therefore, I want to ask you: During the course of the investigations, did material become apparent which would eliminate the reasons for suspicion which had existed so far?
A Yes, it became apparent. Namely, in the form that when the investigations by the prosecution had failed to the extent that there was no doubtless proof of guilt, they seized the last expedient request that the witness Seiler be taken under oath. In German legal procedure, it is the last expedient when the prosecutor no longer knows whether he should file an indictment or discharge the case.
Q Who ordered that she should be taken under oath?
AAs I said, that is an expedient used by the prosecution. In article 66, paragraph 3 of the German Code of Legal Procedure, it is laid down that upon the request of the prosecution, a witness can be taken under oath for the obtaining of trustful testimony, also already in the so-called preparatory proceedings.
Q Just a moment, witness. You are here referring to the article which in its later form got the number 65?
A That is conceivable; at least in the form that was used then, I quoted it according to the edition that was current at that time.
Q Witness, can you remember now that the witness Seiler at the time, during her interrogation, admitted something which, before the arrest of Katzenberger, had not been know as yet and which could be regarded as new circumstantial evidence?
A No, for the witness Seiler had already been interrogated when Katzenberger was brought before me. When I interrogated her in my capacity as an investigating judge, the question was to have her statements in the necessary form and, above all, under oath, put down in a definite manner.
Q The confession of the witness Seiler -- which Katzenberger had first of all denied -- that Katzenberger had taken her on the lap and kissed her and touched her, had that been made before the police or only before you?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Koessl, you used the word "confession". I think that is hardly justified. Not new evidence of confession. There is evidence that she did certain things, but they were not in the nature of a confession of the crime with which Katzenberger was charged. I think your statement is too strong in that respect.
DR. KOESSL: I ask you to excuse my using the wrong expression.
BY DR. KOESSL:
Q As to this representation of the witness Seiler, was the statement made only before you, or when she was questioned by the police?
A Well, you are making very big requirements upon my memory. I know, in any case, that the circumstance that a certain intimacy existed was not new to me, and that in any case, during the interrogation of the witness Seiler, in my capacity as a Judge, they were expressed. For instance, the statement is known to me that the caresses, which Katzenberger could not deny, from the very beginning he interpreted to mean that there was some kind of an uncle relationship; while, as far as I remember the witness Seiler spoke of being something like an adopted child.
In any case, they both meant the same thing.
Q All right. Now, witness, you pointed out to the defense counsel of Katzenberger that he should put in a complaint against the arrest. I am putting the question to you whether it was not your duty and was not within your authority to revoke the warrant of arrest without any further ado, if you were of the opinion that it was unwarranted.
In this respect, I want to call your attention to Article 123 of the Code of Legal Procedure which says that the warrant for arrest has to be revoked if the reason for arrest which is stated in the warrant is eliminated.
The second half of the sentence does not concerns here.
A. Counsel, if I understand you correctly you are putting two questions to me, namely, first, the question as to whether it was my duty as a judge to instruct the defense counsel about the right of complaint against a Warrant of arrest, and the second question is the following, whether I on my own initiative, that is whether I, without consideration to further regulations of the Code of Legal Procedure, could revoke a Warrant which I had once issued. As regards the first question it can be unequivically answered by referring to the Code of Legal Procedure, in which it says that every accused person has to be instructed about his right of complaint when he is taken into custody. I know that this is a stereotype repetition of the instructions that take place every time a warrant of arrest is issued. I remember positively that in the Katzenberger case this instruction was given, and afterwards I transformed the instructions into advice later on. I told Katzenberger that first of all the circumstances and the evidence which had been brought out before, so for, spoke against him, and that he would only bring about an unnecessary delay in the proceedings if he would register a complaint, because then in the material clarification of the criminal case nothing will be accomplished and the files will only be referred to the penal chamber of the district court via the prosecution.
Q. I think that is enough, witness. Now I want to read to you paragraph 115 A of the Code of Legal Procedure, which says as long as the accused person is under invertigatin, one has at all times to pay attention to it whether the continued detention is admissible and necessary. Has it necessary altogether to suggest an arrest proceeding if you know or were of the opinion that the reasons for the arrest were no longer necessary at all?
A. Counsel, you are here skipping something in your thoughts. I think that it would have been important for me to conclude my first train of thought, because I just spoke of the point of time when the warrant for arrest was issued, while you are now suddenly going over to the time when the man was under arrest, during which time it is, to be sure, necessary to examine whether the further continuation of the arrest is still necessary.
Q. Now I want to leave this question, witness. In any event you referred the case to tho Prosecution, apparently in view of Article 126 of the Code of Legal Procedure, which says, if the public indictment has not been raised yet, the warrant for arrest has to be rescinded if the prosecution so requests. At the same time with the application the Prosecution can order that the accused person should be released.
A. No. If I understand you correctly now-
Q. Just a moment. I now want to put my question. By submitting the case to the Prosecution did you think of instigating the prosecution to issue an order according to Article 126 of the Code of Legal Procedure?
A. No. You are apparently now speaking of the end of the arrest with me as investigating judge.
Q. Yes.
A. This end has already been mentioned extensively. The end was as follows:
Q. Not so extensively.
THE PRESIDENT: Why don't you let the witness answer the question you asked him?
A. In my capacity as investigating judge I had the task to take the witness Seiler under oath. And for ovary jurist the reason was apparent that the prosecution was no longer fully convinced of the possibility of carrying out this case. By means of an oath the existing reasons for suspicion had to recode into the background. The reasons for suspicion were in a plausible manner contradicted by the oath. In this oath it was expressed that no sexual relationship of any kind was in existence. From that I now simultaneously as investigating judge in the arrest proceeding against Katzenberger wanted to draw my consequences. I informed the defense counsel that there was a favorable moment, to attach the warrant for arrest and to register a complaint against it.
One might ask why I told the defense counsel that he should register a complaint. I did it because here I still could impose the necessary reserve of a judge upon myself, and the defense counsel achieved the same and even a more far-reaching effect, because if I refused the release, the penal chamber now had automatically to decide about the complaint against the arrest. Thus if you put the question on the basis which regulations I now submitted the files to the Prosecution, so this happened in consideration of Article 33 of the German Code of Legal Procedure, in connection with , I believe Article 306 of the German Code of Legal Procedure.
Q. Do you have the regulations?
A. Oh, yes, if you could give them to me for a moment, please. Thank you very much. It is article 306 Paragraph 2 of the Code of Legal Procedure. It says: "If the court or the presiding judge whose decision is contested considers--" I may interpose that this was my warrant for arrest--"if they consider the complaint as being justified, they have to remedy the situation." Thus in my referring the matter to the prosecution I expressed, that I would sustain the complaint myself so that it would not be necessary to refer the matter to the district court. The necessity of informing the prosecution about this and of hearing the prosecution's opinion first, results from Article 33 of the Code of Legal Procedure. According to this regulation the judge must in all decisions which are made outside of a trial, listen to prosecution in advance in writing or orally. This regulation I considered when first of all I forwarded the complaint to the prosecution in order to find out its opinion. Thank you very much.
Q. Now, witness, can you remember how this forwarding order was worded?
A. This forwarding order Was supplementing an existing stamp; there was a stamp at the office of investigating judge which took into consideration a number of possibilities, which then, if parts were correctly crossed out, said: to the prosecutor for his opinion -- I added in handwriting: "I intend to remedy the complaint, "as it is expressed in article 306.
Q. When the penal files Katzenberger in this way got out of your hands, did you have anything further to do officially with this case later on?
A. No. That was the thing that was so surprising about it.
Q. You mean to say thus, that the filing of the indictment by the prosecution was for you in a certain sense surprising?
A. Yes, because it was inconsistent.
Q. Do you know how this inconsistency, as you termed it, was caused, and to whom the files were now forwarded?
A. To me as investigating judge surprisingly the news came that the indictment had been filed before the Special Court; this news I have to receive so that I know that I now am no longer competent for the further continuance of the arrest as investigating judge.
Q. Witness, did you hear that the indictment was filed with the penal chamber, or did you find out only that the complaint was put immediately before the Special Court?
A. Whether I know that for certain at the time, I don't know for sure, because I was in any case, first of all, under the effect of the shock that an indictment was filed altogether.
Q. Witness, during the entire time when you had to deal with the matters as investigating judge, did Rothaug make an appearance during this entire time? --- In this case, of course?
A. While I was dealing in an official capacity with the Katzenberger case, as far as I know, Rothaug didn't enter into it.
Q. Now, you still opened up another question, that the woman Seiler was eliminated as a defense witness. I would now like to ask you first whether you found out anything about Rothaug's behavior when he found out that the woman Seiler had been taken under oath?
A. In order that the rest will be understandable, I want to say first in advance that in the interim, I, myself, had been detailed to the Special Court, and that the taking under oath of Seiler did not please Rothaug. He even wanted first to make a reproach to me because of that; however, I only had to point out that here there was an application by the prosecution which was binding for me according to Article 66, paragraph 3, which I have already mentioned. Mr. Markl then had to listen to the reproaches.
DR. KOESSL: Thank you. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Any re-direct examination of the witness Groben?
MR. WOOLEYHAN: No, Your Honor.
BY THE PRESIDENT: There is one question I would like to ask the witness.
Q. You stated that Rothaug was displeased that charges were filed against the Seiler girl. Did ho give you any reason why that would displease him? May be I have stated that incorrectly -- that he was displeased because she was put under examination under oath.
A. Unpleasant was the taking under oath of the witness Seiler for Rothaug for the reason that naturally in his steps he took against Katzenberger, she put the greatest difficulties in his way; because one has to consider that Katzenberger was sentenced, even though the witness Seiler, under oath, had denied having had any kind of sexual relationship with Katzenberger. If the witness had not been under oath, then Rothaug, from the point of view of the trial procedure would have had the advantage that he would not have had to deal with this very weighty fact that the witness made her statement under oath, and he would not have been confronted with the necessity to bring the Seiler case of perjury in connection with the Katzenberger case of a violation of the so-called blood protection law. And -
THE PRESIDENT: You have answered the question. It is time for recess, but could we know now whether any other witness will be called?
MR. WOOLEYHAN: Right after the recess. Can this witness be excused?
THE PRESIDENT: This witness may be excused. We will recess now for fifteen minutes. (A recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. ERNST ESCHER, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows:
BT JUDGE BLAIR:
Hold up your right hand and repeat after me the following oath:
I swear by God, the Almighty and Qmnscient, that will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath)
You may be seated.
EXAMINATION BY DR. KOESSL: (Attorney for Defendant Rothaug) May it please the Tribunal, the witness Escher deposited an affidavit which is to be found in Document Book III-I, in the German on page 48, Document NG-697, Exhibit 223.
THE PRESIDENT: Proceed.
Q. Witness, please tell us your first name, and your last name, and your occupation.
A. Dr. Ernst Escher; lawyer in Fuerth in Bavaria.
Q. Witness, you have deposited an affidavit which concerns Rothaug, and largely refers to the Kleinlein - Schaller case.
A. Yes.
Q You expressed that you had misgivings about Rothaug's attitude in proceedings?
A Yes.
Q When you wrote your affidavit did you know that the prosecutor general on 13 January 1943, that is a whole week before the letter which Rothaug wrote to the Chief Prosecutor, which you criticized, had given the following instructions: The decision as to whether it is absolutely necessary to ask for the heavy sentence to be passed on the 20 year old defendant will have to be left to the tribunal, but in my view, it has to be seriously considered whether for the co--defendant Schaller, the death sentence should be demanded. In this letter there are still further directives.
A I have just heard for the first time of this letter. When I deposited my affidavit, I did not know about the existence of that letter.
Q Witness, would you have spoken of defeating the law, if, when you wrote your affidavit, you had known of the directive by the General Prosecutor?
A It seems to me that this question is difficult to answer; for it is difficult to say what one would have done if a different situation had existed, but at any rate, I believe I am bound to say that the letter from the presiding judge, Rothaug, whose routine task, it was at that time, to schedule a date, and to leave the decision to the tribunal consisting of three judges - that this letter did not correspond to the ordinary custom nor did it correspond to the code of procedure.
Q Witness, I should like to make that the subject of questions to an expert; and, furthermore, I shall submit the appropriate commentaries on this matter. So, that concerning the affidavit, I would like to restrict myself to this statement. I only wish to put one more question to you: In your recollection, did you demand reopening of a trial in cases that had been heard under Rothaug, as a presiding judge?
A I did not do that.
DR. KOESSL: I have no further questions to ask the witness. Thank you. BY DR. SCHILF (For the defendant Klemm): May it please the Court, my cross examination refers to another affidavit by the witness. This is Exhibit 188, NG-677, Document Book 3-G, page 1. That is the first affidavit in the Document Book 3-G.
May it please the Court, we wish to give an opportunity to the members of the Prosecution to get the document book; therefore, Mr. Schubert will put his questions first.
BY DR. SCHUBERT: May it please the Court, I am concerned with the same document as the one on which my colleague, Dr. Koessl, has just cross-examined the witness, NG-679, Exhibit 233, in Document Book 3-I.
Q Dr. Escher, you mentioned two cases regarding which I would like to ask you two brief questions. The Fluhrer case and the Sponsel case. Do you remember that Fluhrer was indicted for a sexual offense which he committed with five juveniles; is that correct?
AAt the moment I can not say whether it concerns five juveniles, but I have the indictment in my files here, and, I believe, that I shall be able to answer your question immediately. The indictment of 25 January 1944, does, in fact, mention five cases where Fluhrer was accused of an - and, I should like to add, he was also convicted during the trial by his own confession, of having entertained homosexual relationship with five juveniles.
Q Is it correct -
A The answer -
Q Just a moment.
AAll right, please forgive me, I thought you were repeating your question.
Q Is it correct that Fluhrer had a previous conviction and had had a penitentiary sentence for previous homosexual offenses?
A I believe that one previous conviction was entered in the penal registry, according to which Fluhrer had been sentenced to two years in the penitentiary - two years and six months.
Q In your affidavit you said that in the indictment the expression, I will, quote literally, "As a dangerous habitual criminal," was added afterwards. Have you any reason and do you know at all, can you make a guess who made that addition and when it was made?
A I know neither who made that addition nor do I know at what date it was made, but from the indictment, which I have before me, it is evident that the words were entered afterwards. If it appears desirable, I am prepared to submit the document which I have in my hand here.
Q When you received the indictment that additional entry had already been made, had it not?
A Yes, it had.
Q Can you say when you received the indictment?
A I have not entered the date on which I received it, on the copy of the indictment, and, therefore, I am not in apposition to state the exact date on which I received the indictment. I believe that I must have received it about the 26th of February 1944, for on that day, as is evident from my files which I have before me, I have a motion for evidence, which at that time, I made to the presiding judge of the Special Court.
Q Can you say, Dr. Escher, whether you received the indictment directly from the Prosecution or whether your client handed it to you?
A In this case, I was appointed as a defense counsel by the presiding judge, and, therefore, I must assume that the court or the office of the court, sent me the indictment.
Q Dr. Escher, during your interrogation here, did you look through the court files of the Fluhrer case?
A I certainly had them in my hand, and I do believe that I read in them, but I should not like to say so with an absolute certainty.
Q Do you by chance happen to remember that the prosecution, among its files--the files of the prosecution--entered the remark on the indictment "it is intended to demand the death sentence"?
A I don't remember that.
Q, Did you appeal for a pardon yourself?
A Yes I did, and I have a copy of that appeal among my files.
Q I am now going to discuss the Sponsel case.
THE PRESIDENT: There is a question in my mind that I would like to ask the witness. He has spoken of an application for a pardon. I am wondering if that means a complete discharge from custody, or whether it is a commutation of a larger sentence to a smaller one.
THE WITNESS: The application, in my application for clemency, was to commute the death sentence to a suitable penitentiary sentence.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
BY DR. SCHUBERT:
Q Dr. Escher, concerning the Sponsel case, you mention in your affidavit that the woman, whom I think you knew personally, in the opinion of many people who knew her, was not fully responsible concerning her state of mind. Can you remember what the expert in the case of Sponsel--the court physician--said about the responsibility before the penal law?
A I can remember the case fairly well. The court physician, Dr. Schneller, in the opinion which he submitted at the trial--in his opinion arrived at the conclusion that the conditions of Article 51, Sections 1 and 2, did not apply in the case of the defendant, that to be sure a certain amount of mental deficiency did exist but that that was not adequate to assume that her responsibility was considerably lessened within the meaning of Article 51, Section 2 of the Penal Code.
Q Dr. Escher, evidently at that time you acted as defense counsel quite frequently before the Penal Chamber. Do you know that since the beginning of the war the jurisdiction in respect to the so-called field post thefts had been very severe?
A Like all defense counsel and all jurists who had to deal with penal matters, I was naturally aware of that.
Q Can you tell me what the motion was which the prosecutor made at the session in the Sponsel case?
A Without scrutinizing my notes and merely by my recollection, I have no doubt that the prosecution demanded the death sentence.
I cannot find my notes from which I could tell the text of the motion or the contents, but I have no doubt that the prosecution did demand the death sentence.
DR. SCHUBERT: Thank you.
I have finished my cross-examination.
DR. SCHILF: May it please the Court, I will now refer to Exhibit 188, Document Book III-G, NG-677. Concerning this affidavit, a technical confusion has arisen. When examining the English text, it was found that the text which was printed in the German document book is not complete, or it seems to have been mutilated. So as not to delay matters, I would like to suggest that the witness, who evidently has before him a copy of the German text, should read this mutilation or omission into the record. The last page of the affidavit, the paragraph before the last, in the German document book, consists of six lines, whereas the English version is at least twice as long. The German version--Yes, Your Honor?
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection on the part of the prosecution to adding these notations?
MR. WOOLEYHAN: None whatever, Your Honor, if the affiant has a German copy there.
THL WITNESS: I have.
DR. SCHILF: May I make this suggestion in that case? That is, that the witness read from his original text the paragraph which begins with the words "I have been asked", and that I interrupt him as soon as his text does agree with the text of the German document book which I have before me?