Q Witness, did you ever see it happen in the case of a defendant including foreigners, that you thought that Article 51, -- I, did pertain, and that Rothaug ignored your expert opinion and treated the defendant as if he were a person fully responsible for his actions?
A I cannot remember mainly for the reason that as I said earlier on, I never remained in the courtroom until the verdict was announced, but always left after I had been examined. Therefore, it is impossible for me to know what affect my expert opinion had on the verdict.
Q During your work, did you ever hear or did it come to you through some channel, perhaps did you hear it through letters, through files, as to whether Rothaug, concerning the application of Article 51, whether he had simply ignored it without taking into consideration the expert opinion in his verdict?
A No, I don't know of such a case. The only things I heard, through rumors were that in conversations he had voiced his criticism of the application of Article 51, but I have no authentic information on that point nor do I know of anything that exists in writing.
Q I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you have any redirect examination?
MR. WOOLEYHAN: I do have one question, Your Honor.
EXAMINATION BY MR. WOOLEYHAN:
Q Dr, Baur, in the Pirner case mentioned a moment ago, was Pirner sentenced to death?
A I do not know whether he was sentenced to death, but when I was interrogated by the American prosecution, I was told that such a sentence was passed.
Q If your medical opinion on the mental condition of Pirner had appeared in its form the way you wrote it, could Pirner have been sentenced to death?
DR. SCHUBERT: May it please the Court, I object to this question. The witness is being asked to give a legal expert opinion. He is not able to do so.
I believe too that that question is not connected with the cross examination.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection will be sustained.
MR. WOOLEYHAN: If I may briefly state an argument, taking Dr. Schubert's remarks up in the order in which I remember them. First of all, in cross examination, he devoted considerable time to the written medical opinion of the doctor.
THE PRESIDENT: Does that refer to the Pirner case?
MR. WOOLEYHAN: It did, Your Honor. And secondly, I think there is sufficient foundation in the affidavit to qualify this man, not only as an expert on psychiatry by also as being fully aware of the legal consequences of his medical opinions.
THE PRESIDENT: Let him answer the question.
DR. SCHUBERT: May it please the Tribunal, may I say something on this point, Your Honor? I understood that the objection was to be sustained.
THE PRESIDENT: That is true, that was the first ruling; then on further consideration we have decided to let him answer the question, Dr. Schubert.
EXAMINATION BY MR. WOOLEYHAN:
Q Doctor, would you please answer the question. Do you remember what the question was?
A I should be glad if you would kindly repeat it to me.
Q In the Pirner case in which you have stated that your medical opinion on Pirner as it was later shown to you was not in the form in which you wrote it, let me ask you, Doctor, if your medical opinion had remained the way you wrote it, could Pirner have been sentenced to death?
A To that, I have to reply that I cannot judge it from the legal point of view, but according to my court experience which extends over a great deal of time, I do not think that a death verdict would have been passed.
Q That is all.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness may be excused. We will recess at this time until one-thirty.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 23 May 1947)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
KARL SCHROEDER, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows:
JUDGE BLAIR: Hold up your right hand and repeat after me the following oath:
I swear by God, the almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
JUDGE BLAIR: You may be seated.
DR. KOESSL (Counsel for Defendant Rothaug): May it please the Court, The witness is to be examined about his affidavit in Document Book 9-B, Document No. NG-507, Exhibit 425, in the German document book on Page 157, almost at the end of the book. May I begin with the cross examination?
THE PRESIDENT: Proceed.
EXAMINATION BY DR. KOESSL:
Q Witness, in your affidavit you stated that Rothaug was very severe. I would like to ask you whether Rothaug already before 1933, as far as you know, represented a very strict and severe conception, when he was active in penal procedures. Please answer.
A In 1927 I met Rothaug in the town of Hof where I was Amtsgerichter, Local Court Judge, and he as Prosecutor was transferred to Hof. Rothaug was already as prosecutor extraordinarily severe. Among the judges of the local District Courts of Hof it was generally known that he applied considerably more strict severe standards than any prosecutor before him had ever shown. Rothaug was, in 1929, I believe, on the first of October as Amtsgerichtsrat, local court counsellor, summoned to Nuremberg. First he worked as an investigating judge and later on he became a single judge, a presiding judge of the jury court. I myself came to Nuremberg on 1 July 1931 as first public prosecutor.
Q Witness, I believe these extensive representations are not necessary.
A In my activity as first Public Prosecutor I also had to deal with Rothaug officially. Among us prosecutors -- there were about 30 of us here -- it was generally known among us that Rothaug had the most severe standard of penalty and he had issued the most severe sentences. Later I found out the same, namely that when he was Landgerichtsrat in penal matters in Schweinfurt that the defense counsel considered it not agreeable, as well in Schweinfurt as in Nuremberg when Rothaug was acting as judge.
Q Did Rothaug represent this severe strict conception, without considering whether they wore penal matters of a general criminal nature, whether they were penal cases with political points of view?
A Until 1933 he probably hardly concerned himself with political matters, but even then the penalties which he issued were far beyond the general standard applied by the judges and prosecutors. For Rothaug it was the same, in my opinion, whether the facts had a political character or whether the facts did not have a political character in the same way as, in my opinion, it was the same whether the defendant had relationships to the Party or whether he was opposed to the Party.
Q Can you remember cases where the Party criticized him because he applied equally harsh standards against cases of the Party?
AAt the moment I remember one case especially. This was a penal proceedings against a former -- I believe he was Ortsgruppenleiter, local group leader, in Nuremberg. I can't remember his name at the moment.
Q Do you mean the case Ramsbeck?
A Yes, I mean the case Ramsbeck. In this case the Party offices, as far as I am informed about it, and as partly after my appointment in Nuremberg on 1 July, 1941, I found out the Party offices took the part of Ramsbeck, especially, who wore the honorary insignia.
Q A little more slowly. Did Rothaug now let the party influence him to treat this Ortsgruppenleiter more leniently than a man who was not with the Party?
A I could find the opposite repeatedly. For Rothaug, whatever he had been told by Party offices at any time, was absolutely unimportant for him. In the case Ramsbeck it was like this. I remember exactly -
Q More slowly, please.
A In the case Ramsbeck I still remember the facts of the case very well, Ramsbeck would probably with any other judge hardly have received a more severe prison sentence, a longer prison sentence, than four to five months, but Rothaug gave him, if I remember correctly, nine months' jail, prison, a penalty which in my personal opinion was too high.
The party offices as far as I found out on the side made every effort in view of the services of Ramsbeck, on behalf on the NSDAP, the Nazi Party to achieve a more lenient sentence, or quashing of the of the penalty. Rothaug devoted himself with a fanatism which he applied to every penal case against any leniency and he probably did that at that time, too, and therefore, did not get the special sympathy of Gauleiter Holz who was for pardoning of Ramsbeck and he spoke for it with a special feeling.
Q Thank you. Did any prosecutor who was working in a session put in a nullity plea or plea for reopening of a case on extra-ordinary objections because the conduct of the trial was not in accordance with the legal code of procedure, and in criminal cases, or because the determination of the facts during the main trial had been wrong?
A We public prosecutors, since we know Rothaug, we pointed out again and again and we also noticed that especially the sentences, the written opinions, in which Rothaug had participated proved to be extra-ordinarily extensive and thorough. I never got to know a case or heard any complaint to the effect that on the part of the defendant or even of the prosecutor, the assertion was made that Rothaug had distorted the facts or changed the facts. During my interrogation here, such reproaches were never made to me, and I heard it far the first time that defendants or prosecutors are supposed to have stated that there were irregularities that might have taken place in this field.
Q Thank you, Witnwss, you wrote here that the personal legal conceptions were perhaps identical with those of party circles-
A If during -
Q Just a moment, please. Now, I wont to ask you whether the legal conceptions which Rothaug shewed was in accordance with the then jurisdiction.
A If during my interrogation, I mean during my affidavit I spoke about the identity of the conception of Rothaug and party circles, then I meant it only in the following sense: Namely, that Rothaug applied a known severe standard in individual cases, and that certain party circles may have liked this standard insofar as political enemies were concerned.
The legal conceptions regarding the amount of penalty were in my opinion at that time the usual thing. At that time we had to decide many clemancy pleas which belonged to the competence of the general public prosecutor, as well as the ministry of Justice, and disregarding some individual cases, perhaps the office of the administration of justice the conceptions where Rothaug was active were always approved and this is demonstrated by the fact that the clemency pleas in favor of the defendant were extra-ordinarily seldom, as I believe that I remember with certainty.
DR. KOESSL: Thank you. I have no further questions to put to the witness in the case in chief of the Defense as my own witness.
THE PRESIDENT: You may did that, of course.
EXAMINATION BY DR. SCHUBERT: (Attorney for the Defendant Oeschey) May it please the Court, the witness, Dr. Schroeder, in Document Book 111-C, made an affidavit, NG-35-, Exhibit No. 148.
The affidavit concerns the case Count Montgelas. The case Count Montgelas is a part of the activity of the defendant Oeschcy during the so-called civilian courts martials. The Witness, Dr. Schroeder, was the representative of the prosecution before the civilian courts martials, and as far as I know he was the prosecutor in every case before the Civilian Courts Martials. Therefore, I must within the framework of the case of the defense, I have to represent the entire case of the civilian courts martials with the witness. For that reason, I believe, that I would not serve the purpose today to take a small case out of this entire framework, but I ask for permission, in the case of the witness. Dr. Schroeder, to discuss the case, civilian courts martials, as a whole, inclusive of the case COUNT Montgelas at a given time when I enter the defense.
THE PRESIDENT: We are wondering on the bench as to whether you would have any objections, while the witness is here, if you are prepared for the cross examination?
MR. WOOLEYHAN: If the Court please, I am prepared for any cross examination on any of the affidavits that the witness has given.
THE PRESIDENT: They want to go beyond that.
MR. WOOLEYHAN: They want to go beyond that and I certainly object to it. That is a defensive matter for their case in chief.
THE PRESIDENT: That would be true of the examination that Dr. Koessl was proposing, I take it; wouldn't it?
MR. WOOLEYHAN: I have no objection to his recalling the witness as his own, during his case, I have no objection.
THE PRESIDENT: Of course he could do that without any permission. It is only suggested as to while the witness is here, whether we could possibly dispose of this. If you are not prepared for cross examination then it wouldn't be possible.
MR. WOOLEYHAN: I am prepared for cross examination on any affidavit that this witness has given.
THE PRESIDENT: They want to go beyond that. Very well then the witness may be excused. May be you have some re-direct?
MR. WOOLEYHAN: No, your Honor. Doesn't Dr. Schubert wish to conduct any cross examination at this time?
THE PRESIDENT: Not at this time -- may be I am wrong. May be be there is a misunderstanding. Will you make your wishes clear so we will understand it?
DR. SCHUBRT:(ATTORNEY for Defendant Oeschey) May it please the Tribunal -
JUDGE BRAND: May I ask you a question in that connection. May I ask you is that correct: That you wish to call the witness as your own later?
DR. SCHUBERT: Yes.
JUDGE. BRAND: AS your own witness, at that time you also wish to crossexamine him concerning the affidavit?
DR. SCHUBERT : Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: May I ask you, Dr. Schubert, at that time when you call this man as your own witness, in your Defense, will you then want to ask him questions about these affidavits, or do you want to waive that altogether?
DR. SCHUBERT: At this time I want to examine the witness also--about this affidavit -- in. he context, and the full context later on.
THE PRESIDENT: If you do it at that time, the Prosecutor will insist upon you making the witness your own witness. I warn you you about that.
DR. SCHUBERT: I have no misgivings about that, Your Honor.
MR. WOOLEYHAN: I am sure that Dr. Schubert realizes that is strictly routine; I am not attempting to prejudice him in any way. He can cross examine the witness now if he likes.
JUDGE BRAND: The Prosecution is not objecting. Mr. Wooleyhan, the Prosecution is not objecting to the suggestion by Dr. Schubert?
MR. WOOLEYHAN: No, indeed, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Then this witness may be excused.
Hans Groben, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows:
JUDGE BRAND: Will you raise your right hand and repeat this oath after me:
I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
JUDGE BRAND: You may be seated.
EXAMINATION
BY DR. KOESSL: May it please tho Court, the witness Groben gave two affidavits which concern my client. I ask you first to be allowed to under take the cross-examination on the affidavit in book 3-I; we are concerned with document NG 532, exhibit 224.
Q Witness, will you please first of all, state your first and last name, and your profession?
A Hans Groben, Counsel of the District Court in Nurnberg, Langerichtsrat.
Q Witness, you had frequently the opportunity to take part in cases of penal procedure, where Rothaug was the presiding judge of the Special Court. Did you ever experience it, and observe that Rothaug during the trial urged and insisted upon changing the actual facts -- distorting the actual facts and to falsify the events?
A No, I never experienced that.
Q You, thus, wrote in your affidavit, that Rothaug interrupted defendants and witnesses in order to change the subject; you did not, by that, mean to say that Rothaug in regard to the finding out of the actual events, which were the basis of the case, made any difficulties of any kind?
A No, I said he wanted to deviate.
Q Witness, did you ever experience it, that the verdict by Rothaug, were contested either by the nullity plea or by the extraordinary objections or through the reopening of the case.
A Yes
Q Did you experience a case, in which a sentence of Rothaug was squashed in favor of the defendant?
A Yes, by the method of reopening of the case.
Q What was the sentence which had been pronounced against the defendant after the reopening of the case, after the sentence had been examined?
A The defendant, because of obvious lack of guilt, in the final proceedings, that is without all examinations, was acquitted.
Q Witness, did you hear remarks of the gentlemen of the Senat of the District Court of Appeal or similar high judges, which attacked the legal correctness of the judgment of the sentences which the Special Court had pronounced with Rothaug presiding.
A I do not understand your question.
Q I wanted to ask you what the high judges and other legal jurists, in general, said about the legal basis and reasoning, and the legal value of the verdict of the Special Court which were pronounced with Rothaug presiding?
A Personally, I had very little connections with high judges outside of the court, but I can answer your question to the extent that the judgment about the legal qualities of these verdicts, in the decisions of the Penal Senat of the District Court of Appeal, was expressed there in which the senate after complaints against the refusal of the reopening of the case, decided that the sentence could not be objected to aside from the legal point of view.
Q You are also speaking witness, about the following: That Rothaug, in general, was of the opinion that a death sentence which he had pronounced must be executed?
A Yes.
Q Is this supposed to mean that Rothaug was of the opinion that it was his point of view, that the judge should always have the courage to stand by his decisions, or do you ascribe a different meaning to the sentence?
A No, by the sentence, I want to express that it was in accordance with the entire tendency of Rothaug, that he wanted to see sentences he had pronounced executed; that was part of his entire National Socialist ideology.
Q Now, what significance was attached to the sentence from the point of view of proceedings and what did the judges think of the pardon process and of the decisions of the pardon authorities.
A In the German clemency regulations, it is laid down that after every sentence, regardless of what court has pronounced it, the court has to examine whether a clemency plea could be considered; that is, for example, also there are forms that are ready, that the decisions are made in advance whether the sentence can be executed. This is, however, first of all, merely a formal matter. In the case of a death sentence, of course, a prerequisite for the execution, is that the highest pardoning authorities -- that was in the Third Reich, first of all, Hitler, then it was delegated during the war to the ministry of Justice, that this pardoning authority had to decide whether it wanted to make use of the right to grant a pardon or not. Personally, I always expected and hoped that the Ministry would put a stop to it here, and would express its disapproval of this jurisdiction in a number of cases, by means of demonstration, making use of the right of issuing a pardon. Unfortunately we were, again and again, disappointed in that respect.
Q Can you name the cases in which there was a clemency plea?
A Should I name the cases?
Q I mean where you know that pardons were actually granted?
A Without doubt; for instance, I remember one case, Follert, that was a case of arson on circumstantial evidence. The defendant, after the verdict confessed his guilt, and later he was pardoned. He had a penitentiary sentence of longer duration.
Q If I understood you correctly, Rothaug, first of all, on the basis of circumstantial evidence, pronounced the death sentence -- even though the defendant denied it?
A Yes.
Q Did they now find out whether the defendant actually committed the crime?
A Naturally, that was the interesting point in the case. We were concerned with purely circumstantial evidence which was the basis of the sentence, and, after the defendant had already been sentenced to death, he confessor before, I believe, a police official or prison official, that he had been the one who had committed the arson.
Q In spite of that he was pardoned?
A I have told you that already.
Q Now, I have a further question: As far as the law against public enemies, the application of the decree against public enemies is concerned, the question which you answered here in your affidavit, you said that in regard to the decree against public enemies, Rothaug applied it also to Jews and Poles.
A Before the so-called Penal Code against Poles and Jews was issued.
Q Just a moment please.
A I spoke only about the application to Poles.
Q You spoke only in regard to Poles?
A Yes.
Q You yourself, now, in regard to the application of the decree against public enemies, applying it against Poles -- you objected to it on a train trip?
A Not only on a train trip, but repeatedly.
Q Can you tell me whether Rothaug, in this case, was supported by the verdicts of other courts, especially of the Reich Supreme Court?
AAfter this controversy I could notice that the Reich Supreme Court did not approve of my opinion.
Q And thus Rothaug had the right conception, according to the jurisdiction of the Reich Supreme Court?
A I was never convinced of the correctness of this jurisdiction.
DR. KOESSL: I have no further questions in regard to this particular affidavit, Your Honor. Therefore I ask for permission to turn to the second affidavit. I am now coming to document NO-554, in document bock III-C, Exhibit 153. It is the document which treats of the Katzenberger case.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
BY DR. KOESSL:
Q Witness, in this affidavit you speak of the Katzenberger case. In what capacity did you get into contact with the Katzenberger case?
A I was investigating judge at the local court in Nurnberg during the time from the 1st of January 1939 until October of 1941. I believe there is a typographical error in my affidavit here. My affidavit says "1 September 1939."
Q That is 1 September 1939?
A No, that is incorrect; it should be 1 January 1939.
Q At the beginning of the affidavit?
A Yes; it says in the affidavit 1 September; the correct date would be 1 January.
THE PRESIDENT: I suppose there is no objection to that being changed right in the exhibit?
MR. WOOLEYHAN: No.
BY DR. KOESSL:
Q Please continue, witness.
A In this capacity--of course, today I can no longer state the exact time with certainty. In any case, during the first half of 1941 Katzenberger was brought to me by the police under the suspicion of having violated the law for the protection of German blood.
Q You considered the reasons for suspicion which were compiled at that time as sufficient for you to issue the required warrant for arrest? Is my conception correct?
AAccording to the German code of legal procedure, a warrant for arrest is issued when there is a great deal of suspicion that the accused has committed the crime with which he is charged. Thus, if I issued a warrant for arrest, the final determination of the question of guilt has in no way been prejudiced.
Q You say now that Katzenberger himself said that he saw that a great deal was against him at the moment. Therefore, I want to ask you: During the course of the investigations, did material become apparent which would eliminate the reasons for suspicion which had existed so far?
A Yes, it became apparent. Namely, in the form that when the investigations by the prosecution had failed to the extent that there was no doubtless proof of guilt, they seized the last expedient request that the witness Seiler be taken under oath. In German legal procedure, it is the last expedient when the prosecutor no longer knows whether he should file an indictment or discharge the case.
Q Who ordered that she should be taken under oath?
AAs I said, that is an expedient used by the prosecution. In article 66, paragraph 3 of the German Code of Legal Procedure, it is laid down that upon the request of the prosecution, a witness can be taken under oath for the obtaining of trustful testimony, also already in the so-called preparatory proceedings.
Q Just a moment, witness. You are here referring to the article which in its later form got the number 65?
A That is conceivable; at least in the form that was used then, I quoted it according to the edition that was current at that time.
Q Witness, can you remember now that the witness Seiler at the time, during her interrogation, admitted something which, before the arrest of Katzenberger, had not been know as yet and which could be regarded as new circumstantial evidence?
A No, for the witness Seiler had already been interrogated when Katzenberger was brought before me. When I interrogated her in my capacity as an investigating judge, the question was to have her statements in the necessary form and, above all, under oath, put down in a definite manner.
Q The confession of the witness Seiler -- which Katzenberger had first of all denied -- that Katzenberger had taken her on the lap and kissed her and touched her, had that been made before the police or only before you?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Koessl, you used the word "confession". I think that is hardly justified. Not new evidence of confession. There is evidence that she did certain things, but they were not in the nature of a confession of the crime with which Katzenberger was charged. I think your statement is too strong in that respect.
DR. KOESSL: I ask you to excuse my using the wrong expression.
BY DR. KOESSL:
Q As to this representation of the witness Seiler, was the statement made only before you, or when she was questioned by the police?
A Well, you are making very big requirements upon my memory. I know, in any case, that the circumstance that a certain intimacy existed was not new to me, and that in any case, during the interrogation of the witness Seiler, in my capacity as a Judge, they were expressed. For instance, the statement is known to me that the caresses, which Katzenberger could not deny, from the very beginning he interpreted to mean that there was some kind of an uncle relationship; while, as far as I remember the witness Seiler spoke of being something like an adopted child.
In any case, they both meant the same thing.
Q All right. Now, witness, you pointed out to the defense counsel of Katzenberger that he should put in a complaint against the arrest. I am putting the question to you whether it was not your duty and was not within your authority to revoke the warrant of arrest without any further ado, if you were of the opinion that it was unwarranted.
In this respect, I want to call your attention to Article 123 of the Code of Legal Procedure which says that the warrant for arrest has to be revoked if the reason for arrest which is stated in the warrant is eliminated.
The second half of the sentence does not concerns here.
A. Counsel, if I understand you correctly you are putting two questions to me, namely, first, the question as to whether it was my duty as a judge to instruct the defense counsel about the right of complaint against a Warrant of arrest, and the second question is the following, whether I on my own initiative, that is whether I, without consideration to further regulations of the Code of Legal Procedure, could revoke a Warrant which I had once issued. As regards the first question it can be unequivically answered by referring to the Code of Legal Procedure, in which it says that every accused person has to be instructed about his right of complaint when he is taken into custody. I know that this is a stereotype repetition of the instructions that take place every time a warrant of arrest is issued. I remember positively that in the Katzenberger case this instruction was given, and afterwards I transformed the instructions into advice later on. I told Katzenberger that first of all the circumstances and the evidence which had been brought out before, so for, spoke against him, and that he would only bring about an unnecessary delay in the proceedings if he would register a complaint, because then in the material clarification of the criminal case nothing will be accomplished and the files will only be referred to the penal chamber of the district court via the prosecution.
Q. I think that is enough, witness. Now I want to read to you paragraph 115 A of the Code of Legal Procedure, which says as long as the accused person is under invertigatin, one has at all times to pay attention to it whether the continued detention is admissible and necessary. Has it necessary altogether to suggest an arrest proceeding if you know or were of the opinion that the reasons for the arrest were no longer necessary at all?
A. Counsel, you are here skipping something in your thoughts. I think that it would have been important for me to conclude my first train of thought, because I just spoke of the point of time when the warrant for arrest was issued, while you are now suddenly going over to the time when the man was under arrest, during which time it is, to be sure, necessary to examine whether the further continuation of the arrest is still necessary.
Q. Now I want to leave this question, witness. In any event you referred the case to tho Prosecution, apparently in view of Article 126 of the Code of Legal Procedure, which says, if the public indictment has not been raised yet, the warrant for arrest has to be rescinded if the prosecution so requests. At the same time with the application the Prosecution can order that the accused person should be released.
A. No. If I understand you correctly now-
Q. Just a moment. I now want to put my question. By submitting the case to the Prosecution did you think of instigating the prosecution to issue an order according to Article 126 of the Code of Legal Procedure?
A. No. You are apparently now speaking of the end of the arrest with me as investigating judge.
Q. Yes.
A. This end has already been mentioned extensively. The end was as follows:
Q. Not so extensively.
THE PRESIDENT: Why don't you let the witness answer the question you asked him?
A. In my capacity as investigating judge I had the task to take the witness Seiler under oath. And for ovary jurist the reason was apparent that the prosecution was no longer fully convinced of the possibility of carrying out this case. By means of an oath the existing reasons for suspicion had to recode into the background. The reasons for suspicion were in a plausible manner contradicted by the oath. In this oath it was expressed that no sexual relationship of any kind was in existence. From that I now simultaneously as investigating judge in the arrest proceeding against Katzenberger wanted to draw my consequences. I informed the defense counsel that there was a favorable moment, to attach the warrant for arrest and to register a complaint against it.