Q. In other words, is this correct, that the enemy armament staff was very well known to you?
A. Yes.
Q. Witness, these figures that were then known, were they believed by the majority of higher officials, in other words, Goering or Hitler?
A. No, they were never believed. I remember I can recall a conference in the office of Goering, that conference probably took Place in January 1943, or early in January. In other words, one year a ter I had taken over that office, that the Field Marshal and myself went to tell Goering about the technical development and the position of supply. The conference as planned was held for several hours, and took place at Goering's working office. Apart from this, Major Giesing was present there, who was at that time technical expert of Goering. After we had presented the case to him, the Field Marshal, namely Milch, went on to tell him that it was known to us concerning the output of the production of the enemy, and he had a special folder with him, and he went to Goering, where Goering was sitting, and started speaking. Hardly had Goering heard anything about the figures which Milch presented to him, then he said, word for word, "Well, Milch, are you also among the defeatists? Do you believe in those fantastic figures, for only these people can only cook the water? Leave me alone from all that stuff," and that is how we were dismissed.
Q. Did Milch insist on a higher output of fighters during the conference?
A. Yes, we tried to do that ever since the beginning when we took over the office. To eliminate that last remark I can say that in November 1941, the General Staff, in other words, both Hitler and Goering had released a figure of three-hundred sixty fighters in a month for 1942, and had asked for such a figure.
This figure seemed, to us much too low, knowing the figures which the enemy could produce, and that is how the Field Marshal, namely Milch, at that time told me immediately, if this general staff does not want to have them we will produce immediately double the amount of fighters and we shall put it in : our program, and next year there must be fifteen-hundred planes, and in 1943 have to reach the figure of threethousand per month, three-thousand fighter planes.
Q. Is that correct, that Milch the Armament Industry based itself on a defensive armament?
A. Yes. According to my opinion he was right, he recognized the situation correctly.
Q. When Milch took over the GL, did he create a new organization? When did that happen?
A. The new organization was necessary, and with respect to the divisions, particularly, that division interest in technique to direct them in one single track. First of all the organization had to be very clear in order to draw the lines between the responsibilities. That is why the branching of my office differed in contract with that before, which had been taken up in the following way: that the development of supply and testing were treated separately, and they only could come to me. I was the head.
Q. This position of the GL, did they increase the output, and did they try to reach a better quality or quantity, or, did Milch consider a means to enslave more rigidly these foreign laborers?
A. What Milch's consideration to do was to increase the output and to increase the output of material for the fighting front.
Q. Witness, before you have testified here that within the actual air armament there was also a factory of special ammunitions, which you said before was very secret. Do you know for what these special factories of foreign workers or prisoners of war were used?
A. No, that was absolutely forbidden. There was a special secret production of ammunitions which was only known to and produced by the Germans, and even these Germans were selected specially for the task.
Q. Witness, within the framework of the GL, were political, or the prisoners of war being forced to work in ammunition factories?
A. No.
Q. Did the GL have anything to do with the normal ammunition?
A. No, they were only under the Ministry of Armament.
Q. Were they ever forced by the G1 to load bombers?
A. No. The GL had nothing to do either with loading the bombers, or planes.
Q. Do you know that Russian prisoners of war were used on ack-ack guns, or anti-aircraft guns?
A. Yes, I do, and in my position which I took up later on as head of the Luftgeu, I had the ack-ack under my orders, and on every battery there were ten to twenty Russians, volunteers we called them.
Q. Do you know what Milch's attitude was concerning this use of prisoners of war on tho ack-ack or anti-aircraft guns?
A. I know that the Fieldmarshal, namely Milch, reported to me concerning this matter when these Russian volunteers, or aids, were used on the ack-ack; to some extent they were namely withdrawn from their work in the Armament, and thus we lost a certain number of workers.
Q. What was Milch's attitude?
A. He was against the use of those prisoners on the ack-ack.
Q. Can you tell me if ever he said anything concerning these POWs, that they were shooting at their own people. What did he say about that?
A. He was against this whole business.
Q. Can you remember if he ever used an expression at the time, "That is a dirty trick to get these prisoners shooting at their own people."
A. I remember he was very cross when this decision was made .
Q. He himself, in other words, did not order it?
A. No.
Q. Was the ach-ach at all under his command?
A. No.
Q. Did you have anything to do with the Central Planning as such?
A. No, in my position as chief of the technical division, no. However, I know from various things that Milch told me concerning those conferences of the Central Planning Board, I only know of the questions regarding the raw-material.
Q. According to Milch's conversations, as you recollect, what was the task of the Central Planning Board?
A. Distribution of raw materials, namely, according to Hitler's figures concerning urgency steps, the relative production of raw material was distributed to the various branches of the service.
Q. Do you know anything with respect to how the Central Planning Board had to do with, or dealt with the workers?
A. No. I only heard about raw material, that is all.
Q. Do you know about the fact if the Central Planning Board was in charge of the Armament and War Economy?
A. No, I did hot know that.
Q. Did the Planning Board ever carry out such a task?
A. No, as far as I know concerning this matter, the Planning Board only took care of the distribution of raw material.
Q. Witness, did Milch once make admission of the fact that these Russian prisoners of war could not possibly be forced to work in industry by giving them more food, but they should be used in the agriculture for a little while?
A Yes, I do remenber that.
Q What was the purpose of it all?
A For their work out in the country they were to rest, and to regain strength. At that time they had decided to send people to agriculture, and later on we were to receive them back.
Q Do you know that in the industry there was a so-called Workers Protection Organization?
A Yes.
Q Can you tell me what that was for?
A The Werkschutz had a similar task, namely, the guarding of the whole place where the factory was at, and also the guiding of incoming people, and also the guarding of secret factories. Apart from that the air-raid precaution, and that of fire guarding.
Q Did it have the task of guarding the camps of foreign workers or PW camps?
A No.
Q Do you know anything about the fact that very often a better use of shirkers or slackers was striven for?
A I know this statement from many GL conferences we had. By that they meant those German workers or laborers who were not willing to work and thus jumped from one factory to another and did not want to work.
Q Do you know anything about the fact that Milch, GL, saw to it that those shirkers and slackers were sent to concentration camps to be educated by Himmler?
A No.
Q Did the GL ever do anything against these slackers?
A No. That was not its task either.
Q Did you ever hear that Milch ever sent foreign laborers or German workers to concentration camps?
A No.
Q Did he have the power to do that?
A No.
Q How would Milch have had to ask for this to happen -- through what channels ?
A He would have had to go through Goering.
Q Is it not correct that the channel downwards would have gone through you? I mean concerning the armament industry, if something had been ordered.
A If such an order had been given, then it would have had to go through me in order to go outside, because I was the man who was in charge of correspondence with the industry, liaison with the industry.
Q Such an order never went through you, did it?
A No.
Q Do you think that Milch would have gone over your head and issued such an order?
A No, not at all.
Q Is it correct that within the RLM and the GL Milch was known for following the regular channels accurately?
A Yes, he always used those channels when I was there.
Q Was the industry directly under Milch.
A No, it was not under Milch.
Q Was it under you?
A No, it was not under me either. Concerning the industry, we had contracts with the industry which were actually based on a voluntary basis. We could not give them any orders.
Q What do you know concerning sabotage and espionage in German industry within the last years of the war? Was it very frequent, or not too frequent?
A It occurred very seldom. I believe that it increased toward the end, but I myself know of only two cases.
Q Is it correct that when such sabotage took place, Hitler and Goering held the GL and its official clerks responsible for that?
A Yes.
Q Do yon know that Milch, when such sabotage was reported, very often saw to it that these sabotage cases were not considered sabotage cases?
A Yes. During the construction of planes many things happened which were actually slight mistakes and not sabotage, but omissions, for instance. If some sort of a tool remains on a fuselage or a wing, this can not be considered sabotage. It would be sabotage only when they used a special apparatus in order to destroy the steering mechanism of those planes, but I don't think that that ever happened.
Q Were these acts of sabotage ever reported?
A The persons concerned were very careful about that and did rather announce less than more. However, during their later investigations, they did show that they were omissions rather than sabotage.
Q Can you tell me about the general attitude of Milch; I mean, after a few years passed by, was he very much excited about the heavy airraids, etc.?
A These heavy airraids on our industrial works and later on the heavy airraids on our cities showed him that he had been right in his opinion when he took over the office. He had made a statement -- and that statement was correct -- and it greatly disappointed him that his proposals had not been realized. In other words, that from an aggressive war they had jumped to a defensive war. It actually gave him much to think about, just as it made us all nervous. From day to day the factories were being destroyed more and more, and the transportation facilities for material were more and more difficult.
Q Tell me, witness, is it correct that Milch was during such moods -that he used very strong words?
A Yes, he was known for that, but, as we knew him, we knew exactly that we should not take him too seriously in his remarks. As far as I am concerned, I had a very similar temperament myself, and I acted accordingly. We said many things that we did not carry out later on.
Q Did that occur much more frequently after his accident in Stalingrad?
A Yes. After that accident in Stalingrad, there was an increase of those expressions of indignation. However, we got along fine, always at all times.
Q Concerning these outbursts, did they come through in a greater circle of collaborators and did they lead to an acute sentiment toward the foreign laborers or PW's?
A No, I don't think so.
Q Can you judge Milch's character? Is he a kind hearted man or a hard hearted man?
A Generally speaking, a kind hearted man. He is, in a way, like a tack that is very soft.
Q Do you know anything about the fact that Milch before the Russian campaign had warned that this Russian campaign should not be carried out?
A Yes, he told me that once. That was once when I went to visit him in his home. He visited Goering and tried to see Hitler in order to give an oral report on this matter. At that time, as he told me, he said that the whole enterprise would end with the collapse of Germany, so to say, and he wanted to warn Hitler. Goering, however, did not permit him to visit Hitler or look up Hitler.
Q Do you know that Milch after Stalingrad had a conference with Hitler and explained to him that the war was lost and that Hitler should conclude a peace?
A Yes, I do. He told me about that too. That was after his mission at Stalingrad was finished. That was only in March, 1943. The whole conference last for one hour. During that conference, he told Hitler all the truth about Stalingrad and tried to explain to Hitler that if the war were to continue in the same manner, it would be lost for Germany. He allegedly proposed to Hitler to cease the attacks in the Hast and to roll back the front to the Dnieper and to go into a built-out defense position and fortified position. Furthermore, ho told him to dismiss Field Marshal Keitel and to use a special commander in chief of the Hast and in the West, and, due to the increased attacks or air raids, to go over to a defensive position in the air and to increase the production of fighters which were necessary for that, and to forget about bombers.
I know that Field Marshal Milch at that time was very much depressed. He came back very much depressed after that conference with Hitler. He personally did not believe that Hitler would draw the necessary conclusions from this report. As it actually happened later on, Hitler did not draw the necessary conclusions.
Q Do you know that he said that Ribbentrop should be dismissed, or that he tried to get him released?
A Yes, he tried; he did.
Q Do you know that he proposed to conclude peace with France?
A Yes. He tried that repeatedly.
Q Do you remember that later on, when there was very great damage, he was sorry that Hitler had not followed his suggestion?
A Yes
Q Do you know that he mentioned at that time that the old boundaries with France should be used and that no territorial demands should be made on France.
A Yes.
Q Fitness, one more question. Do you remember, concerning the famous happening at Compiegne, that he was invited there?
A Yes, he was invited there. However, he did not go because in 1938 he had met the French Air Minister, together with a couple of other officers in Berlin, and. he did. not want to humiliate him.
Q Did he think that treatment was wrong?
A Yes, indeed.
THE PRESIDENT: We are not quite clear what you meant by the famous event or happening. That was the French surrender at Compiegne?
DR. BERGOLD: That is a tricky word which I used. You
DR. BERGOLD: That is a tricky word which I used. You will remember that Hitler's campaign used the wagon which General Foch used in 1918 in order to sign the Armistice, and hitler had blown up the F& ch memorial. You know that it was some way of mine to snow you my criticism of that matter. At that time there was a considerable stir all over the world about that train.
Q (By Dr. Bergold) Witness, I wish now to come back to the records of all the sessions which were made. Do you know if any of these records were ever reviewed?
A These records could never be checked, even by the Field Marshall, but we could review them, the Field Marshall and myself, after the sessions. That is why it was done in the following manner, that these verbatim records, namely an excerpt of the most important things that had been decided on during the session, and sent to all those concerned and interested. This record, that excerpt of the record, I always reviewed myself before it went out. However, we had so much work to do that these thick records, that were that thick, could not be read.
Q Do you know that there were many mistakes in those records, inaccuracies?
A Yes, indeed. If we had to check up on something and we were trying to find a certain passage we noticed that some thing had been recorded wrong, which, considering the fact that those sessions were so long, was not surprising at all.
Q Witness, you spoke of the work you had. You had too much work you said, Can you tell me how many signatures approximately a day Milch had to give?
A I can only judge it from the fact as to how many I had to sign. There were approximately five to six hundred signatures a day, and I am sure that the Field marshal Milch himself had more than that.
Q Do you know whether in the evening, after the end of the work hours he took several cases with work and signatures home in order to be able to sign them there?
A Yes, I saw that several times, because I was in his room very often when he was about ready to go home, The driver came out, came upstairs, and took those cases which were filled with documents and reading material, took them down, and I also saw that several times in the morning, early in the morning when the driver brought back these cases with the documents, back to the office. That was not possible to be done in any other way because during the day he only had time for conferences and discussions.
Q Witness, do you know that very often during conferences the stenotypist was given instructions as to removing certain strong words used there criticizing Hitler or Goering, or to change them?
A Yes, I do. I saw that happen once, several tines rather, sometime ago.
Q Witness, I shall come back to those strong expressions used by Milch. Do you know that in the German army if anything goes wrong, if a responsible man was looked for, he will be hanged?
A Yes, we said that very often without actually thinking of carrying out that threat.
Q Can it be said then it was only a strong expression or an expression of indignation which, for instance, as some times you say in the American army, "Go to hell"?
A. That is about the same. In our army we used to say, "This guy should be hanged."
Q. When Milch used such an expression of indignation did it ever happen that he apologized later on?
A. Yes, he apologized later on.
Q. Witness, were you present during the address to the oberquartiermeister and the air fleet engineers of the 25th of January, 1944 -
A. Yes.
Q. That was a biting speech, wasn't it? Here strong words used there?
A. Yes, that was a state of affairs when the air raids were taking place day by day and night by night, and after several factories could no longer be used and parts were being sought for, and the conference had the purpose to get from the quarter masters and engineers of the air fleet the material, which was at their disposal. Many spare parts for airplanes at that time were already with the troops, and we needed those parts urgently in older to rebuild planes and to complete them which were under construction, and that was a very strong appeal to these people, to the troops, to the industry, or rather to the troops to help the industry with spare parts.
Q. How can you explain then that he used strong words with reference to foreign laborers and laborers, how can you explain that, was that in the whole attitude, in the whole mood?
A. I do not know of anything, that such strong expressions were used against labor as far as I know. He spoke against the bureauocracy, because all the offices, the troops held on to those spare parts and wouldn't hand them out. That had nothing to do with the laborers themselves. I only remember that he used strong words against the and the quartermasters.
DR. BERGOLD: You may translate that expression literally.
THE PRESIDENT: Can we understand the translation was not literal? It is just as well.
BY DR. BERGOLD:
Q. Witness, can you tell me now what consideration led to the creation of the fighter staff?
A. All the efforts made by the Field Marshal and his subordinate chiefs of offices did not have the result which was to be expected. Higher up in contradiction with every reason no great program had been ordered, but again and again they came back to the bomber program, and that constant struggle in which this field marshal was with Goering and Hitler and later on also with Speer and all his subordinate division chiefs in order to increase the fighter production, at least to be able to stop the air raids on the industry and the population, at least to reduce them if not stop them, finally in 1941 moved them to withdraw from the responsibility of air industry, air armament, as his immediate resignation during the war could not be considered and expected. The Field Marshal tried as he told me. He tried to do it in this way. That concerned the responsibility for the production of planes through the proposal of the fighter staff and that he got rid of it. He only wanted to keep for the air force the development and the testing of planes, engines and mechanisms, but as far as the production was concerned he wanted to place this into the hands of Speer.
Q. For the purpose, of that transfer, did he use a man from the Speer Ministry who was responsible for all these difficulties which arose? Who was it?
A. Mr. Sauer.
Q. Is it correct that he always would remain away from the conferences of Jaegerstab, that he sent his deputy there more often?
A. Yes. At the beginning he used to go there very often but then later on less frequently. Then he no longer participated in these conferences.
Q. When did Milch entirely resign or withdraw from the air armament?
A. That was at the same time when I withdrew, that must have been around the 20th of June, 1944. June, that is correct.
Q. Later on was there a great transfer necessary or had the Jaegerstab already been carried out?
A. The Jaegerstab had already been carried out at that time. A major transfer was not necessary, particularly considering the fact that the division chief of the planning office became the major chief of the technical air armament about six or eight months later. He was in charge of the office and all the conferences and sessions of the G. L. and the fighter staff. In other words, he knew all about it.
Q. Witness, do you know who asked for the underground transfer of the Armament Industry?
A. Yes, I believe that Hitler, together with Goering, had discussed that and had ordered that.
Q. Do you know what Mileh's attitude was towards that?
A. It was clear to both him and us that the time factor had come too late and that these factories could no longer be finished before the end of the war. As it actually was later the case, they were not completed.
Q. Does that apply to the cement factories?
A. Yes.
Q. Whom were they ordered by?
A. Also by Goering and Hitler.
Q. Will you describe to us now how the Jaegerstab functioned and how it was set up?
A. There were a few constant members in that fighter staff, Jaegerstab, and during all sessions these people from the Speer Ministry and the GL, also from the Air Industry, were called to attend or to discuss a point which had to be decided upon. The decision did not go from the Jaegerstab to the respective offices, but that person of the Armament Industry Speer or the GL asked for that via his assistant.
Q. Is it correct that those conferences always started with a general address and then went into a group of small sessions?
A. Yes, the Jaegerstab, every eight or fourteen or fifteen days, took a trip into a certain territory. All the people necessary for that task from the industry of economy, from the political leadership, and from armament inspectorates, etc. were used. At the beginning the Field Marshal always made the speech concerning the seriousness of the military situation, and what efforts would be necessary. Then Sauer took it over and after Sauer's speech the conference was distributed in small working discussions; in other 1628 words, raw material, construction, labor assignments, air raid precautions, etc.
, etc.
Q During those single conferences did Milch always participate?
A We never participated in these single conferences because they only concerned certain fields.
Q Did the Jaegerstab men recruit foreign laborers from the foreign countries or draft them?
A No, it did not have the authority to do so, nor the newer to do so.
Q Did the Jaegerstab change anything on the GBA?
A No, everything remained the same.
Q Or then on the concentration come factories which belonged to Himmler?
A No, not that I know of.
Q. When these construction plans had been carried out by the Organization Todt, did the Jaegerstab or the GL have any possibility to influence them with respect to laborers?
A No, the OT was immediately under Speer.
Q Do you know anything about Kammler or that Himmler or Hitler had assigned him to work in their subterranean factories?
A I remember that Kammler went on part of the trip with us and ate with us on that trip.
Q Do you know that Hitler, concerning the construction of bunkers, had used one hundred thousand Jewish concentration camp inmates?
A During my inspection together with Gauleiter Giessler and the Munich Gauleiter Schreier, I heard about that.
Q When was that?
A That was in October or November 1944.
Q Milch at that time had already resigned from the GL?
A Yes, that was a matter which had nothing to do with the GL, because I, in my position of commander, discussed that matter together with the Gauleiters who had been invited, together with me.
Q Herr Schmelter deposed that Jewesses were used in the manufacture of planes. Do you know anything about it?
A No, I don't. During my inspection tours I never saw any.
Q Would that have become known to you in your position?
A Yes, I am sure that would have become known to me.
Q In one of the teletypes of February 14, 1944, Goering asked from Himmler for concentration camp inmates for the air armament. Did the GL know about that letter?
A I cannot recall this letter.
Q Who was responsible for these cement constructions? Who was responsible for them, the GL or the Jaegerstab?
A It was Speer with his Organization Todt, OT.
Q The Central Planning once sent to the armament staff a special steel contingent. Was that for construction work for the OT or for planes?
A That could only have been used for the construction of planes because we had nothing to do with other sorts of construction.
Q What do you know, generally sneaking, about what the construction manager had to do with the steel contingent?
A Somebody was to carry cut a construction. A certain contingent was given.
to him and he, the person, was charged with it.
Q. One was charged with it. Whom do you mean by one was charged with it?
A. The construction manager the nan requesting the construction.
Q. If the GL asked for such construction, then the GL would have been charged with it?
A. Yes. Well, just about, or the Luftwaffe.
Q. What did you do about it? When did the GL start with the transfer on the surface?
A. We started our transfer on the surface, as far as I con remember, after the first daylight attack of the American Air Force on the Messerschmitt Factory at Regensburg. At this present moment, however. I cannot remember the exact date. It must have been towards the end of 1942. However, I can be wrong. It night be early in 1942.
Q. Did the Jaegerstab ever carry out construction work for itself?
A. No.
Q. However, the general construction situation was discussed with the Jaegerstab. Why did that happen?
A. Because partly the execution of the program depended on this, that the construction had to be finished by then in order to be able to produce those constructed buildings.
Q. Was Stobbe Oetlefessen a member of Jaegerstab?
A. No, he was only present once or twice in the first sessions when we discussed construction.
Q. Goering delegated throe construction companies from the Luftwaffe. Were these people Germans or were they foreign laborers?
A. They were Germans. Most of then were old people, that I saw, and I had. one of those battalions of the Luftwaffe in my sector. They built runways for tho airfields.
Q. Did Milch have any power over these companies?
A. No, they were under the juartermaster General of the General staff.
Q. Witness, during one of the Jaegerstab conferences miners were dis cussed.