Behind many of these personnel changes, and taking a constantly larger share in guding the destinies of the Reichswehr, was General Kurt von Schleicher. A regimental comrade of Hindenburg's son Oskar, von Schleicher had become a protege and favorite of the old Reich President as well as of Groener. In 1925, in order to provide the Minister of Defense with better staff assistance and to improve coordiation of matters of interest to both the Army and Navy, a new staff section was established directly under the Minister of Defense called the Armed Forces Section (Wehrmachts abteilung). Von Schleicher became its chief, and utilised this position and his personal contacts with Hindenburg, Groener, and Hammerstein to achieve great political and military influence. In 1929, his section was renamed Ministeramt, the Ministry Department, and von Schleicher was given the title of Deputy Minister of Defense.
Von Schleicher, as is well known, became the last chancellor of the Weimar Republic, save only Hitler himself, who destroyed it. Although Schleicher had been an early supporter of Chancellor Bruening, his attitude changed after Hindenburg's election to a second term as President, in april, 1932. Soon thereafter, he persuaded Hindenburg to sack Bruening and appoint Franz von Papen, who became Chancellor, in June 1932. Schleicher himself relinquished his military rank and became the Minister of Defense in Papen's cabinet. The elections of November, 1932, and Papen's own instability brought about the fall of his cabinet, and in December von Schleicher became Chancellor. His tenure was short; Papen who had charmed Hindenburg, struck a bargain with Hitler; on 28 January, 1933, Hindenburg dismissed Schleicher, and on 30 January Hitler became Chancellor in a coalition cabinet with Papen as Vice-Chancellor.
But if the era of von Schlcicher had been one of political vicissitudes, the Reichswehr itself had been further strengthene Although von Schleicher himself became enmeshed in party politics, the Army as a whole did not, but continued on the general lines laid down by von Seeckt. In particular, clandestine rearmament in violation of the Versailles Treaty continued with quickened pace, and whith the strong moral support of Hindenburg's secret approval.
It was, of course, well understood by all concerned that this secret rearmament was not only a violation of international law, but was also forbidden by Germany's internal law. The legal expert of the Reich Defense Ministry, in an opinion written in January, 1927, declared that ".... the Peace Treaty of Versailles is also a law of the Reich, and by reason of this, it is binding on all members of the Reich at home. This commitment ranks superior even to the provisions of the Constitution of the Reich ....." And another memorandum prepared during the sane month within the Troops Department of the Army Command, stated:
When, years ago, preparations for mobilization were started, and after the clarification of the international and constitutional aspects of the affair, and in full recognition of the fact that in no respect was any legal foundation present, other means were knowingly and purposefully used.
A few serving officers were asked whether they would be prepared, and whether their conscience would permit them, to participate in activities which were necessary from the point of view of their Fatherland, but contrary to its law.
The military offices as such were by-passed. High ranking officers did not participate openly, so that they did not have to bear the odium of a conscious breach of the law.
In important fundamental matters, they issued directives sub rosa to individual confidential agents.
It may also be noted that this accelerated secret rearmament began during the years 1926-1929, when international relations seemed comparatively harmonious. As part of the Locarno settlement, the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control were withdrawn, but to the German Government and the Reichswehr this meant merely that they could now proceed with clandestine activities without fear that the Commissions might find them out. As Krupp records reveal, the Commissions' departure was regarded as "an important step on the road towards freedom" because "after the departure of the Commission" the army and Krupp "had more of a free hand" to carry on the prohibited artillery development work which they were engaged in together. They also found,it possible to commence tank and armoured car development work, The Reich government now dared to assist more extensively; a secret document of the German Navy tells us that, beginning in 1927 "...German rearmament was put on a basis which was more and more expanded by the sharing of responsibility by the Reich Government...." It tells us further that a "secret special budget" was set up to cover unlawful military expenses, which increased from 6,800,000 Reichsmark in 1928 to 21,000,000 in 1933.
By the time the Weimar Republic was nearing its end, the Reichswehr had ample cause for satisfaction with the progress it had made in rearmament despite the Versailles Treaty. At Christmas time in 1932, Colonel Zengauer, a department chief in the Army Ordnance Office, accompanied the season's greetings to Krupp with the information that The department is convinced that, thanks to your active cooperation and valuable advice, our armament development in 1932 has made great progress, which is of great significance to our intent or rearming as a whole.
When this was written, Hitler's appointment as Chancellor was only five weeks in the future. Many terrible changes were in store for Germany, but it is a mistake to overlook that the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich had numerous common denominators, and that the Reichswehr was the most important link between the two. What the German military leaders accomplished under the Republic was a vitally important part of the process of German rearmament for aggressive war. This will become increasingly clear as we examine the development of events under Hitler and the Third Reich.
With the Court's permission, Mr. McHaney will continue with the reading of the statement.
MR. MCHANEY:May it Please the Tribunal, Your Honors:
The events leading to Hitler's appointment as Chancellor on 30 January 1933 need not here be set forth again. We do not charge that the Reichswehr bears any special responsibility for Hitler's selection. We may, indeed, criticize the military leaders for not actively opposing the appointment of a man whose criminal program had been so brazenly proclaimed; but however blameworthy this failure was, it is not charged as criminal in the indictment.
But Hitler's appointment as Chancellor was only dictatorship in embryo. The infant was actually born only with the suspension of the Constitution, the suppression of all civil liberties, and the abolition of political opposition.
Thereafter there came a stormy childhood and a violent adolescence before the terrible full maturity of the Third Reich was reached. During this time, the Wehrmacht's lenders did not stand aside. They took a leading part in the development of the Third Reich, and the Wehrmacht was a key pillar in the finished structure. And in so doing, the German military leaders, including those defendants, committed crimes against peace by preparing and launching aggressive wars.
In conclusion we will make a few observations on why this happened. For the moment we will restrict ourselves to an account of what actually happened. And we will start with a description of the changes in the structure of the Wehrmacht which followed Hitler's accession to power, in the course of which we shall see how the individual defendants fitted into the structure.
In Hitler's cabinet, the position of Minister of Defense was for the first time bestowed on a general, Werner von Blomberg, who remained on active service. The principal staff division of the Ministry - the Ministoramt, which under Schleicher had acquired such importance - was now renamed the Armed Forces Department (Wehrmachtsamt). As its chief, Blomberg appointed General von Reichenau, who had been his chief of staff in East Prussia, and who was known as proNazi.
Admiral Raeder's tenure as Chief of the Naval Command continued undisturbed. General Hammerstein, however, was personally anti-Nazi and endured the Hitler regime for only a year. It must not be thought, however, that at this stage Hitler was strong enough to dictate the selection of the Army's leader. Hammerstein's successor as Chief of the Army Command, General Werner von Fritsch, was the choice of Hindenburg and the officers' corps; he perpetuated von Seeckt's reserved attitude toward party politics.
Within the Army, policies were determined largely by von Fritsch and the senior generals. Among these, the most senior were von Rundstedt and the defendant von Leeb, the commanders-in-chief of the two "gruppenkomnando" headquarters at Berlin and Kassel. Slightly younger was a group of twelve or fifteen generals, including the defendants von Kuechler and Blaskowitz, who were Wehrkreis Commanders at the time of Hitler's accession to power, or became such within a few years thereafter. Hoth, Reinhardt, von Salmuth, and Hollidt were all in their forties and all became generals between 1934 and 1935. Reinhardt, as a colonel, was chief of the Traning Section of the Army from 1934 to 1937, and thus played a part in the high-level military planning. Reinecke was on special duty in the War Ministry beginning in 1934. Warlimont occupied an important post in the Army Ordnance Office from 1933 to 1936, and then was sent as Military Plenipotentiary to General Franco in Spain.
We may pass for the moment the defendants von Roques, Woehler, and Lehmann, who did not play important parts until 1935 or later. The remaining two defendants - Sperrle and Schniewind - were among the most senior officers of the Air Force and the Navy, respectively. Sperrle was a regular army officer who went on special duty with the newly-created Air Ministry in 1934 and became the commander of the so-called "Condor Legion" in Spain in 1936. By 1937 he had been promoted three times in three years to the rank of lieutenant general. Schniewind was at sea as captain of a cruiser when Hitler came to power, but in 1934 became chief of staff of the fleet.
In 1937, he was made chief of the Navy Armament Office.
Thus were the defendants situated during the early years of the Third Reich, when Germany's military power grew with such startling swiftness. In point of fact, the speed of rearmament was so bewildering largely because few people realized how completely the Reichswehr had prepared for rearmament under the Weimar Republic. Technologically, very little ground had been lost; Gustav Krupp has told us that After the assumption of power by Hitler, I had the satisfaction of being able to report to the Fuehrer that Krupp's stood ready, after a short warming-up period, to begin the rearmament of the German people without any gaps of experience.
A secret history of artillery design states that, as a result of clandestine activities under the Weimar Republic.
Of the guns which were being used in 1939-1941, the most important were already fully developed in 1933 ..... For the equipment which was tested in secrecy, the Army Ordnance Office and the industry stood ready to take up mass production, upon order from the Fuehrer.
In this regard, the Fuehrer was not bashful. The Reich's military estimates for 1933 showed an extraordinary increase over prior years. Already by October, 1933, a top secret document of the Army Ordnance Office listed fifteen major projects, including the manufacture of 135 tanks, which were being carried out in violation of the Versailles Treaty. In this same month, Germany withdrew from the League of Nations and the International Disarmament Conference.
Hitler's effect on rearmament, in short, was like uncapping a gusher.
In June, 1934, the construction of submarines and heavy battleships was under way. Guns and tanks were beginning to pour from the Krupp and other arms factories. There is no need to fill in the detail now; much of this part of the story is contained in the record and judgment of the first International Military Tribunal, and will be more fully set forth in the documents we will offer in this case.
In March, 1934, the Army started a program for the construction of 650 tanks, to be completed by March, 1935. The second date is significant; in that same month Hitler publicly repudiated the Versailles Treaty . In the twinkling of an eye, the Reichswehr was history and the Wehrmacht a foreboding reality.
As a matter of fact, the Reichswehr had not fooled everyone; to those "in the know" German rearmament had been an open secret for some time. But by 1935, matters had progressed so far that the mask of duplicity was becoming an embarrassment even to the most shameless. so in March, 1935, the mask was thrown off; this event was called Germany's "recovery of military freedom" (Wehrfreiheit). The sequence of events is thus set forth by the IMT:
On 10 March 1935, the defendant Goering announced that Germany was building a military air force.
Six days later, on 16 March, 1935, a law was passed ......instituting compulsory military service and fixing the establishment of the German Army at a peace-time strength of 500,000 men.
In an endeavor to reassure public opinion in other countries, the Government announced on 21 May 1935 that Germany would, though renouncing the disarmament clauses, still respect the territorial limitations of the Versailles Treaty, and would comply with the Locarno Pact.
Nevertheless, on the very day of this announcement, the secret Reich Defense Law was passed and its publication forbidden by Hitler.
In this law, the powers and duties of the Chancellor and other Ministers were defined, should Germany become involved in war.
These events resulted in important changes in the top organization of the Wehrmachtl. In 1935, the Ministry of Defense was renamed the War Ministry (Reichskriegs Ministerium) Blomberg became Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief (Oberbefehlshaber) of the Wehrmacht. His immediate subordinates, von Fritsch and Raeder, became Commanders-inChief of the Army and Navy respectively. Goering, who had been Minister for Aviation since 1933, now took the title of Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force; in his military capacity only, but not in his ministerial status, he was under von Blomberg.
For Erich Raeder and his staff - now renamed the Supreme Command of the Navy (Oberkommando der Kriegsnarine or OKM) - the events of March and May 1935 were like a shot in the arm. The primary goal was recreation of the German submarine fleet, and now the illegal submarine activities of past years paid enormous dividends. The secret history of the German Navy credited these early projects with having made possible the "astonishing facts" that ....... it was possible to put the first submarine into service only 3 1/2 months after the restoration of military sovereignty declared on 16 March 1935, that is on 29 June, and then at intervals of about 8 days to put now submarines continuously into service, so that on 1 October 1935, twelve submarines with fully trained personnel were in services.
A program for the construction of battle cruisers and capital ships was also formulated and set under way. In 1937, the same year that the defendant Schniewind become Chief of Naval Armament, Germany entered into the Anglo-German Naval Treaty, under which both powers bound themselves to interchange full details of their building programs. But this was only a feint to gain time; as the IMT found, Germany had no intention of abiding by the naval agreements, and promptly and deliberately violated them.
The German Air Force - newly born in 1935 - occupied a special position among the three services. The top staff of the Air Force (Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, or OKL) was part of Goering's own Air Ministry, not part of the War Ministry. Goering recruited his staff from civilian aviation administrators such as Erhard Milch, famous pilots such as Udet, and by transfer to the Air Force of regular army officers such as Kesselring, Wever, and the defendant Sperrle.
The infant Luftwaffe soon found opportunity to try its wings in actual combat. The Spanish Civil War broke out in July, 1936, and in September, the defendant Warlimont arrived in Spain as Plenipotentiary Delegate of the Wehrmacht. Although diplomatic reasons underlay German aid to Franco, the Wehrmacht was especially interested in the opportunity it afforded to test German equipment and German battle tactics with new weapons. The Army sent only a few troops, but substantial quantities of guns and ammunition. The Navy played a relatively minor part, though the pocket battlecruiser "Deutschlahd" and two light cruisers patrolled the Spanish Goast. But the Luftwaffe played a major role.
In November, 1936, the defendant Spernle arrived in Franco Spain at the head of the so-called "Condor Legion", which included a large number of bomber, fighter, and reconnaissance squadrons and several anti-aircraft batteries. An article by the defendant Sperrle reveals the great value of the Spanish experience to the Luftwaffe in its subsequent aggressive campaigns, especially in Poland and France. In October, 1937, Sperrle was relieved in Spain and given command of one of the three "air groups' into which the Luftwaffe was divided.
Spectacular as were the achievements of the Navy and the Luftwaffe, the Army's expansion wasof greater importance. As in the case of the Navy, the top staff was renamed the "Oberkommando des Heeres" (OKH). With the need for camouflage removed, the Troops Department now emerged as the General Staff of the Army.
The subdividing of Germany into seven Wehrkreise was abolished in 1935, and the three obsolete cavalry divisions dissolved. Germany was newly divided into thirteen Wehrkreise, each with a corps headquarters. Nurnberg was the center of the Wehrkreis XIII, and the building directly across the street from the Palace of Justice is the former headquarters of the XIIIth Army Corps. Subordinate to each corps were three (occasionally two) infantry divisions. In addition, there were three more corps headquarters, without territorial jurisdiction, controlling the motorized, light, and armoured (panzer) divisions respectively. Above the corps headquarters, the two old "gruppenkommandos" were replaced by three territorial "army group" (heeresgruppe) headquarters, commanded by the three most senior generals - von Rundstedt, von Book, and there defendant von Leeb. A fourth non-territorial army group under von Brauchitsch controlled the motorized, light, and armoured divisons.
In March 1936, the last safeguard of the Versailles Treaty was swept away. A year earlier, a plan for the military reoccupation of the Rhineland had been prepared by the Ministry of War. On 7 March 1936, in open defiance of the Treaty, the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland was entered by German troops.
Once again, the secret rearmament activities of earlier years gave the German military leaders courage; the German Navy's secret history states On 7 March 1936, during the critical moment of the occupation of the demilitarized zone on the Western border, eighteen submarines in service were available, seventeen of which had already passed the test period and in case of emergency, they could have been employed without difficulties on the French coast up to the Gironde.
In announcing this action to the Reichstag, Hitler endeavored to assuage the hostile reaction which he no doubt expected to follow from this violation of the Treaty by saying: "We have no territorial claims to make in Europe". But events which were to give the lie to this assurance were not far in the future. Between May 1935 and the end of 1937, the German Army more than quadrupled; by the time of the annexation of Austria, it comprised 32 infantry, 4 motorizod, 4 armoured, 3 light, and 1 mountain division, or 44 in all.
The impressive revival of the Wehrmacht's strength was achieved by Germany's military leaders with the full support of German industry and, after January 1933, under the political leadership of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party. And before we describe the conquest of Poland and the other countries overrun by the Wehrmacht, we may well pause to examine briefly the development of relations between the Wehrmacht and the Nazis, for it was the alliance between Hitler and the Wehrmacht -an alliance which was established and preserved despite some points of difference and much ill will between the Nazi Party and the German officers' corps -- that wasthe key stone of the arch of the Third Reich. As the defendant Reinecke put it in the notes for one of his lectures "The two pillars of the Third Reich are the Party and the Armed Forces and each is thrown back on the success or downfall of the other.
The basis for this alliance between Hitler and the Wehrmacht was not openly acknowledged during the early months of the Hitler regime. Indeed, when Blomberg took office in the Hitler-Papen cabient, he attributed his selection to Hindenburg, not to Hitler, and, with a bow to von Seeckt, promised to preserve the Reichswehr as "an instrument of the state above all parties." But this promise rapidly became meaningless as German party politics succumbed to the rigor mortis of dictatorship. After the election of 5 March 1933 Hitler had numerous opposition members in the Reichstag the Enabling Act of 24 March 1933, which gave his cabinet full legislative power, even above the Constitution. A month later Goering established the Gestapo, and in July all parties other than the NSDAP were declared criminal. During the remainder of 1933, the vise of tyranny was tightened by the prostitution of the judiciary, strangling of the trade unions, and the subjection of the press to Goebbels and Dietrich. It had been all very well for von Seeckt to maintain a haughty superiority to "party politics" under the Weimar Republic, but by the latter part of 1933 there was no such thing left in Germany, and there was only one overriding and all-important political issues whether to fight against the militaristic tyranny that was settling over Germany, or to join with Hitler and the Nazis in establishing the dictatorship of the Third Reich. The leaders of the Wehrmacht gave their answer cautiously but, in the end, decisively.
Indeed, in some circles of the Wehrmacht, there was rather more enthusiasm than caution. In February 1933, Hitler's very first month as Chancellor, both Blomberg and Reichenau made public statements favorable to the Nazi cause, and on 31 March 1933, Blomberg, speaking for the Wehrmacht, saluted Hitler as "the leader of the German destiny". Later the same year Hitler reciprocated these manifestations of good will. On 1 September 1933, the day of the annual Nazi Party rally at Nurnberg, Blomberg waspromoted to the rank of a full general (Generaloberst) and the defendant Leeb was appointed Commander-inChief of Gruppenkommando 2.But Blomberg and Reichenau had been specially favored by Hitler, and the latter was a well known Nazi sympathizer.
As yet, the old line conservative generals -- such as the Commander-in-Chief, von Fritsch and the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Beck -had not taken a position. Hitler's support of rearmament was favorably received throughout the Wehrmacht, but there was trouble with some of Hitler's followers, notably the Storm Troops (Sturmabteilung, or "SA") under the leadership of the notorious Roehm. This, the so-called "radical wing" of the Nazi Party' wanted to break the grip of the officers' corps by incorporating the SA into the Reichswahr. But this threat to the privileged status of the officers' corps was eliminated during the so-called "Roehm purge" in June 1934, when Roehm and his followers were murdered in an orgy of political assassinations This put the quietus on the military hopes of the SA, and was so welcome an event to the Wehrmacht that they were prepared to overlook the brutal murder during the "purge" of two of their own colleagues -- Generals von Schleicher and von Bredew.
And so when Hindenburg died on 2 August 1934, and Hitler proclaimed himself Chief of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Hitler had already won powerful support among the leading generals, and the remainder were by no means prepared to take a stand against him. That some day, on the ordersof Blomberg, all members of the Wehrmacht took the following oath to Hitler:
I take this holy oath before God, that I will render unconditional obedience to the Fuehrer of the German Reich and of the German people, Adolf Hitler, and as a brave soldier Will be prepared at any time to sacrifice my life for this oath.
But it was the repudiation of the arms limitations of the Versailles Treaty in May 1935 which finally sealed the bargain between Hitler and the military leaders.
We have already traced their clandestine rearmament activities during the fifteen years which preceded this event, and have seen with what unalloyed enthusiasm they welcomed open rearmament in the spring of 1935. And it was in the fall of 1935 that the old line generals threw off their previous reserve and spoke out enthusiastically and devotedly for the Fuehrer. The occasion was the 125th anniversary of the German War Academy, which had been founded by Scharnhorst in 1810, and which had closed in 1920 as required by the Versailles Treaty. On 15 October 1935; great ceremony attended the reopening of the academy. The Fuehrer himself was in attendance with Goebbels and Dietrich at his heels; the aged Fieldmarshal von Mackensen and General von Seeckt emerged from retirement; among the active military leaders in attendance were Blomberg, Fritsch, the Chief of the General Staff Beck, Goering and Milch from the Luftwaffe, Rundstedt, Witzleben, and the Commander of the War Academy, Lieutenant-General Liebmann.
The occasion was graced by speeches, not only by Blomberg, but also by Beck and Liebmann, both of whom were foremost and highly respected examples of the so-called "old school" among the German military leaders. Addressing the students of the Academy. Beck reminded then "of the duty which they owe to the man who recreated the Wehrmacht and made it strong again and who finally struck off the fetters of Versailles, and to the new State which assured us a foundation stronger than ever in a united nation". Addressing the Fuehrer on "behalf of the officers' corps, General Liebmann declared:
We knew and we are convinced in our deepest being that we have solely your determined will and your infallible leadership to thank for our freedom and - like the German people - we and the entire German Armed Forces will show our thanks to you, our Fuehrer, through unflinching faith fulness and devotion.
There ensued a period which might be described as honeymoon between Hitler and the Wehrmacht. The military leaders were thoroughly occupied with the recreation of Germany's military might and Hitler, for the most part, did not interfere with their activities. Hitler took the occasion of his own birthday (20 April) in 1936 to promote Blomberg to the highest military rank of fieldmarshal -the first German fieldmarshal appointed since the first World War; simultaneously. Fritsch and Goering were made full generals and Raeder a Generaladmiral. The attitude of the German officers' corps towards Hitler during these years has been well summarized by the defendant Blaskowitz;
The rearmament of Germany, at first (1933-35) secret and later unconcealed, was welcomed by me.
All officers of the Army shared this attitude and therefore had no reason to oppose Hitler.
Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly desired.
In such happy collaboration with Hitler, the officers' corps proceeded to make the Wehrmacht once again mighty for war. Shortly before their creation was put to use, however, a serious crisis occurred. Most of us are too much inclined to think of Hitler's dictatorship as untroubled; in point of fact, Hitler was constantly encountering crises, some of which seriously threatened his political mastery.
Early in 1938, the relations between Hitler and the Army were gravely affected by what has become known as the "Blomherg-Fritsch affair". This episode resulted in important changes in the top organization of the Wehrmacht, and had other far-reaching consequences.
The principal actors in this drama were Hitler, Himmler, Goering and, within the Army, Blomberg, Fritsch, Beck, Lieutenant-General Wilhelm Keitel, who had succeeded Reichenau as Chief of the Armed Forces Department of the War Ministry, and several of the senior generals of the Army, including Rundstedt, Reichenau, Brauchitsch, and the defendant Leeb.
The immediate cause of the crisis was that on 12 January 1938, having previously obtained Hitler's blessing, Fieldmarshal Blomberg, a widower, married a young lady whose lineage was not sufficiently aristocratic to meet with the approval of the German officers' corps. Hitler and Goering witnessed the ceremong, and all seemed serene, but very shortly thereafter rumors were circulated in high places attacking the lady's reputation. Criticism of the marriage within the officers' corps grew louder and louder. On the basis of these rumors, Hitler and Goering forced Blomherg to resign on 25 January 1938, and two days later the Blombergs left Germany for Italy on what was at the same time honeymoon and exile.
It is not altogether clear whether or not Hitler himself was anxious to get rid of Blomberg, who was primarily the victim of German military class-consciousness. But there is little doubt that Hitler, as well as Goering and Himmler, wanted to be rid of the Commander-inChief of the Army, General von Fritsch, whose arrogant behavior had rubbed Hitler the wrong way, and who made no secret of his lack of respect for the military abilities of Goering and Himnler. Two days after Blomberg's dismissal, Hitler, in Goering's presence, summarily relieved Fritsch as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, using as a pretext an absolutely false and unspeakably malicious accusation that Fritsch had been guilty of unnatural sez offenses. Fritsch was held in house arrest pending investigation, and a few weeks later was completely exonerated by a military court martial, but in the meantime he had been replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Army by von Brauchitsch, and Fritsch remained in retirement until the attack against Poland a year and a half later.
This preposterous and contemptible affair threw the Army into an uproar, and had fantastic overtones. A fiery young naval lieutenant named von Wangenheim flew to Rome, sought out Blomberg, and offered him a pistol in order that his suicide might vindicate the honor of the Wehrmacht. The wordly fieldmarshal handed back the pistol with the observation that Wangenheim "apparently had entirely different opinions and a different standard of life than he himself". But the effect of Fritsch's dismissal was fundamentally much more important, inasmuch as a large part part of the officers' corps thoroughly approved Blomberg's dismissal, whereas everyone knew that Fritsch -- the very model of a very German general and the idol of the Wehrmacht -- had been most shamefully treated.
Furthermore, important issues underlay Fritsch's dismissal. The officers' corps had not forgotten Roehm and the SA, and now Himmler and the SS loomed as a menace to the Army's military monopoly. Some of the leading generals, such as Leeb and von Kressenstein, were strong advocates of religious training for the troops, which did not fit the neo-paganism of the SS. Furthermore, Goering, capitalizing on the exploits of his Luftwaffe in Spain, was demanding a larger voice in military affairs than von Fritsch was disposed to accord him. It was plain that the whole Fritsch-Blomberg affair was a frame-up, and that Goering and Himmler were back of it. This was a direct and sinister attack against the Army leadership, for the purpose of subjecting it to domination by Hitler, Goering, Himmler, and other party bigwigs. The Army's efforts to meet this challenge failed miserably; in this failure personal ambition, lack of solidarity, and moral instability all played a part.
Having dismissed Blomberg and Fritsch, Hitler was faced with the question of their replacement, and in solving this problem appears to have relied chiefly on Goering and a newcomer to the top level, LieutenantGeneral Wilhelm Keitel, who, as Chief of the Armed Forces Department, had been Blomberg's chief assistant in the War Ministry since 1935, and whose son had married Blomberg's daughter.
On 27 January, Hitler informed Keitel that he himself would take over personal command of the Wehrmacht, with Keitel as his chief assistant. The War Ministry and the title "Minister of War" were abolished. All this was accomplished by a Hitler decree on 4 February 1938. The Armed Forces Department of the War Ministry was taken over by Hitler as his personal military staff and designated "Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wohrmacht or "OKW"); the rest of the Ministry passed out of existence. Keitel was given the title "Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces", and thereafter functioned more or less as Hitler's executive officer for armed forces matters.
Hitler did not immediately select a successor to Fritsch as Commander-in-Chief of the Army. The defendant Leeb and Rundstedt were the most senior generals, but Hitler at first leaned rather toward his old time favorite, Reichenau. Rundstedt or Leeb would have been acceptable to the officers'corps, but there was strong opposition to Reichenau. On 3 February 1938, Hitler finally decided to appoint Lieutenant-General von Brauchitsch, at that time Commander-in-Chief of the army group for motorized and armoured troops. Brauchitsch was held in high esteem among the leaders of the officers' corps, but several circumstances connected with his selection boded ill for the unit- and independence of the Army. Firstly, Brauchitsch allowed himself to be chosen as successor to a man who had been most shamefully and wrongfully dismissed. Secondly, Brauchitsch himself was suffering domestic complications, and permitted himself to undergo the indignity of having these carefully reviewed by Hermann Goering. Worse still, this very private problem was solved only with the assistance of Keitel and Goering, who were instrumental in persuading his wife to consent to a divorce, so that Brauchitsch could remarry. Thirdly, while Bruachitsch was given the rank of full general which Fritsch had held, Goering was to receive the rank of fieldmarshal which Blomberg had held, and would thereby outrank the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.