THE PRESIDENT:It is available.
DR. HAGEMANN:If your Honor please, in Book 5, I am offering a few documents which deal with counts 2 and 3 of the indictment. Since the Tribunal has not granted the motion to strike these counts of the indictment I am obliged to present evidence as to these points also. I am going to offer four documents in this connection. The first one of these is SKl-807, on page 1. This is an affidavit of the former Rear Admiral August Thiele, the Chief of Staff of the Command of the fleet at the time when Admiral Schniewind was fleet chief. Admiral Thiele states in this affidavit that the commando order was probably not even received by the fleet, and as to the supplementary order to the commando order - he had not submiatted that to the fleet chief. A passing on of this supplementary order to the commando order to subordinate divisions had not taken place for two reasons and had not been necessary. The first reason, because the subordinate units received this supplementary order directly, and the second reason because the fleet was not factually concerned with the contents of this order. I am now offering this document as Schniewind Exhibit 119.
THE PRESIDENT:Admitted.
DR. HAGEMANN:SKl-801, on page 3 of the document book, 3 to 18, contains a series of affidavits, referring to the decree concerning the application of military jurisdiction in the Barbarossa area and concerning special measures by the troops. All these are affidavits, one from the former Admiral Boehm, at one time commanding Admiral of Norway; another affidavit by the former Admiral Wurmbach, then Chief of Staff of the Baltic Sea Naval Station. Then there is an affidavit of the fomer Admiral Schmundt, at that time commanding Admiral of the cruisers; further a document by the former Rear Admiral Loewisch, former chief of Staff at the Navy Commander "C"; then there is an affidavit of the former Rear Admiral Englehardt then Chief of Staff at the Navy Commander "D"; and finally an affidavit of the former Squadron Judge Advocate Dr. Kickstat who was at the time Chief Judge Advocate at the Navy Military courts in the Ostland.
The affiants unanimously state that the decree in question was not passed on to subordinate units and that for the rest this decree was not applied. I am offering this document as Schniewind Exhibit 120.
THE PRESIDENT:Admitted.
DR. HAGEMANN:As a further document I am offering Doenitz 49 on pages 19 to 28 of Document Book 5. This contains an affidavit of the former Marineoberstabsrichter Fritz Jaeckl. It contains a list of verdicts of Navy courts concerning cases which according to the military jurisdiction order Barbarossa were not subject to the jurisdiction of military courts. This is to show that contrary to the jurisdiction order in the event of offenses of German soldiers which damaged indigenous populations, the navy courts took action against the perpetrators. What the Navy courts thought of the jurisdiction order can be gathered from the reportsof sentences which are enclosed. I am making reference in this connection to page 27 where it is stated that heavy sentences are necessary in order to increase the faith of the population of the occupied territory in the good name and integrity of the German soldier. I am offering this document as Schniewind Exhibit 121.
THE PRESIDENT:Admitted.
DR. HAGEMANN:The last document which I would like to offer is one contained in document book supplement 5 which is SKl-808. This is a further listing of sentences where German soldiers were sentenced by Naval courts for offenses committed against indigenous population. This list was compiled by an Oberstatsanwalt with the court in Flensburg who was in charge of the former Navy file archives. The document contains four cases where German soldiers were tried and word sentenced contrary to the military jurisdiction or the Barborossa order. This document is being offered as Schniewind Exhibit 122.
THE PRESIDENT:Admitted.
DR. HAGEMANN:All documents of Document Book 5 are to prove that Admiral Schniewind did not pass on the orders at issue and that the orders were not applied or adhered to.
This, if your Honors please, brings me to the conclusion of my presentation of evidence.
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Gollnick, we are ready, to hear your opening statement in the case of Field Marshal Sperrle.
DR. GOLLNICK:If Your Honor please, before I am to start with the reading of my opening statement I should like to have the Marshal of the court instructed to fetch the witness Field Marshal Milch here from the court prison. I intend to hear him as the first witness after having concluded with the reading of my opening speech.
THE PRESIDENT:The Marshal will take note of that and so arrange.
DR. GOLLNICK:Mr. President, Your Honors .
At the close of its Opening Statement of 5 February 1948, the Prosecution in discussing the point of the Indictment "crime against peace" has declared that the provision of Art. II Fig. 2 of the Control Council Law No. 10 regarding the circle of those that may be found guilty of this crime, does not have the purpose to hold automatically criminally responsible all persons who occupied high military positions. Furthermore it was emphasized that the accused high military leaders were not accused because they were soldiers, and that they were not charged with such acts that customarily are to be expected of soldiers, namely the drafting of military plans and the commanding of troops.
The Prosecution did not adhere to these principles. This is particularly evident in the Indictment against Field Marshal Sperrle. Examining the evidence submitted against this defendant with an impartial and unprejudiced eye one cannot escape the impression that Field Marshal Sperrle was indicted only because of his high military position as Field Marshal and Commander in Chief of Air Fleet 3. This judgment results not only in regard to the Indictment for the crimes against peace and of conspiracy, but also in regard to war crimes and crimes against humanity.
As to Point I of the Indictment the Prosecution fails to recognize a particularly important point of view, which at this point I wish to emphasize.
This concerns the position of the Army in relation to the State leadership, the relationship between politics and Armed Forces, an essential problem, which also in the verdict will play a decisive part.
No less authority but the Commander-in-Chief of the British Armed Forces, Field Marshal Montgomery, has precisely recognized and appraised this problem, when he said in his well-known speech at Portsmouth on 26 July 1946. I quote:
"In serving the nation the Army is above politics and this must remain so. It is devoted to the State and it is not for the soldier to change his devotion because of political views. It must be made clear that an Army is not a gathering of individuals, but a fighting force, formed by discipline and under the control of its leaders." What Field Marshal Montgomery says is true of the common soldier just as much as of the high military leader. They have neither the right nor the duty to put their own views above those of the State leadership, and what Field Marshal Montgomery demands for himself and his country must not be denied to the German military leaders, even though the Stateleadership has made wrong decisions and fateful mistakes. This the State leadership in the final analysis will have to account for to its own nation. This responsibility, however, is not that of the soldier whatever his rank, who as a bearer of arms of his country has staked his life for the existence of his fatherland. He is responsible neither to his own people, much the less toward the victorious nations.
I now shall consider the individual points of the Indictment against Field Marshal Sperrle and am starting with Points I and IV.
Field Marshal Sperrle until 1934 was an officer with the troops. After a short activity at the newly created Reichs Air Ministry he was again transferred to field service, and in 1935 he took over the command Air Service Area Headquarters 5 at Munich. In his service rank and position he lacked any possibility to influence the military development in Germany.
He had no part in the seizure of power by Hitler. The ideas of National Socialism were opposed by him. This opposing attitude also led to his dismissal by Hitler in August 1944.
At the outbreak of the war Field Marshal Sperrle took over the newly formed Air Fleet 3, which he has led until his dismissal in August 1944. Throughout the war he was assigned only on the Western Front.
The first charge of the Prosecution against him is that Field Marshal Sperrle from November 1936 until November 1937 was in charge of the "Legion Condor" in Spain, Nothing less is alleged but that purpose and aim of this undertaking was the establishment of a regime in Spain that would support the Third Reich in its plans of aggression and war. Furthermore the civil war was designed to serve as a testing ground for German pianos and other weapons. Field Marshal Sperrle never learned of theso aims. Neither did he have any knowledge of war plans and aggressive wars, which according to the Prosecutor's statement Hitler is supposed to have indicated to the Commander in Chiefs of 3 Armed Forces Branches only in November 1937. The German Auxiliary Corps, the leadership of which Field Marshal Sperrle had taken over on orders of the OKW, comprised only 5 - 6000 men and already numerically was not in a position to influence decisively the course of military events in Spain. This strength could not compare with the Italian units, which mounted to 50 - 60,000 men and with the International Brigades fighting on the side of the red Spaniards, who were more than 40,000 men strong and also supported by a strong air-arm of Russian origin.
I shall prove that also in Spain General Sperrle advocated a more humane warfare and in his conduct of war reduced the terror of the civil war to the best of his ability.
Further the Prosecution accused Field Marshal Sperrle to have taken part in a conference between Hitler and the Austrian Chancellor v. Schuschnigg at the Obersalzberg on 12 February 1938, as well as in the blackmail against Schuschnigg. As evidence the Prosecution presents document 4005 PS, Exh.
1370. It deals with a talk by the Gauleiter Dr. Friedrich Rainer, which he made on 11 March 1942, that is four years later at Klagenfurt. It contains not one word indicating the presence of Field Marshal Sperrle at these conferences. Allegedly he is supposed to have on direction of Hitler talked about the air force during dinner. This allegation is incorrect and also not proven by any witness. The document itself possesses no probative value, since it is not claimed that Dr. Rainer was an eye or oar witness to this occurrence.
The next Prosecution document PS, Exh. 1034 reproduces an affidavit by Chancellor v. Schuschnigg. He has not testified with a single word to the presence of Field Marshal Sperrle at these conferences. Chancellor Schuschnigg has, rs I shall prove, in his notes published by the press in 1946 described his meeting with Hitler on the Obersalzberg. Also in these notes there is no mention that Field Marshal Sperrle exerted any influence upon hit. To the contrary, in his notes he has stated that in the ante-chamber he had met some Generals, who told him that they had no idea why they had been summoned. This concurs with the testimony by Field Marshal Sperrle quoted but held in doubt by the Opening Statement of the Prosecution.
The IMT in its judgment against the then defendant Franz von Papen, who had prepared the conference with Hitler on 12 February 1939 and advised v. Schuschnigg to accept Hitlers conditions, stated that von Papen used intrigues as well as threats in order to bring about the annexation of Austria. In this connection the judgment declares:
"The statute however has not declared such violations of political moral to be criminal, as evil as they may be."
THE PRESIDENT:At this time it will be necessary for us to be in recess for fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1120 hours.)
THE MARSHAL:The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. MUELLER:Dr. Mueller for Field Marshal von Kuechler.
Your Honor, I would like permission for Field Marshal von Kuehler to be excused from the sessions tomorrow morning and tomorrow afternoon in order to go through the Washington documents.
THE PRESIDENT:He may be excused for that purpose. The record will so show.
DR. GRUENEWALD:Dr. Gruenewald for the defendant, Lehmann. Your Honor, I would like to ask, too, permission for the defendant, Lehmann to be absent from the sessions this afternoon and for tomorrow in order to go through the Washington documents.
THE PRESIDENT:He may be excused for that purpose. The record will so show.
DR. GOLLNICK:How much less can Field Marshal Sperrle, who without knowledge of the subject of the conference took part only in the meals, but not in the conferences, be accused of criminal conduct.
Also in aggressive plans against Austria Field Marshal Sperrle did not participate. The Prosecution itself in its Opening Statement has pointed out that the occupation of Austria had not been planned carefully in advance, but was precipitated by unforeseen events, I shall prove that the order Issued at that time to the Air Service Area Headquarters 5 for the carrying out of a winter maneuver in the Bavarian Highlands and in Southeast Bavaria, came as a complete surprise to Field Marshal Sperrle, as well as to other participants. No live ammunition was carried along during these maneuvers. There was a strict prohibition for air craft to cross the Austrian border.
The then Chief of the General Staff of the Fifth Air Force Service Headquarters and his chief of the the tactical group received the order for marohing into Austria from the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force immediately prior to the invasion. A planning or preparation by Field Marshal Sperrle did not take place in this operation either. Incidentally no German at that time, considered the Anschulss of Austria an act of aggression which, as the polls have shown, was carried out with the consent of more than 95% of the population In regard to the preparations for the occupation of the Sudentenland the Prosecution alleges that Field Marshal Sperrle was present during an address by Hitler to some of his Generals on 10 August 1938 at the Obersalzberg, and that he had drafted plans for the employment of the Luftwaffe.
The Prosecution has failed to furnish proof for this allegation. In the proceedings up to this date it has already been established that Hitler made a speech only to the chiefs of the general staffs and that the commanders in chief and other high-ranking commanders were excluded. Field Marshal Sperrle was at the Obersalzberg on 10 August 1938.
The only document referring, according to the presentation of the Prosecution, to the newly-activated Air Force Headquarters 3 at the time of the Sudetenland invasion is the order by the OKW, dated 30 Sept. 1938 - NOKW 2665, Exhibit 1054 which, followed the Munich accord, was dispatched to 200 civilian and military agencies and concerned solely matters of supply in accordance with the Munich Agreement for the march into the Sudentenland. This march into the Sudentenland took place on 1 October 1938 and was completed in two days. The order of 30 September by the OKW was received by the Air Force Headquarters 3 as late as 4 October 1938, as it is shown by the receipt stamp, it therefore war out of date in view of the course of events.
In accordance with this order bears the notation in the left corner on the top of page 1: "no steps to be taken" which was initialed by Colonel Stein, at that time quartermaster of Air Force Headquarters 3.
The units of the Luftwaffe subordinated to the command of Field Marshal Sperrle did not participate in the march into the Sudetenland. Involved were only the Air Force Headquarters 1 (Berlin) and 4 (Vienna).
The same applies to Sperrle's participation in the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in the spring of 1939, as alleged by the Prosecution, which was likewise carried out only by units of the Air Force Headquarters 1 and 4. I shall prove that it was an error of the press to mention the name of Field Marshal Sperrle.
Field Marshal Sperrle was neither involved in plannings for a war of aggression against Poland or in military operations against Poland. The Third Air Force was never in action against Poland but was assigned to tasks of safeguarding the German border in the West. In paragraph 8 to 12 of the Indictment, which deal with the campaign against Poland, nothing is mentioned about the Third Air Force and Field Marshal Sperrle. Furthermore, in the letter by the Army Group Into the OKH, dated 25 July 1939 - Document NOKW 2800, Exhibit No. 1384 - concerning the cooperation of the army with the Luftwaffe, only the Air Force 1 is mentioned. The "Special Regulations No. 1" issued by Air Force Command 3 on 27 August 1939 - Document NOKW 2666, Exh. 1388 - which were presented by the Prosecution, only concern the transmission of orders by the OKW regard to administration, supply and food supply.
These orders are signed by the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force 3. Field Marshal Sperrle did not see these orders.
Following the declaration of war by Francoat the beginning of September 1939 the Third Air Force was assigned to tasks of safeguarding the southern part of the German frontier in the West. The preparation of the military measures, necessary for this frontier area, constituted the loyal execution of the military orders received for the defense of the own country in war tine.
The Document "War Games Yellow" (Kriegsspiel Gelb) NOKW 621, Exh. 1161 submitted by the Prosecution, contains records for a theoretical maneuver which was carried out by Army Group A. Such maneuvers are customary in all armies of the world and were also carried out by the Allies at that time.
The documents which had been captured in partly burned condition on 10 January 1941 on the occasion of the emergency landing of a German plane in Belgium, exclusively contain regulations and orders by the 2nd Air Force Headquarters under the command of Genneral of the Air Force, Felmy.
In this document the task of the Third Air Force is mentioned only for the purposes of information. Here too, only military preparations, made after the outbreak of a war, have been put into action only against those enemy forces which declared war on Germany.
Concluding I have to state that the Prosecution has not furnished any proof for the charge that Field Marshall Sperrle participated in the planning or execution of aggressive wars and that he was aware that these were wars of aggression of a criminal nature.
The Prosecution, in regard to the charge that Field Marshal Sperrle had participated in a joint plan or in a consipiracy, for the purpose of committing a crime against the peace, has not even made an attempt to produce evidence. At this early date already I move that the proceedings against Field Marshal Sperrle to stopped with respect to Counts I and IV of the Indictment because the charges as to these counts of the Indictment are entirely unsubstantiated.
I now come to Counts II and III of the Indictment. "Crimes against enemy military forces" and "Crimes against Humanity". The Indictment charges that Field Marshal Sperrle participated in war crimes committed in violation of the laws and rules of warfare. I shall furnish proof for the fact that all orders issued by Field Marshal Serrle were in line with the regulations of the laws of warfare. He prohibited any bombardment to terrorize the civilian population, any destruction of private property, of churches, hospitals and monuments, and forceful act against prisoners of war or the civilian population. The Third Air Force alwasy acted and fought in compliance with order. In the course of the western capaign Field Marshal Sperrle has repeatedly given orders to the effect that attacks, necessary from the military point of view, be cancelled if churches or monuments of art and culture were endangered by these attacks. He gave orders to discontinue attacks on the retreating French columns when it was found that these columns were mixed with fleeing French civilians.
that these columns were mixed with fleeing French civilians.
The "Kommando-Order", having been announced by radio and press, could not be kept secret. I shall prove, however, that the chiefs of the general staffs of all headquarters subordinated to the Third Air Force had been instructed on orders of Field Marshal Sperrle that everyone in his area was to take stops that no Kommando troops were to be killed, but were to be treated as prisoners of war and sent to the proper prisoner of war camps under fictitious designations and false names. Accordingly, the Kommando Order was not carried out in a single case in the Third Air Force sphere of responsibility.
The headquarters of the Third Air Force had hardly anything to do with prisoners of war because it had no authority in that area.
Shot down enemy air-crows who had been taken prisoner by members of the Air Force were delivered to the Luftwaffe prisoner of war camps which were directly subordinated to the Reich Minister for Aviation and the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe. The Third Air Force did not have any prisoner of war camps of its own. Wounded prisoners who were not fit to be shipped were given medical treatment by specialists in the hospitals of the Luftwaffe just as the wounded German soldiers. Field Marshal Sperrle has used his personal influence for the treatment of those wounded prisoners. Repeatedly it happened that on his orders planes were dispatched to obtain specialists for the purpose of saving the lives of seriously wounded fliers of the Allied Air Force.
I shall furnish proof for the fact that it was Field Marshal Sperrle who made particalar efforts in organizing and introducing the sea-rescue service which saved the lives of many hundreds of enemy fliers who had been forced down on the sea. Field Marshal Sperrle gave instructions, contrary to higher orders, to carry out this rescue service for the benefits of enemy fliers even in cases where the planes and sea-planes of the emergency service, which were clearly marked with the Geneva Red Cross, were attacked by Allied fliers and casualties occurred contrary to all provisions of international law and the laws of humanity.
The majority of the rescued fliers were members of the Allied Air Forces. If it was observed that enemy fliers gave SOS signals from a point near the English coast, Field Marshal Sperrle permitted that the British radio stations were informed on the international wave length so that the rescue measures could be undertaken from England. This too was carried out against orders from higher authority in the interest of a humane conduct of the war.
Only for a short period after the armistice with France were prisoners of war put to work in the area of the Third Air Force. The prisoners were put to work for several weeks with clearing the French air fields. Hostilities had ended at that time in France. These prisoners of war too were cared for by Field Marshal Sperrle. He cared for their housing and food supply and made arrangements for their family members to visit them, and gave permission that some of these prisoners were given temporary leave to visit their families. Later on prisoners of war were no longer put to work by Headquarters of the Third Air Force.
I shall prove that in matters concerning administration, construction, as well as prisoners of war, the air force administrative command headquarters were directly subordinated to the Reich Minister of Aviation and the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe in respect to orders and directives.
The Procurement and allocation of civilian workers who had been working for French industrialists was effected in the air force administrative command headquarters directly through the offices of the military commanders in France who held the executive power.
After the start of the Russian campaign orders by the Reich Minister of Aviation and the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe were sent directly to the air force administrative command headquarters for the purpose of establishing collection camps for Russian prisoners of war. Field Marshal Sperrle has never saw or heard of any Russian prisoners of war nor has he heard of them.
They were not sent to the occupied Western territories at that time and remained in the East due to an order by Hitler cancelling their transfer. The documents presented by the Prosecution which concern the employment of Russian prisoners of war - NOKW 2794 and 2795, Exh. 193 and 194 - in November 1941 only deal with the employment of Russian prisoners of war in the future. They do not concern Field Marshal Sperrle because this was a matter to be dealt with by the Air Force Administrative Command Headquarters which in this respect were not subordinated to the Third Air Force but were under the direct command of the Reich Minister of Aviation and the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe.
The Prosecution has presented Document NOKW 2946, Exh. 1345, against Field Marshal Sperrle, containing a bulletin for the labor allocation of Soviet prisoners of war within the territory of the air fleet, of December 1943. This was also issued by the Reich Minister of Aviation, and Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe and is addressed to the Air Force Administrative Command Headquarters (Luftgaukommandos). These regulations applied only to the home territory and the East, no Russian prisoners of war being in the West, nor, in particular, having been detailed to duty as anti aircraft artillery auxiliaries. All regulations provided for in the bulletin had to be dealt with by the Air Force Administrative Command Headquarters. They had to make their reports direct to the Reich Minister of Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Air Force. This bulletin also proves that the Air Force Administrative Command Headquarters was immediately subordinate to the Reich Minister of Aviation and the Commander in Chief of the Air Force in matters concerning prisoners of war.
The correctness of this description becomes also evident from the order of the Air Force Administrative Command Headquarters Western-France dated 20 October 1942 - NOKW 2793, Exh. 218 - submitted by the Prosecution. It becomes clearly evident from the ordinances to which reference is made at the top of the document, that the regulation referred exclusively to orders of the Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Air Force, but not to regulations of Air Fleet 3. This document proves also that the Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Air Force issued his orders directly to the Air Force Administrative Headquarters and that Field Marshal Sperrle is not responsible for these orders of the Air Force Administrative Command Headquarters.
The document 2796 Exh. 219 refers to the turning over of 2000 German non-commissioned officers and men from air force units to units at home, and the allocation of prisoners of war. It concerns an ordinance of the Air Force Administration Headquarters Western Franee of 25 October 1942. It is, as the ordinance to which reference is made shows, an implementation ordinance to the above mentioned order of 20 October 1942 which is based on an order of the Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander-inChief of the Air Force. Under number Va of the order, reference is made to the order of the Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Air Force dated 14 October 1942. This is also evidence for the fact that it concerns ordinances and orders which were issued directly by the Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Air Forces to the Air Force Administrative Command Headquarters Western France.
Besides it is in no way explained by the presentation of all these Prosecution documents in what respect these orders constitute war crimes. Nor did Field Marshal Sperrle become guilty of any crimes against the civilian population. His orders in regard to the conduct of members of Airfleet 3 towards the civilian population were aimed at the protection of the population. I shall prove that disciplinary offenses and excesses against the civilian population were severely punished, and that the punishments inflicted were read to the troops at regular intervals for their instruction and to act as a deterrent. It was prohibited to requisition the homes of the civilian population in excess of what was absolutely necessary. In case of billeting in homes, emply rooms had to be occupied in the first place. To this effect it was necessary to obtain the French Mayor's agreement.
It was prohibited, to remove household goods and furniture. Measures of control had been ordered accordingly.
The utilization of the labor of the civilian population was no task of the Air Fleet Command 3. This, was, as already mentioned, the responsibility of the military Commander in Chief of France and of the Field and Post Headquarters under his jurisdiction. In so far as civilian French workers were employed in German agencies of the Airfleet 3, Field Marshal Sperrle used his power to secure for the employees good working conditions, additional meals and other advantages.
The Prosecution presented in document NOKW 1238 Exh. 475, a number of teletype messages. It is incomprehensive in what way they are suited to constitute a charge against Field Marshal Sperrle. In the teletype message of 15 February 1943 it is reported to the High Command of the Army and the High Command of the Armed Forces by the Commander in Chief West, that on the evening of 13 February 1943, 2 officers of Airfleet Command 3 were so seriously wounded by pistol shots that they died, and that the Security Service had taken severe reprisal measures. These reprisal measures did not be come known to Field Marshal Sperrle. He has also never become acquainted with the contents of the teletype message. The Airfleet Command which had no territorial powers, had no influence on reprisal measures. The Commander of Paris respectively the Military Commander in Chief of France, had to deal with such attacks.
If by teletype message dated 10 May 1942 in the same document the Wehrmacht Commander in Chief in the Netherlands makes a report in regard to the military situation in the Netherlands through the Commander in Chief West to the OKH - High Command of the Army and the High Command of the Armed Forces, describing therein this situation as tense with regard to the transfer of prisoners of war and students as well as other Dutchmen for labor allocation in the Reich, Field Marshal Sperrle is thereby in no way involved. The same applies to the report of 17 August 1942 which the Commander in Chief West sent to the OKH - High Command of the Army and the High Command of the Armed Forces in regard to attacks on railway trains carrying French workers to Germany, and to the report dated 21 September 1942 regarding plots against the army and reprisal measures against terrorists.
The contents of these reports never became known to Field Marshal Sperrle.
The Prosecution has presented several documents with the claim that Field Marshal Sperrle as deputy of the Commander in Chief West signed ordered which contained crimes against humanity. To start with the following may be said in regard to the deputizing for the Commander in Chief West.
Field Marshal Sperrle was deputy for Field Marshal von Rundstedt in the years 1943 and 1944 for several weeks while the latter was on leave for reasons of health. Field Marshal Sperrle was appointed deputy because he was in France the next senior officer of the same rank. He was not a deputy in the usual meaning of the word because Field Marshal Sperrle retained his post as Commander in Chief of Airfleet 3 while he acted as deputy. Neither did he move into the official quarters of the Commander in Chief West while acting as deputy. All current matters were independently and directly handled by the staff of the Commander in Chief West under the command of the Chief of the General Staff. Important matters and matters of principle were taken care of by the High Command OKH or OKW of the Army or the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces in direct conjunction with the Commander in Chief's Chief of General Staff and merely presented to Field Marshal Sperrle for his signature.
His activity as deputy was as follows: 1 - 2 times every week technical staff officers on the staff of the Commander in Chief West, on rare occasions the Chief of Staff, came to the Headquarters of Air Fleet 3 in order to make a formal verbal report to Field Marshal Sperrle and to have those orders signed which required the signature of the Commander in Chief.
It was customary in the German Armed Forces that only the absolutely necessary orders were given when deputies were acting, and that all matters of principle, especially these of long range, were deferred in order not to encroach upon the regular commander's conception of the matter. Field Marshal Sperrle observed this rule. The preparation and the drawingup of the orders and regulations which were submitted to him for signature was done by the Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief West and his co-workers, based on theopinion and conceptions of Field Marshal v. Rundstedt which were known to the Staff.
First of all, the Prosecution takes document NOKW 997, Exhibit 475, as a basis. These are the "Basic comments of the Commander in Chief West No. 26" dated 6 June 1943 which had been forwarded to the OKW-High Command of the Armed Forces. The Prosecution refers to subsection 15 of the document which is, furthermore, incomplete and which mentions the recruiting of workers within the area of the Commander in Chief West. As the document shows, the Military Commander Belgium/ Northern France reported that German agencies had recruited workers for other areas within his area, without the required arrangements by his agencies and the indigenous agencies, and that through this most of these workers were lost to the recruitment of workers for Germany by the Sauckel operation. In the part of the report against which objections are raised by the Prosecution, it was said that it will be investigated to what extent military agencies had participated in the recruiting which was contrary to the orders of the Military Commander Belgium/Northern France. Consequently, the whole thing is but an examination of a complaint of the Military Commander Belgium/Northern France about an encroachment upon his command, and a clearing up and defining of the limits of the authority of military agencies.
Field Marshal Sperrle neither remembers the contents of, nor that he signed, this document which had been, as is shown in it, drawn up by the General Staff of the Commander-in-Chief West, and only submitted to him for signature in his capacity as deputy. The contents of this document are not suitable to support even in the least the charge of a crimes against humanity against Field Marshal Sperrle.
The Prosecution thinks it can prove by presentation of Document R 125 Exhibit 450 that Field Marshal Sperrle had furthered the Sauckel operation. This is a record of a conference between Field Marshal Milch and Sauckel during the 54th meeting of the Central Planning Board on 1 March 1944 in the Reich Air Ministry. I shall prove that Sauckel did not tell the truth when he said: "All German agencies of the Military Commanders Field Marshal v. Rundstedt, Field Marshal Sperrle, assisted me extraordinarily in these measures."
Furthermore the Prosecution submitted document 715 PS, Exhibit 842 in order to support its charges. It contains a teletype addressed by the Commander in Chief West to the High Command of the Armed Forces on 6 June 1943, and it is a reply to the order of the High Command of the Armed Forces of 1 June 1943 to which reference is made at the beginning of the teletype. Field Marshal Sperrle saw this teletype now for the first time. He also contests that he ever signed such a report. The Prosecution may submit the original document from the files of the Commander in Chief West. These are proposals which were drawn up, as is shown in the heading of the teletype, by the staff of the Commander in Chief West, after contracting the German Embassy in Paris and the Commander of the Security Police and the S.D. Besides, the proposed seizure of the French officers was admissible according to international law. After the landing at Dakar, the events in Tunis, the increasing dangers of the resistance movement in France, the measures for the protection of the German Armed Forces against the participation of high-ranking French officers as leaders in the growth of the resistance was an urgent military necessity, Germany and France were in the state of truce.