Therefore there can be no question of the Nazification of agriculture.
2. Agricultural market regulations have been the central problem of agrarian policy in all countries since 1930. Similar measures were taken everywhere, serving to standardize the markets and to raise the national revenue. If every country the market regulations were adapted to the needs of war and kept on after the end of the war. In Germany it started as a peace-time institution and it would have been continued even if there had been no war. Today the demand for market regulations is listed in the Bavarian constitution as a constitutional principle. All this surely proves that the market regulations were not a preparation for war.
3. Rearmament in itself is not an offense under International Law. This was declared in the IMT Judgment. But now the Prosecution has related the activity of the Reich Defense Committee during the period from 1934 to 1936 with preparations for war. But the complete text of the documents reveals that the committee had only a possible war of defense in mind.
4. Darre signed the law on the procurement of land for Wehrmacht purposes. But only the expropriation of land serves armament purposes. For this the High Command of the Wehrmacht was the responsible authority. The Minister for Food had quite a different task. He had to take care of agricultural interests threatened or damaged by the Wehrmacht. It was his particular duty to procure new land for farmers whose estates had been appropriated.
His activity was confined to these limits and so was his responsibility for the law and proceeding from the law. His activity, then, did not serve armament purposes but was designed to remedy the damage agriculture had suffered because of rearmament.
5. The preparation for industrial mobilization was headed by the Plenipotentiary General for Military Economy, Schacht.
In the meeting of the Reich Defense Committee of 26 June 1935 it was established that on Schacht's orders a coupon system was prepared on the basis of a decree for the provisional ensurement of the requirements of the German people.
This was to guarantee uniform supplies for the German people. It was established in the report by the Plenipotentiary General for Military Economy that this coupon system which had been developed would come into immediate effect in the event of mobilization. The Reich Minister of Food had prepared a skeleton agreement on the organisation of Food Economy in wartime as well as various decrees for the public control of the various agricultural products.
The Ministry of Food was "subject in wartime" to the Plenipotentiary General for Military Economy "and was to abide by his instructions". Schacht was acquitted in the IMT judgment. Thus, this Tribunal did not see anything in the legislation for which Schacht was responsible, which could be objected to from thepoint of view of International Law. And this was quite correct. For such precautionary measures against the possible event of war are customary in all countries.
6. In the report made at the end of 1937 by the Plenipotentiary General for Military economy, are listed a number of precautionary measures for economic mobilization in the food sector. These were to be carried out at the direction of the Plenipotentiary General. The appropriate instructions were issued by the Supreme Command of the Whermacht or the Plenipotentiary General for Economy to the Reich Ministry of Food and by the latter to the Reich Food Estate. Uniformity in the handling of these questions was the responsibility of the Office for the Safeguarding of Food Supplies. (Stella fuer Ernaehrungssicherung). Such precautionary measures are a matter of common practice in all countries, even today.
7. The measures necessary in the event of mobilization are sketched in advance in Mobilization Handbooks in all countries. As in France, Germany provided for a state of emergency which sould precede any mobilization. The Head of the State gave orders to the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht that a state of emergency was to be declared. The latter communicated the order to the Plenipotentiary General for Economy, who in turn transmitted it to the Reich Minister of Food.
Thus he was the third link in the chain of recipients of orders. Having received this order, he was obliged by the law of the State, to put into effect the measures outlined in the Mobilization Handbook. In so doing, he did not create a legal precedent. For the organization of the wartime food economy and the rationing of individual agricultural products were effected in accordance with the provisions of two basic orders issued by the Plenipotentiary General for Economy. These two orders also stipulated that the Reich Minister of Food should issue the necessary implementation orders. These were drawn up by order of Schacht.
These implementation orders contained merely the provisions governing the commandeering of agricultural products and the control of consumption. Their sole purpose was to prevent the grave economic and social sufferings which threatened the broad masses of the people as a result of the war, particularly the danger of hoarding and profiteering.
In the authentic social catechism of the Roman Catholic Church are developed the fundamental ideas expressed in the encyclical "Quadragesima". Fig. 111 reads as follows:
"In the event of war or of the scarcity of goods, or of the serious and blatant misuse of goods, it is not only the right, but also the duty of the State to in troduce a special system, the purpose of which is to prevent hoarding and the increase of profiteering in essential commodities."
It was this very purpose which was served by the introduction of the wartime food economy. These organizations are still in existence today, three and a half years after the end of the war. They operate in the same way today as during the war. Their purpose today, too, is to meet the contingencies of a period of grave emergency. At that time, the emergency was created by the war; today it is the outcome of economic chaos. A system which public opinion and the Roman Catholic Church regard as the duty of statesmen cannot be considered as a crime judge by the standards of International Law.
I am obliged now to refute certain contentions made by the Prosecution in their Final Pleas, which I have inserted into my document at this point.
1. The Prosecution asserts that Darre's position within the sphere of economic mobilization corresponded to that of Funk. The documents submitted prove the contrary. Funk, like Schacht, was Plenipotentiary General for Economy. In accordance with the provisions of the Reich Defense Law, Darre was the subordinate of both and took orders from them. I refer the Court to page 24/25 and 33/34 of my closing Brief.
2. The Prosecution further asserts that, during the month following the Hossbach conference in November 1937, Darre prepared a comprehensive program for the wartime food economy.
In point of fact, these orders had been worked out in 1935 on Schacht's instructions and were accordingly already in existence at the end of 1937. The report of the Plenipotentiary for War Economy of December 1937 gives, with the yearly balance, an account of progress in economic mobilization resulting from the years of work devoted to the subject by Schacht the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy. I refer the Court to pages 24/25 of my Closing Brief.
3. The Prosecution asserts that the rationing system was put into force following an order issued by Darre on the guarantee of essential commodities to meet the requirements of the German people. I have refuted this allegation with the help of documents. The decree laying down temporary measures for guaranteeing the essential requirements of the German people was signed and put into force by the plenipotentiary General for Economy, Funk. I submitted this decree as Sur-Rebuttal Document Exh. 221-II C 41d. This decree introduces the rationing of all foodstuffs. Art. 13 of this decree stipulates that the Reich Food Minister shall Issue the necessary enforcement regulations.
The contention that this decree and the supplementary legislation were put into force four days before the attack on Poland also creates a false Impression.
May I draw attention to the Sur-Rebuttal Document Exh. 219-II C 41b. These are the pertinent passages from the Mobilization Manual far the Civil Administration. According to this Manual, mobilization is preceded by a period of tension. The measures planned for this period of tension were to be ordered by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor. On 27 August, Hitler announced the period of tension. Thereupon, Funk was compelled to issue the decrees provided for in the Mobilization Manual for this eventuality. In that Darre was the subordinate of Funk, he was similarly compelled to issue the necessary enforcement orders.
4. The Prosecution also mentions the circular dated 8 September 1938, which is signed by Trick and Darre. In this circular, attention is drawn to the fact that Hitler had ordered that the preparation of economicmobilization be expedited. By virtue of this decree, the Minister of Food, as a purely executive official, was compelled to publish the pertinent decrees as provided for in the Mobilization Manual.
I have proved that such measures are customary in all countries. A document dated 9 November 1948, with the following text, is particularly worthy of note:
"At the beginning of the new American Congress assembling in January Plan "M", a secret document prepared by military and economic authorities, will be submitted to the representatives for their acceptance. It is a mobilization plan prepared for the eventuality of an armed conflict, which deals with the mobilization within a few hours, of the entire country on an unprecedented scale. A distribution plan for raw materials, every detail of which has been worked out, and also the rationing of all important products, will be put into force. Foodstuffs, textiles, and coal will then only be obtainable on ration cards."
(Nuernberger Nachrichten of 10 November 1948, page 3). 5. The Prosecution alleges that, on 27 August 1939, Darre issued a decree bringing into operation the administrative offices whichwere responsible for distribution and administration within the food industry, on a wartime basis.
Here too, the true facts are different. The organization of the wartime food economy was not established by any decree of Darre's but by a decree of the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, Funk. Pursuant to Art. 12 of this decree, it was the duty of the Reich Food Minister, Darre, as a subordinate of Funk in this sphere, to issue the necessary enforcement regulations. These regulations, too, were already in existence in 1937, and were formulated on the instructions of the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, Schacht.
I should to page 41 of my closing Brief. 6. Finally, the Prosecution quotes a sentence from one of Darre's memoranda, dated 27 November 1939, and concludes from it that Darre had prepared a war of aggression. But in the quotation, they omit a very important sentence. This sentence reads as follows:
"For, practically speaking, the difficulties attendant upon a war (blockade) had already been experienced since 1934, though perhaps not to the same degree, owing to' the permament lack of foreign currency."
The Prosecution laid this sentence before the witness Haushofer in his examination on 30 September 1948, (English Transcript page 24001). The witness' statements in this connection were comprehensive and, I think, very much to the point. In this connection, I should like to draw attention to pages 53 - 55 of my Closing Brief. Finally, the Prosecution refers to a letter from Darre to his wife in February 1942.
This sentence, too, is incompletely quoted, thus creating a false impression. I refer you to my Closing Brief, pages 59-60. 7. Finally, the Prosecution breaches the subject of the storage of grain. They assert that Darre demanded of Goering a minimum quantity of 6 million tons of grain as a reserve in case of war. No such document has, as yet, been submitted by the Prosecution. I have analyzed the actual facts with the help of all available statistical material. I have submitted a series of figures as Sur-Rebuttal Documents. They are Exh. 204-216 II b 22 a - II B 22 n.
The witness Zschirnt, former Chairman of the Main Association of the German Grain Industry (Hauptvereinigung der Deutsch en Getreidewirtschaft) also corrected some of the Prosecution's errors during his examination on 29 October 1948. In conclusion, the actual facts are presented in detail, supported by documents and figures, on pages 61-100 of my Closing Brief.
I now come to the storage of grain The accumulation of Grain Reserves.
1. The reason for the building up of sores of grain was the bumper harvest in 1938. In the Reich proper, it yielded 26.2 million tons, and was four million tons higher than that of the year 1937. The major export countries were swamped with surplus supplies. Germany had trade agreements with the Sputh Eastern countries, which stipulated certain minimum figures for the quantities of grain to be bought by Germany. These countries insisted that Germany take the surplus supplies. The overseas export countries likewise sought to buy grain. Thus it was that in 1938, large supplies of grain were imported. Yet it should be observed in this connection that maize imports alone, amounting to 1.9 million tons in the year 1938, were entirely used as fodder.
2. Imports of bread grain in the period from January to July 1939 were reduced to a minimum. In all, approximately 300,000 tons of wheat and approximately 90,000 tons of rye were imported. The value of those imports was 47 million Reichsmark. They amounted to sifficient to supply the requirements of the German people for 12 days.
Germany's imports, however, were totally insignificant as compared with these of Great Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands. Germany's imports of bread grain in the year 1938 amounted to only a quarter of Great Britain's imports of bread grain.
3. The balance of the Reich Grain Office on 30 June 1939 shows that at this time, the total of grain reserves (including fodder grain) amounted to 5.5 million tons. Of this quantity, only 3.4 million tons were grain produced in Germany itself. Thus the storage problem in Germany had become acute. The acuteness of this problem applied not only to Germany, however, but also to the United States. There 13.5 million tons had to be stored, that is to say, two and a half times as much as in Germany.
Germany, however, did not possess the huge storage facilities available in the New World. It was available therefore necessary to make available with a large number of auxiliary stores and, as a result, storage costs were extraordinary high. I have indicated the amount of these costs, by submitting an official bulletin issued by the Bizonal Office for Food, and Agriculture in Frankfurt/Main.
4. In 1939, Darre, too, considered the storage costs extremely high and therefore raised objections to the building up of excessive reserves. This fact is expressed in a memorandum to Hitler and Goering, dated 29 January 1939.
"On the other hand, it must be clearly understood that a few average or good harvests in succession will increase grain stocks to such an extent that, particularly in view of the pressure of the world market, the storage costs would no longer be occasionally justifiable.
Storage costs for 3 1/2 million tons of grain in the current year alone amount to 150 million Reichsmark ... With this sum which is expended solely for storage, approximately one million tons of grain could be bought from domestic sources.
The present extremely favorable grain supply situation "would make it possible to use some of the grain as fodder.
The result would be "that the Minister of Finance, would be able to save considerable sum of money on grain storage costs."
5. The Prosecution has submitted expert opinions which were written in the middle of February 1939. They deal with the grain situation in the event of a hypothetical military situation, i.e., in the event of the less of East Prussia and the territory left of the Rhine, thus, purely of defensive action. The expert opinions are analyzed in detail in my Closing Brief and consequently I have to refer to it.
While Darre viewed the accumulation of grain reserves which had been rendred necessary by circumstances as a move of agrarian policy, Goering new demanded that the reserves become permanent, in case of war, and be national reserves.
This thought was an obvious one to anyone holding Goering's views. For many countries, particularly Great Britain, had purchased considerable quantities of grain abroad and built up stores in case of war. The reserves stored in Germany, on the other hand, consisted for the most part, of grain rpoduced in the country. Once Goering had demanded that a national reserve be established, only very limited quantities of grain were purchased abroad. Hot even all the supplies guranteed to Germany by trade agreements, were taken up. I have proved all those facts with the help of detailed statisitical material, particularly in my Sur-Rebuttal documents.
6. It is, in any case, difficult to comprehend how grain reser ves can be held to be instruments of aggressive warfare. In former times, stocks were hold in besieged fortresses, but not by armies which marched out to wage aggressive wars. But above all, the cultivated of grain is not a war industry. Grain is a food not a weapon of destruction. Grain is not a weapon, much less a weapon of aggression such as phosphorus, long-range bombers or long-range missiles. Grain has never been a direct weapon of war. It is and will remain the staff of life. It serves to preserve life and not to deal death.
7. The really weak spot in Germany's armour was her fats supply. only 40% of Germany's requirements were mot by domestic supplies. As far as grain was concerned, there had been no choice about accumulating reserves. As far as facts were concerned, there were no reserves worth speaking of. But Germany made no attempt to build up reserves It is very characteristic that in summer 1939, Germany declined an offer of a large consignment of whole oil from Norway. It was not Germany but Britain which bought up this consignment.
I now come to a new point, the Polish question.
1. At the beginning of the war, Darre was donuded of his power, in the sphere of food, by Backe, in the sphere of settlement, by Himmler. Himmler, chief of Police, became Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of Germandom. Darre never worked hand in hand with the Reich Commissioner. On the contrary, he was strongly opposed to his measures and to his policy. To the extent to which the Reich Ministry of Food had anything whatsoever to do with this particular sphere of work, it operated under Himmler's orders.
The work of settlement as such was the responsibility of the Offices of the Reich Commissioner. The Settlement Organizations which came under the command of the Ministry of Food, were responsible for the economic organization necessary in connection with the settlers. They worked to Improve the productivity of the country, granted extensive loans and increased the production of the farms.
The Ostdeutsche Landbewirtschaftungsgesellschaft (Eastern German Agricultural Control Organization) did not commandeer land. This had been done by Main Trustee Office East and Himmler's Central Soil Office long before the organization war founded. The Ostland, on the contrary, received instructions from Goering, based on the provisions of the law, to supervise the cultivation of the land, in order that it might be used to the best possible advantage. This task it discharged in an examplary manner. Hundreds of millions of Reichsmark flowed into the incorporated Eastern areas. In so far as the Ostland was working by order of Goering, it acted on orders and not by virtue of its own authority.
2. Both the Siedlungsgesellchaft were founded only in the spring of 1940.
They did not create a legal precedent. This had been done long age by the organization administered by Goering and Himmler, which alone were authorized to take such action and were responsible for it, without the assistance, knowledge or consent of Darre.
In so far as Goering or Himmler or their agencies may have violated International Law in their action in the incorporated areas, the Siedlungsgesellschaften sad the Ostland had no part in their activities. The administrative work and the work of increasing production performed by these organizations under the jurisdiction for the Ministry of Food served the interests of production and not of destruction. It served the in terests of order and not of chaos. Had the areas in question been occupied territory, it is precisely such administrative and general supervisory work which would have formed part of the duties of the occupying power. Since the incorporated Eastern territories had become part of the Reich by order of the Chief of State, however, it was the duty of the Minister of Food, in accordance with the law of the land, to ensure orderly control of production and care of farms.
This task was carried out correctly and in the best possible way There is no indication whatsoever of violation of International Law in the execution of this work.
3. Finally, neither the economic control of settlers nor the trustee administration of land is a crime against humanity. They are merely measures of economic development. Moreover, no proof has been brought of the fact that Darre took any part whatsoever in crimes against humanity, either by giving active assistance or passive consent.
JUDGE MAGUIRE:Dr. Merkel, we have arrived at our usual hour for recess, and if it is convenient we will recess for fiteen minutes.
(A short recess was taken until 1515 hours)
THE MARSHAL:Military Tribunal IV is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE MAGUIRE:You may proceed, Doctor.
DR. MERKEL: -
S p o l i a t i o n.
1. Darre had no independent authority in the occupied areas. Goering, as Commissioner for the Four-Year-Plan, was responsible for economic control as a whole. Both officially and in practice, the responsibility for the individual occupied areas lay with the appointed Military Commanders-in-Chief, Chiefs of Civil Administration, Reich Commissars or, in the case of Poland, with the Governor General.
2. There was, in fact, no spoliation of the occupied areas from the point of view of agriculture during Darre's period of office. Even the British Ministry of Economic Warfare stresses that, until the end of 1941, Germany endeavoured to bring these areas up to the highest possible standard from the economic point of view. Everyone looked upon the areas incorporated into the Reich as parts of the Reich, and they were given full economic support. The inhabitants of these areas received the same attention as those of the Reich proper. There can be no question of spoliation of these areas. On the contrary, it was the duty of the Reich Minister of Food to introduce agricultural laws there. For since these areas had been declared Reich territory, they had to be supported, serviced and supplied in accordance with those laws. But this was only possible if the basis of legal and economic action was made a uniform one.
3. Detailed analysis of the wartime food balances confirms the statement of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare cited above. For this, I refer the Coutr to my Closing Brief. Taking into account the admissible removal of goods by the German Wehrmacht, the German population by no means lived on the occupied territories during Darre's period of office.
Foreign Workers 1. In dealing with the question of foreign workers, a distinction must be made between the recruitment of workers abroad and the employment of such workers in Germany.
Darre had nothing to do with the recruitment of foreign workers. That was the concern of the Reich Ministry of Labor. And, in fact, the Generalrat of the Four Year-Plan dealt with this question at the beginning of 1940. In this connection, Backe, Goering's agricultural advisor, requested that, should it be necessary, Polish workers be recruited by force for work in the Reich. The only person authorized to issue such an order was Frank, Governor General of Poland exclusively. Only Goering, as Commissioner of the Four-Year-Plan, was in a position to issue instructions to him. Backe, Chief of the Department for Food within the organization of the FourYear-Plan had no authority whatsoever to make such a move. If compulsory measures were in fact taken, he may have been involved, in that he gave his consent. Darre knew nothing of the matter. He rejected himself declined to take such measures and had no part in the taking of them.
If such measures were, in fact, taken, they could not have been taken on any very considerable scale. For as early as May 1940, hundreds of thousands of French prisoners were pouring into the Reich. Manpower shortages were made good by them. This fact was established by the British Ministry of Economic Warfare too. Its statements coincide with those of the German experts. Only small numbers of civilians came into the Reich as workers that year.
2. The foreign agricultural workers were well treated in Germany. The leading farmers of Western Germany confirm this fact unanimously. Orders to the contrary issued by the Party and the Police were only on paper. For, in view of the special circumstances prevailing in German agriculture, it was impossible to put such orders into practice on the farms.
R a t i o n i n g.
1. Giving way to Party pressure, Backe gave orders for an insignificant reduction in the rations of the Jews at the beginning of the war.
This reduction made a difference of some 40-50 calories per day. Accordingly, the Jews had been receiving 2,400 calories from the beginning of the war onwards, and were receiving 2,000 calories at the time of Darre's overthrow. This cannot be considered a crime against humanity. For, for more than three years, the consumers of the Bizone have been receiving an average of 60% of this ration. Furthermore, Darre was not involved in this measure in any way. He had no previous knowledge of it, and would not have approved it had he been in possession of such knowledge. The quantities involved played not the slightest role within the supply system as a whole.
2. The rations issued to prisoners of war were laid down by the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht. The Minister of Food was in no way responsible for them at all. Moreover, the British Ministry of Economic Warfare has stated that the rations issued to prisoners of war were adjusted to those of the civilian population. In the three years following the war, the German civilian population of the Bizone has not received even 60%, and in the French and Russian Zones, not even 50% of the rations issued to prisoners of war during the war.
Membership of Criminal Organizations.
1. SS-Fuehrer Darre was not an active SS-Fuehrer at any time. He resigned his honorary position as Chief of the Race and Settlement Main Office on 8 February 1936.
At the beginning of the war, he allowed the rift between himself and Himmler to become apparent. As Hitler, the Chief of State, had forbidden him to resign from the SS, he had no choice but to remain and let the rift be apparent to the outside world. Thus from the beginning of the war onwards, Darre no longer even held the position of an honorary SS Fuehrer. He broke off all but the strictly necessary connections with Himmler and the SS and did not take part in any of the gatherings of the higher SS Fuehrers. On the contrary, Himmler forbade individual higher SS Fuehrer to have any dealings with him. He had no further connections with the SS.
Thus Darre cannot be considered to number among the group which has been declared a criminal organization in the Judgment of the IMT.
2. Darre was a Reichsleiter of the NSDAP, Chief of the Reich Office for Agrarian Policy and handled the Party machinery which dealt with agrarian policy.
The latter was closed own in 1933 following the formation of the Professional Agricultural Association. The Reich Office for Agrarian Policy performed no actual work of its own worth mentioning, and became completely dormant with the outbreak of war. From this time onwards, the title of "Reichsleiter" was purely a matter of form. Darre performed no special work in his capacity as Reichsleiter and took no part in any activity described as criminal by the IMT Judgment. Measures ordered by the Party Administration after Darre's downfall cannot possibly be attributed to Darre. But it is precisely such orders which led to the ruling contained in the IMT Judgment that certain groups within the Party were declared criminal organizations.
In any case, from the beginning of the war onwards, Darre took no active part whatsoever in and gave no support to the work of the Party. On the contrary, he was declared totally unsuitable for Party purposes by the Party Administration, and was therefore removed from office. A member of an organization who is declared unsuitable for membership of this organization by that organization and is treated as such by the organization, does not further the ends of this organization, but impedes its progress, and is regarded by the organization not as a positive but as a negative force.
For this reason, Darre cannot be considered as one of that group within the Party organization declared criminal by the IMT Judgment. Here the old legal principle of "Cessante, legis ratione cossat lex ips" applies. Where the spirit of the law is not pertinent, the law itself cannot be applied.
C o n s p i r a c y From Hitler's point of view, there were two groups of leading men.
1. The group concerned with matters of military importance and of foreign policy. The members of this group took part in the four secret sessions which the IMT Judgment considers to be of decisive importance.
2. The Party political group. This consisted of G o e r i n g, H e s s, H i m m l e r, L e y, G o e b b e l s and B o r m a n n.
Goering alone was a member of both groups. During the war, S p e e r grew in importance as a member of Hitler's entourage, without actually being a member of one of these groups. The majority of the members of the leading Party political group dide by their own hand.
Darre belonged to neither of these two groups. He did not take part in any of the four secret meetings and did not even know of them. Moreover, he was not one of the Ministers who had any influence on Hitler. Since 1936, the importance of his position as a Minister had been decreasing and from the beginning of the war onwards, it carried absolutely no weight. And this is not surprising. For Hitler himself described him as a defeatist. This attitude on Darre's part is confirmed by the testimonies of a number of witnesses.
The witness Dr. Maushofer reports a statement made by Darre during the period before the war. Darre determinedly rejected any thought of war with the East:
"For even if I did consider it possible that such an idea might be correct, it would be the greatest disaster for the German people to embark upon a campaign of conquest towards the East.
For it would mean the end of the German people as a nation."
At the outbreak of war, he said:
"At the end of this war, grass will be growing over the asphalt of Berlin."
He spoke too of the madness of war between the nations of Europe in view of the threat of Bolshevism.
Theo article by Lord Lymington, however, which he put at Darre's disposal for his newspaper "Odal" at the latter's request, and which Darre published in this newspaper two months before the outbreak of war, is particulary characteristic. This article, with which Darre thus identified himself reads as follows:
"The end of a war would imply hunger throughout the world.
The Apokalypse is upon us, it is for us to decide whether the horsemen will trample us under foot.
Their names are Sand, Water and Hunger.
And as rear-guard comes Pestilence, riding hard on the heels of Hunger.
These four, like war or Bolshevism are the outriders of the dark, new age from which there is no returning to the light."
The man who expresses such thoughts is no exponent of war and no war criminal. Darre executed his duties in his own special sphere of work correctly. He won himself acclaim within his own profession, not only at home but abroad. His opinions frequently deviated from the prevailing opinions of the Third Reich. He joined battle with the Party, he broke with Himmler at a time when few men willingly incurred the displeasure of one in such a powerful position. And for these reasons he met with opposition, was ridiculed and finally accused of madness. This type of resistance was in keeping with his character. He took no part in war crimes, either by giving active support or even only by passive consent. I therefore move that he be acquitted.
The Jewish High Priests, when entering the presence of Jehova, bore on their breasts the words "U r i m w o T h u m m i m", Light and Right. In these dark days through which we are passing, light and right are solely needed to vanquish darkness, hatred and destruction. May this be the purpose served by the judgment of this Court.
PRESIDING JUDGE MAGUIRE:I take it, Doctor, that you're finished?
DR. MERKEL:Yes, Your Honor, I have finished.
PRESIDING JUDGE MAGUIRE:Thank you very much.
We will now proceed with the argument on behalf of the defendant Lammers.
Dr. Seidl?
DR. SEIDL:Dr. Seidl on behalf of the defendant Dr. Lammers. Mr. President. MAY IT PLEASE THE TRIBUNAL, When, on 20 November 1945, the IMT trial of Hermann Goering and another 21 defendants opened, one of the tasks of the defense had to consist, among other things, in tracing the causes which in the period 1930/1932 rendered possible the tremendous rise of the National Socialist Movement, and led on 30 January 1933 to the appointment, by the President von Hindenburg, of the leader of that Movement, Adolf Hitler, to the office of Reich Chancellor.
The defense has submitted evidence which clearly shows the causal connection between the Versailles Treaty, the later reparations policy of the victors of World War I and the economic collapse of Germany with its almost 7 million unemployed - the decisive cause of the seizure of power by the National Socialist Movement. When the defense undertook this task before the IMT, it did not yet know the text of the plan that originates from, and was named after, the former US Secretary of Treasury, Henry Horgenthau, and which was to play such a disastrous role at the conferences of Quebec, in September 1944, and of Yalta and Potsdam, in 1945. Nor did the defense know at the time of the Directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the US Commander in Chief of the Occupation Forces, of April 1945, in which, after an enumeration of the fundamental objectives of Military Government in Germany, the following sentence can be found:
". . .Except as may be necessary to carry out these objectives, you will take no steps (a) looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany "or (b) designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy."
Three and a half years have now passed since the unconditional surrender of Germany. Germany has been mutilated and deprived of her most important agricultural territories. The remainder has been divided into 4 zones, industry has been upset by the dismantling program even in its peace-time foundations and reconstruction possibilities, and the country as a whole has been brought to the very edge of the abyss. Henry Morgenthau's policy, raised to resolutions at the conferences of Yalta and Potsdam, has been carried out consistently. This relieves us of the necessity of continuing demonstrating the causal connection between Versailles and the seizure of power by National Socialism, commenced during the IMT trial: For any comparison with the results of the preceding three and a half years of occupation policy in Germany makes the authors of the Versailles Treaty, and the reparations politicians of the period following World War I, even appear as statesmen of great political judgment.
The proceedings before the International Military Tribunal and US Military Tribunals form part of this general occupation policy. In the Directive ICS 1067 already mentioned, of the C-i-C of the occupation forces, a special section is devoted to those trials. Within the framework of the general objectives of the occupation policy, they are to serve a definite aim. The question as to whether the path pursued by the prosecution in these trials is in accordance with the ideas and intentions which were first linked with them in 1945, may be left open. In fact, these trials have been used by the prosecution to strive for a definite aim.
While the agreements of Yalta and Potsdam were destined to smash Germany politically, economically and militarily for an indefinite time to come, these trials were to serve the purpose of breaking the backbone of the German nation in the moral sense.