Let me also mention, in this connection, the acquittal of the defendant Scheide in case IV (Pohl et al.). Scheide was a regular member of the SS (Standartenfuehrer) and "Amtschef" in the WVHA.
Tribunal No. II did not consider the proof to have been established for a knowledge of criminal activities of the SS on the part of Scheide. In contrast to this judgment, I should like to mention the Prosecution's contention that Rasche must have had knowledge of the criminal activities of the SS, because the Dresdner Bank issued loans to a few economic enterprises of the SS, which were subordinated to the WVHA.
The peculiarity of Rasche's case, however, does not only lie in the abundance of documentary evidence which has been submitted by the Prosecution, but also in the irrelevance of the individual documents which usually becomes obvious at the first glance. It closely analyzed these documents disclose that the matters at issue of the customary business of any banking institute, such as the purchase of shares, commission business and the granting of credits. The Prosecution has endeavored to construe a uniform aim of all these normal commercial transactions, namely, the carrying out of the program of the Government of the Third Reich. In the introductory passages of my expositions I have pointed out that the Prosecution used the method of compiling from the entire compass of business of a large banking establishment everything which could possibly be connected with political matters. If this material found was placed side by side, and if it was omitted to take into consideration that this compilation represented only a most minute part of the entire complex of business which frequently did not concern Rasche at all, then the political line of the bank and the political banker Rasche was found. It did not cause much trouble to find connections with authorities and po litical matters.
For, just as there is no country in which the economic life remains unaffected by political conditions, this rule applies all the more to the Third Reich with its control system which overshadowed the whole of the economic life.
Every connection with authorities the consent of which was necessary for the majority of commercial contracts, was construed as an identification with their aims. Every political moment of any kind whatsoever was interpreted as the motive or purpose of the transaction. Any business concluded with a foreigner or Jew thus became a business with political reasons and, in a very daring legal construction, a spoliation. Any business connection with an enterprise controlled by political agencies became a political matter, and, by a bold legal inference, a credit granted was interpreted as a cooperation in everything which happened in the respective enterprise. This method of the Prosecution, this deluge of documentary material can effectively be countered by one thing only. By a clear comprehension of economic processes and of the legal questions decisively involved in all Counts of Rasche's case. I am fully convinced that this comprehension will serve the Tribunal as a tool for the pronouncement of a Judgment which acquits my client.
PRESIDING JUDGE MAGUIRE:I take it, Doctor, this completes the argument on behalf of the defendant Rasche? Thank you very much; we will now proceed to hear arguments of counsel in the case of defendant Darre. Dr. Merkel?
DR.MERKEL: (Counsel for defendant Darre) Your Honors, in the English translation there are to be found a few mistranslations which I have corrected. Permit me to submit to the Tribunal a few of the corrected copies. I come first to Darre's position in the Third Reich.
Darre's position in the Third Reich The case of Darre is an exceptional one in the history of the Third Reich.
Only a few Ministers fell from grace in the Third Reich. Darre is among them. The history of his fall is the key to the understanding of his character, his aims and his actions.
He was overthrown by Backe, his state secretary, and Bormann, the omnipotent chief of the Party Chancellery. Perhaps the figure of Himmler also loomed in the background.
1. At Easter 1947, Backe committed suicide. He was originally to have been indicted. When he did away with himself, the plan of an industrial trial was allowed to drop. Then Darre, the Minister who had been overthrown by Backe, was indicted as representative of the agrarian sector.
Again and again during this trial, the shadow of Backe has reappeared. He was the first to suggest in the General Counsel for the Four Year Plan that foreign labor should be brought to Germany, if necessary under compulsion.
Hitler and Goering commissioned Backe to make the preparations in the agricultural sphere for a possible war against Russia. At the same time, Backs received the order to keep this work secret from Darre.
Finally, Backe is the author of those two agricultural memoranda which were produced before the Russian campaign and are known under the names "Green Donkey" and "Brown Camel".It is not necessary to investigate here, whether these ideas of Backe's were realized.
Rather, it is the character which is revealed in these documents, which is of decisive importance.
Dr. Haushofer, an expert on the agrarian policy of the Third Reich, of non-aryan origin and victim of the 20th of July 1944, expresses his view as follows:
"There was an extraordinarily marked difference between Darre and Backe.
Whether in praise or in blame, Darre was always described as an i dealist.
As long as the Party maintained the facade of idealism, it was wont to speak warmly of this idealism of Darre's. At the instant when the Party went over to the realism of its neo-imperialism, Darre's idealism was repeatedly referred to in a derogatory and contemptuous manner.
"Backe was a realist who had very early taken the stand of the utter cynic.
Backe probably soon reached the conclusion that Darre would not be able to succeed against the mighty con stellation of his opponents, which included such diverse powers as Goering, Himmler, and Ley, and he therefore probably recommended himself as the coming successor."
The witness Dr. Schmitt, chairman of the Society of Persecutees of the Nazi Regime, confirms this statement. This man, who lay for 6 years in a concentration camp, was Darre's doctor from 1938 to 1941. Schmitt speaks of "Backe's cynical perfidy and his ambition, for which he would commit murder". He had succeeded in taking Darre's place with the slogan: "the slack and feeble Darre must go!"
2. Backe's rise and Darre's fall took place in three stages. In 1936 the Four Year Plan was announced. The Ministry of Food was put under Goering's command. Backe was Goering's agricultural advisor.
At the beginning of the war Backe became the leading figure in the Ministry of Food. Darre had informed Hitler that he refused responsibility for Backe. Hitler replied that he wanted to work with Backe.
Darre handed in his resignation. Hitler refused it.
Early in 1942, Backe brought the matter to a head. Hitler decided in his favor. Darre was overthrown and banished. The public was told of a sickness of Darre's, and people spread the rumour that he was mad.
Weakened in 1936, deprived of authority in 1939, overthrown in 1942, these are the three descending stages of Darre's ministerial career.
3. To the same degree, Darre came into conflict with Goering and the economic policy supported by him.
By 1936, the grave crisis in German agriculture had been dealt with by the market regulations. The Four Year Plan started a new crisis for German agriculture. Large numbers began to fly from the land. Darre felt himself obliged to bring this flight to the attention of the public. He demanded that the Party positively protect farming. If the flight from the land was not overcome, then the Party had failed. This speech and the Reich Farmers Conference in Goslar at the end of 1938 aroused an extraordinary sensation. In leading political circles Darre was called a Frondeur.
A second result of Goering's economic policy was that prices and wages in industry increased. Thus the purchasing power of agriculture for industrial necessities was seriously impaired. Darre decided on a second thrust. In a memorandum to Goering and Hitler on 21 January 1939 he pointed out that all just and harmonious relationship between industry and agriculture had been lost. The final consequence of this chaotic condition in German economy was the unstable currency.
Finally, Darre saw the increasing danger of an economic imperialism which would undoubtedly injure the farmers severely. On 25 January 1939 he spoke in Munich before loading representatives of German industry. "I emphasize this once again because we want to hold ourselves clearly aloof from imperialist tendencies. The new order can only be based on honest cooperation between the peoples and never on dictatorship and exploitation, for these were the methods of the old imperialism and capitalism."
Thus Darre and his agrarian policy came into sharp conflict with Goering and his industrial policy.
4. Of decisive significance, however, was the conflict which arose between Darre and the Party.
Darre did not enter the Party until 1930. He was not among the old warriors who marched with Hitler in 1923. In background and education he differed fundamentally from the radical powers of the Party. As a natural scientist his view of the world was organic and could not be understood by the dull materialism of many Party circles. His sympathy went out to the farmers. He wanted to ensure the inner powers of resistance and stability of agriculture. He wanted to maintain and protect it in a world filled with capitalist and collectivist powers. This fight might have seemed hopeless. Darre took up the fight and tenaciously pursued his path until his downfall.
5. Darre made German agriculture professionally self-administrative. Such self-administration had been demanded in general by the papal encyclical Quadragesimo anno. The great Vienneso Sociologist Othmar Spann supported similar theories. The Party, on the other hand, rejected these theories and saw in the Reich Food Estate the embodiment of these ideas which they opposed.
The Party considered the Reich Food Estate as an alien body. They called it "the Reich Contrary Estate" (Reichsquerstand) or the "Reich Reactionary Estate" (Reichsreaktionaerstand). They wanted an organization of agriculture which, like the German Labor Front, was inclined in favor of the Party organization. Darre on the other hand, created the Reich Food Estate purposely, as a corporation of public rights which was independent of the Party. Thus he naturally came into conflict with the Party's demand for totalitarianism.
His bitterest opponents here were Gauleiters Goebbels, Koch, Terboven, Buerekel, and a few others whose names are less well known.
Another enemy was Lay. He wanted to incorporate land workers into the German Labor Front. The result would have been that class warfare would have been carried into the villages. Darre, however, succeeded in keeping them in the organization for agricultural professions.
All these currents united in the Party Chancellery. When Bermann, an embittered opponent of Darre, became chief of the Party Chancellery, these powers prepared to strike the final blow. Bermann declared Darre unfit for the Party. In the Party handbook it was stated with regard to Darre that the Party rejected all forms of the corporate State. It was, moreover, bluntly stated, that such leaders as were not recognized by the Party would be dismissed.
At one time Darre had been a representative of the farmers' and conservative wing of the Party. The more the radical powers came to the fore, however, the more his position was weakened until he was finally overthrown.
6. Originally Darre was in close contact with Himmler, which consolidated in the years 1934 to 1936 into a political coalition. At that time, Darre was conducting a defensive battle against the Party, the German Labor Front and major powers in industry.
PRESIDING JUDGE MAGUIRE:Referring to your paragraph 6 which you just read, are those dates accurate? We have it in English "1944 to 1946".
DR. MERKEL:That is an error; it should be "1934 to 1936".
Originally Darre had been protected to a certain extent by Roehm. After his death Darre welcomed the opportunity to reinforce his heavily contested position through a coalition with Himmler.
From 1936 onwards, however, Himmler evinced tendencies towards an ever stricter police regime, which Darre opposed. The tensions grow. On 8 February 1938 Darre resigned his honorary post as chief of the Rassound Siedlungshauptamt. This was immediately after the Blomberg-Fritsch crisis.
When at the beginning of the war, Himmler became Reich Commissar for the Strengthening of Germanism, Darre broke with him completely. He did this regardless of the fact that he brought upon himself the enmity of one of the most powerful men of the Third Reich.
7. All these facts have been proved by numerous documents and testimonies. Only through them can one understand Darre's position in the Third Reich. Goering, Goebbels, Himmler, Ley, and Bermann had unrestricted access to Hitler, and so had these Gauleiters who were known as particularly staunch opponents of Darre. These men formed the leading political group of the Third Reich, Goering in the sphere of economic policy, Goebbels in cultural life, Himmler in the sector of government and police, Ley in the spheres of labor and social welfare policy, Bermann, as the man who held the reins of Party policy in his hands, first behind the scenes and then blatantly in the open. These men, not Darre, had Hitler's ear. Darre was rejected by this close circle about Hitler. For them, he was a romantic; he was not a man of violence and was therefore rejected by tyese men of quite a different stamp.
Samll wonder that Hitler embraced the outlook of this Circle, dropped Darre and gradually took Backe in his place:
I came now to the racial question.
B.
The period before the war.
I.
The Racial Question.
1. The Prosecution described Darre as a supporter of National Socialist racial theories, Darre, however, rejected the idea of the "Master Race" in its radical anti-semitic form as well as in its imperialist expression.
Dr. Haushofer and Dr. Schmitt agree in stating that there was a lot to be said for Darre's racial theories. Neither in origin nor in aims did they have anything to do with nihilist theories which led to mass extermination.
The Prosecution also states that Darre supported a theoretical anti semitism. Theories are not facts and anti-semitism as such is not a crime against humanity. The IMT judgment has already affirmed this. In reality, however, Darre was strongly opposed to all violence and himself prevented attacks against Jews insofar as he learned of them.
2. The Prosecution objects to the Reich Estate Law (Reichserbhofgesetz) on the grounds that it is an expression of Nazi ideologies. But in actual fact the tradition of the inherited estate in Germany is very old and has nothing to do with racial problems. Nor is this tradition of the inherited estate in Germany is very old and has nothing to do with racial problems. Nor is this tradition of the inheritance of family estates restricted to the sphere of Germanic law. The Jewish land regulations were also based on the principle of family estates at a time when the Jews were still an agricultural people. This is revealed by the Third Book of Hoses, Chapter 25, whereby every tribe, every race, every family, was to remain on the portion of inheritance allotted to them by God.
Why should such a law not be introduced in Germany, especially since it was in accordance with ancient German traditions?
3. The Prosecution considers the aryanization of the soil a crime against humanity. The judgment in Case No. 5 held a different view in the case against Flick. The confiscation of property for an adequate remuneration is not a crime against humanity. Crimes against humanity are crimes directed against the life and liberty of suppressed peoples, but not against their property. And besides, every country has its expropriation laws.
Darre signed neither the law itself nor the implementary decree. This means that under national law he was not responsible for either law. But he had to accept the legal position established by other ministers, and to issue an implementary decree. The practical significance of this decree was negligible because Jewish property in the form of farms and estates was very small indeed in Germany.
4. Finally, Darre is alleged to have promoted the Jewish policy instituted by the SS.
It is true tint Darre was honorary chief of the Rasse und Siedlungahauptamt until 8 February 1938 and that in this capacity he also took a share in the instruction of the SS. But he had differences with Himmler even here. Himmler did not like Darre's policy. And the judgment in Case No. 8 rightly emphasized that the activities of the Rasse und Siedlungshauptamt could not be complained of during Darre's term of office. Darre had no influence, however, on the later period.
II.
Reich Food Estate, Market regulations, Rearmament.
1. The Prosecution charges Darre with the so-called coordination policy. According to the IMT Judgment the coordination policy was not a crime. Besides, coordination in the agricultural sphere took place on the basis of free votes and Darre did not build up the Reich Food Estate as a Party affiliation but as an agricultural organization, independent of the organization of the Party.
Therefore there can be no question of the Nazification of agriculture.
2. Agricultural market regulations have been the central problem of agrarian policy in all countries since 1930. Similar measures were taken everywhere, serving to standardize the markets and to raise the national revenue. If every country the market regulations were adapted to the needs of war and kept on after the end of the war. In Germany it started as a peace-time institution and it would have been continued even if there had been no war. Today the demand for market regulations is listed in the Bavarian constitution as a constitutional principle. All this surely proves that the market regulations were not a preparation for war.
3. Rearmament in itself is not an offense under International Law. This was declared in the IMT Judgment. But now the Prosecution has related the activity of the Reich Defense Committee during the period from 1934 to 1936 with preparations for war. But the complete text of the documents reveals that the committee had only a possible war of defense in mind.
4. Darre signed the law on the procurement of land for Wehrmacht purposes. But only the expropriation of land serves armament purposes. For this the High Command of the Wehrmacht was the responsible authority. The Minister for Food had quite a different task. He had to take care of agricultural interests threatened or damaged by the Wehrmacht. It was his particular duty to procure new land for farmers whose estates had been appropriated.
His activity was confined to these limits and so was his responsibility for the law and proceeding from the law. His activity, then, did not serve armament purposes but was designed to remedy the damage agriculture had suffered because of rearmament.
5. The preparation for industrial mobilization was headed by the Plenipotentiary General for Military Economy, Schacht.
In the meeting of the Reich Defense Committee of 26 June 1935 it was established that on Schacht's orders a coupon system was prepared on the basis of a decree for the provisional ensurement of the requirements of the German people.
This was to guarantee uniform supplies for the German people. It was established in the report by the Plenipotentiary General for Military Economy that this coupon system which had been developed would come into immediate effect in the event of mobilization. The Reich Minister of Food had prepared a skeleton agreement on the organisation of Food Economy in wartime as well as various decrees for the public control of the various agricultural products.
The Ministry of Food was "subject in wartime" to the Plenipotentiary General for Military Economy "and was to abide by his instructions". Schacht was acquitted in the IMT judgment. Thus, this Tribunal did not see anything in the legislation for which Schacht was responsible, which could be objected to from thepoint of view of International Law. And this was quite correct. For such precautionary measures against the possible event of war are customary in all countries.
6. In the report made at the end of 1937 by the Plenipotentiary General for Military economy, are listed a number of precautionary measures for economic mobilization in the food sector. These were to be carried out at the direction of the Plenipotentiary General. The appropriate instructions were issued by the Supreme Command of the Whermacht or the Plenipotentiary General for Economy to the Reich Ministry of Food and by the latter to the Reich Food Estate. Uniformity in the handling of these questions was the responsibility of the Office for the Safeguarding of Food Supplies. (Stella fuer Ernaehrungssicherung). Such precautionary measures are a matter of common practice in all countries, even today.
7. The measures necessary in the event of mobilization are sketched in advance in Mobilization Handbooks in all countries. As in France, Germany provided for a state of emergency which sould precede any mobilization. The Head of the State gave orders to the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht that a state of emergency was to be declared. The latter communicated the order to the Plenipotentiary General for Economy, who in turn transmitted it to the Reich Minister of Food.
Thus he was the third link in the chain of recipients of orders. Having received this order, he was obliged by the law of the State, to put into effect the measures outlined in the Mobilization Handbook. In so doing, he did not create a legal precedent. For the organization of the wartime food economy and the rationing of individual agricultural products were effected in accordance with the provisions of two basic orders issued by the Plenipotentiary General for Economy. These two orders also stipulated that the Reich Minister of Food should issue the necessary implementation orders. These were drawn up by order of Schacht.
These implementation orders contained merely the provisions governing the commandeering of agricultural products and the control of consumption. Their sole purpose was to prevent the grave economic and social sufferings which threatened the broad masses of the people as a result of the war, particularly the danger of hoarding and profiteering.
In the authentic social catechism of the Roman Catholic Church are developed the fundamental ideas expressed in the encyclical "Quadragesima". Fig. 111 reads as follows:
"In the event of war or of the scarcity of goods, or of the serious and blatant misuse of goods, it is not only the right, but also the duty of the State to in troduce a special system, the purpose of which is to prevent hoarding and the increase of profiteering in essential commodities."
It was this very purpose which was served by the introduction of the wartime food economy. These organizations are still in existence today, three and a half years after the end of the war. They operate in the same way today as during the war. Their purpose today, too, is to meet the contingencies of a period of grave emergency. At that time, the emergency was created by the war; today it is the outcome of economic chaos. A system which public opinion and the Roman Catholic Church regard as the duty of statesmen cannot be considered as a crime judge by the standards of International Law.
I am obliged now to refute certain contentions made by the Prosecution in their Final Pleas, which I have inserted into my document at this point.
1. The Prosecution asserts that Darre's position within the sphere of economic mobilization corresponded to that of Funk. The documents submitted prove the contrary. Funk, like Schacht, was Plenipotentiary General for Economy. In accordance with the provisions of the Reich Defense Law, Darre was the subordinate of both and took orders from them. I refer the Court to page 24/25 and 33/34 of my closing Brief.
2. The Prosecution further asserts that, during the month following the Hossbach conference in November 1937, Darre prepared a comprehensive program for the wartime food economy.
In point of fact, these orders had been worked out in 1935 on Schacht's instructions and were accordingly already in existence at the end of 1937. The report of the Plenipotentiary for War Economy of December 1937 gives, with the yearly balance, an account of progress in economic mobilization resulting from the years of work devoted to the subject by Schacht the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy. I refer the Court to pages 24/25 of my Closing Brief.
3. The Prosecution asserts that the rationing system was put into force following an order issued by Darre on the guarantee of essential commodities to meet the requirements of the German people. I have refuted this allegation with the help of documents. The decree laying down temporary measures for guaranteeing the essential requirements of the German people was signed and put into force by the plenipotentiary General for Economy, Funk. I submitted this decree as Sur-Rebuttal Document Exh. 221-II C 41d. This decree introduces the rationing of all foodstuffs. Art. 13 of this decree stipulates that the Reich Food Minister shall Issue the necessary enforcement regulations.
The contention that this decree and the supplementary legislation were put into force four days before the attack on Poland also creates a false Impression.
May I draw attention to the Sur-Rebuttal Document Exh. 219-II C 41b. These are the pertinent passages from the Mobilization Manual far the Civil Administration. According to this Manual, mobilization is preceded by a period of tension. The measures planned for this period of tension were to be ordered by the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor. On 27 August, Hitler announced the period of tension. Thereupon, Funk was compelled to issue the decrees provided for in the Mobilization Manual for this eventuality. In that Darre was the subordinate of Funk, he was similarly compelled to issue the necessary enforcement orders.
4. The Prosecution also mentions the circular dated 8 September 1938, which is signed by Trick and Darre. In this circular, attention is drawn to the fact that Hitler had ordered that the preparation of economicmobilization be expedited. By virtue of this decree, the Minister of Food, as a purely executive official, was compelled to publish the pertinent decrees as provided for in the Mobilization Manual.
I have proved that such measures are customary in all countries. A document dated 9 November 1948, with the following text, is particularly worthy of note:
"At the beginning of the new American Congress assembling in January Plan "M", a secret document prepared by military and economic authorities, will be submitted to the representatives for their acceptance. It is a mobilization plan prepared for the eventuality of an armed conflict, which deals with the mobilization within a few hours, of the entire country on an unprecedented scale. A distribution plan for raw materials, every detail of which has been worked out, and also the rationing of all important products, will be put into force. Foodstuffs, textiles, and coal will then only be obtainable on ration cards."
(Nuernberger Nachrichten of 10 November 1948, page 3). 5. The Prosecution alleges that, on 27 August 1939, Darre issued a decree bringing into operation the administrative offices whichwere responsible for distribution and administration within the food industry, on a wartime basis.
Here too, the true facts are different. The organization of the wartime food economy was not established by any decree of Darre's but by a decree of the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, Funk. Pursuant to Art. 12 of this decree, it was the duty of the Reich Food Minister, Darre, as a subordinate of Funk in this sphere, to issue the necessary enforcement regulations. These regulations, too, were already in existence in 1937, and were formulated on the instructions of the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, Schacht.
I should to page 41 of my closing Brief. 6. Finally, the Prosecution quotes a sentence from one of Darre's memoranda, dated 27 November 1939, and concludes from it that Darre had prepared a war of aggression. But in the quotation, they omit a very important sentence. This sentence reads as follows:
"For, practically speaking, the difficulties attendant upon a war (blockade) had already been experienced since 1934, though perhaps not to the same degree, owing to' the permament lack of foreign currency."
The Prosecution laid this sentence before the witness Haushofer in his examination on 30 September 1948, (English Transcript page 24001). The witness' statements in this connection were comprehensive and, I think, very much to the point. In this connection, I should like to draw attention to pages 53 - 55 of my Closing Brief. Finally, the Prosecution refers to a letter from Darre to his wife in February 1942.
This sentence, too, is incompletely quoted, thus creating a false impression. I refer you to my Closing Brief, pages 59-60. 7. Finally, the Prosecution breaches the subject of the storage of grain. They assert that Darre demanded of Goering a minimum quantity of 6 million tons of grain as a reserve in case of war. No such document has, as yet, been submitted by the Prosecution. I have analyzed the actual facts with the help of all available statistical material. I have submitted a series of figures as Sur-Rebuttal Documents. They are Exh. 204-216 II b 22 a - II B 22 n.
The witness Zschirnt, former Chairman of the Main Association of the German Grain Industry (Hauptvereinigung der Deutsch en Getreidewirtschaft) also corrected some of the Prosecution's errors during his examination on 29 October 1948. In conclusion, the actual facts are presented in detail, supported by documents and figures, on pages 61-100 of my Closing Brief.
I now come to the storage of grain The accumulation of Grain Reserves.
1. The reason for the building up of sores of grain was the bumper harvest in 1938. In the Reich proper, it yielded 26.2 million tons, and was four million tons higher than that of the year 1937. The major export countries were swamped with surplus supplies. Germany had trade agreements with the Sputh Eastern countries, which stipulated certain minimum figures for the quantities of grain to be bought by Germany. These countries insisted that Germany take the surplus supplies. The overseas export countries likewise sought to buy grain. Thus it was that in 1938, large supplies of grain were imported. Yet it should be observed in this connection that maize imports alone, amounting to 1.9 million tons in the year 1938, were entirely used as fodder.
2. Imports of bread grain in the period from January to July 1939 were reduced to a minimum. In all, approximately 300,000 tons of wheat and approximately 90,000 tons of rye were imported. The value of those imports was 47 million Reichsmark. They amounted to sifficient to supply the requirements of the German people for 12 days.
Germany's imports, however, were totally insignificant as compared with these of Great Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands. Germany's imports of bread grain in the year 1938 amounted to only a quarter of Great Britain's imports of bread grain.
3. The balance of the Reich Grain Office on 30 June 1939 shows that at this time, the total of grain reserves (including fodder grain) amounted to 5.5 million tons. Of this quantity, only 3.4 million tons were grain produced in Germany itself. Thus the storage problem in Germany had become acute. The acuteness of this problem applied not only to Germany, however, but also to the United States. There 13.5 million tons had to be stored, that is to say, two and a half times as much as in Germany.
Germany, however, did not possess the huge storage facilities available in the New World. It was available therefore necessary to make available with a large number of auxiliary stores and, as a result, storage costs were extraordinary high. I have indicated the amount of these costs, by submitting an official bulletin issued by the Bizonal Office for Food, and Agriculture in Frankfurt/Main.
4. In 1939, Darre, too, considered the storage costs extremely high and therefore raised objections to the building up of excessive reserves. This fact is expressed in a memorandum to Hitler and Goering, dated 29 January 1939.
"On the other hand, it must be clearly understood that a few average or good harvests in succession will increase grain stocks to such an extent that, particularly in view of the pressure of the world market, the storage costs would no longer be occasionally justifiable.
Storage costs for 3 1/2 million tons of grain in the current year alone amount to 150 million Reichsmark ... With this sum which is expended solely for storage, approximately one million tons of grain could be bought from domestic sources.
The present extremely favorable grain supply situation "would make it possible to use some of the grain as fodder.
The result would be "that the Minister of Finance, would be able to save considerable sum of money on grain storage costs."
5. The Prosecution has submitted expert opinions which were written in the middle of February 1939. They deal with the grain situation in the event of a hypothetical military situation, i.e., in the event of the less of East Prussia and the territory left of the Rhine, thus, purely of defensive action. The expert opinions are analyzed in detail in my Closing Brief and consequently I have to refer to it.
While Darre viewed the accumulation of grain reserves which had been rendred necessary by circumstances as a move of agrarian policy, Goering new demanded that the reserves become permanent, in case of war, and be national reserves.
This thought was an obvious one to anyone holding Goering's views. For many countries, particularly Great Britain, had purchased considerable quantities of grain abroad and built up stores in case of war. The reserves stored in Germany, on the other hand, consisted for the most part, of grain rpoduced in the country. Once Goering had demanded that a national reserve be established, only very limited quantities of grain were purchased abroad. Hot even all the supplies guranteed to Germany by trade agreements, were taken up. I have proved all those facts with the help of detailed statisitical material, particularly in my Sur-Rebuttal documents.
6. It is, in any case, difficult to comprehend how grain reser ves can be held to be instruments of aggressive warfare. In former times, stocks were hold in besieged fortresses, but not by armies which marched out to wage aggressive wars. But above all, the cultivated of grain is not a war industry. Grain is a food not a weapon of destruction. Grain is not a weapon, much less a weapon of aggression such as phosphorus, long-range bombers or long-range missiles. Grain has never been a direct weapon of war. It is and will remain the staff of life. It serves to preserve life and not to deal death.
7. The really weak spot in Germany's armour was her fats supply. only 40% of Germany's requirements were mot by domestic supplies. As far as grain was concerned, there had been no choice about accumulating reserves. As far as facts were concerned, there were no reserves worth speaking of. But Germany made no attempt to build up reserves It is very characteristic that in summer 1939, Germany declined an offer of a large consignment of whole oil from Norway. It was not Germany but Britain which bought up this consignment.