Q. Where did he live at that time, that is, since his assumption of the title as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy?
A. When he assumed this office, in Berlin and in the vicinity of Berlin, at the Wavy headquarters.
Q. Did he live with his family, or did he live with his staff?
A. He lived with his family, but his life was with his staff for the greater part.
Q. And after the staff, in the autumn of 1943, was transferred to Berlin to the so-called underground corridor -
A. At that time in the headquarters itself, but his family lived there for part of the time as well, but official conversations for the most part took place until late in the evening.
Q. And that means from that period of time on he lived in a Marine officer's quarters?
A. Yes.
Q. You, among all officers, could from a close proximity follow the course of the Admiral's life. Can you tell me what his motives were, that is, in your opinion, which were the decisive motives when he save out his military orders?
THE PRESIDENT: You can't speak about the motives of people. You can't give evidence about other people's minds. You can only give evidence of what they said and what they did.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I do believe that an officer who lived with another officer for years has a vertain knowledge of the motives, basing his knowledge on the actions of the officer and of what the officer told him. However, perhaps I mau put my question in a little different way.
THE PRESIDENT: He can give evidence about his character, but he can't give evidence about his motives.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Then I shall ask him about his character, your Honor.
BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q. Can you tell me, please, whether Admiral Doenitz when he formulated his orders and in all of his actions showed egotistical motives that came to your knowledge?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, that is the same thing again, isn't it? That is the same question again really.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I meant it to be a different question.
THE PRESIDENT: Nobody is charging him with being egotistical or anything of that sort. He is charged with the various crimes that are charged against him in the indictment.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Then I shall ask a question regarding the opinion of the Prosecution. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q. The Prosecution judged Admiral Doenitz as cynical and opportunistic. Is that in line with your own judgment?
A. No.
Q. How would you judge him?
A. I would judge him to be a man who wanted to do only his work and his duty, and who was interested about his arms and about the men who were carrying these arms.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I have no further questions to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you other members of the defendants' counsel want to ask any questions?
(No response)
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: My Lord, might. I first mention the documents that I put in the cross examination this morning, or rather it was a document which had been in before. It was D-658, GB-229.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the letter. G or D?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: D, my Lord, the D series. That is the document dealing with Bordeaux, and there was a dispute as to whether it was from the Bordeaux Commando Raid, The dispute was as to whether it was from the SKL, that is the Naval War Staff Diary, or from a war diary of some lower formation. My Lord, I have had the matter confirmed with the Admiralty, and I will produce the original to defense counsel. from one Abteilung, Toil A--that is part A,-- for December 1942. So it is from the War Diary of the Defendant Raeder and the witness. BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q You have said, Witness, that you don't recollect protesting against this order of the 17th of September 1942.
A. Yes.
Q. I will try and refresh your memory. Would you lock at a document, D-865?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: My Lord, that is an extr on from an interrogation of Admiral Doenitz on the 6th of October I should anything the record was kept in English, and, therefore, the translation into German not represent necessarily the Admiral's actual words. BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE: first paragraph. It is the end of the first paragraph on page 207 in the English text. The Admiral is dealing with the order of the 17th of September 1942, and in that last sentence in that paragraph he says:
"I remember that Captain Godt"--the spelling in English was wrong--"Captain Godt and Capt in Hessler were against this telgram. They told me that expressly because they said "That can be misunderstood," But I said "I must tell that now to these boats to prevent the losses in this one percent. I must give them a reason so they don't feel obligated to do that."
Do you remember protesting now, saying "That can be misunderstood"? of the page of the German:
"Thus I sent the second telegram in order to avoid that I should have futur losses. The second telegram happened on my instigation. I am completely and personally responsible for it, because Captains Godt and Hessler both expressly stated that they considered the telegram as ambiguous or liable to be misinterpreted." Do you remember that new? the English, first paragraph; page 4 of the German text, third paragraph. age that I read to you before--My Lord, that is the bottom of page 4: "--that his most primitive demands for the conduct of warfare by annihilating ships and crews are contradicted by efforts to rescue members of the crews." It is the last clause of the first sentence, He answere:
"These words do not correspond to the telegram. They do not in any way correspond to our actions in the years of 39, '40, '41, and 42, as I have plainl shown you by the Laconia incident. I would like to emphasize once more that the Captains Godt and Hessler both were violently opposed to the sponsor of the telegram."
Do you still say that you don't remember protesting spirit the sending of that telegram?
A. I have stated repeatedly that I do not remember this.
Q. I did not get that.
A. I have stated repeatedly that I do not remember this.
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: My Lord, did you get the English? I am afraid I did not.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
THE INTERPRETER: The witness said, "I have stated repeatedly that I do not remember this". BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q. I will show you one more extract, the document D-866, which will become GB-459. That is a further interrogation, on the 22nd of October.
The first question on the document is: "Do you consider this order to be contract to the prize rules of the German Navy pursued in the beginning of the war?"
And the last sentence of the first paragraph of the answer is: "Godt and Hessler told me, 'Don't make this wireless; you- see, one day there can be a wrong appearance about it. There can be a misinterpretation of that'."
You don't remember using those words?
A. No.
Q. You were an experienced staff officer, were you let?
A. Yes.
Q. You knew the importance of drafting an operational order with absolute clarity, did you not?
A. Yes.
Q. These orders you were issuing were going to young commanders, between 20 and 30 years of age, were they not?
A. 20 years I would say was too young. They might have been at the end of their twenties, perhaps.
Q. Yes. Do you say that this order is not ambiguous?
A. Yes. Perhaps if you take one sentence out of the context, you might have some doubt, but not if you read the entire order.
Q. What was the point of the words, "Rescue runs counter to the rudiments.
demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews."?
A. (No response)
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: Show it to him, will you?
(A document was handed to the witness.)
BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q. What was the point of those words., if this was merely a non-rescue order?
A. It was the reason and the motivation for the rest of the order, and a coordination of ships and crews which were fighting against our U-boats.
Q. You see, all your other orders were so clear, were they not?
Have you got the defense documents there in the witness box?
A. I believe yes,
Q. Look at the defense document, Doenitz Number 8 on page 10,
A. I do not have those documents before me.
(A document was handed to the witness.) BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q. It is on page 10 of that book. Let me just read you the second paragraph:
"U-boats may attack at once enemy merchant vessels on which armament is evidence.
As far as circumstances permit; measures shall be taken U-boat is excluded."
Now, no commander could go wrong with that order, could he? It is perfectly clear.
Look at another one, D-942, at page 13. It is the last paragraph of the order, on Page 15. Now, this is a non-rescue order.
Have you got it? Paragraph E, Standing Order 154:
"Do not rescue crew members nor take them along, and do not bother about boats of ships, Weather conditions and proximity of land are of no consequence. Concern yourselves only with the safety of your own boat, and try to achieve additional successes as soon as possible.
"We must be hard in this war. The enemy started it in order to destroy us; and we have to act accordingly."
Now, that was perfectly clear, was it not? That was a non-rescue order?
A. It was just as clear as the three other orders about whcih we are concerned.
Q. Look at one or two more and then let me come back to that order; Page 45, another order:
"Order from Flag Officer, U-boats" -- reading the third line -- "to take on board captaions with their papers of ships sunk, if it is possible, without endangering the boat or without impairing the fighting capacity".
It is perfectly clear to anybody exactly what was intended, is it not?
A. That is not an order at all; it is just an extract from the War Diary
Q. Yes. Reciting the words of the order, them, on the next page in Paragraph 4:
"Try under all circumstances to take prisoners if that can be done without endangering the boat". -- again, perfectly clear. June, 1944, the last sentence;
"Therefore, every effort must be made to bring in such prisoners far as possible without endangering the boats" intended to be a non-rescue order; that is right, is it not?
A. Yes, certainly.
Q. I ask you again, what was meant by the sentence, "Rescue runs counter to the rudimentary demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy ships and crews."?
A. That is a reason for the rest of the order, and it deals with ships and their crews which had been armed and had to fight U-boats in order to give them equal advantage.
Q. Why do you speak about the destruction of crews if you do not mean the destruction of crews?
A. We are concerned with the fact of whether the ships and their crews were to be destroyed, which is something entirely difference from the destruction of the crews after they had not been on the ship any longer.
Q. And that is something entirely difference from merely not rescuing the crews; isn't that a fact?
A. I do not quite understand that question.
Q. Destruction of crews is quite different from non-rescue of crews?
A. Destruction when the ship and crew are together.
Q. You are not answering the question, are you? But if you want it again, Destruction of crews is quite different from non-rescue of crews?
A. The destruction of the crews is different from the non-rescue of survivors, yes.
Q. Were those words merely put in to five this order what you described as a lively character which an order should have?
A. I cannot give you the details, I have already said that I do not remember the antecedents of this order.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, the Tribunal has already said to the witness that the document speaks for itself.
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: Yes. BY COLONEL PHILLIMORE:
Q. Would you just look at the next document in the prosecution book; that is D-663, on the last sentence of that document? In view of the desired destruction of ships' crews, are you saying that it was not your intention at this time to destroy the crows if you could? they are torpedoes, became survivers?
Q Will you now answer the question? Was it not your intention at this time to destroy the crows or survivers if you like, if you Could?
Do you remember the case of Kapitaen leutnant Eck? American and British officers here. "Filius" and then machine-gunned the survivers? Do you know that? briefing the commanders, had he not?
Q Yes. Now, if instead of taking the whole blame upon himself for the action which he took, if he had defended his action under this, order of the 17th of September 1942, are you saying that you could have court-martialled him for disobedience?
Q In view of the awarding of your order, do you say that? to decide. Eck, as far as I know, did not refer to this order. on briefing that this was an annihilation order, from September 1942 to the end of the war.
a way. He certaibly did not ask me about this, in any event. admitting that he briefed as he did, don't you?
Q You also know, don't you, that another commander he briefed was subsequently seen either by yourself or by Admiral Doenitz before he went out?
Q Again when he came back?
Q In general. Are you seriously telling the Tribunal that none of these officers who were briefed that this was an annihilation order, that none of them raised the question either with you or with Admiral Doenitz? any event. to be ambiguous; deliberately; so that any U-boat commander who was prepared to behave ashe did was entitled to do so under the order. Isn't that right? issued?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: No further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other cross-examination? Do you wish to examine, Dr. Kranzbuehler? BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Tribunal that he only informed very few officers about his interpretation of the Lakonia order?
officers last year. talked neither with Admiral Doenitz nor with you nor with Captain Hessler about his interpretation of the Lakonia order, even though he was repeatedly in your staff?
A That I know.. Whether from Moehle's affidavit of last year or from another source, that I cannot tell you at this point. you and Captain Hessler were against the Lakonia order, yet you state that you do not remember this contradiction. Do you consider it possible that Admiral Doenitz had overemphasized your objection to this order, in order to take the complete responsibility for himself?
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. I do not think you can ask him that question, Dr. Kranzbuehler, whether it is possible that the Admiral had over-emphasized what he said.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: If I am not permitted to put this question I have no further questions, Your Honor, to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Then with the permission of the High Tribunal I would like to call Captain Hessler as my next witness.
BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: the pure truth and will withhold and will add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath).
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q Captain Hessler, when did you enter the Navy?
Q You are related to Grand admiral Doenitz. Is that correct?
A Yes. In November of 1937 I married his only daughter.
Q When did you enter the U-boat service? according to the Prisenscheibe?
A Yes. I was instructed such at that time. to you?
A Yes. This Scheibe was submitted to me and I was instructed about it. is? mechanism, in the very shortest period of time possible we can determine how neutral and how other ships have to be dealt with. For instance, whether the neutral vessel has contraband, can be sunk; or whether it has to be passed -whether we have to let it pass. read on what paragraph of the prize law this case was to be found; and through that it was possible at the time of the investigation of a merchant ship to limit the time to the shortest possible time. Commander?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Now; I am submitting to the Tribunal this disc as Exhibit Doenitz Number 95. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: wrecked survivers?.
A Yes. The rescuing of survivors in the naval action is a matter of course and is to be carried through as fas as military measures permit. In U-boat warfare rescue of survivors, that is, the taking on board of the entire crew, is utterly impossible, for the space conditions of the U-boat do not permit any such action. The carrying through of other measures, such as, for instance, the approaching to life-boats, the picking up of those who are swimming and the taking of them into the life-boats, giving provisions and water, is, on general principle not possible, fo the endangering of the U-boat is in every part of an operational zone so great that you cannot carry out any of these measures without endangering your boat too much.
from when to when?
Q In what areas did you operate? Azores to Bergen, and the area West of Friedland.
Q What success did you have as against merchant shipping?
Q You have the knight's Order? by you?
A In most of the cases the situation was as follows: That I immediately left the place of sinking; that at the place of sinking I had to go away from this point of sinking, for my danger through hostile sea or air forces required me to do so. In two cases the danger was not quite as large. I could approach the life-boats and help them.
Q And what ships were concerned in this? These were the two ships.
Q How did you help the life boats? position and told them how they could reach land in their life boats. In the second place I gave them water, which is very, very important for survivors in tropical regions. Then in one case I rendered medical aid for the few who were wounded. sunk play a role too in how to surface while you were rescuing? justified suspicion toward every merchant-man and it's crew no matter how innocent they might appear. destruction. British ship, which I torpedoed North of Cape Byrd. The ship had stopped after it had been hit by the torpedo. The crew had left the ship and was in the life boats and it seemed to be sinking. I was thinking whether I should surface in order to Save the crew, tell them how to reach land, and ask them if they needed water. Then the feeling, I might say it was more or less unexplainable, kept me from doing so. I lifted the periscope and at the same moment when the periscope extended quite a good deal above the surface of the water, this steamer which seemed to have been abandoned from previous experiences, the sailors manned the guns, and the sailors who had kept themselves concealed underneath the guns and behind the railing, then at the closest possible range they opened fire on my periscope so that I had to take all necessary precautions. The hit close to the periscope but could not endanger me. Jones, which I torpedoed, that ship also seemed to be sinking. I wondered whether I should surface, when in one of the life boats I sew two British sailors who were in perfect uniform, spotless uniforms, and that, of course, made me suspicious.
I saw the ship at close range. I would judge 50 to 100 motors and I took a good look at the ship and I determined that it had not been abandoned, but in all possible spots of concealment sailors were still present. When I torpedoed the ship these concealments burst, and I saw that the ship had at least four to six guns of ten to fifteen millimeter strength, a large number of depth charges and installations, and anti-flack was there also behind the railing. Just on the strength of the coincidence that the depth charges had not been let go, that was the reason I escaped destruction. was less concerned with the crews and survivors than with endangering my own ship, and with something which was entirely clear to me in the future. U-boats? your task as Commander? You were to secure and instruct them as to all orders? instructions you gave and the instructions by the Chief of the Flotilla had to give, such as Moehle? bread outline about all questions as to their actions and demeanor at sea. The Chief of the Flotilla had the instructions or mission to ascertain that all Commandants shoul know of all recent orders of the Commander in Chief of the U-boats and would have them at hand. Therefore, I right say almost it was a limited instruction.
Commandants told about their action toward survivors of the ship-wrecked? instruction had been in the U-boat school at my training. after the Lakonia order of September, 1942? and told them: Now, you are no longer to decide whether the situation in the open sea will permit your rescue only. From now on in it is prohibited to carry through rescue measures. the war, that is, two and a half years, the Commandants were told about the Lakonia incident, or was it just immediately after this case?
A I would say at the most until January, 1943. After that time there was no more talk about that.
Q That means about the incident? That is about the Lakonia case? What about the orders issued as a result of it? longer. suggestion from you or from one of your crows to shoot at survivors? that captains and leading engineers, if possible, were to be taken along? to take place only when it could be done without endangering the ships?
which shot down some fliers in the Bay of Biscay? the Autumn of 1943? incident represent the opinion that the U-boat Command or should have shot at the fliers which were left?
A No, on the contrary he was put out about this; that the aircraft personnel had not been brought along by the U-boat crew. or was your opinion represented in the staff? the question that any member of the staff had a deviating opinion. to the significance of the Lakonia decree with Korvetten Kapitain Kupisch of your staff and then Kapitain Kupisch told him about the incident of the U-386, and told it in such a way that the Commanders of the U-boats demanded the shooting of the survivors?
Q Why not? U-boat and did not return from that mission. The incident with U-386 took place in the autumn of 1943, and that was later opinion or the possibility that this story about U-386 might have come from you, did you discuss this matter with him?
Q Can you say that with certainty?
Moehle gave to this Lakonia order? and then through a British Officer. officers who were instructed by Moehle, none discussed the interpretation of this order with the Commander in Chief of the Submarines? these officers considered the interpretation of Kapitain Moehle completely impossible, and that it did not agree with the interpretation or opinion of the Commander in Chief of the Submarines.
Q Therefore, they could not require a clarification?
Q. The Prosecution's accusations against Grand Admiral Doenitz are to a large part based on extracts from the War Diary of the SKL and of the commanders of the U-boats, documents which are in the possession of the British Admiralty. How is it possible that all of this date, is in the possession of the Admiralty and that is in toto? and of the commander-in-chief of the submarines, which were in the Navy archi ves should be saved and should not he destroyed.
Q Did he tell this to you?
A Yes, in this way; when I told him that our own data in the staff had been completely destroyed. destruction of the archives? Navy to carry on and that in its warfare it had nothing to conceal. expressed to you? as to the carrying out of the U-beat warfare and on those occasions the question was put to you as to the senior officers whether the submarine command was accused of criminal actions.
Q And what answer did you have?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I have no further questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any defendant's counsel wish to ask any questions?
The Prosecution?
COLONEL PHILLIMORE: With the Tribunal 'spermission I would not propose to cross-examine and ask leave to adopt my cross-examination of the last witness because it is the same ground substantially.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
Does any other Prosecutor wish to cross-examine?
Yes, Dr. Kranzbuehler?