And even after Ribbentrop's return from the visit to Warsaw, Hitler thought it worthwhile in his Reichstag Speech on the 30th of January 1939 to say: "We have just celebrated the fifth anniversary of the conclusion of our non-aggression pact with Poland. There can scarcely be any difference of opinion today among the true friends of peace as to the value of this agreement. One only needs to ask oneself what might have happened to Europe if this agreement, which brought such relief, had not been entered into five years ago. In signing it the great Polish marshal and patriot rendered his people just as great a service as the leaders of the National-Socialist State rendered the German people. During the troubled months of the past year the friendship between Germany and Poland has been one of the reassuring factors in the political life of Europe." Poland, and the last occasion on which the Nazi Leaders mentioned the German-Polish Agreement with approbation. During February 1939 silence fell upon German demands in relation to Poland. But as soon as the final absorption of Czechoslovakia had taken place, and Germany had also occupied Memel, Nazi pressure upon Poland was at once renewed.
were further pressed. And in view of the fate which had overtaken Government took alarm at the developments.
Nor were they alone.
1939, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, speaking in the House of Commons, stated that His Majesty's Government had given an assurance to help it vital to resist.
On the 6th of April, 1939, an Anglo-Polish present temporary and unilateral assurance given by His Majesty's democratic powers was not difficult to find.
With the evidence later--"was not the subject of the dispute at all."
The Nazi Would that be a convenient point to stop?
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until 2 o'clock.
(Whereupon at 12.55 hours the Hearing of the Tribunal adjourned, to reconvene at 14.
00 hours.)
Military Tribunal, in the matter of:
THE PRESIDENT: Before the Attorney General continues his opening statement, the Tribunal wishes me to state the proposed new time of sitting for the immediate future. They think it would be more convenient that the Tribunal shall sit from 10:00 o'clock in the morning until 1:00 o'clock, with a break of ten minutes in the middle of the morning; and that the Tribunal should sit in the afternoon from 2:00 o'clock until 5:00 o'clock, with a break for ten minutes in the middle of the afternoon; and that there should be no open sitting of the Tribunal on Saturday morning as the Tribunal has a very large number of applications by the Defendants' counsel for witnesses and documents and other matters of that sort which it has to consider.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: May it please the Tribunal, when we broke off I had been saying that the Nazi Government was intent upon aggression, and all that had been taking place in regard to Danzig, the negotiations, the demands that were being made, was really no more than a cover, a pretext, and excuse for further domination. Poland, England and France were well in hand. While Hitler, at Munich, was telling the world that the German people wanted peace and that, having solved the Czechoslovakian problem, Germany had no more territorial problems in Europe, the staffs of his armed forces were already preparing their plans. On the 26th of September 1938 he had stated:
"We have given guarantees to the States in the West. We have assured all our immediate neighbours of the integrity of their territory as far as Germany is concerned.
That is no mere phrase. It is our sacred will. We have no interest whatever in a breach of the peace. We want nothing from these peoples." International cooperation is utterly impossible unless one can assume good faith in the leaders of the various States and honesty in the public utterances that they make. But, in fact, within two months of that solemn and considered undertaking, Hitler and his confederates were preparing for the seizure of Danzig. To recognize these assurances, those pledges, these diplomatic moves as the empty frauds that they were, one must go back to inquire what was happening within the inner councils of the Reich from the time of the Munich Agreement. on the Reconstruction of the German Navy. Under the heading "Opinion on the Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England", this is stated:
"1. If, according to the Fuehrer's decision Germany is to acquire a position as a world power, she needs not only sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval communications and secure access to the ocean.
"2. Both requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition to Anglo-French interests and would limit their position as world powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by peaceful means. The decision to make Germany a world power, therefore, forces upon us the necessity of making the corresponding preparations for war.
"3. War against England means at the same time war against the Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well, and a large number of countries overseas, in fact, against half to one-third of the world.
"It can only be justified and have a chance of success"--and it was not moral justification which was being looked for in this document--"It can only be justified and have a chance of success if it is prepared economically as well as politically and militarily and waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an outlet to the ocean."
THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal would like to know at what evidence.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Well, sir, my colleagues, my American and my British colleagues, were proposing to follow up my own address by putting these documents in. The first series of documents, which will be put in by my noted colleague, Sir David-Maxwell Fyfe, will be the Treaties.
THE PRESIDENT: I suppose that what you quote will have to be read again.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Well, I am limiting my quotations as far as I possibly can. I apprehend that technically you may wish it to be quoted again so as to get it on the record when the document is actually put into evidence. But I think it will appear, when the documents themselves are produced, that there will be a good deal more in most of them than I am actually citing now.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Very well.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: This document on naval warfare against England is something which is both significant and new.
Until this date the documents in our possession disclose preparations for war against Poland, England and France, purporting on the face of them at least to be defensive measures to ward off attacks which might result from the intervention of those states in the preparatory German aggressions in Central Europe. Hitherto aggressive war against Poland, England and France has been contemplated only as a distant objective. Now, in this document for the first time we find a war of conquest by Germany against France and England openly recognized as the future aim, at least of the German Navy. previous order of the Fuehrer. In that appendix were set out the future tasks for the armed forces and the preparation for the conduct of the war which would result from those tasks:
"The Fuehrer has ordered"--and I quote--"that besides the three eventualities mentioned in the previous Directive preparations are also to be made for the surprise occupation by German troops of the Free State of Danzig.
"For the preparation the following principles are to be borne in mind. The primary assumption is the lightning seizure of Danzig by exploiting a favorable political situation and not war with Poland. Troops same time for the seizure of Memel-land, so that both operations can take place simultaneously should such necessity arise." has shown, final preparations for the invasion of Poland were taking place. On the 3rd of April 1939, three days before the issue of the Anglo Polish communique, Keitel issued to the High Command of the Armed Forces a Directive for the uniform preparation of war by the armed forces in 1939-1940 was being re-issued and that part relating to Danzig would be out in April. The basic principles were to remain the same as in the previous Directive. Attached to this document were the orders "Fall Weiss", the code name for the proposed invasion of Poland. Preparations for that invasion were to be made, it was stated, so that the operation could be carried out at any time from the 1st September 1939 onwards.
preparation of the war by the armed forces, 1939-40, and in it he said:
"I shall lay down in a later Directive future tasks of the armed forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with these for the conduct of war. Until that Directive comes into force the armed forces must be prepared for the following eventualities:
"1. Safeguarding of the frontiers.
"2. 'Fall Weiss'.
"3. The annexation of Danzig.
Then in an annex to that document, which bore the heading "Political Hypotheses and Aims" it was stated that quarrels with Poland should be avoided. But, should Poland change her policy and adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, a final settlement would be necessary, notwithstanding the Polish Pact. The Free City of Danzig was to be incorporated into the Reich at the outbreak of the conflict at the latest. The policy aimed at limiting the war to Poland, and this was considered possible at that time with the internal crisis in France and resulting British restraint. of it--doesn't involve the intention of immediate aggression. It is a plan of attack "if Poland changes her policy and adopts a threatening attitude". But the picture of Poland, with her wholly inadequate armaments threatening Germany, now armed to the teeth, is ludicrous enough, and the real aim of the document emerges in the sentence--and I quote: "The aim is then to destroy Polish military strength and to create, in the East, a situation which satisfies the requirements of defence"--a sufficiently vague phrase to cover designs of any magnitude. But even at that stage the evidence doesn't suffice to prove that the actual decision to attack Poland on any given date had yet been taken. All the preparations were being set in train. All the necessary action was being proceeded with in case that decision should be reached. Hitler addressed the Reichstag on the 28th of April 1939. In that speech he repeated the demand which had already been made upon Poland, and proceeded to denounce the German-Polish Agreement of 1934.
Leaving aside for the moment the warlike preparations for aggression, which Hitler had set in motion behind the scenes, I will ask the Tribunal to consider the nature of this denunciation of an agreement to which, in the past, Hitler had attached such importance.
In the first place, of course, Hitler's denunciation was per se ineffectual. The text of the Agreement made no provision for its denunciation by either party until a period of ten years had come to an end. No denunciation could be legally effective until June or July of 1934, and here was Hitler speaking in April of 1939, more than five years too soon.
In the second place, Hitler's actual attack upon Poland when it came on September 1, was made before the expiration of the six months period after denunciation required by the Agreement before any denunciation could be operative. And in the third place, the grounds for the denunciation stated by Hitler in his speech to the Reichstag are entirely specious. However one reads its terms it is impossible to take the view that the Anglo-Polish guarantee of mutual assistance against aggression could render the GermanPolish Pact null and void, as Hitler sought to suggest. If that had been the effect of the Anglo-Polish assurances, then certainly the Pacts which had already been entered into by Hitler himself with Italy and with Japan had already invalidated the treaty with Poland. Hitler might have spared his breath. The truth is, of course, that the text of the German-Polish Agreement text of the assurances, contains nothing whatever to support the contention that the German-Polish Pact was in any way interfered with. pet diplomatic child? Is there any other possible answer but that, the Agreement having served its purpose, the grounds which he chose for its denunciation were chosen merely in an effort to provide Germany with some kind of justification, at least for the German People, for the aggression on which the German leaders were intent. decent excuse, since nothing happened, and nothing seemed likely to happen from the Polish side to provide him with any kind of pretext for invading Poland. So far he had made demands upon his Treaty partner which Poland as a sovereign State had every right to refuse. If dissatisfied with that refusal Hitler was bound, under the terms of the agreement itself, to seek a settlement -- I will read the words in the pact, "To see a settlement through other peaceful means, without prejudice to the possibility of applying those methods of procedure, in case of necessity, which are provided for such a case in the other agreements between them that are in force." And that presumably was with reference to the German-Polish Arbitration Treaty signed at Locarno in 1925.
what they want, but are not entitled to, from Poland by merely asking for it, and that, on their side they made no further attempt to settle the dispute "By peaceful means" in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, and of the Kellogg Pact, to which the Agreement pledged both Parties, because in itself it created a stronger presumption of aggressive intentions against Hitler and his associates. That presumption becomes a certainty when the documents which I am about to call the attention of the Tribunal to are studied. installations in Poland, and on the 16th of May the defendant Raeder, as Commander in Chief of the Navy, issued a memorandum setting out the Fuehrer's instructions to prepare for the operation "Fall Weiss" at any time from the 1st September 1939. Hitler on May 23, 1939, with various high-ranking officers, including the defendants Goering, Raeder and Keitel. The details of the whole document will have to be read to the Tribunal later. I am merely summarizing the substantial effect of this part of it now. Hitler then stated that the solution of the economic problems with which Germany was set at first could not be found without invasion of foreign States and attacks on foreign property. Danzig, and I am quoting, "Danzig is not the subject of the dispute of Poland. It is a question of expanding our living space in the East. There is, therefore, no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision: to attack Poland, at the earliest opportunity. We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of this isolation will be decisive. The isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful politics."
So he explained to his confederates. He anticipated the possibility that war with England and France might result, but a two front war which was to be avoided if possible, yet, England was recognized, I say with pride, as the most dangerous enemy which Germany had. England, he said, I quote, "England is the driving force against Germany, the aim wall always be to force England to her knees."
More than once he predicted that the war with England and France would be a life and death struggle. All the same," he concluded, "Germany will not be forced into war but she would not be able to avoid one." Chief of the 3rd Army Group, issued a detailed battle plan for the "Fall Weiss". The following day von Brauchitsch issued a memorandum in which it was stated that the object of the impending operation was to destroy the Polish Armed Forces. "High Policy demands, " he said, "High Policy demands that the war should be begun by heavy surprise blows in order to achieve quick results."
The preparations proceeded apace. On the 22nd June Keitel submitted a preliminary time table for the operation which Hitler seems to have approved and suggested that the scheduled maneuver must be camouflaged -- must be camouflaged "In order not to disquiet the population." On the 3rd of July Brauchitsch wrote to Raeder urging that certain preliminary naval moves should be abandoned in order not to prejudice the surprise of the attack. On the 12th and 13th August Hitler and Ribbentrop had a conference with Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister. referred from several points of view. I summarize How what is the Blaskowitz matter: At the beginning of the conversation Hitler emphasized the strength of the German position, of the German western and eastern fortifications, and of the strategic and other advantages that they held in comparison with those of England, France and Poland. Now I quote from the captured document this, Hitler said this:
"Since the Poles through their whole attitude had made it clear that in any case in the event of a conflict they would stand on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, a quick liquidation at the present moment could only be of advantage for the unavoidable conflict with the western democracies. If a hostile Poland remained on Germany's eastern frontier, not only would the eleven East Prussian divisions be tied down, but also further contingents would be kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This would not be necessary in the event of a previous liquidation." Then this: "Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for the neutrals to be liquidated one after the other. This process could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing with an uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a neutral of that kind."
Ciano was for postponing the operation. Italy was not ready. She believed that a conflict with Poland would develop into a general European war. Mussolini was convinced that conflict with the Western
But that the Fuehrer said that the Danzig question must be disposed of one way or the other by the end of August. I quote "He had, therefore, decided to use the occasion of the next Polish provocation in the form of an ultimatum." together at Obersalzburg, and gave the order for the attack: In the course of what he said he made it clear that the decision to attack had in fact been made not later than the previous spring. He would give a spurious cause for starting the war. At that time the attack was timed to take place in the early hours of the 26th of August. On the day before, the 25th of August, the British Government, in the hope that Hitler might still be reluctant to plunge the world into war, and in the belief that a formal treaty would impress him more than the informal assurances which had been given previously, entered into an agreement, or expressed agreement for mutual assistance with Poland, embodying the previous assurances, that had been given earlier in the year. It was known to Hitler that France was bound by the Franco-Poland Treaty of 1921, and that that of the Guarantee pact signed at Locarno in 1925 to intervene in Poland's favor in case of aggression, and for a moment Hitler hesitated. The defendants Goering and Ribbentrop in the interrogations which you will see in the future, agreed that it was the Anglo-Polish Treaty which led them to call off or rather postpone the attack, which was timed for 26. Perhaps he hoped that after all there was still some chance of repeating what he had called the Czech affair. If so, his thoughts were short lived. On the 27th of August Hitler accepted Mussolini's decision not at once to come into the war, but asked for propaganda support, and a display of military activities on the part of Italy so as to create uncertainty in the minds of the Allies. Ribbentrop on the same day said that the Armies were marching. month, desperate attempts were being made by the Western Powers to avert war. You will have details of them in evidence. Of the intervention of the Pope. Of President Roosevelt's message. Of the offer by the British Prime Minister to do our utmost to create the conditions in which all matters in issue could be the subject of free negotiations, and to guarantee the resultant decisions.
But this and all the other efforts of honest men to avoid the horror of a European conflict were pre-destined to failure. The Germans were determined that the day for war had come. On the 31st August Hitler issued a top secret order for the attack to commence in the early hours of the 1st September.
The necessary frontier incidents duly occurred. Was it, perhaps, for these that Keitel had been instructed by Hitler to supply Heydrich with Polish uniforms, and so without a declaration of war, without even giving the Polish Government an opportunity of seeing Germany's final demands, and you will hear the evidence of the extraordinary diplomatic negotiations, if one can call it such, that took place in Berlin, without giving Poland any opportunity at all of negotiating or arbitrating demands which Nazi Germany was making, the Nazi troops invaded Poland. thanking him for his intervention but pointing out that the war was inevitable and that the most promising moment had to be picked after cold deliberation. And so Hitler and his confederates now before this Tribunal began the first of their wars of aggression for which they had prepared so long and so thoroughly. They waged it so fiercely that within a few weeks Poland was overrun. his military Commanders and in the course of what he said he made this observation:
"One year later Austria came; this step was also considered doubtful. It brought about a tremendous reinforcement of the Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all the Western fortifications had to be finished. Then followed the creation of the Protectorate, and with that the basis of action against Poland was laid. But I was not quite clear at the time whether I should start first against the East, and then in the West, or vice versa.
The decision came to fight with Poland first.
One might accuse me of wanting to fight again and again. In struggle, I see the fate of all human beings."
He was not sure when to attack first. But that sooner or later he would attack bears out it was in the East, but not in the West, so was never in doubt, and he had been warned not only by the British and French Prime Ministers but even by his confederate Mussolini that an attack on Poland would bring England and France into the War. He chose what he thought was the opportune moment, and he struck. and France, and to precipitate it by an attack on Poland, is not to be denied. Here was defiance of the most solemn treaty obligations. Here was neglect of the most pacific assurances. Here was aggression, naked and unashamed, which was indeed to arouse the horrified and heroic resistance of all civilized peoples, but which was to tear down many of the pillars of our civilization.
the domination of Europe, if not of the world, theNazi Government proceeded to attack other countries, as occasion offered. The first actually to be attacked, actually to be invaded after the attack upon Poland were Denmark and Norway. and Denmark without any warning, without any declaration of war. It was a breach of the Hague Convention of 1907. It was a breach of the Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation signed between Germany and Denmark dated 2nd June, 1926. It was, of course, a breach of the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928. It was a violation of the non-aggression Treaty between Germany and Denmark made on the 31st of May 1939. And it was a breach of the most explicit assurances which had been given. After his annexation of Czechoslovakia had shaken the confidence of the world, Hitler attempted to reassure the Scandinavian States. On the 28th of April, 1939, he affirmed that he had never made any request to any of them which was incompatible with their sovereignty and independence. On the 31st of May, 1939, he signed a non-aggression Pact with Denmark. seized Danzig, he again expressed his determination to observe the inviolability and integrity of Norway in an aide memoire which was handed to the Norwegian Foreign Minister by the German Minister in Oslo on that day. speech:
"Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even points of controversy with the Northern States, neither has she any today. Sweden and Norway have both been offered non-aggression pacts by Germany, and have both refused them solely because they do not feel themselves threatened in any way." morning of 9 April 1940, a German memorandum was handed to the Governments of those countries attempting to justify the German action.
Various allegations against the Governments of the invaded countries were made. It was said that Norway had been guilty of breaches of neutrality. It was said that she had allowed and tolerated the use of her territorial waters by Great Britain. It was said that Britain and France were making plans. This is to invade and occupy Norway that the government of that country was prepared to acquiesce in such an event. tions were true or false. That question is irrelevant to the issues before this Court. Even if the allegations were true -- and they were patently false -- they would afford no conceivable justification for the action of invading without warning, without declaration of war, without any attempt at mediation or conciliation. Aggressive war is none the less aggressive war because the state which wages it believes that other states might in the future take similar action. The rape of a nation is not justified because it is thought she may be raped by another. Nor even in self-defense are warlike measures justified except after all means of mediation have been tried and failed and force is actually being exercised, against the State concerned. evidence which we now possess, it is abundantly clear that the invasion of these two countries was undertaken for quite different purposes. It had been planned long before any question of breach of neutrality or occupation of Norway by England could ever have occurred, and it is equally clear that the assurances repeated again and again throughout 1939 were made for no other purpose than to lull suspicion in those countries and to prevent them taking steps to resist the attack against them which was all along in active preparation. of the Foreign Affairs Bureau --APA--of the N.S.D.A.P., had interested himself in the promotion of fifth column activities in Norway and he had established close relationship with the "Nasjonal Samling," a political group headed by the now notorious traitor Vidkun Quisling.
During the winter of 1938-1939 APA was in contact with Quisling and later Quisling conferred with Hitler and with the defendants Raeder and Rosenberg. In August 1939 a special 14-day course was held at the school of the office of Foreign Relations in Berlin for 25 followers whom Quisling had selected to attend it. The plan was to send a number of selected and "reliable" men to Germany for a brief military training in an isolated camp. These "reliable men" were to be area and language specialists to German special troops who were taken to Oslo on coal barges to undertake political action in Norway. The object was a coupe in which Quisling would seize his leading opponents in Norway, including the King, and prevent all military resistance from the beginning. Simultaneously with these fifth column activities Germany was making her military preparations. On the 2 of September 1939, as I said, Hitler had assured Norway of his intention to respect her neutrality. On 6 October he said that the Scandanavian States were not menaced in any way. Yet on 3 October the defendant Raeder was pointing out that the occupation of bases, if necessary by force, would greatly improve the German strategic position. On the 9 October Doenitz was recommending Trondheim as the main base, with Narvik as an alternative base for fuel supplies. The defendant Rosenberg was reporting shortly afterwards on the possibility of a coup detat by Quisling, immediately supported by German military and naval forces. On the 12 September 1939 the defendant Raeder advised Hitler, in the presence of the defendants Keitel and Jodl, that if Hitler was favor of Norway, if possible with Quisling's assistance but if necessary entirely by force.
Hitler agreed, but there was a doubt whether action Weather conditions delayed the march against the Low Countries.
In on Norway.
On 1 March a directive for the occupation was issued by Hit ler.
The general object was not said to be to prevent British encroach Britain."
But the Directive went on:
"... on principle we will do out utmost to make the operation appear of the Scandinavian States.
.. It is important that the Scandinavian our measures.
.. In case the preparations for embarkation can no longer objectives."
The form and success of the invasion are well known. In the early southern coast.
In addition, airborn troops were landed near Oslo and Stavanger, and aircraft.
The German attack came as a complete surprise.
with only slight losses. Only the plan to capture the king and Parliament failed.
But brave as was the resistance which was hurriedly organized is so charged.