AYes. I took the plenipotentiary papers with me to Berlin and these papers had been signed by Grossadmiral Doenitz in his capacity as Chief of State and Supreme Commander of the armed forces and contained, in a few words, that he gave me the power and the order to conduct negotiations and to fulfill the capitulation
QWere these papers examined by the Allies and conformed?
AIn the course of the afternoon of May 8th they asked me for them and apparently examined the documents and Several hours later the papers were returned to me by a high officer of the Red Army with the words that I had to show them again at the occasion of the signing.
QDid you show it again?
AI have shown this power of attorney when the act of capitulation took place and I added it to the documents. BY PROFESSOR DR. JAHRREISS (Counsel for the defendant Jodl):
QWitness, during your testimony you have given us an explanation of the organization of the OKW. This organization was formed by a decree of the Fuehrer and Chancellor on the 4th of February, 1936. In that decree the Supreme Command of the armed forces was designated as the military Staff of the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht. In that light you were the Chief of Staff.
Now, the prosecution has repeatedly named Jodl as your Chief of Staff. Is that right?
ANo, General Jodl never was my Chief of Staff and the Chief of an office of the High Command of the Armed Forces, as I have already stated.
QThat is to say, the Chief of several coordinated offices?
ANo, There was never such a thing as a Chief of Staff of my personal office
QMention was made here about the discussion between Schuschnigg and Hitler on the 12th of February, 1938, at Obersalzberg. You remember that. The Court has been shown a note by Jodl in his diary referring to this conversation.
as Jodl present at this conversation?
ANo, he was not present and his knowledge is derived from a conference which I described here between him and Canaris about the information as to Certain military preparations during the days after the conference with Schuschnigg, that is to say, it is an impression which General Jodl had gained as a result of the explanation given to him.
QIn the course of preparations to solve the German-Czechoslavakian question the Sudeten question, and incident which was allegedly to be construed played a great role. Did you ever give an order to the department under Canaris to bring about such an incident at the Czechoslovakian border?
ANo such orders of directives were ever given by me at least.
QAfter Munich in October 1938, Field Marshal, the then Chief of the Department of National Defense, the defendant Jodl, left this position and he was transferred to Vienna. Who was his successor?
AJodl was transferred to the Front. He became an artillery chief with the division invenna and his Success was Warlimont, at that time Colonel Warlimont.
QThat is to say his successor?
AYes.
QIf I understood you correctly, that is to say Jodl was not only sent on leave but he was transferred out of his office?
AJodl was transferred out of the High Command of the armed forces as a troop officer with a division and Warlimont was not the deputy but successor to Jodl in the same position.
QNow, the Prosecution has said that at the occasion of that famous conference of the 23rd of May, 1938 -- no, 1939, Mr. Warlimont was present or allegedly was present as a later successor of Jodl or deputy of Jodl. What had Jodl to do with that conference?
ANothing, he was at that time an officer at the front and commander in Vienna and he had nothing to do with it.
QWhy did you designate Jodl Chief of the Armed Forces Leadership Staff?
A. That was in consequence of our work from 1935 to '38 which we had together, and I thought that I could not find a better man for that position.
Q.How did Jodl picture his military career after the assumption of his career in Vienna or in Bruenn?
A.I knew about his passion and his desire to become commander of a mountain division. He has frequently told me about it.
Q.Well, would there have been any chance to get such a command?
A.Yes, I have tried to use my influence with the Supreme Command of the Army, and I remember that during the summer, 1939, I wrote him that his desire to become the commander of a mountain division in Reichenhall -- I don't remember the name -- will come true. I was glad to be able to give him that information.
Q.Were you the one to make the decision?
A.No, I asked the Supreme Command of the Army and he decided.
Q.If I understand correctly, you, yourself, notified Jodl?
A.Yes. I wrote him a letter because I knew that he would be very happy about it.
Q.Yes. May I ask, Fieldmarshal, have you been in regular correspondence with Jodl?
A.No; I believe that was the only letter which I wrote to him during that year.
Q.I ask that for a very definite reason. Jodl was excluded from the OKW. He knows that there was an eventuality of being chief of the Armed Forces Leadership Staff later; that is to say, an important position. He goes to the front, I should say, and one should think that then he would not only receive a private letter once from you but would be kept informed by you regularly.
A.That was certainly not done from my side, and, according to my personal opinion, every general staff officer who comes to the front is very happy if he is not bothered with such things any more.
Q.Yes, but fate does not grant us everything which makes us happy. It could be possible that officially, for instance, one would have to give an order to somebody and inform this gentleman, instruct him.
A.No, I have not done that. I don't believe that was done, but I don't know for sure whether somebody might not have informed him.
Q.During the period when Jodl was in Vienna and Bruenn, that is, away from Berlin, was he repeatedly in Berlin in order to got information?
A.I have not seen him and he did not come to see me. I believe it very unlikely because he would have come to see me.
Q.Then I have to understand first that shortly before the beginning of the war, upon a telegram, he came to Berlin and he had to be informed as to what was going on?
A.Yes, that was the first contact between him and myself.
Q.You informed him?
A.Yes
Q.Another thing, Fieldmarshal, you remember, perhaps the somewhat stormy morning in the Reich Chancellory after the Simowitsch Putsch; that was the 27th of March 1941?
A.Yes, yes, Yugoslavia.
Q.If we look back and think of the political and war history of the last two hundred years in Europe, they we ask ourselves:
"Was there nobody during that conference in the Reich Chancellory who could have said, or who had said, 'Instead of attacking a state, whose attitude was not quite clear, right away, shouldn't we deploy our troops along the border and then by diplomatic negotiations find the solution?'"
A.No, under those turbulent conditions during that morning session, as much as I know, Jodl himself, personally, mentioned that in the course of the discussion. I think the suggestion was to deploy our troop along the border and try to find a solution.
Q.If I am correctly informed, in October '41, for the purposes of inspection or a visit to the army group, you were in the cast; is that correct?
A.Yes, in the fall of '41 I was frequently with army groups in order to get information for the Fuehrer.
Q. Was Fieldmarshal Leb the commander of that Harresgruppen?
A.Yes, he was.
Q.Did von Leb tell you about particular worries which he had at that time?
A.Yes, I think that was the next to the last visit to Leb where the question of a surrender -- that is to say, the question of the population of Leningrad -- played an important role, and it worried him very much at that time because there were definite signs already of the population streaming out of the city. I remember that at that time he asked me to make the suggestion to the Fuehrer, wince he could not take over millions of civilian people and feed them within his army group, that a sort of opening should be left that the copulation could be evacuated in the direction of the Russian side.
Q.Did the population come into your direction?
A.Into the forests of the south at that time, according to the explanation of Leb, there was a certain amount of pressure to get through the German lines and that was recognizable.
Q.And that would have impeded your operations?
A.Yes.
Q.Fieldmarshal, you are aware, I believe, because it has been mentioned before, of the order of the Fuehrer and Supreme Command about the Commandos of the 18th of October '42, PS-498, which has been submitted here?
A.Yes.
Q.Do you know that before an order of that kind would be issued, it would be announced publicly?
A.Yes; that was announced by a daily armed forces report.
Q.We are dealing with the armed forces report of September, 1942, and, after the usual report about what happened, it is stated:
"The High Command of the Armed Froces is obliged, therefore, to issue the following regulations:"
The first paragraph is not interesting and then, as the secondpoint, is the following sentence:
"In the future all terror and sabotage troops of the British and their allies who do not behave like soldiers, but rather like bandits, will be considered and treated by the German troops as such and they will be killed in the struggle wherever they appear without any consideration."
Fieldmarshal, who has written these words?
A.The Fuehrer personally. I was present when he dictated and corrected it. BY DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and the OKW):
Q.Witness, I should like to continue with the point which was the last one that Dr. Jahrreiss mentioned. It dealt with the Commando Order No.498-PS In that Commando Order under No. 6, Hitler threatened that all commanders would be responsible under court martial if they would not carry out this order. Do you know about the conditions which led Hitler to formulate the order like that?
A.Yes, they are quite clear, I should think; that is to say, based on the demand that this order should definitely be carried out, the general and those who should carry it out would consider it as a very severe one. He wished to put more pressure on that regulation by threatening punishment and to force them to carry it out.
Q.Now, I should like to put several questions to you concerning the character of the so-called group of the General Staff and the OKW. Witness, what do you understand by the German General Staff?
A.The General Staff means to me those officers who by special training are able to be assistants to the higher leadership.
THE PRESIDENT:The defendant has already spent a very long time in explaining the difference between the OKW and the staff of the various commands, and the Prosecution have defined specifically and quite clearly what the group is, which they are asking the Court to declare as criminal, and, therefore, I do not see what relevance any further evidence on the subject can have. What are you trying to show by asking him now about what he understands by the General Staff?
DR. LATERNSER:This question was purely preparatory. After this question I wanted to put another one and, by the answer to the second question, I wanted to prove that under the alleged group, one has accused a group under a wrong name.
THE PRESIDENT:I do not see how it matters if it is a wrong name if the group is specified. But, anyhow, the defendant has already told us what he understands by the General Staff. Will you nut your second question. BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q.Witness, if the higher military leaders can be designated in a group as General Stuff and OKW, do you consider this name correct or misleading?
A.According to our German military concept, this designation is misleading because for us the General Staff always meant an assistant, a machinery of assistans, whereas the commanders-in-chief of army groups were the commanding generals of the Leadership Corps, the Fuehrer Corps.
Q.The military hierarchy has sufficiently been explained in this trial. I only want to know the following from you:
The relation of these echelons to each other, was it only one of military relation of command or beyond that among these groups; was there a further organization which reached beyond the military duties?
A.No, the General Staff -- that is to say, the General Staff officers could be recognized by their uniforms as assistants to the leader. The leaders or the commanders had no horizontal connections in their positions. There was no organization that would have provided horizontal connections between the top commanders.
Q Yesterday the affidavit was shown to you which Colonel General Halder made.
I would now like to mention the last sentence of that affidavit; I shall read it to you:
"That was the actual General Staff in the highest leadership of the Armed Forces."
Is the statement in that sentence correct or incorrect?
AI understand it this way, that Halder wanted to say that these few officers who had General Staff positions were the ones who took part in the main work of the General Staff of the Army, while the rest, in large number -- far beyond one hundred General Staff officers in the OKH -were not connected with it. That is what I think he wanted to say -- a small group that was concerned with these major problems.
QDo you know of a single incident where Hitler has ever consulted a military leader in a political matter?
ANo, that did not happen.
QI may assume that you were present at the briefing conferences with Hitler, at least most of the time. Could you tell me anything about objections which any commander -- supreme commanders -- who had come from the front lines may have made with or without success?
AAs a rule, front commanders who were present were silent listeners at these briefing discussions and then any such commander could make a report about his area to Hitler and there was an opportunity to discuss the things personally and to utter opinions. But otherwise nobody had any opportunity of saying anything.
QWitness, were you ever present when energetic objections were made to Hitler?
AIn the briefing discussions?
QNo, I mean generally. Whatever the occasions may have been.
AI was not, of course, present at every conference which Hitler may have had with Supreme Commanders of Armies, but I don't know of any such incidents. These cases which were important in this war were the objections of the Generals before the beginning of the war in the West. That, I believe, I have sufficiently explained. And I understand your question now to mean beyond that, whether beyond that, I knew of any case. I have to point out, then, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army at that time went to the limit of anything which he could do as an officer.
QWhat was the attitude of Hitler toward the General Staff of the Army?
AIt was not a good one. One may describe it best by saying that he had a sort of suspicion, a mistrust, and he considered the General Staff arrogant, He had an innate prejudice against it. I believe that is sufficient.
THE PRESIDENT:We have hear all this once, if not more than once.
DR. LATERNSER:Mr. President, I don't believe that this witness has been asked about that. As far as I remember, this particular witness has not been asked about these points.
THE PRESIDENT:Well, the Tribunal unfortunately thinks it has.
DR. LATERNSER:And I was very careful about this point. I would not have put the question if one of my colleagues had put it before.
QWould Hitler, should an application for resignation be tendered by one or more front commanders -
THE PRESIDENT:Nearly ever, officer who has come and given evidence to this Court has spoken upon that subject, certainly many of them.
DR. LATERNSER:Mr. President, is that with regard to the question I have now put ?
THE PRESIDENT:Nearly all the officers who have been examined in this Court have told as it was impossible to resign. That is what you are asking, isn t it?
DR. LATERNSER:Yes, I will forego that question, if I can assume that the Tribunal accepts that it is true, which I want to prove.
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal thinks it is cumulative; whether they accept its truth or not, it is a different question.
DR. LATERNSER:In this connection, also I would like to say something. I do not believe that it can be considered cumulative, because it has already been put by my colleague, Dr. Dix. The question to two different witnesses makes a different situation, because the subjective answer of the individual witness is desired. But I will forego that question.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other question you want to ask?
DR. LATERNSER:Yes, I have a few more questions.
QWitness, to what extent was the headquarters of the Fuehrer-the Hauptquartier -- secure against raids?
AThere was a special security detachment -- and also, I believe, from the Army, and also I believe from a company of the Waffen SS -- and very thorough measures in the way of guards, barriers and similar things. It was very well secured against raids.
QWere there several zones?
AYes, there was an inner zone and an outer zone -- several areas which were limited individually.
QYou have already stated that the commander-in-chief of theArmy groups and Armies in the East, outside of their theatre of operations, did not have any competence or jurisdiction. Was there a tendency to keep that area as small as possible, or as largo as possible?
AOriginally the tendency was such as to keep that area of operations as large as possible, in order to assure the possibility of movement in the rear area. Only later did the Fuehrer, by energetic means, see fit to limit these zones, to make them as small as possible
QYes, for what reason?
AAs he said, in order to free military officers of administrative matters andto limit them to small, areas.
QYou mentioned during an interrogation that units of the Waffen SS, which were tactically for combat, were subordinated to the Army. I would like to clarify thatparticularly, because in my opinion there is still one point not quite clear -- the Einsatzgruppe of the S.D., did they have anything to do with the units of the Waffen SS which were subordinated to Army units for the purpose of tactical tasks?
ANo, the formation of Waffen SS within the Divisions were so incorporated into the Army units and had nothing to do with anything else. They were purely combat troops.
QWas it possible for a Commander-in-chief to punish an SS man for any offense?
AUpon apprehension I believe no Commander-in-Chief would have hesitated; but aside from that, jurisdiction was with the top, that is, the Reichsfuehrer, Himmler, and not the Supreme Commander of the particular Army or army group.
Q Did the various functionaries of the Einsatzgruppc SD, have to report to the Supreme Commanders of the armies upon what they did on orders of Himmler?
AThis question has been treated here in great detail by witness Ohlendorf, and I am not informed about the connection which existed between the commanders and the Einsatzgruppe commando units. I did not take part in them, and I had no hand in them.
QThat is not what I wants to hear from you, Field Marshal. I wanted to know whether the agents or the Einsatzgruppe of the SD, according to your knowledge of regulation, were obliged to report to the army commanders in the rear of whose areas they had to work?
AI do not believe so, but I do not know the orders concerned. I have not seen them.
QDo you know whether the Higher military commanders at any time knew about the intention of Hitler or Himmler to exterminate the Jews?
AAccording to my opinion that was not the case, and I personally was not informed.
QNow, I have only one me question concerning the prisoner-of war complex. It became known during the war that there were regrettable circumstances concerning the supplying of Soviet Russian prisoners of war during the beginning of the East campaign. What was the reason for these conditions in the beginning?
AI can only base my statement on what the commander of the army has reported during the briefing conferences. As I recall, he has repeatedly reported that it was a problem of large masses, that extraordinary efforts of organization were required in order to supply and house and guard them.
QNow, these conditions doubtlessly were chaotic during a certain period of time. I am thinking of a particular reason which may have existed, and in order to refresh your memory, I would like to mention the following:
The army had plannned establishments in the homeland for the future prisoners of war, because it was thought in the beginning that these prisoners would be transferred to the homeland. In spite of thes preparat ions, however, I have been told, there came a sudden decree by Hitler who prohibited the transfer of these Soviet Russian prisoners into the homeland.
AI have explained that this morning, and I have said that during a certain time, until September, all transportation of Soviet Russian prisoners of war into the homeland, the Reich area, was not permitted and only after that there was a possibility to transfer them into the home camps, for reasons of manpower.
QAnd these difficulties in the beginning could not be remedied with the means at the disposal of the troops?
AApparently not. I am not informed about that because only the Supreme Commander of that army could know it. That was their responsibility.
QI have only a few more questions about the position of the Deputy Chief of the armed forces leadership staff, the Wehrmacht Fuehrung Stab. When was that position created?
AI believe in 1942.
QIn 1942? What was the rank connected with that position?
AIt would be a colonel or a general.
QI mean, was it like a position of a division commander?
AWell, I may say like the commander of a brigade or a division, a department head.
QHow many chiefs of department were there in the OKW?
AI could not say from memory. I would not like to give you a wrong figure.
QWhat do you estimate?
AEight chiefs, each one two, three, four departments. About 30 to 35 chiefs of department there may have been there.
QThe Deputy Chief of the Wehrmacht Fuehrung Stab was one of the 30 heads of deparments?
ANo, I would not like to say that. We had subordinate to these offices department chiefs. We had apartment group chiefs. That is, they were over several sections.
QWhat were the official tasks connected with that position?
AThe supervision and conduct of all the work of those parts of the Wehrmacht Fuehrung Stab witht the Fuehrer headquarters, to supervise that work according to the directives of the Chief of the armed forces Leadership Staff, Jodl.
That was the task.
QThe Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Leadership Staff, was he in a particular measure responsible for strategic planning, as is asserted by the Prosecution?
AResponsible? He was, of course, not according to his position, but as a matter of fact, he belonged to a small group of qualified general staff officers which were concerned with those things, as Haldar has pointed out.
QNow, I have one last question. That is the position of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Leadership Staff was therefore not as significant as the other positions which are included in that group of the general staff and OKW?
AI have said chief of a group, of a section in the Armed Forces Leadership Staff and assistant in the group, in the small group of those who had to deal with strategic questions, but subordinate to General Jodl and the departmrny chief in the staff.
QField Marshal, I believe that the question such as I have put it was not answered. I have asked you whether the significance, the importance of that position was the same as that of the others which are mentioned in that group of the general staff of the OKW.
ANo, certainly not that, because in that group, general staff in OKW, there were the supreme commanders and the chiefs of the general staff, He did not belong to these.
BY DR.BABEL (Counsel for the SS):
QWitness, you have said in your affidavit K-12 that the SS at the beginning of the war became the front line fighters for a policy of power and conquest. In order to exclude an y misunderstandings, I should like to clarify the following:
What did you mean by SS?
AI can say that what has been read here by my Counsel was a short summary of a much longer affidavit. If you read that, you would find the answer to your question In a more precise form in which I shall state it, I dealt with the Reichsfuehrung SS under Himmler and underthose functions within his competence. police SS, which in the occupied territories appeared and were active. The conceptof the so-called general SS had nothing to do with that. I hopethat clears it.
QYes, thank you. BY DR. BERGOLD (Counsel for Bormann):
QWitness, the Prosecution in its trial brief has accused the defendant Bormann in connection with his activity in the so-called Volkssturm. In that connection, I would like to put a few questions.
Did the Vokssturm, as it was formed by decree of the Fuehrer of 18 October 1944, have an offensive purpose of a defensive purpose?
ATo that I have to answer that Reichsleiter Bormann declined any information, any cooperation and coordination of the Volkssturm and the military office
QYou mean to say that you were not at all informed of the purpose of the Volkssturm?
ANo, only so far that I had a certain impression that it meant the last bit of manpower to defend their own homesteads.
QWithin the framework of the armed forces, there was no offensive purpose in it?
ANo, only the various parts of the Wehrmacht which had departments of the Volkssturm in their areas either incorporated them or sent them home.
QDid I understand you correctly that you wanted to say that that institution, the Volkssturm, was a brainchild of Bormann or did that come from Hitler?
AI do not know that. Maybe from both.
QHitler did not tell you about it either?
ANo, he only spoke about the Volkssturm and similar things, but military officials had nothing to do with it.
QDid Bormann report any other military matters to the Fuehrer besides this peculiar thing of the Volkssturm?
A He has often accused the armed forces in various ways, I can only assume that what I have heard and assum that it originated from Bormann.
I do not know it for sure. BY DR. HORN: (Counsel for defendant Ribbentrop):
QIs it correct that the defendant von Ribbentrop, after his return from Moscow in August 1939, on account of the changed foreign political situation-the guarantee pact between England and Poland had been ratified--advised the Fuehrer to start certain military measures?
AI had the impression at that time that the orders given to me by Hitler were based upon a conversation between him and his foreign Minister. I was not present at that conversation.
QIs it correct that von Ribbentrop, just as the other ministers, was for the most part never informed about the strategic plans?
AI can only say that from my point of view and from the point of view of the Chief of the Armed Forces Leadership Staff, that we werenot authorized to do it, and we never did it.
If the Reich Foreign Minister was at any time informed about such questions, that information couldhave come onlyfrom Hitler and I doubt if he made an exception there.
Q.The Prosecution has submitted a letter of 3 April 1939 concerning an impending occupa tion of Denmark and Norway which you sent to the then Reich Foreign Minister. In that letter you informed the Reich Foreign Minister of the impending occupation and requested him to take the necessary foreignpolitical stops.before that date. Did you instruct von Ribbentrop about the intended occupation of Norway and Denmark?
A.No, I could not possibly have done that. According to the way in which the Fuehrer worked with us, that letter was a somewhat unusual way to inform the Reich Foreign Minister upon orders by Hitler. Otherwise he would not have known about it, and I was charged to write it.
Q.In connection with the testimony by General Lahousen, I want to ask you one question. Atthe time of the Polish campaign, was there a directive or an order by Hitler to exterminate the Jews in the Polish Ukraine?
A. I can not recall any such thing. I only know that even during the occupation of Poland, after the initial occupation, the problem of the Polish Jews played an important role, and in that connection I once put a question to Hitler, which I believe he answered by saying that that area was well designed to settle the Jews there.
Other things I do not remember or do not recollect.
Q At the time of the Polish Campaign, was there any plan to instigate a revolt in the Polish Ukraine in the back of the Poles?
AI cannot answer that question, although I have heard certain things said here by Lahousen.
DR. HORN:I thank you BY DR. BOEHM (Counsel for the SA):
QFieldmarshal, you were chief of the OKW and also chief of the KGW, that is a prisoner of war system. Did you ever issue orders or have orders issued on the basis of which members of the SA or units of the SA were used to guard prisoners of war or prisoner of war camps, or should have been used that purpose?
AI cannot remember that any such directive had been issued by the high command of the armed forces. I believe that certainly was not the case.
QIn that connection, was it over reported to you that any such guarding of prisoners of war by SA over took place ?
AI cannot remember but I should not mean to exclude that some officers of the army in some particular places may have used SA men for the guarding. I don't know.
DR. BOEHM:Thank you.
THEPRESIDENT: perhaps we better adjourn now for ten minutes.
(A recess was taken)
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal will sit in open session tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock. At 1230 it will take supplementary applications for witnesses and documents, and that at a quarter to one it will adjourn into a closed session.
CROSS EXAMINATION BY GENERAL RUDENKO:
QDefendant Keitel, I would like you to tell me exactly, when did you receive your first officer's commission?
AOn the 18th August 1902
QWhat was the degree and extent of your military education?
AI came into the army as an officer candidate and as a soldier I advanced through the various ranks to second lieutenant.
QI asked you about your military education, not rank.
A I was troop leading officer until 1909, and then almost six years regimental adjutant.
Then during the first World War, battery commander, and then after the spring of 1915, in the general staff.
QEvidently, the translation was not correct. You finished the military academy or had you taken your military training in some other place; just what is it?
AI was never to a military academy. Twice I participated in so called general staff travels as regiment adjutant and in the summer of 1915, I was ordered to go to the general staff and returned to my regiment later.
QJust what military training and military rank did Hitler possess?
AOnly a few years ago I found out from Hitler himself that after the end of the first World War, he was a lieutenant in a Bavarian Infantry Regiment, Throughout the war, the first World War, he served as a soldier and possibly as a non-commissioned officer toward the end.
QShould we not conclude, therefore, that you having had extensive training and experience in military matters, had a opportunity to influence Hitler considerably in his decisions of strategic and other military matters as well as all matters concerning the armed forces ?
ANo, I have to make a statement in that respect which for the layman and for the professional officer, for reasons which are hard to understand, Hitler had studied tactics and strategy and he had a knowledge in military fields which was something surprising. May I give an example for that. The other other officers of the armed forces will confirm it, that concerning organization, armament, leadership, equipment, of all armies, and what is more remarkable, of all navies of the globe, he was so well-informed that it was impossible to prove any error on his part, and I have to add that also during the war, while I was at his headquarters and in his close proximity, that during the night Hitler studied all the big general staff books by Moltke, Schliefen and von Klausewitz and from there had a tremendous knowledge and therefore we had the impression that only a genius can do that.
Q I do hope that you will not deny that because of your military training and experience you were Hitler's adviser in a number of important military matters?
AI was in his closest military surrounding and I have heard a lot from him and about him; but yesterday when I was asked by my counsel I already pointed out that even in the simpler questions, every-day questions, concerning organization and equipment of the armed forces I have to admit openly I was the onewho was advised and not the adviser.
QSince when did you begin to cooperate with Hitler militarily?
AExactly from the day when I was called into that position, the 4th of February 1938.
QThat means that you were working in close contact with Hitler during the period when preparations for aggressive wars were made, is that not so?
AYes. I have given all the necessary explanations as to how I entered the situation in the beginning of February and how things have developed and how surprisingly new situations arose.
QWho besides you among military leaders of the OKW and the OKH had the title of the Minister of the Reich?
AThe rank of Reichsminister was given to the three commanders-inchief of the branches of the armed forces, and the supreme commander of the air force, Reichsmarshal Goering, was also Reichsminister of Aviation; and also I received only the rank but not the competence and not the position of the minister.
QWho besides you among military leaders of the OKH and the OKW signed decrees together with Hitler and the other Reich ministers?
AIn the ministerial field of the Reich government there was the form of the signatures of the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor and the ministers, and then finally the chief of the Reichschancellory. In the military field that did not exist, but according to the traditions of the army and the armed forces the main personalities concerned signed--that is, the Chief of Staff or whoever had written the order with an initial on the margin.
QBut you said yesterday already that you have signed such decrees together with other Reichsministers.
AYes, I have yesterday mentioned several decrees and also given the reasons why I signed than, and that in doing so I was not a Reichsminister and did not have the function of a minister inoffice.
QWhat was the agency that, beginning with February 1938, filled the function of the Minister of War? What was the government agency that fulfilled the function of the government of Minister of War?
AUntil the end of January or the first day of February it was former Reichsminister von Blomberg. Beginning with the 4th of February there was neither a war minister or a war ministry.
QThis is precisely why I asked you what government agency had taken on the function of the ministry of war, since there was no ministry of was following the period you mentioned.
AI myself with the armed forces office and the former staff of the War Ministry continued the work such as I have described yesterday. That is, all rights and autonomies and competences were transferred to the commanders of the branches. It wasn't upon an order of myself but upon an order from Hitler.
QFrom the testimony you have given so far it appears that the central unifying supreme command was directly controlled and supervised by Hitler. Would that be a correct conclusion?
AYes, that was the military staff of Hitler.
QWho in the OKW supervised directly the military plans of a strategic nature? Specifically, I mean the plans for the attack on Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, Holland, France, Norway, Jugoslavia and the Soviet Union?
AI believe that yesterday I stated that very precisely, saying that the operational and strategic planning, after an order had been given by Hitler, were worked out by the commanders of the branches; that is to say, for the army by the High Command of the army and the General Staff of the army. They were reported to Hitler and then further decisions were made,
QI would like to ask you with regard to Jugoslavia the following: Do you admit that a decree, or rather, a directive issued under your signature about the partition of Jugoslavia represents in itself a document of both political and international significance, since it practically decides on abolishing Jugoslavia as a sovereign state?