As far as properties are concerned that existed and were important for the conduct of the war, such as steel or copper or tin, it was my will and my view that these raw materials should be used there where they could most quickly be used for manufacture.
If it was on the spot and the traffic problem permitted it, then they should remain there and be used right there. If it was not possible to usethem in the country, then I would of course if I had the important raw materials there, would have had them brought to wherever their use could best and quickly be put into the war economic situation. That is generally what the decree says and that was my principal view and my principal order. They were put in the quickest and suitable use wherever possible.
QOn the 19th November 1925, a Dr. Muehlmann made an affidavit, which haw b een presented by the prosecution under 3042-PS,(?) and which is worded as follows: I am quoting three short sentences:
"I was Special Deputy of the Governor General of Poland and had to secure art treasures in the Government General. The order was given to me by Goering in his capacity as the Chairman of the Committee for the Reich Defense. I confirm that it was the official policy of the Governor General Frank, that all important art treasures of Polish public institutions or private collections, or belonging to the church, be taken into custody. I confirm that the art treasures which I have mentioned were in fact confiscated and I am aware that in the event of a German victory, they would not have remained in Polish hands but would be used to complete German art property."
In effect I had no direct method of securing art treasures from Poland.
I sat as Chairman of the Ministerial Council and would have not the right.
In fact, however, Muehlmann, who came to see me, told me that he was working for the securing of art treasures from without the world.
It was my view that the art treasures from without the world.
It was my view that the art treasures during the time of war, and there would have to have eventually, of what would be secured, protection so that no destruction could be possible through fires, or bombing, or anything like that.
I want to emphasize immediately, and I shall, of course, refer to this matter later, that in connection with France, none of these art treasures were had for me in the so-called personal collection.
That is on the other side. That these art treasures were in fact secured is correct, and it was defended who was to have them when the reason was that the owners were not available, but on the whole when they were present, and, here I remember a Count Pototsky, for instance, where the owner was present, the art treasures were left where they were.
The exception regarding the final fate of these art treasures had not yet been final thoughts of the Fuehrer.
But he had given an order, and I communicated that by letter to Muehlmann and Frank; he had sent a letter in order that these art treasures were the first of all to be brought to Koenigsberg.
Four pictures were to be taken to the German Museum in Berlin, or rather to the Imperial Friedrich Museum in Berlin, and then I would like to say right now, and about which the Prosecution has confirmed against by the Fuehrer's drawings from Lemberg, that the Fuehrer's drawings from Lemberg were not confiscated by us at that time, and Lemberg had become Russian, and, it was wrong during the absence of Russia and during the period of battle when these Lemberg drawings, as far as I can remember the fact, were removed from the burning Lemberg building in order to save them from Russia and to handle them.
He arrived with them, and visited me, and although I was normally mentally interested, I did not have time to look at them at leisure, since I - ,5916 was on my way to the Fuehrer at the time, when I did not have the time to take them along with me, and under that particular fact Muehlmann can confirm that straight away.
What happened after that and where they went, I don't know, and perhaps with that I have answered the question referring to the Polish Art Treasures.
Apart from that, there is the famous altar, which was originally made in Nurnberg and of German work, and this German work the Fuehrer wished.
I have nothing to do with it personally, with this work of art, apart of being brought to Lemberg Dramatic Museum.
I just happened to know of that, but the final distinction was, it had not been stated about that in the event I opposed, and this would have been my point, that I certainly had answered in the affirmative.
QWhat connection did you have with Quisling?
AQuisling. Quisling. I met Quisling long after the occupation of Norway for the first and only time.
He was in Berlin at the time, and visited me.
I had a short and immaterial conversation, but before that, one of his representatives whom I did not know personally, either I met him before the outbreak of the war, sent a letter to me, which has been not shown to me, and which I cannot personally remember, since naturally when hardly put before me, and anyway, that is immaterial.
In that letter the name of Quisling appeared, and we were asked to give financial support to his movements, and the letter contained an account of how far the political contributions were being paid, with Russia on one side, and England on the other, for political influence of the parties.
Later on he only talked to me, and of means of supplying coal, and some support otherwise could be given to Quisling, and we adopted the attitude that, because of the foreign account situation, we are not very rich, or that we could not compete with the Russians or the British contributions, and that the thought of the department who could charge that to the support of Quisling, or not, could be had under that fact, and if they were to answer in the affirmative, then I, of course, was perfectly agreeable to meet him with some money.
The figure, it was discussed, and it certainly would be given but was very much higher than the amount which was in fact later on paid by the Fuehrer, by the Foreign Office.
I have never thought much of the poor financial report of that that was given it by them; you are to give a lot so that you would achieve something, as I had my experience from the last World War.
I am talking about the money which went into the Rumanian Parliament, which, in fact, was not of enough, and based on the experience then, on my experience, they gave well.
Apart from that I think I must have met him very much later, and had a complete immaterial conversation with him, which I cannot recollect.
QWhat was your attitude towards the Norway campaign?
AThe Norwegian campaign, that surprised me rather; that was because in this connection, and that was peculiar, I had not been informed for quite some time.
The Fuehrer went very far with that basic decree, which I have mentioned earlier, and that the air force was very late indeed, but since the air force had to do only the most important task in the campaign, I expressed myself unmistakably, and not at all in an offensive way, that situation.
The whole of that military point of view I was perfectly favorably disposed to watch of the campaign, since as the Supreme Commander of the air force, and quite independently from the political consideration, I had to think over this strategic problem; since from between what was the point of view of the air force that would improve considerably by my Airforce coming through from a basic airport to England, as any reasonable expert is to say, of course.
Consequently from the strategic point of view, and as Supreme Commander of the Airforce I could only approve of that operation. My objection merely was that I was opposed too late, and secondly, that the plan did not appear quite effectively but apart from that, that my attitude was perfectly positive.
QWas Hitler afraid of the occupation of Sweden in that connection?
AYes, but not because of occupation by German forces, but when the Fuehrer decided to occupy Norway, we already had considerable and detailed information regarding the intended occupation by the Britishhand French, which we got to later, or even confirmed, when we had access to the Brish paper's, and papers of the French General Staff. I offer to say to you in this connection that there was particularly a plan not only to occupy Norway, but presumable all Nordic to intercept Swedish ore supplies for Germany, and over and above that to interfer in the rations, and finished financial conflict at the time going on, and at the time in the State of Finland. The Fuehrer feared, of course, that Sweden would give in to British contribution, and as a like result hoping Finland then would permit the march through with the cutting off of Swedish resources and supplies which was coming to us, I had a very heavy responsibility at that time, and I took it upon myself by showing Hitler that I knew Sweden, and the Swedish people, and the King so well; that I knew they would bring Hitler to bear on Sweden, and no matter how powerful an opponent that Sweden would offer every resistance to defend its neutrality, if necessary, with arms against any one who wish to threate them, and from that matter was the reason for that action, and that I personally would, pledge my word for that conviction, and with all my knowledge, I would-take it upon myself to see that they could remain unafraid in that respect, and with that the question was settled. THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now. (The Tribunal adjourned until 15 February 1946, at 1000 hours) Official transcript of the International Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America, the French Re public, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against Hermann Wilhelm Goering, et al, Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 15 March 1946, 1000-1300, Lord Justice Lawrence presiding.
HERMANN WILHELMGOERING - Resumed.
DIRECTEXAMINATION - Continued. BY DR. STAHMER:
QWhat reasons existed for the invasion of Holland and Belgium?
AThis question first has to be answered from the purely military and strategic point of view. It has been examined from these points of view. We were wondering whether the neutrality of the two states would be absolutely guaranteed.
THE PRESIDENT:Something seems to be wrong with the equipment. The Tribunal will adjourn. BY DR. STAHMER:
QWould you please continue.
AI repeat. At first, we had to determine whether the neutrality of Holland and Belgium would, under all circumstances, be assured in a conflict. In the beginning, it seemed it would. Then, information came in that particularly between Belgium and France, but also between Holland and England, negotiations had taken place. There was an incident at Venlo where a Dutch general staff officer had been caught on German territory, and neutrality could not be maintained under the pressure.
THE PRESIDENT:The translation isn't coming through quite loud enough there. BY DR. STAHMER:
Q would you continue, if you please.
AIf neutrality wasnot assured under all circumstances, there arose a tremendous danger for the struggle in that the right flank was menaced and exposed. The purely military offices had to be concerned with strategic matters only, and they knew, since they were asked to give their opinions, that they had to give this information in a purely military sense, that is, to point out that of course by occupying both countries, the purely military and strategic situation would be different.
Then, if this would not have taken place, such an occupation would have taken place on the part of the enemy.
An additional element which made it necessary to doubt the absolute neutrality of these countries was the fact that most of the flights from Great Britain into Germany went ever Dutch or Belgian territory. Reliable information reached us, informing us that the Belgian Army, which had been deployed, at the beginning of the war, on the western front, were prepared with all their forces along the German border.
Further information indicated that an exchange of thought between the French General Staff and the Belgian General Staff had taken place, and that under pressure from the French General Staff they had given assurances they would participate in the construction of the fortification line along the Maas against Germany.
Other information indicated that the French Chief of Staff, Gamelin, as well as Admiral Darlan and the Chief of the Air Force, Vuillemin, considered the occupation of Belgium necessary under all circumstances and demanded it for the security of France, and that considerable negotiations had taken place between theFrench and the British Governments. The information at the time was highly reliable, and how true it was we could ascertain later when, after marching into France, we found the secret documents of the French General Staff and also minutes of conferences which had taken place between the French and British government, the so-called Supreme Military Conference.
It was the opinion of the Fuehrer that it was impossible to maintain neutrality on the part of the countries in the face of increased FrenchBritish pressure, and that then, the Ruhr area particularly, whichwas so vital to us, would have been exposed to extreme danger. How justified this opinion was can be seen from reports in which the British Chief of Government suggested and had explained also by experts in the War Council how best the Ruhr Valley could be attacked by low-flying British aircraft which would approach over Belgium and then, at the last moment, ever the shortest distance could attack the Ruhr Valley from Belgium, and in this manner could destroy the most important industries there.
If that was not carried out at first, it was due to the concern of the French Prime Minister that he, on his part, was worried about French industry and wanted to leave it to the other side to make the first attacks against industry. England insisted, however, at all times, on carrying out this attack from Belgium on the Ruhr Valley.
If we take into consideration how short the flying distance is from the Belgian border to the most Important industries of the Ruhr Valley, only a few miles, then we have to recognize the entire danger which was apparent if the neutrality of Belgium was not respected by our enemies, because if it had been respected, and attacked by the British Air Force, at the Ruhr Valley, we would have had to start by coming from the north and would have had the comparatively long distance, where it would have been impossible without difficulty to avoid and to cut off such an attack.
However, if this came over Belgium it was almost impossible.
Therefore in this serious struggle it was important in the first place to think of our own vital interests and not to leave the advantage to the enemy, but once we were convinced, once we realized these moments of danger menacing our people and our enemy to exclude these elements and to use the advantages which the enemy wanted to use.
QFor what reason were officers interned in France, even after the war was over?
AFirst I would like to correct an expression in this question.
In France the war was not at all terminated. It was just an armistice that had been signed, and in this armistice we had dealt very generously.
Already in the preamble of the armistice there was expressed a tendency of future friendship, contrary to that armistice which had been signed in 1918 on the same spot.
When at that time Marshal Petain asked for an armistice, the first answer he received was that capitulation would have to be an unconditional one.
Later we gave to understand that quite a number of demands concerning the fleet, certain parts of an unoccupied territory, questions of colonies, that these demands would be the first to be considered.
The situation was such that Germany at that moment had to insist on an absolutely unconditional capitulation and that no French forces of any importance which could have come from England should be at the disposal, in order to avoid a complete military catastrophe in France.
No line, no French formation, could have avoided the penetration by German troops all the way to the Mediterranean.
There were no reserves in England.
Everything which had been there was in the expeditionary force which was in the Belgian area north of France and finally had been battered at Dunkirk.
In this armistice the conditions were respected which had been mentioned as requests.
The Fuehrer had a certain generous solution touching the question of captured officers, but since contrary to a far-reaching appeasement which we had hoped for, and which really took place in the beginning, and since by propaganda, from across the Channel and the establishment of a new sector of resistance under General de Gaulle, in France, the resistance began to develop.
For all these reasons, from my point of view, it was quite clear that first of all French officers would put themselves at the disposal for these movements.
But at the same time it was a matter of course for Germany, recognizing this danger, that these elements who would be the loaders in such military movement of resistance, that is to say, the officers, and so tried to stave off the danger.
So that in that way she put all these officers who had been still free in France, into captivity.
That was a fundamental prerequisite in order to avoid the danger of a renewed war in our back in France.
I believe that it is quite unique, while on all fronts war was still raging, for one to permit the officers of a country with whom one has an armistice to move around freely.
As far as I know, that has happened for the first time in the history of warfare
QCan you give us definite information to explain that the struggle in France, which was finished in 1940, had taken such severe forms later?
AOne has to distinguish between two phases. The first phase was the great military dispute, that is to say, the attack of the German forces against the French army.
This struggle was executed and terminated quickly, and one cannot say that it was always a chivalrous one, because from that period we know of several deeds on the part of the French, against our prisoners, which were later pointed out in the white books which we presented to the International Red Cross in Geneva.
But all in all, it had the usual forms of a military struggle, with the excesses that always occur here and there in such a struggle.
After that had been terminated, at first appeasement and quiet reigned.
Only later, as the struggle continued and expanded, especially when the struggle against Russia was added, when on the opposite side a new centre of leadership had been created, then at that time in the countries of the west which had been quiet until then and where no serious events had taken place, an absolute change was brought about by the resistance movement.
Raids, attacks on German officers and so on, hand grenades and bombs thrown into localities where German officers or soldiers were present. Bombs were even thrown in places where there were women -- Red Cross nurses. Auto-cars were attacked, lines of communication cut, rails were blasted, and this in increasing measure.
Since this was a war behind the front, and during a period of land warfare, such a war represented a great difficulty. When serial warfare was added, entirely new possibilities and methods were developed. Might after night a large number of planes came over and dropped a tremendous quantity of explosives and arms, directives, etc., for this resistance movement, in order to reinforce and increase it. The German Intelligence was quite successful, by means of radio measures of deception, to get a large number of these materials into their own hands; but sufficient amounts were left which fell into the hands of the resistance movement.
The atrocities which have been committed in this connection were also of large extent. As to this, documents can be submitted. Of course -
MR. JUST ICE JACKSON:If the Tribunal please, I am very reluctant to interrupt this examination, but I should like to ask if the Tribunal will avail itself of the Charter provision to require from Counsel a statement as to how this is relevant to the charges which we are engaged in trying.
It raises a rather large and important question, and that question is this, as I see it: It raises a question which involves a great deal of time, if time is an important element in this proceeding.
For the purposes of this statment, I may admit that there were actions taken by partisan groups within occupied territories which were very annoying, objectionable and injurious to the would-be conqueror. It is sought to introduce testimony as to what partisans did toward the German occupying forces, on the theory of reprisal, then I respectfully submit that Counsel is proceeding in reverse order, that is to say, if the Defense says, "Yes, we did commit certain atrocities; we did shoot hostages; we did violate is not, under the Hague Convention relevant but then at least we might have that question presented.
But unless this evidence is offered on the theory that reprisals would be justified, it has no place, I submit, in the case. If it is offered on the basis of establishing a theory of reprisal, our first inquiry is, What is it that reprisals were for? In other words, the doctrine of reprisal can only be invoked when you first admit that you committed certain definite acts of violation of international law. Then your question is whether you were justified. I submit that it might shorten, and certainly would clarify this proceeding, if counsel would definitely state what acts it is on the part of the German occupying force that he is directing this testimony, as I suppose, to excuse it, and that unless there is some theory of reprisal pointed out with sufficient definiteness, so that we may identify the violations on Germany's part for which she is seeking excuse by way of reprisal, this testimony is not helpful in deciding the ultimate question.
The question here is not whether the occupying countries resisted. Of course they resisted. The question is whether acts of the character we have shown can be excused by way of reprisal, and if so, there must be an admission of those acts and the doctrine of reprisal must be set forth, it seems to me, much more specifically.
D., STAHMER: Unfortunately, I did not understand all of the statement, but I believe that for the following reasons what we have discussed up to now is relevant:
The defendant is accused of the fast that hostages had been taken in large numbers and were killed, and it is said that this was a violation;
at any rate, the motives which led to the taking of hostages have not, up to now, been discussed, at least not sufficiently, and to clarify this question, which is 30 important for the decisions in this trial, it is in my opinion absolutely necessary to explain that these decrees concerning the arrest and the treatment of hostages were called for by the attitude of the resistance movement and the actions of the resistance movement.
Therefore, in my opinion it could be said with justification that the actions of the resistance movement were the cause for +he measures which had to be taken later by the German military authorities, much to their regret.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:May I say one word in answer to Doctor Stahmer's offer, if it be an offer?
The suggestion of Doctor Stahmer that the motives here are to be tried seems to me to lead us very far afield. If he is invoking the international law doctrine of reprisal, then he has to meet the conditions of that doctrine. Article 2 of the Geneva Convention of the 27th of July 1929 provides specifically that measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited. He therefore must relate it to some one ether than prisoners of war. Under the doctrine of reprisal, as we understand it, any act which is claimed to be justified as a reprisal must be related to a specific end continuing violation of international law on the other side. That is, it is not every casual and incidental violation which justifies wholesale reprisal. If it were, then international law would have no foundation, for a breach on one side, however unimportant, would completely absolve the other from any rules of warfare.
Secondly, anything which it is claimed to be justified as a reprisal must follow within a reasonable time and it must be related reasonably to the offense which it is sought to prevent. That is, you can't by way of reprisal engage in wholesale slaughter in order to vindicate a single murder. Next it must be shown as to the reprisal that a pretest was made, as a basis for invoking reprisal. You cannot engage in reprisals without notice. The reprisal must be noticed and there must be notification by a responsible party of the government.
Next, and most important, a deliberate course of violation of international law cannot be shielded as a reprisal. The specific acts must be reprisals for specific acts under the conditions I have pointed out.
You cannot vindicate a reign of terror under the doctrine of reprisal; and so I respectfully submit that the offer of Doctor Stahmer to inquire into the motives of Goering individually or of all defendants collectively, or of Germany, does not meet any legal test.
It might be pointed out to the Court by way of mitigation of sentence after conviction, but is not a proper consideration on the question of guilt or innocence of the charges which we have brought to the bar.
THE PRESIDENT:Mr. Justice Jackson, I understood you to agree that this sort of evidence might be relevant in mitigation of sentence?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:If your Honors find the defendants guilty, then it comes to the question of sentence, as in our practice. You might find almost anything that a defendant saw fit to urge relevant to the sentence, but I don't take it that Doctor Stahmer is now dealing with the question of offers relevant to that subject. If it is I should consent that any plea for leniency be heard, of course. It is offered, as I understand it, on the question of guilt.
THE PRESIDENT:That may be so, but the Tribunal may consider it more convenient to hear the evidence new. The Charter, as far as I see, hasn't provided for any evidence to be given after sentence of sentence is pronounced. Therefore any evidence which would have to be given in mitigation would have to be given now.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:The difficulty with that, I should think, would be this: that a defendant may very well be found guilty on some count but not on others. That would require mitigation at this time of the question of sentence, two-thirds of which might be irrelevant because he might not be found guilty on more than one count.
I may be biased in favor of the practice that I know, or at least may be presumed to have some knowledge of. In our procedure the question of guilt is tried first.
The question of sentence is a separate subject, to be determined after the verdict. I should think that would be the logical way to proceed here. I do not understand that this -- and I think Doctor Stahmer confirms my view -- is offered on the question of sentence.
I don't think he concedes he has reached that point yet.
DR. STAHMER:May I speak briefly on this?
It has been said that violations of international law were committed, to a large extent, by organizing partisan groups. The struggle against these actions could only be carried out by reprisals. As Justice Jackson has explained, it is correct that certain conditions prevailed for reprisals, but I believe-
THEPRESIDENT (interposing): You agree that the conditions which Mr. Justice Jackson stated are accurately stated?
DR. STAHMER:Yes, but we have to deal here, in my opinion, with the fact of an emergency,an emergency which was created by action of the partisans in violation of international law, and this condition of emergency permitted commanders of the army to take general measures in order to remove these conditions which had been brought about in violation of international law. Therefore, at any rate, these facts are of importance and are relevant concerning the question of verdict.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not propose to hear an unlimited number of defendants' Counsel, but I observe that Dr. Exner is there, and they are prepared to hear one other Counsel; if Counsel wish, Dr. Exner, upon the subject.
DR.EXNER(Counsel for Defendant Jodl): May it please the Tribunal, indeed, we are all interested in that question of reprisals, and I would like to say a few words.
Having taught ten years of international law at the university, I believe that I understand something about it. Reprisals are among the most disputed terms of international law. One can say that only on one point is there absolute certainty. That is the point which Justice Jackson has mentioned as the first one. Reprisals against prisoners of war are not permitted. Everything else is matter for dispute and not at all accepted in international law. It is not correct that it would be the practice among all states, and therefore international law, that a protest is a prerequisite for taking reprisals. Neither is it correct that there has been a so-called sensible connection. It was asserted that there must be a connection in time and a relation of proportion ought to be between the violation and the reprisals, and there are experts on international law who assert it and say that there should be a demand, but existing international law, in the sense that an agreement has been made to that effect or that it would be a law -- that is not the case.
It will have to be said, therefore, on the basis of violations of international law by the other side, we can never take reprisals against prisoners of war. However, every other form of reprisal is admissible.
I just wanted to state that in general terms, and perhaps I still could say that it has been asserted that at this time we should not speak about the reasons for mitigation. I would like to remind the Court that we are only permitted to make one address, and if in this speech which takes place before the decision has been reached about the question of guilt we are not permitted to speak about mitigation, then we would not have any opportunity to speak about it at all.
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal will adjourn now.
(A recess was taken)
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that the evidence is admissible on the question of reprisals, and the weight that should be given this or similar evidence will be reserved for future consideration.
BY DR. STAHMER:
QWill you please continue?
AI believe that the statement which I am about to make will be satisfied with the condition which Justice Jackson has put as follows.
I do not in any way wish to dispute that things took place which may be debated as far as international law is concerned, and other things occurred which under every circumstance may be considered and must be considered as excesses.
I only wanted to set forth how it happened without entering the legal status of reprisals, but considering the feeling of the individual soldier, who was not challenged by regular troops, but in the back and was prevented from doing his mission through these disturbances.
Through all of these things, with which I do not wish to take up your time, there was an embittering, which in certain cases as a matter of state emergency had been decreed, and partially the excesses of certain occurrences had taken place.
We must put ourselves back into the period of the stormy battles.
Today, after the elapse of years, in a quiet setting forth of the legal basis, these things sound disturbing, and they sound incredible and not understandable.
Explanations or expressions made through embittering sound differently and do not lead to a comprehension of the situation that obtained at that time.
It was my sole intention for just one moment to picture to the high Tribunal that atmosphere, out of which such actions, even if they could not be excused, would appear understandable, and in a like situation were carried out by others.
That was and is my answer to the question why the relations in France had two different aspects of war;first--and I would like to include with this the phase of the regular battle--and, second, the phase of that battle which was not led by regular troops but those which came from the back in the underground and contrary to other measures, which brought with them atrocities and cruelties and brought forth other cruelties than those that would be brought forth in a regular war.
And in a case like that special or single occurrences will take place which the highest leadership cannot always control and is in no position to control.
QWhat measures were taken by the German occupational authorities in France in order to help French agriculture?
AI can reply very briefly, and I can refer to the testimony of the witness Koerner, whose testimony I can only confirm.
By that I mean France, as far as her agriculture was concerned, was during the period of occupation helped, developed and increased.
A large number of non-arable tracts or those which had not been put to good agricultural use were re-instated or re-constructed, put to good use.
Other tracts, by the use of additional fertilizer or additional cultivation, were intensified in their production.
Individual reports as to just what took place and figures as to an increase of agricultural development I am not able to give you exact statistics on, but responsible experts are in a position to give exact figures.
Q What reasons were present for the bringing of credit slips in occupied countries?
AA measure which would probably be taken by every occupying power, so that the circulation of money could be regulated to keep it in its proper limits and channels and to keep the currency of the country under control; in other words, similar to the procedure that is being used, in cur occupied zones of Germany today,
QIn Document 141-PS there is something concerning the 15th of November 1945 in which there was a regulation regarding art objects. Are you familiar with this or shall I refresh your memory?
AI remember this document very distinctly. It has played an important role, these art objects which were taken to the Louvre and later into the exhibition hall. We were concerned with, these objects of art which were Jewish property but without masters and had left the country; that is, the art objects that left the country and had been confiscated. This order was not issued by me. I did not knew this order. It was the Fuehrer's Decree. Then, when I was at Paris. I heard of this order and heard further that it was the intention of these art objects in the main -- that is, as far as they had museum value -- to put them into the museum at Linz which the Fuehrer contemplated erecting at Linz. I personally will confess that I am interested but not ineverything that was to be transported to Southern Germany. I personally, for quite sometime previous to this incident, had decided and had made my intention known to the Finance Ministry, that after the war or some other period of time which I considered opportune, that the objects of art which I had in my possession, either through purchase, through gifts, r through inheritance, that these art objects would be taken and given as a grant to the German people, and I had the intention to institute or to erect this gallery or museum in a different way from what museums had been constructed in prior days -- for the development of this gallery was put up at Karinhall and according to the historical background, these paints and objects of art were to be presented and shown according to the historical background. Preparations had been taken along those lines but because of the outbreak of the war, work could rot be completed. Paintings, statutes, an other objects of art were to be included in this collection and this collection was to be completed. Then, when I saw the course of events and heard that these objects, which I mentioned prior, were to be transported, to Linz -- there were some which were not of museum value and were to be used for a subordinate purpose -- I had the intention, and I fully admit that, that I had a passion for collecting things of all sorts and I said that after these things are confiscated and are to remain so, I wish to have a snail part, I wish to buy a small portion of them, so that I may include them into this gallery which I intended to establish in Northern Germany.