Q This was permitted not because of the circumstances that depended on you but because of the oncoming offenses of the Red Army, was it not so?
AI did not understand the question clearly enough in order to answer it.
QYou say that the question has not been solved. I am telling you: isn't it a fact that the problem had not been solved because of the Red Army and not because of any decision or volition on your part.
AI believe at the time When this letter was sent there was no influence of this kind felt. The question which had been touched of the comprehensive organization of economic matters in occupied territories did not actually materialize because other influences and circumstances were against it.
Q I do not plan to discuss this with you right now, these questions, but you still have not answered my last question.
I am asking again, do you assert that Goering as the Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan was at the head of both the civilian and the military German organs which dealt with the economic exploitation of all the occupied territories? And do you affirm or deny that you were his nearest and closest assistant?
AAs far as exploitation of occupied countries is concerned, we cannot deal with it in this manner. The Four Year Plan had the possibility to be connected with the occupied countries, but it was only done if it was absolutely necessary. In general it was concerned with internal problems, and those offices which in the occupied countries took care of economic matters were military or civil agencies. In the East, Rosenberg was concerned with this only if there was a matter between the military and the economic, or between departments at home if there was a dispute or a disagreement the Four Year Plan could be drawn in. The Reichsmarshal in those cases could make special decisions, but that was in very, very few cases.
At this conference that was mentioned today about occupied countries having to help supply foodstuffs for Europe, we had the right, since in the occupied territories, not only the East but also in the West, we put in many new developments in the line of agriculture. In the West I can point out -
Q (Interposing) What law are you discussing?
AI speak of the right which Germany had to take part in the economic produce, because we put in many new developments in these countries. I would like to point out in the East, the regions which had been completely devastated, which had no seed, no machines, and with greatest difficulty -
Q (Interposing) Who gave that right to the Germans?
AWe speak of the right if we occupy a country and build it up to take part in the surplus, for all of Europe knew what countries we had occupied, and we knew the cares and problems that we had in the occupied countries.
QI ask you once more, where did the Germans get the right?
AI am not a jurist. Therefore, I cannot answer the question,
QI am talking again about the German rights.
AI am speaking only of the natural right that if we did any developing that we could share in the profits of this developing work.
Q What did you do when you annihilated and plundered the territory?
AGermany did not devestate these countries, especially not in an agricultural country. In fact, we instituted great developments. In the West I remember that part of France was completely devestated -
THEPRESIDENT: (interposing) Witness, you are going too fast. Can't you see the light?
AI beg your pardon.
In the West we did great developing services, so that through German organization, the Reichsland, we rebuilt these areas and repatriated French people to this territory and gave them the possibility to again function as peasants and to share in the agricultural production of the country. In the East we found territories which, through the efforts of the war, had been damaged greatly. There were no more machines existing. Everything had been taken away by the Russians, and all agricultural implements had been taken away or had been destroyed. There we had to start with the most elementary and primitive ways to start agriculture again.
But it was possible in the years of our occupation in the East to reinstate agriculture. German initiative and German machinery is to be thanked for this task. BY GENERAL RUDENKO:
QThe German initiative also included a considerable number of concentration camps established in the occupied countries. Did that not also cover the extent of the German initiative?
AI was not concerned with that problem and cannot say anything about things I do not know about.
QYou are not sufficiently informed on concentration camps? It appears that you are quite well informed, or appear to be, on other economic measures as well as other social measures within the occupied territories.
ANaturally I know quite a bit about the rehabilitation of agricultural areas.
QYou still say you know nothing about concentration camps?
AThat's right. I was not concerned with these matters.
QThe fact that millions of persons were being annihilated by the German occupation authorities -- about that you know nothing?
ANo; I know nothing about that.
QYou know nothing about that?
AI have just found that out now.
QOnly now?
GENERAL RUDENKO:That's all. BY DR. BOEHM (Counsel for the SA)
QMr. Witness, do you know that Heines was Chief of Police at Breslau?
THE PRESIDENT:I asked defendants' counsel at the end of the examination by Dr. Stahmer whether they wished to ask any questions, and they said they didn't offer to ask any questions.
Therefore, it is not your turn now to ask any questions.
DR. BOEHM:I must say through the speech of Mr. Jackson that there was a point raised which I did not know of before, and that is the person of the Chief of Police, Mr. Heines. I request that I may be permitted to put two or three questions to the witness so that this question which we are concerned with may be clarified.
THE PRESIDENT:Very well. We hope you won't take too long.
DR. BOEHM:I will try to be brief, Mr. President. Thank you. BY DR. BOEHM:
QWitness, do you know that Heines was Chief of Police at Breslau?
AYes.
QYou further know that as such the prisoners of Breslau were under his jurisdiction?
AYes.
QDo you further know that in the time at issue at which this Lager was erected, the Police prisons were overcrowded?
AThat I don't know. I just mention the case of Heines as one of the camps which was established without the knowledge of the Defense Ministry.
QThen do you know that Heines established this camp only in his capacity as Chief of Police?
AYes, that may be.
QThank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Stahmer, have you any questions to ask?
DR. STAHMER:I have no further questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT:Then the witness can retire.
DR. STAHMER:With the permission of the high Tribunal, I wish to call as my next witness, General Field Marshall Kesselring.
(ALBERT KESSELRING, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows): BY THE PRESIDENT:
QWill you tell me your name?
AAlbert Kesselring.
QWill you repeat this oath after me:
I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth, and will withhold and add nothing?
(The witness repeated the oath).
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. STAHMER:
QWitness, since when do you belong to the Luftwaffe?
ASince January 10, 1933.
QWhat rank did you have when you came into the Luftwaffe?
AUp until that time I was colonel and a commanding officer of the artillery in Dresden. Then I was retired and as a commander of the Luftwaffe I went on from there.
QYou worked on the development of the Luftwaffe?
AIn the first three years I was chief ofthe administrative office and with the General Staff, andthen was useful in allied fields.
Q Did the development of the Luftwaffe proceed for defense or attack?
AThe German Luftwaffe was purely a weapon of defense. I must add that each plane, as well as the total Luftwaffe, in their nature is of course an offensive weapon. Even in ground fighting if offensive without defensive is without success, then in the case of the Luftwaffe it is the same in a more intensified manner.
The Luftwaffe has its aims in a deep space, immaterial from defense or from attack, and this realization was with the Reichsmarshal and his generals.
It is clear that in the developing of an air force from the beginning only the lighter craft are developed or used as the first constructions. Therefore,up until the year 1936 we had 37 light airplanes, Stukas, fighters, and a few others, some old models, but they were models which werenot fit for combat.
We may represent the attitude that the defense with these light craft can be successfully done, but I would like to cite the contrary example and point to the end of the World War where the German defensive air force was beaten up by the opposite air force.
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal thinks the witness is dealing in far too great detail.
A I will continue. The offensive airforce was absent. We had no fighter planes until 1937 or 1938, and these fighters which were brought later had neither the range nor the fuel to serve as a weapon of conquest or an offensive weapon.
We had no 4-motor jobs.
QYou were active in the attack on Warsaw?
AI was chief of Luftflotte 1 and led this attack.
QWas this attack, according to the then given military situation, justified and how was this attack carried through?
AThere were several attacks made on Warsaw. Warsaw was, according to German attitudes and conceptions, a fortress and also was being defended by air. Our hypotheses of the Hague Convention were not present in that case.
The first phase of the attack against Warsaw, according to the operative basis of the Luftflotte, was to combat a hostile airforce and the prepared airfields which were in the vicinity, and according to my opinion these attacks were justified.
In the second phase we were concerned with the operative movements, or changes, of the Poles. I would like to add that Warsaw was the central point of that part of Poland and we received news that ground troops and railroad stations were heavily supplied. Air attack against these movements was decreed and put through. It was directed at railway depots and bridges of the Vistula.
I would like to add that from my point of view the execution of this attack by Stukas and fighter planes was justified -- and I was in agreement with this -- because the precision attack of these weapons was presupposed and because we were mainly intent on war targets.
The third phase was concerned with the shooting of Warsaw. This attack was made by the army, and the air arm was used as a supplementary part. I myself was over Warsaw, and after each bombing attack I spoke with the men who took part, and can give personal reports as to this, that everything humanly possible was done to hit military targets only and not to hit civil targets.
QThen, comprehensively, can you certify that these attacks were made because of military necessity completely?
A Yes.
QWere you also present at the attack on Rotterdam?
AAs chief of airfleet No. 2 and the right wing, I made this attack against Holland, France, and had the air infantry corps under my command. General Student had pursued this attack and he is the only personality who saw the position of the ground troops, and the support by air was given to the Fourth Air Corps. The smallest troop units were made into groups which were to be deployed. The deployment and the execution and disposition took place completely and solely according to tactical requirements, according to technical possibilities. The demands on General Student were made very soon and came soon to my command.
Preparations were made according to plan and with ease. The troops knew about the situation and the possibility of change at Rotterdam and that the Reichsmarshal might intervene. We knew about this. We also knew that Panzer divisions were approaching. The target was singular and we knew all the details. The target was not to cause any difficulty, seeing we were all experienced. There was a connecting line between the general of my staff and the other staffs. We all knewjust what was going on, and this communication and connection was disturbed perhaps shortly, since all commands came from me or the Reichsmarshal. Owing to this line of communicatio and the then existing state of technology, there was a possibility of keeping the tactical connection between the ground troops and the air arm. Then the customary connection as far as signals were concerned was regulated and there was to be no difficulty from that score.
QThat was the order, that the situation and target was to be-
AI myself never had a personal doubt that the attack was to be carried through, only perhaps whether it would have to be repeated under certain circumstances.
To clarify the question: if we know the personality of this general and the technique of his leadership, his clear demands, we can count on the execution of this air plan. This attack was carried through according to plan and in time, and our knowledge that everything was under control was complete.
We had the report that further attacks were not necessary. The men in charge of the Luftflotte during these three days of combat in Holland were kept posted on all matters, and the Reichsmarshal, especially on the third day, that is, the date on which I am talking of now -- he intervened in the leadership of it and did everything that could be done from a position of such high leadership.
I cannot recall a report that the bombing attack was not in accordance with the course of events of the tactical situation.
QHave there been bombings while capitulation talks were in progress?
AThere was no report to the office, and the squadron which was above Rotterdam had no such information. It might have been that there was confusion in Rotterdam itself, confusion about which I know nothing, and I don't know of the agreements that were made between General Student and the Holland people. At a conference which I attended later I could not carry through, because the General had a brain injury.
If the attack -- this is my inner conviction -- is not what it should have been, then I am very sorry. As a soldier of twenty-two years, as an artillery man, as a flyer, and as a man of long leadership I would like to state here emphatically that if this took place, this case is to be counted among those which is really an accident of war, and if the outside world does not know it, it happens to every country and much more frequently than one would expect.
QHow can we say that many fires originated in the city?
AAccording to the report, I was impressed, and this is something of experience, that in this war devastations did not take part so much through bombing as through fire. I am very sorry to say a bomb hit a power magazine for oil and the fire was spread that way. After the attack, after a state of capitulation had been declared,the fire fighting should have stopped the fire.
Q What military consequences did this attack have?
AThe immediate consequence was the capitulation of troops. General Wenninger, who had been air chief, was with me, and he told me the immediate consequences of that was the capitulation of the Dutch Army.
QIn November, 1940, did you lead the attack on Coventry?
AI have, douctlessly, as chief of the air forces, too, participated in that attack. At the moment, I cannot say whether Air Force 3 was not there too, but I did it.
QWhat was the purpose of the attack?
AConventry was, according to our files, target files; with the archieves of the commander in chief of the air force, it was a typical industrial center and we called it "Klein-Essen," (little essen). These files, archives, have been compiled by experts, engineers, officers very carefully and methodically and they contained cards, maps, and key points, descriptions, etc. These details were known to me and the troops very thoroughly, -- besides General Wenninger, who I mentioned before, who was responsible very often to the troops about the particular targets and the effectiveness of their operations.
The preparations of attack were very methodical, extraordinarily so. I have myself assisted and supervised, and the Reich Marshal himself has examined these preparations. In the case of Coventry the conditions were very simple, since the nights presented good weather conditions and without radio navigation we could find Coventry. When the target distribution of Coventry was simple one could see what one could hit, so that the missing of the targets way impossible, practically impossible, but the bombing itself depends on the same rules and all the basic statistics of all shooting by weapons. During the war this experience was extraordinary and the particular characteristics of the air bombardment has to be added, that in particular cases a whole area has to be considered as a target and thereby a natural broadening of the target as a consequence. All bombings under the orders of the OB. D. L. were examined the next dayby photography, the taking of pictures, where the bombs landed subsequently. As I said, and as I said about Rotterdam, it is not so that the bombs destroyed the target but the destruction of the of the target was caused by fire, fire started by bombs.
I do not know if I should not add some more.
The Convention of the Hague has taken into consideration aerial warfare to a very small extent. It is quite sure, that, too, if a target should be avoided, the highest office had to issue directives which was the basis of the preamble of the Convention of the Hague, and the literature which was published after takes into account the particular characteristics of the air force. The target was considered by us admissible according to international law. Itdid not exclude that from our side, and in particular cases, examinations and investigations were made, and in detail, however, we have assumed the responsibility that our organization was ordered, by personal visits, to take care of the preparation of the bombings, the target designation and the meteorological details so methodically so that a very high amount of exactness could be expected.
In the case of Coventry, I was very happy that this had been selected for the simple reason that here there offered itself a target which was not to be hit by a terror attack but an important military objective.
DR. STAHMER:I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT:Does any other defense counsel wish to ask questions?
DR. LATERNSER:Dr. Laternser, counsel for the General Staff and the OKW. BY DR. LATERNSER:
QWitness, since when were you commander in chief of an army group?
ACommander in chief of an army group, I was that since September, 1942, after I had been commander in chief of the troops, andI had certain experiences on tactical questions.
QThat is to say, the army group which you led was in Italy?
AThe army group was in the Meditteranean area.
QYou heard of the group of the General Staff andthe OKW, as the prosecution has called them, you have probably heard about that?
AYes.
QI have one third question. What does one mean in speaking about the German General Staff, that is to say, of the individual parts of the Wehrmacht?
AThe General Staff of the individual parts of the Wehrmacht represents a group of those officers within the part of the Wehrmacht who as assistants of the leadership, have to carry part of the responsibility.
QWould you like to tell us how this group was constituted within the air force and what offices were included?
AThe General Staff of the Air Forces was parallel to the General Staff of the army and it was equal to that just like one after the other. The General Staff considered of the central office, of Fuehrungs Stab (Leadership Office) with the Chief of Staff, the Fuehrungs Stab (Leadership Departments), organizational groups, the General quartermaster's office, and so on. The individual command divisions all the way down to the division; and on the side of the ground organizations, the Air Gaus, had interstaff offices and assistants of the leadership, of the leaders. The co-responsibility of the Chief of the General Staff was incompatible at the time with the leadership as such. The Chief of the General Staff of the lower and higher divisions, had great influence on all the general staff officers without thereby impairing the responsibility of the military officers.
QIf I may summarize your answer, that is to say, that the General Staff of the Air Force can be understood to mean the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force plus the General Staff officers of the troops, than, I believe I understand it correctly? .
AYes, perfectly.
QNow, in this trial, the group of persons whom you know, which is called General Staff here, do you consider this designation according to military language, do you cousider this correct? Is that group of General leaders called General Staff?
AI have said before already, that the General Staff is a division of assistants of leadership in Germany, that is to say, that the commanders have nothing to do with that. According to German concepts, they did not fit into that organization and simply for that reason, that the leaders, the commanders in chief did not go that way of General Staff officers -
the commanders were individual personalities. There is probably one way of grouping them, that is, the title and the pay, title generally.
QThus, therefore, if one summarizes the high military leadership as General Staff, then you would consider it wrong?
ANo, according to German conception it is wrong.
Q A similar connected link for high military position has never existed before within the realm of such German situation?
AUnder German conditions such was not admissible for various reasons. The commanders-in-chief were not that sort of war counsellor or similar organization group for certain purposes. They did not have the individual or in-toto responsibility to the Reich Defense Council. They were responsible only to commander-in-chief of the sector or certain office. The grouping of the commanders-in-chief for any results was impossible, according to my opinion, because, in the first place, the condition was entirely different. First, either they were under the commander-in-chief of the Army, or the Air Force, or the Navy, or the Wehrmacht, as such then they were one hundred percent under the German high command. Others were one hundred percent under the allied high command -- the Axis command. Then there were the independent commanders, independently from the commander-in-chief of the Army, and others who were independent of Army groups.
QYou speak too fast. Did the commanders-in-chief, did they only have to do with the education of military problems as they were presented to them, or did they develop their own plans to present them to Hitler?
AThe commanders-in-chief were personalities of military leadership only, and only responsible for the status to which they were appointed; within that area they could make improvements, and note any suggestions or changes for improvement to the OKW; with the OKW there was no political definite reporting or collaboration.
QYou just mentioned improvements or changes. Does that mean only military and tactical directions or improvements, or did such suggestions also, I shall say, did they have to do with the "if"?
ANo, only military tactical positions, and in a similar case the "if" was discussed, unless the higher officer decided, then the auditorium kept quiet.
QI shall come later to this point. The group of the general staff, in such discussions there, did they ever meet collectively?
ANo.
QDid they at any time introduce any directive in the organization for this group?
A No.
QWere there ever made suggestions by members of this group to deviate from the International Law?
AI believe not, rather the opposite.
QDid the official positions which were in this group, were these positions changed, did they change them, or were they intact in that position?
ADuring the last years there were a great use of changing commanders and commanders-in-chief.
Q what do you know about the conference which took place between Hitler and the High Military leaders?
AWe will have to distinguish between two kinds. One: consisted of an address before the campaign was started to the higher commanders who would take part in the campaign. The purpose was generally in the form of issuance of an order to these commanders, to inform them about the situation, and with the oratorical forces released by the Fuehrer, it was quite natural that he could not fear anything, particularly since they were not informed about the various matters in the background. Discussions did not take place, they were not admitted after such a question. Afterwards, sometimes, there was a military tactical conference, at which one of the commanders would put his deluge of commands forward. As I have mentioned, we never had any political questions, as it was not read, but we were put before a fact which we had to accept as soldiers.
QYou participated in a conference which took place with Hitler on 22 August 1939, that is shortly before the beginning of the Polish campaign?
AYes.
QAt the end of this conference was not there a reference made according to which a treaty had been made with the Soviet Union and concluded?
AAt the end, after the address, all the gentlemen were called together, and told that a report had just been received, according to which the Russians will have a benevolent neutrality.
QWhat impression did that report give the higher military leaders?
ASo far as I am concerned, and what I know of the others, that was a leading contention. In any other case there was the possibility of extending the war treaty east, at least, we could not deny the possibility.
However, if Russia was no more to be considered, then speaking as a leader of the Airforce, at least for the Airforce, there was a balance given which guaranteed a short decisive victory, and beyond that, it meant it would not make necessary the extending of the Fuehrer's operation.
QAt any rate, you had received this with quite a great relief?
AYes.
QDid you know as to whether members of the group of the general staff of the OKW had met with the high politicians, and also the Party people?
AIf I can speak for my presence, I was in the Mediterranean area, as well as in the West. I had to cooperate, and I was depending on the cooperation of the high kommissar Gauleiter Hofer, and there was a Gauleiter on my back -
QI want to know whether the high military leaders met with the high politicians, and where the conference took place, and if any political plans of any kind?
ANo, no. That I can definitely say that was not the case. Soldiers did not bother about politics. Politics by the politicians were made by them and we had to execute them.
QThis non-political education of the soldier, and the high political leaders as to use of them were used to that extent, weren't they?
AThe high military leaders, as to them, that is a development which took place since the 18th Century in the German Army.
QWhat do you know about the relations between the high military leaders, and the 5th Column?
AWith the 5th Column, the military leadership never had anything to do with. That was below their level.
QWhat impression did you gain from the conference which Hitler held before the beginning of the East campaign, as well as with the military leaders. Did you believe from the situation described to you that was was inevitable?
AI had a certain impression that the purpose and aim of that address to the military leaders was to convince them of the necessity as to a preventive war.
That is to say, to attack before the mobilization and armaments in Russian fortresses would be harmful to Germany.
QCould you give any reason how you came to that opinion, or impression during that conference?
AAs I said before, these addresses were invariably going into one direction, as they gave a picture of the military general situation, the time, the element, a definite picture which was at any rate swift. I want to say here, in speaking of the Russian campaign, that I had no doubt at all, that I could not have any doubt at all until the last day practically of August, of any fight against -- during the last days I know I had no time or means to be informed about the entire situation of the Russian front, and I had so much to do in my own office -
THE PRESIDENT:Mr. Witness, Mr. Witness, will you go more slowly, please, and have some consideration for the interpreters. BY DR. LATERNSER: I would like you to repeat the last answer, please.
AI could not doubt what was said, all the more, as I had been in the action against England as commander of the airforce, and had not the entire time of mine to inform myself about the entire situation of the Russian site, such as to judge for myself to quite -
QSince this trial, it has been shown the commanders-in-chief are responsible for events which can hardly be avoided during a war. I should like to ask you to describe this day of the commander-in-chief, describe briefly the day of the commander-in-chief of the airforce, or the army?
AThe Day, of course, according to the individual personality of the commander, if I may speak for myself I -
QMr. Witness, I ask you to be very brief.
THE PRESIDENT:Mr. Witness -- Dr. Laternser, surely that is accumulative to what the witness has already been saying, and likely to be very long. The description of the Day of a commander, this witness already said the commander had nothing to do with politics, and nothing to do with the staff. Why should we betroubled of what the commander's Day consists?
DR. LATERNSER:Mr. President, I should like to ask this question for the following reasons. Since his activities were very extensive, especially at the front, not every report, or each individual report put in there can reach him.
The reports in his sector must of necessity go through the office which is accommodated for them, so that such reports which are of extraordinary importance, especially are important for the decision of military leadership for his plans on the front then.
THE PRESIDENT:Give it in that way then, rather than giving the witness a full day to describe it.
DR. LATERNSER:All right, I will put it that way.
QMr. Witness, in the translation of the extent of your activity as commander-in-chief, or of commanders-in-chief, in their reports because of preparations,could only such messages, which after examination by the office, be of such importance that they had to be presented to the commanderin-chief?
AEspecially daring combat, it was quite impossible that all the reports could be brought before the commander-in-chief. It was almost impossible, if I can talk about myself, that fifty to seventy percent of my time I had to be at the front. The amount of independence of the staff of the army, of the airforce, and the Navy command, had to be responsible within their own sectors, that is, to maintain their own responsibility.
QDid you have the extensive activity of a commander-in-chief, and if so, was it possible that all reports of violations of International Law, of a minor or medium nature, would reach you?
AIt had to be tried. It had to be attempted, whether any possible individual case or not; that it is very bad, and for the reason that I have mentioned before, because the commander-in-chief sometimes could not even be reached.
Q In other words, in these cases the Commander-in-Chief had to be able to depend on his assistants.
AYes.
QFrom June, 1941, until November, 1941, you were Commander-in-Chief of an air fleet on the Eastern Front?
AYes.
QDo you have any knowledge about the extermination of Jews in the East?
ANo, I know nothing about that.
QDid you know anything about the activity of the Einsatzgruppen of the SS?
ANo.
QYou didn't even know the names of these units?
ANo.
QDo you know anything about the regrettable order according to which Russian Commissars after their capture were to be shot?
AOf this order I heard at the end of the war. The air force did not have anything -- but the ground force -- to do with this matter. I believe -and I can say it with almost absolute certain that the air force, not even in the way of reports knew anything about it. Even in the face of frequent contact with General Field Marshal von Bock with the Army leaders and commanders of Panzer groups, I did not hear anything about this order from these gentlemen.
QDid you know anything about that Commando order
AThe Commando order was known to me.
QAnd what was your attitude with regard to that order?
AI considered such orders which reached me as commander-in chief in the Mediterranean area -- I did not consider then binding on me, but just as an order within which I had certain liberty, in this matter. And my position was that I as Commander-in-Chief had the right to decide whether it was a commander incident as a violation of international law or something which could be tactically explained, and the task was that the solution was that whoever were uniforms and had a definite tactical job, if they were within the points of the Hague Convention were to be considered soldiers and to be treated as such.
QThe Commando order was therefore not used within your command?
AIn one case, yes, it was, certainly -- but I cannot remember it.
Q What case do you mean?
AI mean the case of Colonel Dostler.
QThe case of Colonel Dostler has already been mentioned in this proceeding. At that time did you know about that case? Were you informed?
AI have said as a witness under oath that I cannot remember that case. I do not believe that I was informed about that, for two reasons: First, because after conferences with my chief I found out that none of the three of us knew anything; and secondly, because just at that time by unsuccessful operations on the Southern Front I was more out of my position than in it.
QIf you would have been asked in the case of Dostler to decide what would you have decided?
AI do not know the case as such well enough -MR JUSTICE JACKSON: I don't think we can try Dostler's case or that this witness should give his conclusions, inasmuch as Dostler's case is being tried by a competent court and that issue is disposed of. I have no objection to any facts that inform this Tribunal, but his conclusion as to the guilt of his fellow. officer is hardly helpful. THE PRESIDENT: Particularly as he said he cannot remember. DR. LATHERNSER: I withdraw the question
QCan you quote other cases where the Commando order was not applied in your territory?
ASmall landings behing the lines south of Venetia. There were aerial landings north of Albende in the Genetial territory. There were smaller cases in the territory of Ortona. I am convinced that the troops understood the general view and acted accordingly.
QYou were Supreme Commander of an air fleet in the East. Can you tell me anything about the treatment of the Russian civilian population by the troops?
AUntil the end of November I was in Russia. I can only say that the relations between the population and the troops was the best possible, that the field kitchens were placed at the disposal of the poor and the children, as it was the custom, and was a fact; and the high moral level of the Russian women was recognized by us. It was respected by German soldiers. And I know that the services of our doctors were often used by the Russian population. I remember this particularly, since we always had an ability to suffer pains. But war passed across the field of the Smolensk so rapidly that the whole territory made a peaceful impression.