There was to be reinforcement by the East Prussion division. Furthermore, this document is dated 2 Play 1935, which is about 6 weeks after the promulgation of the Conscription Law on 16 March, 1935, and so it could hardly have been planned as a defensive measure against any expected sanctions which might have been applied by reason of the passage of the Conscription Law.
Of course, the actual reoccupation of the Rhineland did not take place until 7 March, 1936, so that this early plan would necessarily have been totally revised to suit the existing conditions and specific objectives. As I say, although the plan does not mention the Rhineland, it has all of the indications of a Rhineland Operation Plan. That the details of this particular plan were not ultimately the ones that were carried out in reoccupying the Rhineland does not at all detract from the vital fact that as early as 2 May 1935, the Germans had already planned that operation, not merely as a Staff Plan but as a definite operation. It was evidently not on their timetable to carry out the operation so soon, if it could be avoided. But they were prepared to do so, if necessary, to revise French sanctions against their Conscription Law.
It is significant to note the date of this document is the same as the date of the signing of the Franco-Russian Pact, which the Nazis later asserted as their excuse for the Rhineland reoccupation.
The military orders, on the basis of which the Rhineland reoccupation was actually carried into execution on 7 March, 1936, were issued on 2 March, 1936 by the War Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Blomberg, and addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Fritsch, the Commanderin-Chief of the Navy, Raeder, and Air Minister and C-in-C of the Air Force, Goering. We have that order signed by Blomberg, headed, as usual, "Top Secret", identified by us as C-159. I offer it in evidence as U.S.A. Exhibit 54.
The German copy of that document bears the defendant Raeder's initial in green pencil, with a red pencil note "To be submitted to the C-in-C of the Navy".
The first part of the Order reads:
"Supreme Command of the Navy:
"1. The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has made the following decision:
"By reason of the Franco-Russian alliance, the obligations accepted by Germany in the Locarno Treaty, as far as they apply to Articles 42 and 43, of the Treaty of Versailles which referred to the demilitarized zone, are to be regarded as obsolete.
"2. Sections of the Army and Air Force will therefore be transferred simultaneously in a surprise move to garrisons of the demilitarized zone. In this connection, I issue the following orders:--"
There follows the detailed orders for the military operation.
We also have the orders for Naval cooperation. The original German document, which we identify as C-194, was issued on 6 March, 1936, in the form of an order on behalf of the Reich Minister for War, Blomberg, signed by Keitel, and addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Raeder, setting out detailed instructions for the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet and the Admirals commanding the Baltic and North Sea. I offer the document in evidence as Exhibit U.S.A. 55.
The short covering letter is as follows:
"To: C-in-C Navy:
"The Minister has decided the following after the meeting:
"1. The inconspicuous air reconnaissance in the German bay, not over the line Texel-Doggerbank, from midday on Z-Day onward, has been approved. C-in-C air force will instruct the air command VI from midday 7 March to hold in readiness single reconnaissance aircraft to be at the disposal of the C-in-C fleet.
"2. The Minister will reserve the decision to set up a U-Boat reconnaissance on line, until the evening of 7 March.
The immediate transfer of U-Boats from Kiel to Wilhelmshaven has been approved.
"3. The proposed advance measures for the most part exceed Degree of Emergency A and therefore are out of the question as the first countermeasures to be taken against military preparations of neighboring states. It is far more essential to examine the advance measures included in Degree of Emergency A, to see whether one or other of the especially conspicuous measures could not be omitted."
That is signed "Keitel".
The rest of the documents are detailed naval orders, operational orders, and I think I need not read further.
For the historical emphasis of this occasion, Hitler made a momentous speech on 7 March 1936. I have the volume of the "Voelkische Beobachter", Berlin, Sunday, 8 March 1936, our document 2289-PS, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit U.S.A. 56.
This is a long speech which the world remembers and of which I shall only read a short portion.
"Men of the German Reichstag! France has replied to the repeated friendly offers and peaceful assurances made by Germany by infringing the Reich pact through a military alliance with the Soviet Union exclusively directed against Germany. In this manner, however, the Locarno Rhine pact has lost its inner meaning and ceased in practice to exist. Consequently, Germany regards herself, for her part, as no longer bound by this dissolved treaty. The German government are now constrained to face the new situation created by this alliance, a situation which is rendered more acute by the fact that the Franco-Soviet treaty has been supplemented by a Treaty of Alliance between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union exactly parallel in form. In accordance with the fundamental right of a nation to secure its frontiers and ensure its possibilities of defense, the German government have today restored the full and unrestricted sovereignty of Germany in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland."
The whole matter of the German reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland caused extensive international reprecussions. As a result of the protests lodged with the League of Nations, the Council of the League made an investigation and announced the following finding, of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice, as being carried in the League of Nations monthly summary, March, 1936, Volume 16, Page 78, and it is also quoted in an article by Quincy Wright, in the American Journal of International Law, page 487, 1936.
The finding is this:
"That the German government has committed a breach of Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, by causing on March 7, 1936, military forces to enter and establish themselves in the demilitarized zone, referred to in Article 42 and the following articles of that Treaty, and in the Treaty of Locarno. At the same time, on March 7, 1936, the Germans reoccupied the Rhineland in flagrant violation of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties. They again tried to allay the fears of other European powers and lead them into a false sense of security by announcing to the world 'we have no territorial demands to make in Europe.'" That appears in this same speech of Hitler's, which I have offered in evidence as U.S.A. Exhibit 56, which is document 2289-PS.
The language will be found on page 6, column 1, "We have no territorial claims to make in Europe. We know above all that all the tensions resulting either from false territorial settlements or from the disproportion of the numbers of inhabitants to their living spaces cannot, in Europe, be solved by war."
Most of the acts set forth in the part of the Indictment, which I have been discussing, I think do not need judicial proof because they are historical facts. We have been able to bring you a number of interesting documents, illuminating that history. The existence of prior plans and preparations is indisputable from the very nature of things. The method and sequence of these plans and their accomplishment are clearly indicative of the pro-gressing and increasingly aggressive character of the Nazi objectives, international obligations and considerations of humanity notwithstanding.
The detailed presentation of the violations of Treaties and International Law will be presented by our British colleagues, in support of Count Two of the Indictment.
In clear relief, there is shown the determination of the Nazi conspirators to use whatever means were necessary to abrogate and overthrow the Treaty of Versailes and its restrictions upon the military armament and activity of Germany.
In this process, they conspired and engaged in secret armament and training, the secret production of munitions of war, and they built up an air force.
They with drew from the International Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations on the 14th October 1933.
They Instituted universal military service on 16 March, 1935.
On 21 May, 1935, they falsely announced that they would respect the territorial limitations of Versailles and Locarno.
On March 7, 1936, they reoccupied and fortified the Whineland and at the same time, falsely announced that they had no terri torial demands in Europe.
The objectives of the conspirators were vast and mighty, requiring long and extensive preparations.
The process involved the evasion, circu vention and violation of inter national obligations and treaties.
They stopped at nothing.
The accomplishment of all those things, together with getting Versailles out of the way, constituted an opening of the gates toward the specific aggressions which followed.
I pass next, if the Tribunal please, to the presentation of the story of the aggression against Austria.
I do not know whether your Honor desires me to start on that or not.
I am perfectly willing to do so.
THE PRESIDENT:Are you going to use this volume of documents marked "M" tomorrow?
MR ALDERMAN:There will be a new one marked "N".
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal will adjourn until 10:00 08clock tomorrow morning.
(Whereupon, at 1630 hours the hearing of the Tribunal adjourned to reconvene at 28 November 1945, at 1000 hours.
Official transcript of the International Military Tribunal, in the matter of:
The United States of America, The French Republic, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against Hermann Wilhelm Goering, et al, Defendants, sitting at Nuernberg, Germany, on 28 November 1945, 1000-1230, Lord Justice Lawrence, presiding.
THE PRESIDENT:I call upon Counsel for the United States.
Mr. SIDNEY ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, at this point we distribute document book lettered "N", which will cover the next phase of the case as it will be presented. Of the five large phases of aggressive warfare, which I undertake to present to the Tribunal, I have now completed the presentation of the documents on the first phase, the phase lasting from 1933 to 1936, consisting of the preparation for aggression.
The second large phase of the program of the conspirators for aggression lasted from, approximately, 1936 to March 1939, when they had completed the absorption of Austria and the occupation of all of Czechoslovakia. I again invite the Court's attention to the chart on the wall, at which you may be interested in glancing from time to time as the presentation progresses.
The relevant portions of the indictment to the present subject are set forth in Sub-section 3, under Section IV (f), appearing at Pages 7 and 8 of the printed English text. This portion of the indictment is divided into throe parts: First, the 1936 to 1938 phase of the plan, planning for the assault on Austria and Czechoslovakia; second, the execution of the plan to invade Austria, November 1937 to March 1938; third, the execution of the plan to invade Czechoslovakia, April 1938 to March 1939.
As I previously indicated to the Tribunal, the portion of the indictment headed "(a) Planning for the assault on Austria and Czechoslovakia" is proved for the most part by Document No. 386-PS, which I introduced on Monday as Exhibit U.S.A. 25.
That was one of the handful of documents with which I began my presentation of this part of the case. The minutes taken by Colonel Hoszbach of the meeting in the Reich Chancellory on 5 November 1937, when Hitler developed his political last will and testament, reviewed the desire of the Nazi Germany for more room in central Europe and made preparations for the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia as a means of strengthening Germany for the general pattern of the Nazi conspirators for aggression.
I shall present the materials on this second, or Austrian phase of aggression, in two separate parts. I shall first present the materials and documents relating to the aggression against Austria. They have been gathered together in the document book, which has just been distributed. Later I shall present the materials relating to the aggression against Czechoslovakia. They will be gathered in a separate document book. First, the events leading up to the autumn of 1937, and the strategic position of the National Socialists in Austria. I suggest at this point, if the Tribunal please, that in this phase we see the first full flowering of what has come to be known as "fifth column" infiltration techniques in other countries; and first under that, the National Socialist aim of absorption of Austria.
In order to understand more clearly how the Nazi conspirators proceeded, after the meeting of 5 November 1937, covered by the Hoszbach minutes, it is advisable to review the steps, which had already been taken in Austria by the Nazi Socialists of both Germany and Austria.
The position, which the Nazis had reached by the Fall of 1937 made it possible for them to complete their absorption of Austria much sooner and with much less cost than had been contemplated at the time of the meeting, covered by the Hoszbach minutes.
The acquisition of Austria had long been a central aim of the German National Socialists. On the first page of "Mein Kampf", Hitler said, "German Austria must return to the Great German Motherland," and he continued by stating that this purpose of having common blood in a common Reich could not be satisfied by a mere economic union. Moreover, this aim of absorption of Austria was an aim from 1933 on and was regarded as a serious program, which the Nazis were determined to carry out.
At this point, I should like to offer in evidence our document No. 1760-PS, which, if admitted, would be Exhibit U.S.A. 57. This document is an affidavit executed in Mexico City on 28 August of this year by George S. Messerschmidt, United States Ambassador, now in Mexico City. Before I quote from, or a part of Mr. Messerschmidt's affidavit, I should like to point out briefly that Mr. Messerschmidt was Consul General of the United States of America in Berlin from 1930 to the late Spring of 1934. He was than made American Minister in Vienna where he stayed until 1937.
In this affidavit he states that the nature of his work brought him into frequent contact with German Government officials, and he reports in this affidavit that the Nazi Government officials, with whom he had contact, were on most occasions amazingly frank in their conversation and made no concealment of their aims.
If the Court please, this affidavit, which is quite long, presents a somewhat novel problem of treatment in the presentation of this case. In lieu of reading this entire affidavit into the record, I should like, if it might be done in that way, to offer it in evidence, not merely the English original of the affidavit, but also a translation into German, which has been mimeographed.
THE PRESIDENT:Mr. Alderman, some of the Tribunal's documents are not marked with the "PS" number, which makes it very difficult to find. I wonder whether you have a copy of the book, which is numbered.
MR. ALDERMAN:If we could borrow the set that isn't numbered, we will number it.
This translation of the affidavit into German, has been distributed to Counsel for the Defendants.
DR.KUBUSCHOK (Defense Counsel): I am the attorney for the Defendant von Papen. An affidavit has just been turned over to the Court, an affidavit of a witness, who is obtainable. The content of the affidavit contains so many subjective opinions of the witness, it seems possible to hear the witness personally in this matter.
I should like to take this occasion to ask for a decision, as a matter of principle, whether, that which a witness can present by his presence, may instead be presented in the form of an affidavit; in other words, a witness who can be reached, should be brought in instead of an affidavit.
MR. ALDERMAN:May I be heard?
THE PRESIDENT:You have finished what you wanted to say?
DR. KUBUSCHOK:Yes.
THE PRESIDENT:Very well, We will hear Mr. Alderman.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I recognize, of course, the inherent weakness of an affidavit as evidence where the witness is not present subject to cross examination.
Mr. Messerschmidt is an elderly gentleman. He is not in good health. It was entirely impracticable to try to bring him here; otherwise, we should have done so.
I remind the Court of Article 19 of the Chanter:
"The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence.
It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and non-technical pro cedure, and shall admit any evidence, which it deems to have probative value."
Of course, the Court would not treat anything in an affidavit such as this as having probative value unless the Court deemed it to have probative value; and if the Defendants have countering evidence, which is strong enough to overcome whatever is probative in this affidavit, of course, the Court will treat the probative value of evidence in accordance with this provision of the Charter.
By and large, this affidavit and another affidavit by Mr. Messerschmidt, which we shall undertake to present, covers background material, which is a matter of historical knowledge, of which the Court could take judicial knowledge. Where he does quote these amazingly frank expressions by Nazi leaders, it is entirely open to any of them, who may be quoted, to challenge what is said, or to tell your Honors what they conceive as what they said. In any event, it seems to me that the Court can accept an affidavit of this character, made by a well known American diplomat, and give it whatever probative value it seems to have to the Court.
On the question of reading the whole thing, the whole affidavit, I understand the ruling of the Court, that only those parts of documents, which are quoted into the record, will be considered in the record, to have been based upon the necessity of giving the German Counsel knowledge of what was being used. As to these affidavits, we have furnished them complete German translations so that it seems to us that a different rule might obtain where that has been done.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, have you finished with what you have to say?
MR. ALDERMAN:Yes.
DR. KUBUSCHOK:The representative of the Prosecution, takes the point of view that the age and state of health of the witness makes it impossible to summon him as a witness. I do not know the witness personally, and consequently am not in a position to state to what extent he is actually incapacitated.
Nevertheless, I have profound doubts regarding the presentation of such evidence of such an old and incapacitated person. I am speaking now not about Mr. Messersmith but I should like to open the question to what extent the state of health of a witness determines whether or not a person can be heard by this Court.
It is important to know what questions, in toto, were put to the witness, since an affidavit only reiterates the answers to the questions which were put to the person. Very often conclusions can be drawn from questions, which were not in fact put to the witness. It is here a question of evidence on the basis of an affidavit and for that reason we are not in a position to assume, with absolute certainty, that the evidence of the witness is complete.
I am not of the opinion of the Prosecution that in this case there are being introduced two pieces of evidence of different value; namely, on the one hand the evidence of a witness and on the other hand the evidence as laid down in an affidavit. The situation is rather this: That either the evidence is sufficient, or it is not. I think the Tribunal should confine itself to complete evidence.
MR. ALDERMAN:May it please the Tribunal, I want-
THE PRESIDENT:Just a moment.
MR. ALDERMAN:Yes.
THE PRESIDENT:Yes, Mr. Alderman, did you wish to add anything?
MR. ALDERMAN:I wish to make this correction, perhaps, of what I had said. I did not mean to leave the implication that Mr. Messersmith is in any way incapacitated. He is an elderly man, about 70 years old. He is on active duty in Mexico City, and the main difficulty is that we didn't feel that we could take him away from his duties in that post combined with a long trip at his age.
THE PRESIDENT:That's all, is it?
MR. ALDERMAN:Yes.
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal have considered the objection which has been raised, and in view of the powers which the Tribunal has under Article 19 of the Charter, which provides that the Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence, but shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and non-technical procedure and shall admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value.
In view of those provisions, the Tribunal holds that affidavits can be presented, and that in the present case it is a proper course. The question of the probative value of an affidavit as compared with a witness who has been cross-examined would of course be considered by the Tribunal; and if at a later stage, the Tribunal thinks the presence of a witness is of extreme importance, the matter can be reconsidered. And they would add this: That if the defense wish to put interrogatories to the witness, they will be at liberty to do so.
MR. ALDERMAN:I offer then our document 1760-PS as Exhibit USA 57, affidavit by George S. Messersmith; and rather than reading the entire affidavit, unless the court wish me to do so, I had intended to paraphrase the substance of what it covers at various parts of the affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal thinks it would be better and that you must adhere to the rule which we have laid down, that only what is read in the court will form part of the record.
MR. ALDERMAN:I shall read then, if this Tribunal please, on the third page of the English mimeograph; to identify it, it is the fourth paragraph following the list of names, starting with President Miklas of Austria and Chancellor Dollfuss:
"From the very beginnings of the Nazi Government, I was told by both high and secondary Government officials in Germany--"
THE PRESIDENT:Will you tell us again which page you are on?
MR. ALDERMAN:Page 3 of the English version, the fourth paragraph below the list of names. There are two Messerschmidt affidavits and counsel confuses between the two, I think.
"From the very beginnings of the Nazi Government, I was told by both high and secondary Government officials in Germany that incorporation of Austria into Germany was a political and economic necessity and that this incorporation was going to be accomplished 'by whatever means were necessary.
' Although I cannot assign definite times and places, I am sure that at various times and places, every one of the German officials whom I have listed earlier in this statement told me this, with the exception of Schacht, von Krosigk and Krupp von Bohlen.
I can assert that it was fully understood by everyone in Germany who had any knowledge whatever of what was going on that Hitler and the Nazi Government were irrevocably committed to this end, and the only doubt which ever existed in conversations or statements to me was how and when."
And in connection with that paragraph, I invite your attention to the list of German officials to whom he refers on page 2 of the affidavit; and they are listed as Hermann Goering, General Milch, Hjalmar Schacht, Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Count Schwerin von Krosigk, Joseph Goebbels, Richard Walter Darre', Robert Ley, Hans Heinrich Lammers, Otto Meissner, Franz von Papen, Walther Funk, General Wilhelm Keitel, Admiral Eric von Raeder, Admiral Karl Doenitz, Dr. Bohle, Dr. Stuckert, Dr. Krupp von Bohlen, Dr. Davidson. Now, the statement was that he was sure that at various times and places, everyone of those listed German officials had made these statements to him with the exception of Schacht, von Krosigk, and Krupp von Bohlen. Continuing with the next paragraph:
"At the beginningsof the Nazi regime in 1933, Germany was, of course, far too weak to permit any open threats of force against any country, such as the threats which the Nazis made in 1938. Instead it was the avowed and declared policy of the Nazi Government to accomplish the same results which they later accomplished through force through the methods which had proved so successful for them in Germany: Obtain a foothold in the Cabinet, particularly in the Ministry of the Interior, which controlled the police, and then quickly eliminate the opposition elements. During my stay in Austria, I was told on any number of occasions by Chancellor Dollfuss, Chancellor Schuschnigg, President Miklas, and other high officials of the Austrian Government that the German Government kept up constant and unceasing pressure upon the Austrian Government to agree to the inclusion of a number of ministers with Nazi orientation. The English and French ministers in Vienna, with whom I was in constant and close contact confirmed this information through statements which they made to me of conversations which they had with high Austrian officials."
I shall read other portions of the affidavit as the presentation proceeds.
On this question of pressure used against Austria, including terror and intimidation, culminating in the unsuccessful putsch of July 26, 1934, to achieve their ends the Nazis used various kinds of pressure. In the first place, they used economic pressures. A law of 24 March 1933, German law, imposed a prohibitive 1,000 Reichsmark penalty on trips to Austria and brought great hardship to this country, which relied very heavily on its tourist trade. For that I cite the Reichsgesetzblatt, 1933, Roman I, page 311, and ask the court to take judicial notice of that German law.
The Nazis used propaganda and they used terroristic acts, primarily bombings. Mr. Messersmith's affidavit, Document 1760-PS, from which I have already read, goes into some detail with respect to these outrages, I read again from page 4 of the affidavit, the English version, the second paragraph on the page:
"The outrages were an almost constant occurrence, but there were three distinct periods during which they rose to a peak.
During the first two of these periods, in nid 1933 and in early 1934, I was still in Berlin.
However, during that period I was told by high Nazi officials in conversation with them that these Waves of terror were being instigated and directed by then.
I found no concealment in my con versations with high Nazi officials of the fact that they were responsible for these activities in Austria.
These admissions were entirely consistent with the Nazi thesis that terror is necessary end must be used to impose the will of the Party not only in Germany but in other countries.
I recall specifically that General Milch was one of those who spoke frankly that these outrages in Austria were being directed by the Nazi Party and expressed his concern with respect thereto and his disagreement with this definite policy of the Party."
And the next paragraph:
"During the wave of terroristic acts in May and June 1934, I had already assumed my duties as American minister in Vienna.
The bomb outrages during this period were directly primarily at railways, tourist centers, and the Catholic Church, which latter, in the eyes of the Nazis, was one of the strongest organizations opposing them.
I recall, however that those outrages diminished markedly for a few days dur ing the meeting of Hitler and Mussolini in Venice in mid-June 1934.
At that time Mussolini was strongly supporting the Austrian Government and was strongly and deeply interested in maintaining Austrian independence and sovreignty and in keeping down Nazi influence and activity in Austria.
At that time also Hitler could not afford an open break with Mussolini and undoubtedly agreed to the short cessation of these bomb outrages on the insistence of Mussolini because During the first two of these periods, in nid 1933 and in early 1934, I was still in Berlin.
However, during that period I was told by high Nazi officials in conversation with them that these Waves of terror were being instigated and directed by then.
I found no concealment in my con versations with high Nazi officials of the fact that they were responsible for these activities in Austria.
These admissions were entirely consistent with the Nazi thesis that terror is necessary and must be used to impose the will of the Party not only in Germany but in other countries.
I recall specifically that General Milch was one of those who spoke frankly that these outrages in Austria were being directed by the Nazi Party and expressed his concern with respect thereto and his disagreement with this definite policy of the Party."
And the next paragraph:
"During the wave of terroristic acts in May and June 1934, I had already assumed my duties as American minister in Vienna.
The bomb outrages during this period were directly primarily at railways, tourist centers, and the Catholic Church, which latter, in the eyes of the Nazis, was one of the strongest organizations opposing them.
I recall, however that those outrages diminished markedly for a few days dur ing the meeting of Hitler and Mussolini in Venice in mid-June 1934.
At that time Mussolini was strongly supporting the Austrian Government and was strongly and deeply interested in maintaining Austrian independence and sovreignty and in keeping down Nazi influence and activity in Austria.
At that time also Hitler could not afford an open break with Mussolini and undoubtedly agreed to the short cessation of these bomb outrages on the insistence of Mussolini because he, Hitler, wished to achieve as favorable an atmosphere for the meeting between him and Mussolini as possible.
The cessation of the bomb outrages during the Hitler-Mussolini conversations was considered by me and by the Austrian authorities and by all observers at that time as an open admission on the part of Hitler and the German Government that the outrages were systematically and completely instigated and controlled from Germany."
Them turning to page 7 of the English version, follow int the line which reads, "Official dispatch from Vienna dated July 26, 1954, a short line, I quote the following paragraph:
"In addition to these outrages, the Nazis attempted to bring pressure upon Austria by means of the Austrian Legion.
' This organization, a para-military force of several thousand men, was stationed near the Austrian border in Germany as a constant and direct threat of violent action against Austria.
It was without any question sanctioned by the Nazi Government of Germany as it could otherwise not have existed, and it was armed by them.
It was made up of Austrian Nazis who had fled from Austria after committing various crimes in Austria and by Austrians in Germany who were attracted by the idle life and pay given by the German authorities."
These terroristic activities of the Nazis in Austria continued until July 25, 1934.
It Is a well-known histori cal fact of which I ask the court to take judicial notice, that on that day members of the NSDAP of the Nazi Party attempted a revolutionary putsch in Austria and killed Chancellor Dollfuss.