DR. LATERNSER: (counsel for the General Staff): I would like to point out that it was the opinion of the Tribunal that every defendant'S counsel should receive, in sufficient time beforehand, a copy of all documents which are submitted during the proceeding, and that this has not been done.
It is, therefore, difficult for the defense to follow the proceedings because the documents submitted have not been submitted in a sufficient quantity.
THE PRESIDENT:I don't think the Tribunal have ever imposed upon the prosecution the duty of supplying a copy of every document to every member of defendants' counsel.
You no doubt have before you a copy of the Tribunal's order upon the subject, and I believe that the order is posted upon the board in the defendants' information center. If I remember correctly, it is that a certain number of criminals or Photostatic conies shall be deposited in the information center, and that a certain number of copies of the documents shall be supplied to the defendants' counsel, and that for the rest, the defendants' counsel must rely upon the fact that every document or part of a document which is put in evidence is read in open court and therefore comes through the earphones to defendant's counsel and will appear in the shorthand notes. We have provided that copies of the shorthand notes shall be suppled to defendants' counsel as soon as possible after the day on which the evidence is given. Beyond that we have not thought it right to impose a duty upon the prosecution to supply documents to the defendants' counsel.
Is that not in accordance with your recollection?
DR. LATERNSER:Mr. Chairman, the American prosecution, the British prosecution, and also the French prosecution, in the course of the proceedings, have seen to it that of all documents so many copies have been given to the defendants' counsel that each defendant's counsel could hove one copy before him. I believe, in order to facilitate the work, that this could also have been done by the Soviet prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT:That is a belief on your part which is not strictly in accordance with the Tribunal's orders. The Tribunal has not made that order, and it may be that the United States and Great Britain have gone beyond the Tribunal's orders and have supplied a copy to each defendants' counsel.
However, as I say, the Tribunal has not as yet seen fit to impose that duty upon the prosecution.
I suppose you don't really know exactly how many copies of these Soviet documents have been deposited in the information center?
DR. LATERNSER:I don't know the exact number, At any rate, there were not so many that each defendant's counsel could have one copy of each document, which has been done by the other prosecutions.
THE PRESIDENT:Well, you no doubt understand the very great difficulties of making translations and making copies. I am sure that the Soviet prosecutors will do everything in their power to assist defendants' counsel, but, as I say, we have not imposed upon the prosecution the duty of supplying one copy of a translation into German, of each document, for each defendants' counsel. I can only express the hope that the soviet prosecutors will do the best they can.
DR. LATERNSER:I remember that on the occasion when the press got 250 copies of the documents, you, Mr. President, said that it should be possible to distribute 25 copies to the defendants' counsel, That was, at that time, the opinion of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT:Teh Tribunal's orders on this subject are in writing, and you will find them in the defendants' information center. I have stated my recollection of them; if I am wrong, you can bring me a copy of the document and I will withdraw my statement.
GENERAL ZORYA: May it please your Honors, it is my task to present the documentary evidence dealing with the aggression against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, organized by the Fascist war criminals now sitting in the prisoners' dock.
This charge of the crime, mentioned in sub-paragraph "a", Article VI of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, was formulated by paragraph 6, Section 4, Count I, of the Indictment in the present case, and in Section IV of the opening statement by the Chief Prosecutor from the USSR, General Rudenko.
Among the many criminal wars which German Fascism waged against freedom-loving nations, With its predatory aims, the attack on the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics occupies a place by itself.
It can be safely said that the aggressive war against the Soviet Union was the key question of the whole Fascist conspiracy against it.
All Aggressive actions on the part of German Fascism committed prior to the attack on the USSR, and in particular the German aggression against Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, were, as has been shown by my colleague, Colonel Pokrovsky, just stages on the road to the attack on the Soviet Union.
The Ukrainian wheat and the coal of the Donbass, manganese of the Kola Peninsula and Caucasian crude oil, fertile steppes of the Volga region, and Byelorussian forests, played a decisive part in the criminal schemes of the Fascist aggressors.
The war against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was waged by Fascist Germany also with the intent of enslaving and exploiting the Soviet peoples.
In the war of Fascist Germany against the Soviet Union, the animal hatred of the Hitlerites against the Slav peoples found its full horrifying expression.
And finally, German imperialism, appearing in its Fascist edition, saw in the seizure of the wealth of the Soviet Union and in its immeasurable resources of food and raw materials a base for the realization of their far-reaching aggressive aims to achieve, first, hegemony in Europe, and, later on, hegemony in the whole world.
The well-known formula of German imperialism, "Drang nach Osten," which was mentioned in the opening statement of the Chief Prosecutor from the USSR, was at different times interpreted by the Fascist criminals in many different ways, but always in their aggressive plans the attack on the Soviet Union was given a prominent place.
"If new territory is desired," wrote Hitler in his book, "Mein Kampf," in substance it can be secured at the expense of Russia.
The new Empire must move along the paths trodden by the knights of old."
(Hitler, "Mein Kampf," Munich edition, 1930 - page 742 -which is before the Tribunal.)
The fact that having at last initiated the Fascist aggression in 1939, Hitler began the war in the West, did not substantially change this basic conception of Fascism.
Under number 789-PS the American Prosecution submitted to the Tribunal the transcript of the conference held on 23 November 1939 between Hitler and the members of the German High Command.
At this conference, Hitler, according to his own words, gave a survey of the thoughts which dominated him in connection with the forthcoming events.
In the course of this survey he declared (the place where I am reading now you will find on page 33 in the documents already in front of you):"For a long time I hesitated whether I should not begin with an attack in the East, and only then with the one in the West.
It came about by force of events that for the nearest future the East dropped out of the picture."
(Page 2 of the Russian text.)
This statement by Hitler bore witness to the fact that the attack on the Soviet Union was not eliminated from the plans of Fascist aggression, and the whole question was reduced only to the problem of selecting the most favorable moment for this attack.
It should be noted that the authors of Fascist aggression did not consider the version "West" as the most favorable version for its start.
Again, exactly five months prior to the above-mentioned conference, at the conference of 23 May, 1939 (USA exhibit No. 79).Hitler briefed his accomplices on the present situation and political aims of policy, and said--I am citing now from page 4:"If fate forces us into a conflict with the West, it would be desirable that we, by that time, possess more expanse in the East."
The vast expanses in the East, as Hitler's conspirators thought, were to play a decisive part during the conflict in the West.
Therefore, when the Fascist hordes were unable to force the Channel, stopped at its shores and had to find new ways of aggression, the conspirators immediately began to prepare for an attack on the Soviet Union, because this was the basic part of all their plans of aggression, without which they could not materialize.
I believe it is unnecessary to refer to documents of an earlier period, and particularly to quote any further from Hitler's book, "Mein Kampf," where questions connected with the predatory attack on the Soviet Union were formulated long before 1939.
This book is already before the Tribunal, and relevant parts of it were cited as evidence by our American and British colleagues.
The Soviet Prosecution desires to submit to the Tribunal a file of documents which bear witness to the fact that the aggression of Fascist Germany against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was committed with malice aforethought.
Among these documents there are files from various archives captured by units of the advancing Red Army, statements by Fascist leaders, published in the press, including those by several of the Defendants, and depositions by persons who were in possession of reliable information as to how the preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union were actually carried out.
The documents of the Soviet Prosecution are presented under the following sections.
1. Preparations for war in Germany itself.
2. Assuring the security of the preparations for war by intelligence activities.
3. The securing by the Fascist conspirators of the participation of the satellite countries in the aggression against the Soviet Union.
I shall begin with Section which I shall call, "Preparations for war in Germany itself."
The statements of Hitler and his accomplices demonstrate that the idea of a criminal attack on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had for a long time been ripe in the minds of the Fascist conspirators.
But apart from this fact, we are also interested in the question as to when this intention began to take on the concrete form of direct military preparations for the predatory war against the Soviet Union.
On the 18th of December, 1940, the directive known to the Tribunal as directive number 21, "Plan Barbarossa" (the document of the American Prosecution numbered 446-PS), received its official formulation.
When the signature of the Command appears on such a document, this is the moment which crowns long and intensive work by all the links in the chain of military administration.
This work may not have been governed by written orders. The secrecy surrounding this work often made it necessary to have recourse to verbal orders.
And, on the other hand, many orders of a routine nature, on the strength of an already existing strategic project.
acquire a corresponding purpose, although outwardly they seem to have no connection with it.
It therefore appears that, with regard to establishing the actual moment at which military plans for the attack on the Soviet Union began--
THE PRESIDENT:General Zorya, the Tribunal observes that you are about to read a deposition of General Warlimont, whom the Tribunal understands is in Nurnberg, and the Tribunal considers that, in accordance with the order that it made the other day in another case, in the case of another deposition, if the Defendant's Counsel desired, you ought to be prepared to allow General Warlimont to be submitted to the Defendant's Counsel for cross-examination.
GENERAL ZORYA:I am now reading an extract, that is, from the questioning of Warlimont which was made by General Alexandrov of the Soviet Prosecution, and if the Defense will desire to call General Warlimont for cross-examination, the Soviet Prosecution will do its best to satisfy this request.
THE PRESIDENT:That is, of course, on the supposition that I am right in saying that General Warlimont is in Nurnberg--available in Nurnberg.
Go on.
GENERAL ZORYA:I think it is a proper moment now to mention that, regarding the attack on the Soviet Union, we will use not only the documents, as not everything is always put on paper, but also testimony of persons who participated directly in making these preparations.
At this moment I should, like to refer to the deposition of General Warlimont, which the President has just mentioned.
This.
deposition, which was given by Warlimont on the 30th of November, 1945, is pre-
sented as evidence under No. 263.
Walter Warlimont, as is well known, was the chief of the Department of National Defense in OKW, and later the deputy chief of the Operational Staff.
I shall read that part of this deposition which touches on the question before us. I ask you to turn to page No. 2 of the Russian text of this document, which is on page 20 in the bunch of documents presented by the Russian Prosecution on the question, and the answers to questions put to Warlimont:
"Personally, I first heard of this plan" -- that is "Plan Barbarossa" -"on the 29th of July, 1940. On that day Colonel-General Jodl arrived in a special train at Reichenhall station, where Department 'L' of the Operational Staff was stationed. This struck one immediately, because General Jodl had, till then, never, I believe, come to see us. Besides myself, three other officers were ordered to present themselves."
I now skip several paragraphs and go to page 3, page 21 in the documents:
"I cannot repeat word by word his expressions. The text was as follows: Jodl said that the Fuehrer has decided to prepare for war against Russia. The Fuehrer based this on the fact that war had to come in one way or another, so that it would be better to prosecute this war in connection with the one already being fought, and, in any case, to start the necessary preparations for it."
I again skip several lines which are not relevant to the question we are dealing with:
At a later date I talked with Hitler. He had intended to commence the war against the Russian Union already in the Autumn of 1940, but he gave up this idea. The cause of this was that the strategic position of the troops at that time was not favorable for this purpose. The supplies to Poland were not good enough; railways and bridges were not prepared; the communication lines and airdromes were not organized. Therefore, an order was given to secure the whole transport and preparations to prepare for such an attack which will eventually be made.
To the question as to whether this order was an order of the 9th of August 1941, called "Aufbau Ost", Warlimont replied:
"Yes, this order was prepared by the staff in accordance with instructions of General Jodl. In General Jodl's opinion, the concentration could take place only after all the preparations indicated in this order had been made."
Further on in his statement, Warlimont said that Plan Barbarossa, which was called "Fritz" to start with, was presented to Hitler on the 5th of December 1940, after which it was edited and saw the light of day on the 18th of December.
I think that the testimony of a man like Friedrich Paulus, a former field marshal of the German army, who took the most direct part both in the preparations and in the execution of Plan Barbarossa, can give considerable help in the investigation of questions connected with the history of the preparation of this plan.
I present the testimony of Friedrich Paulus, dated 9 January 1946, given in a camp for prisoners of war, and marked USSR 156, and request that it be accepted as evidence.
DR.NELTE (Counsel for defendant Keitel): I just wanted to remark that I do not possess a copy of this document. It seems as if it would be the same statement which could not yet be given to the defendant's counsel. If the Soviet prosecution could give me this copy of the statement now, I would be able to see if I wanted to protest in the way in which I did in the beginning of this session.
(Whereupon copies of the document above referred to were handed to Dr. Nelte.)
DR. NELTE:According to the original which I now see before me, this is the same kind of a statement by Field Marshal Paulus. Paulus, in a letter to the Government of the Soviet Union, has expressed his opinion. The Soviet delegation has reproduced that letter and presented it in the original. This photostat does not contain an official authorization by the Soviet authorities, nor is it an affidavit which could be admitted as proof.
Therefore, I ask the Tribunal to consider generally the question which I mentioned at the beginning of this session, and to make a decision in order that the Soviet prosecution in the future may treat similar statements according to the wishes of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT:Do you wish to make any answer to what Dr. Nelte has said?
GENERAL ZORYA:Yes, I do.
If it please the Tribunal, the Soviet prosecution has accepted the decision that the originals of all the documents of the Soviet Union or certified copies mil be presented. Apart from this, as to evidence of some importance and interest which has been given us by some of the witnesses, and which will be brought out by us, if the defense desires to cross examine the witnesses subsequently everything possible will be done to bring them to Nurnberg and enable them to give verbal depositions. The same thing applies to Paulus, to whose statement I shall refer. That testimony can be checked, as the representative of the defense just asked, after Paulus has been brought here.
THE PRESIDENT:Then I understood from what you said, General, that as far as the photostatic copy of Field Marshal Paulus ' statement is concerned, a certificate will be furnished -- as we indicated the Tribunal wished -that the photostatic copy is a true copy of the original, and as far as the question of producing witnesses of importance is concerned, Field Marshal Paulus will be produced as a witness for the defendants' counsel to cross examine.
That meets your objection, I think, Dr. Nelte.
DR. NELTE:The principle of this question appears there, in that official authorization should be given that the documents submitted represent the realintention of those who have made those statements. Statements are always merely a doubtful substitute for the examination of the witness himself.
The defense appreciates very well the difficulties which the Soviet Prosecution may have in bringing in witnesses. The defense realizes that and appreciates it, but in those cases in which the individuality of the witness and the importance of several questions is in the foreground, the personal questioning of the witnesses should be preferred. Wherever this is impossible, for reasons which we cannot judge, it would be desirable at any rate that these people who have made these statements should make their statements in the form of an affidavit.
The Soviet delegation should bring in a certificate that these statements are the original ones. That, however, would be no strengthening of the statement. We do not doubt for one moment that statements of this kind are at the disposal of the Soviet delegation. The defense is not so much interested in those formal statements but in the possibility of material proof.
If the Soviet prosecution could help us in this way, we should be extremely grateful.
THE PRESIDENT:You can go on, General.
GENERAL ZORYA:I think the testimony of Paulus can be of great help to us. I shall now read that part of Paulus' testimony which refers to the history of the preparation of Plan Barbarossa. Request you to read page 27, the portions which are underlined in red pencil, which I intend to read now.
THE PRESIDENT:Perhaps, General, since it is now 12:45, you had better to begin this document before the adjournment.
GENERAL ZORYA:Yes, sir.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
Official transcript of the International Military Tribunal in the matter of The United States of America, the French Re public, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against Hermann Wilhelm Goering et al, Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 11 February 1946, 1400 to 1730 hours, Lord Justice Lawrence presiding.
MAJ. GENERAL ZORYA:Mr. President, following the statement made by the Russian Delegation, I will ask for permission to cross-examine the former Field Marshal of the German Army, Paulus, who will be cross-examined by the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R., General Rudenko.
THE PRESIDENT:Very well; the witness may be brought in.
(The witness took his place in the box) BY THE PRESIDENTS:
QWill you please tell me your name?
APaulus.
QWill you repeat this oath after me? "I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing?"
(The witness repeated the oath)
Would you like to sit down? BY GENERAL RUDENKO:
QYour name is Friedrich Paulus?
AYes.
QYou were born in 1890?
A 1890.
QYou were born in the village of Breitenau, in Kassel?
AYes.
QBy nationality you are a German?
AYes.
QYou are a former Field Marshal of the German Army?
AYes.
QYour last official position was Commander of the Sixth Army at Leningrad?
A Yes.
QWill you please tell us, Witness, whether you have given a statement to the Government of the Soviet Socialist Republics?
AYes, I gave it to them.
QYou are confirming such statement?
AYes, I confirm that.
QTell us, please, Witness, what you know regarding the preparation by the German High Command of the armed attack on the Soviet Union.
AFran personal experience, I can state the following:
On the 3rd of September, 1940, I took office with the High Command in the General Staff. I was a General Quartermaster and as such I was deputy to the Chief of the General Staff, and in addition carried out the instructions of an operational nature which he delegated to me.
When I took office I found in my sphere of work, or influence, among other things, a still uncompleted operational plan which concerned itself with an attack on the Soviet Union. This operational work or scheme had been carried through by the then General Major, Marx, Chief of the General Staff of the 18th Army, who for this purpose temporarily had been taken over to the Chief of Staff of the Army. The Chief of the Army, Halder, gave the development of this plan into my hands and on the following basis:
There was to be a check of the possibilities of an attack against the Soviet Union, covering the territory, or terrain, the strength of the attack, the manpower to be needed, and so forth. For this purpose there was also mentioned that about 130 to 140 German divisions would be available for this operation. In addition, from the beginning we were to keep in mind taking Roumania into consideration as far as this operation was concerned. The north wing was to include Finland, but this was problematical and was not included in the general plan.
Then, in addition, as a basis for this work which was to be undertaken, the intention of the OKW -- the purpose of this operation was to be first the destruction of the Russian Army in the West, Russia, and to prevent them from getting into Russia Proper.
As Point 2, the reaching of the line from which the Russian air arm could not effectively attack Germany.
And the last point was the reaching of the line, the Wolga-Archangelsk.
The working out or preparation which I just outlined was completed at the beginning of November through two attacks with which I was concerned. The officers of the General Staff entrusted with this work, as a basis for the attacks, assumed that to the south one army was to be redeployed from the South of Poland and from Roumania, with the idea of reaching the Dnieper River. To the north of this area there was to be one army group and the strongest around Warsaw; and to the north, to reach Minsk, Smolensk and later to push through to Moscow.
Then there was to be a third army group, the Group North, to be taken from the area of East Prussia to push through the Baltic regions toward Leningrad.
And the conclusions which were taken from these plans was that the Dnieper was to be reached and Smolensk and Leningrad, and then the operation was to be carried on according to developments, and to plan accordingly.
In connection with this, for these undertaking and for the evaluation of all victories, there were to be several conferences through the General Staff Chief of the Army, that of the Army Groups which had been planned for the East. And further, in connection with this conference, through the Chief of that time, Colonel Kinsel, there was a speech about Russia, describing the geographic and economic situation, about the Red Army, and so forth. And the significant point of this speech was that some preparations for an attack by Russia was not known. With these maneuvers and conferences as I have just described there were theoretical discussions and plans for this offensive and after the conclusion of these conferences, the scheme of the attack was considered concluded and ready.
At this time -- that is, on the 10th of December 1940, the OverCommander gave our Directive No. 20, and this directive as issued was the basis for all military and economic preparations. And these directions or instructions were to be carried out in such a way that deployment of troops was made ready and developed. These first directives for the deployment of troops in February, 1941, were confirmed by Hitler and they concerned themselves with all these measures and were made known to the troops.
Then several supplementary directives were issued.
For the beginning of the attack, the Over-Commander counted on the period of time which would make it possible to carry large movements of troops in Russia, and all preparations were concluded. Then at the end of March Hitler decided to make a change because of his desire to attack Yugoslavia. Then orders as of the 1st of April were set after that time -
THE PRESIDENT :I am afraid you are a little too fast.
THE WITNESS:Where shall I begin?
THE PRESIDENT:I think you better begin where you said that at the end Hitler made a change in the plan.
A (continuing): Because of his decision to attack Yugoslavia, the date for the beginning of the attack had to be changed by about five weeks. That meant postponement to the last half of June. And indeed, this attack actually took place on the 22nd of June, as planned.
Then in conclusion, I would like to state that the preparations for this attack on the Soviet Union which actually took place on the 22nd of June had been prepared.
QIn what way and under what circumstances -
THE PRESIDENT:One moment. Did the witness give the date? He said that preparations for this attack had been made, and what I want to know is, did he give the date from which it had been prepared? BY THE PRESIDENT:
QDid you give the date from which the preparations went forward?
AI am referring to the 3rd of September 1940, when I assumed office, and my observations refer back to that point. BY GENERAL RUDENKO:
QIn what way and under what circumstances was the participation in the aggression on Soviet Russia ushered in by the participation of Roumania?
AFrom personal observation, I can say the following:
In about September 1940, at the time in which I was concerned with the operational workings or preparations for the attack on Russia, and from the beginning, the using of Roumania was envisaged for the marching in, that is the right or south wing of the German Army and that was taken into consideration right from the beginning.
Then a military mission at that time headed by Cavalry Leader Hansen was sent to Roumania. Then a whole Panzer Division, the Thirteenth, was transferred to Roumania. For those who knew about the future plans it was obvious that this step could only serve to make ready the future partner in the war for the future plans and steps which we had to take now regarding Hungary.
In December, 1940, Colonel Laslow came to the High Command of the Army at Zossen, to the headquarters of the Chief of the Hungarian Operational Group. He asked for a conference regarding questions of organization.
The Hungarian Army at that time was concerned with the question of changing over its units into divisions and also with the setting up of motorized groups such as Panzer groups. The chief of the Organization and myself advised Colonel Laslow at the same time because several Hungarian commissions were in Berlin. The Hungarian Minister of War was also present at the same time, and we discussed the exchange of supplies or the sending of supplies -- German supplies -- to Hungary.
It was clear to all of us who were concerned with future plans that all these measures with regard to supplying arms to other armies was only possible at that time when these armies could be used for war, for Germany.
Regarding Hungary, there is a further point I should like to ention: With the development of events in Yugoslavia, Hitler at the end of March, 1941, decided to attack Yugoslavia. On the 27th or 28th of March I was called to the Reichschancellery in Berlin where at that time there was going on a conference between Hitler, Keitel and Jodl and on which the Chief of the Army had been active. This conference had just been concluded. When I arrived I was advised by the General Staff of the Army, General Halder, that Hitler had decided to attack Yugoslavia and for once to eliminat a flanking movement from the direction of Greece, because there was a rail line leading to the South, and to get this rail line, and then also for the future -- for the case "Barbarossa" t keep the right flank clear for this plan, for the carrying out of this plan.
I was charged with the mission and received the required number of officers to go to Vienna to give certain orders to the appropriate officers and then after that to travel on to Budapest to the Hungarian General Staff and to carry out the same mission there and to agree with them on the deployment of German troops in Austrian territory and the participating of Hungarian troops in the attack against Yugoslavia.
On the 30th of March, early in the morning, I arrived in Budapest and had a conference with General Wert, then with the Chief of the Operational Group of the Hungarian General Staff, Colonel Laslow. These conferences went along in good order and ended very quickly and the desired result was achieved. The result was then written down on a card, and on the card that I received from the General Staff of Hungary was contained the deployment against Yugoslavia, the deployment as Yugoslavia as envisaged, and also the manpower in the Carpathian sector was discussed. This was to protect the rear against the Soviet Union and the fact was a sign that even on the side of Hungary the realization was that an attack by Germany against Yugoslavia would be considered as an aggressive action by the Soviet Union.
As a matter of principle, principally, the taking in of Hungary into the preparation of these plans and later on into the carrying out of these plans as far as that is concerned at that time I received the attitude of Hitler and it was as follows:
Hitler thought that Hungary was anxious, through German help, to recapture the areas which she had lost in the First World War. And in addition, they were afraid that Roumania, which was an Ally of Germany and might push them into the background. As far as this attitude was concerned, Hitler thought Hungary in line with his ideas. But he was, as we could see from various examples, very cautions toward Hungary, and for two reasons: For one, he did not believe Hungary; and secondly, he did not want to make Hungary too many promises at too early a stage, and I can cite one example: The question of the oil regions. Later when the attack was begun that is the attack against Russia, the Seventeenth Army which was fighting at that point had the emphatic order at all costs to take this before the arrival of the Hungarians.
Regarding this future partner, according to my observation, the strategy of Hitler was such that as far as certain participation was concerned he counted on it and sent armaments and help but he was not certain when he went to make all his plans and did not set a certain time when to initiate Hungary into his plans.
Then we come to the Finnish question. In December, 1940, the first visit of the Finnish General Staff Chief took place at Zossen. General Heinrichs had a conference with the General Chief of the Army, but I can't remember the contents of the speech out of this conference. But he did make a speech about the Finno-Russian War of 1939-1940. He gave this speech before the officers of the General Staff of the Army and told his officers who were present at the time -- that is in connection with the discussion of the Eastern plans -- this speech before these officers had quite a significance at that time, because it coincided in time with the directive issued in December.
This speech was significant in that battle experiences with the Red Army were made clear and a judgment of the Finnish troops -- that is, for future plans by the Germans -- could be made known.
Then there was a second visit of this Finnish General Staff Chief. That was at Zossen at the headquarters, and it was perhaps in the second half of March, 1941. The Chief of Staff of Finland arrived from Salzburg where he had had conferences with the High Command of the Wehrmacht. The contents of these conferences with the Chief of Staff was the cooperation of the Southern Finnish Manpower with the Operation Barbarossa, and working together with the Army Group North which was to come from East Prussia towards Leningrad. At that time the agreement was reached that the Finnish troops were to be determined according to the pushing forward of the German Army Group North and the later command pushing forward toward Leningrad. That was to depend on later agreements according to the development of events.
Those are the personal observations which I myself made in the beginning, and the drawing together of the analysis into a common action.
QIn what way was the attack on the USSR carried out by the German troops under the High Command?
AWill you please repeat the question. I did not quite get it.
QHow, and under what circumstances, was the armed attack on the USSR carried out, the attack which was prepared by the Hitlerite government and the High Command of the German Army?
AThe attack on Russia took place as I described, after a plan which had been prepared much in advance and had been prepared very carefully. The troops involved in this attack had been assembled, and only on special instructions were they taken group by group into the line of future deployment and then, on this whole long front, from Rumania to Eastern Prussia, they were to be ready. Of course, Finland was excluded from this.
The troops were assembled along this front for a simultaneous attack, and the operational plan on a large scale, as I described in the beginning, was tried out mentally, so to speak. Then, the deployment, and marching up of troops in detail, in groups, corps, divisions, was discussed in detail and was put in order in the smallest detail, much before the beginning of the war. Everything was ready.
A deceptive measure was directed and organized from Norway and the coast of France. The purpose of a landing in England in June 1941 was to be pretended, and attention was to be diverted from the East through this pretense.
Not only the operational carrying out, but the tactical surprise was planned well in advance.
For instance, the prohibition of the boundaries before the beginning of the war meant possible losse and the loss was to be a sacrifice for the element of surprise. On the other hand, the element of surprise across the boundary from the enemy was not expected.
All of these measures showed that a criminal attack was underfoot.
Q.In what way did you determine the aims which were pursued by Germany in attacking Soviet Russia?
A.The purpose of attacking the Volga Line, which was far beyond German strength, is characteristic of the boundless ambition of Hitler and of the nationalist regime. As far as strategy is concerned, the reaching of these aim would have been the destruction of the manpower of the Soviet Union, the fighting forces of the Soviet Union. with the winning of this line there would have been conquered the chief areas of Soviet Russia, with the capital, Moscow, and the political and economic center, the focal point of the Soviet Union!
Economically, the reaching of this line would have been significant. It would have meant the possession of the most important nutritional areas, the most important natural resources, including the oil wells of the Caucasus and the main centers of production of Russia, and also the communications not of Russia, that is, European Russia.
Hitler was very strong on the winning of economic aims in this war. Just how strongly he felt on this point I can cite through a personal axample that I describe. In June of 1943, the first of June, at a conference regarding the army group south in Poltawa, Hitler declared:
"If I do not get the oil of Maikob and Prosnia, then I must quit this war.
For the spoliation and the administration of the areas which were to be conquered, economic and administrative organs had been envisaged before the beginning of the war, and everything had been placed in readiness.
Then, in conclusion, as a comprehensive remark, I would like to state that the aims as mentioned meant the conquering, for the purpose of colonization, o Russian areas and territories, and through their use and spoliation, and through the means gained therefrom, the war in the West was to be concluded win the setting up of German domination of Europe.