You have, on the 1st of October, document C-2, which is United States Exhibit 90, and that is a long document putting forward an almost infinite variety of breaches of international law, which were likely to arise or might have arisen from the action in regard to Czechoslovakia, and on all these points the opinion of the Foreign Office is sought.
That, of course, remained a hypothetical question at that time because no war resulted.
Then, the Tribunal will remember the count-
THE PRESIDENT:Can you give us the number of that document?
SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, C-2, my Lord, US Exhibit 90.
Then, if the Tribunal please, we come to the second stage of the acquiring of Czechoslovakia.
That is, having obtained the Sudetenland, arranging so that there would be a crisis in Czechoslovakia which would be an excuse for taking the rest.
The Tribunal will remember the importance of this because it is the first time that the German Government went outside its own statement about not going beyond German blood.
On that point, again this Defendant was active. On the 13th of March, as events were moving to a climax, he sent a telegram to the German Minister in Prague who was under him, telling him to "make a point of not being available if the Czech Government wants to get in touch with you in the next few days."
That is
USExhibit No. 116, document 2815.
At the same time, he saw a delegation of pro-Nazi Slovaks in Berlin at a conference with Hitler at which this Defendant was present.
Tiso, one of the heads of the pro-Nazi Slovaks was directed to declare an independent Slovak State in order to assist in the disintegration of Czechoslovakia.
That is US Exhibit 117, document 2802-PS, and the Tribunal might care to compare it with a previous meeting a month before, which is shown in document 2790-PS, US Exhibit 110.
So that this Defendant was assisting in the task, again, of proposing internal trouble.
Then on the 14th of March 1939, the next day, Hacha, the President of Czechoslovakia, was called to Berlin.
This Defendant was present at the meeting and the Tribunal will remember the usual pressure and threats which resulted in the aged President's permission to hand over the Czechoslovak State to Hitler.
The Tribunal will find that subject dealt with on page 911 of the transcript, and the relevant exhibit is US Exhibit 118, document 2798-PS, which is the minutes of the meeting between Hitler and Hacha that this Defendant attended.
You will also find it dealt with in US Exhibit 126, 3061-PS, which is the Czechoslovakian Government Report.
That was the end of the Czech part of Czechoslovakia. The following week this Defendant signed a treaty with Slovakia which I now put in.
It is document 1439-PS, and I put it in as Exhibit GB-135, and the important part is Article II, under which the German Government was given the right to construct military posts and installations, and keep them garrisoned within Czechoslovakia.
That is 1439-PS, which I put in as GB-135. Again, I am not going to read it at length, but I hope the Tribunal will stop me if there are any of these documents which they would like read instead of summarized.
In that way, this Defendant, by the terms of that treaty, after completely finishing Bohemia and Moravia as an independent state, had got this military control in Slovakia.
Before I pass to Poland there is one interesting little point on the Northern Baltic which I put before the Tribunal to show how this Defendant could hardly keep his hands out of the internal affairs of other countries, even when it didn't seem a very important matter.
The Tribunal will remember that on the 3rd of April, 1939, as shown in GB-4, TC-50-PA, Germany had occupied Memeland.
It would have appeared, as far as the Baltic States were concerned, that the position was satisfactory, but if the Tribunal and document 2952-PS, which I put in as GB-137, they will find that this Defendant acted in close concert with the Conspirator Heydrich;who is dead, in stirring up trouble in Lithuania with a group of pro-Nazi people called the Woldemaras Supporters.
2953-PS shows that Heydrich was passing to the Defendant Ribbentrop the request for financial support for the-
THE PRESIDENT:Just one moment, Sir David. Unfortunately these documents aren't in any order.
SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: I'm terribly sorry.
THE PRESIDENT:It is very difficult to find them. This follows after 3061 and 1439?
SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, it follows after 3061. The next one is what I referred to.
The treaty with Slovakia, 1439, should come after that.
THE PRESIDENT:You are going to read 2953?
SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, my Lord. That is the one I was going to read.
That is a letter from Heydrich to the Defendant Ribbentrop and it says:
"Dear Party Comrade v. Ribbentrop.
"Enclosed please find a further report about the 'Woldemaras Supporters.
' As already mentioned in the previous report the 'Woldemaras Supporters' are still asking for help from the Reich.
I therefore ask you to examine the question of financial support, brought up again by the 'Woldemaras Supporters' set forth on page 4, paragraph 2 of the enclosed report and to make a definite decision.
"The request of the 'Woldermaras Supporters' for financial support could, in my opinion, be granted. Deliveries of arms should not, however, be made under any circumstances."
Then, 2952, the next document, is a fuller report, and at the end of that there is added in handwriting, "I support small regular payments, e.g. 2,000 to 3,000 marks quarterly." It is signed "W", who I understand to be the Secretary of State.
I merely quoted that to show the extraordinary interference, even with compartively unimportant countries.
Then we pass to the aggression against Poland, and again the Tribunal has had that fully dealt with by my friend Colonel Griffith Jones, but again it might be useful if I just separated the various periods so that the Tribunal will have these in mind. The first was what one might call the Munich period, up to the end of September 1938, and at that time no language was too good for Poland. The Tribunal will remember the point.
The Important documents showing that aspect of the case are GB-30, which is Document 2357-PS, Hitler's Reichstag speech on the 20th of February, 1938, and then GB-31, Document TC-76, which is the secret Foreign Office memorandum of the 26th of August, 1938, GB 27, Document 73 No. 40.
THE PRESIDENT:What number?
SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: It is a conversation between M. Lipski
THE PRESIDENT:What was the number?
SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: I beg your Lordship's pardon. The last one was TC-76.
THE PRESIDENTS:Yes, but after that.
SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: The next one was TC-73, No. 40. Seventythree is the Polish White Book and 40 is the number of the document in the book. It is an extract from the conversation between M. Lipski, the Polish ambassador and this Defendant.
Finally in this group is TC-73, No. 42, Hitler's speech at the Sportpalast on the 26th of September, 1938, in which he said that this was the end of his territorial problems in Europe and expressed an almost violent affection for the Poles.
Now, the next stage was between Munich and the rape of Prague, and then the next stage - part of the German stage in Czechoslovakia having been accomplished and parts still remaining to be done - there is a slight change but still a friendly atmosphere. That begins with a conversation between this Defendant and M. Lipski, which is contained in Exhibit GB-27, Document TC-73, No. 44.
There this Defendant put forward very peaceful suggestions for the settlement of the Danzig issue. The Polish reply is in GB-28, TC-7345.
THE PRESIDENT:You didn't rive the date of those, did you?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FIFE:The first one is 24 October 1938; the Polish reply which says that it is unacceptable that Danzig should return to the Reich, but making suggestions of a bilateral agreement is the 31st of October 1938. Between these dates, the Tribunal will remember, according to Document C-137, Exhibit GB-33, dated the 21st of October, the German Government had made its preparations to occupy Danzig by surprise. But, although these preparations were made, still some two months later, on the 5th of January 1939, while the rape of Prague had not taken place, Hitler was suggesting to M. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, a new solution. That is contained in Document TC-7348, GB-34, the interview of Hitler and Beck on the 5th of January, 1939.
Then this Defendant saw M. Beck on the next day and said there was no violent solution of Danzig, but a further building up of friendly relations. That is contained in GB-35, Document TC-7349, Not content with that, this Defendant went to Warsaw on the 25th of January and, according to the report of his speech contained in 2530-PS, GB-36, talked of the continued progress and consolidation of friendly relations, and that was capped by Hitler's Reichstag speech on the 30th of January 1939, in the same sort of tones, contained in GB-37, TC-7357. That was the second stage - the mention of Danzig in honored words, because, of course, the rape of Prague had not been attained.
Then one has to remember, as one comes to the Summer, the meeting at the Reichschancellory on the 23rd of May, 1939, which is reported in Document L-79, US Exhibit 27.
It has been read many times to the Tribunal, and I only remind them as to this point: that that is the document where Hitler makes quite clear, and states in his own words, that Danzig has nothing to do with the real Polish question. I have to deal with Poland because I want lebensraum in the East. That is the effect of that portion of the document which has been read so often to the Tribunal--that Danzig was merely an excuse.
It is important to have in mind, if I may respectfully suggest it, that that meeting was on the 23rd of May, 1939, because there is an interesting corroboration of the attitude of mind--in showing how clearly this Defendant Ribbentrop had adopted the attitude of mind of Hitler, in the introduction to Count Ciano's Diary, which was put in as US Exhibit 166, 2987-PS, but I don't think this part of the Diary, the introduction, has been raised before the Court. It is 2987-PS, and it comes after L-79, which is the Little Schmundt File, just after the Obersalzburg Document. It is set out in the trial brief, if the Tribunal will care to follow it there. Count Ciano says:
"In the Summer of 1939 Germany advanced her claim against Poland, naturally without our knowledge; indeed, Ribbentrop had several times denied to our Ambassador that Germany had any intentions of carrying the controversy to extreme. Despite these denials I remained in doubt; I wanted to make sure for myself, and on August 11th I went to Salzburg. It was in his residence at Fuschl that Ribbentrop informed me, while we were waiting to sit down at the table, of the decision to start the fireworks, just as he might have told me about the most unimportant and commonplace administrative matter. 'Well, Ribbentrop,' I asked him, while we were walking in the garden, 'What do you want? The Corridor, or Danzig?' 'Not any more', and he stared, at me through those cold Musee Greven eyes, 'We want war.'" I remind the Tribunal how closely that corroborates the statement that Hitler had made at his Chancellory conference on the 23rd of Maythat it was no longer a question of Danzig or the Corridor, it was a question of war to achieve the lebensraum in the East.
Then I remind the Tribunal, without citing it, that the "Fall Weiss" for operation against Poland is dated the 3rd and 11th of April, 1939, which certainly shows that preparations were already in hand.
And then there is another reference in Count Ciano's Diary which also his not been read, and which makes this point quite clear. Again, if the Tribunal would take it as set out in the trial brief, I will read it, as it hasn't been read before:
"I have collected in the conference records of verbal transcripts of my conversations with Ribbentrop and Hitler. I shall only note some impressions of a general nature. Ribbentrop is evasive every time I ask him for particulars of the forthcoming German action. He has a guilty conscience. He has lied too many times about German intentions towards Poland not to feel embarrassment now over what he must tell me and what he is preparing to do.
"The will to fight is unalterable. He rejects any solution which might satisfy Germany and prevent the struggle. I am certain that even if the Germans were given everything they demanded, they would attack just the same, because they are possessed by the demon of destruction.
"Our conversation sometimes takes a dramatic turn. I do not hesitate to speak my mind in the most brutal manner. But this doesn't shake him in the least. I realize how little weight this view carries in German opinion.
"The atmosphere is icy. And the cold feeling between us is reflected in our followers. During dinner we do not exchange a word. We distrust each other. But I at least have a clear conscience. He has not."
Whatever other defects there may have been about Count Ciano, there cannot be an appreciation of the situation which is more heavily corroborated by supporting documents than his diagnosis of the situation in the Summer of 1939.
Then we come to the next stage in the German plan, which was sharp pressure of the claim for Danzig shown immediately after Czechoslovakia had been formally dealt with on the 15th of March.
It is shown how closely it followed the completion of the rape of Prague. The first sharp raising of the claim was on the 21st of March, as shown in Document GB-38, TC-7361. And that developed, as the Tribunal has heard from Colonel Griffith-Jones.
Then we come to the last days before the war, and one interesting sidelight is that Herr von Buerksen, the German Ambassador at the Court of St. James, returned from London on the 18th of August, 1939; and I put in the extract from the interrogation of the Defendant Ribbentrop, which is Document D-490. I put that in as GB-138.
I do not intend to read it to the Tribunal because it can be summarized in this way; that the Defendant Ribbentrop has certainly no recollection of ever having seen the German Ambassador to the Court of St. James after his return.
He thinks he would have remembered him if he had seen him and he accents the probability that he did not see him.
And there is the point, when it was well-known that war with Poland would involve England and Francs, that either he was nit sufficiently interested in opinion in London to take the trouble to see his ambassador or else, as he rather suggests, he had appointed so weak and ordinary a career diplomat to London that his opinion was not taken into account, either by himself of by Hitler.
In either case, he was completely uninterested in anything which his Ambassador might have to tell him as to opinion in London or the possibility of war.
And I conceive myself speaking with gread moderation in putting it this way, that in the last days before the first of September, 1939, this defendant did whatever he cloud to avoid peace with Poland and to avoid anything which might hinder the encouraging of the war which we know he wanted.
He did that, well knowing that war with Poland would involve Great Britain and France.
These details were given in full by Col.
Griffith Jones.
I am not going through them again but I have, for the convenience of the Tribunal, referred to the transcript at pages 1000 to 1059 and
M.Lipski summarized all that took place in his report of the 10th of October, 1939, which is Document TC 73 - 147, which is Exhibit G.B.127.
Now, these are the actions of this defendant in the Polish matter.
I am rind to inform the Tribunal, that with regard to the other countries, they are very much shorter than with regard to Poland.
I now come to Norway and Denmark. I remind the Tribunal of the fact, if it cares to take cognizance thereof, that on the 31st of May, 1939, the Defendant Ribbentrop, on behalf of Germany, signed a non-aggression pact with Denmark, which provided that, "The German Reich and the Kingdom of Denmark will under no circumstances go to war or employ force of any other kind against one another."
This is Exhibit G.B.77, Document TC24.
And just to fix the date, the Tribunal will remember that on the 7th of April, 1940, the German armed forces invaded Denmark and at the same time they invaded Norway.
With regard to Norway there are three documents which show that this defendant was fully in the earlier preparations for that act of aggression. The Tribunal will remember that my friend, Major Elwin Jones, did indicate, with some particularity, the relations between Quisling and the Defendant Rosenberg. But Rosenberg in this case also required the help of the Defendant Ribbentrop and, if the Tribunal would he good enough to turn to document 957 PS, which I am putting in as G.B.139, they will see the first of the documents which connect this defendant with the earlier Quisling activities.
The first one, 957 PS, is a letter from Defendant Rosenberg to this defendant and it begins:
"Dear Party Comrade von Ribbentrop:
"Party Comrade Scheidt has returned and has made a detailed report to Privy Councillor von Gruendherr, who will address you on this subject, We agreed the other day that two to three hundred thousand Reichsmarks would be made immediately available for the said purpose. Now it turns out that Gruendherr states that the second instalment can only be made available after eight days. But as it is necessary for Scheidt to go back immediately, I request you to make it possible that this second instalment is given to him at once. With a longer absence of Reichsamtsleiter P.S. Scheidt also the connection with your representatives would, be broken up, which just now, under certain circumstances, could be very unfavourable.
"Therefore I trust that it is in everybody's interest, if P. M. Scheidt goes back immediately."
That was the 24 of February.
Now, the next document is a report from Rosenberg to Hitler, and if the Tribunal will good enough to turn to page 4 -- this is on the Quisling activities -- they will find that that passage is sufficient to show how this defendant was connected with it.
It is the second para-
graph on page 4. It is the next document, 004-PS. It should be the one after 957-PS. It is only a matter of chance whether one finds it or not.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is a report from Rosenberg to Hitler.
"Apart from financial support which was forthcoming from the Reich in currency, Quisling had also been promised a shipment of material for immediate use in Norway, such as coal and sugar. Additional help was promised. This shipments were to be conducted under cover of a new trade company, to be established in Germany or through especially selected existing firms while Hagelin was to act as consignee in Norway. Hagelin had already conferred with the respective Ministers of the Nygardsvold Government, as for instance, the Minister of Supply and Commerce and had been assured permission for the import of coal. At the same time, the coal transports were to serve possibly to supply the technical means necessary to launch Quisling's political action in Oslo with German help. It was Quisling's plan to send a number of selected, particularly reliable men to Germany for a brief military training course in a completely isolated camp. They were then to be detailed as area and language specialists to German Special Troops, who were to be taken to Oslo on the coal barges to accomplish a political action. Thus Quisling planned to get hold of his leading opponents in Norway, including the King, and to prevent all military resistance from the very beginning. Immediately following this political action and upon official request of Quisling to the Government of the German Reich, the military occupation of Norway was to take place. All military preparations were to be completed previously. Though this plan contained the great advantage of surprise, it also contained a great number of dangers which could possibly cause its failure. For this reason it received a quite dilatory treatment, while at the same tine, it was not disapproved as far as the Norwegians were concerned.
"In February, after a conference with General Field Marshal Goering, Reichsleiter Rosenberg informed the Secretary in the Office of the Four Year Plan, only of the intention to prepare coal shipments to Norway to the named confidant Hagelin. Further details were discussed in a conference between Secretary Wohlthat, Staff Director Schickedanz and Hagelin. Since Wohlthat received no further instructions from the General Field Marshal, Foreign Ministe von Ribbentrop -- after a consultation with Reichsleiter Rosenberg -- consented to expedite these shipments through his office. Based on a report of Reichsleiter Rosenberg to the Fuehrer it was also arranged to pay Quisling ten thousand English pounds Per month for three months, commencing on the 15 of thousand English pounds per month for three months, commencing on the 15 of March, to support his work".This was paid through Scheidt, the man who was mentioned before.
Now, the other document, which should be next one -- I hope it is in your Lordship's copy, number D 629, is a letter from Defendant Keitel to Defendant Ribbentrop, dated the 3 of April, 1940. I need only trouble the Tribunal with the first paragraph. The Defendant Keitel says:
"Dear Herr von Ribbentrop:
"The military occupation of Denmark and Norway has been, by comment of the Fuehrer, long in preparation by the High Command of the Wehrmacht. The High Command of the Wehrmacht has therefore had ample time to occupy itself with all the questions connected with the carrying out of this operation. The time at your disposal for the political preparation of this operation, is on the contrary, very much shorter. I believe myself therefore to be acting in accordance with your own ideas in transmitting to you herewith not only these wishes of the Wehrmacht which would have to be fulfilled by the Governments in Oslo, Copenhagen and Stockholm for purely military reasons, but also if I include a series of requests which certainly concern the Wehrmacht only indirectly but which are, however, of the greatest importance for the fulfillment of its task".
Then he proceeds to ask that the Foreign Office get in touch with certain commanders. The important point for which I read it to the Tribunal, as far as I know for the first time, is that there we have the Defendant Keitel saying quite clearly that the military occupation of Denmark and Norway has been long in preparation. And it is interesting when one looks back to the official life of Ribbentrop, which is contained in the Archives, and is Document D 472. I am only quoting a sentence because of the interesting contract.
"With the occupation of Denmark and Norway on the 9 of April, 1940, only a few hours before the landing of British troops in these territories, the battle began against the Western Powers.."
Then it goes on to Holland and Belgium.
It is quite clear that whoever else had knowledge or whoever else was ignorant, this Defendant Ribbentrop, had been up to his neck in the Quisling plottings and it is made clear to him well a week before the invasion started, that the Wehrmacht and the Defendant Keitel had been long in preparation for this particular act of aggression.
I think, my Lord, that is really all the evidence on the aggression against Norway because again, the story was put forward fully by my friend, Mr. Elwyn Jones.
THE PRESIDENT:We will adjourn now.
(Whereupon at 1700 o'clock the Tribunal adjourned until 1000 o'clock the following day) Official transcript of the International Military Tribunal, in the matter of:
The United States of America, the French Repub lic, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, against Hermann Wilhelm Goering, et al, Defendants, sitting at Nurn berg, Germany, on 9 January 1946, 1000-1245, Lord Justice Lawrence, presiding.
SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: If the Tribunal please, when the Tribunal adjourned I had just dealt with the last of the two Norway documents, which I now put in as Exhibits, GB 140 and GB 141. Their numbers were 004-PS and D-629.
My Lord, for convenience, the first document to which I shall refer in a few minutes will be Document Number 1871-PS.
THE PRESIDENT:I have got that here.
SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, before I come to that, I just want to say one word about the aggression against the Low Countries, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg.
The facts as to the aggression against these countries, during the period when this defendant was Foreign Minister, was stated in full by my friend Mr. Roberts. If I give the Tribunal the reference to the transcript at Pages 1100 to 1125, I don't need to detain the Tribunal on that part of the case.
I only remind the Tribunal that the action of this defendant as Foreign Minister to which attention may be called is the making of a statement on the 10th of May 1940 to representatives of the foreign press with regard to the reasons for the German invasion of the Low Countries, and these reasons were, in my respectful submission, demonstrated to be false by the evidence called by Mr. Roberts, which appears in that part of the transcript.
My Lord, I then proceed to the aggression in southeastern Europe against Greece and Yugoslavia, and the first moment of time in that regard is the meeting at Salzberg in August 1939 at which the defendant von Ribbentrop participated when Hitler announced that the Axis had decided to liquidate certain neutrals. That document is 1871-PS, which I now put in as Exhibit GB 142, and the passage to which I should like to refer the Tribunal is on Page 2 of the English version, two-thirds down the page in the middle of the fifth paragraph, six lines from the top.
Your Lordship will find the words "Generally speaking."
THE PRESIDENT:Yes.
SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: I desire to quote from there:
"Generally speaking, it would be best to liquidate the pseudo-neutrals one after the other. This is fairly easily done, if one Axis partner protects the rear of the other; who is just finishing off one of the uncertain neutrals, and vice versa. Italy may consider Yugoslavia such an uncertain neutral. At the visit of Prince Regent Paul he (the Fuehrer) suggested, particularly in consideration of Italy, that Prince Paul clarify his political attitude towards the Axis by a gesture. He had thought of a closer connection with the Axis and Yugoslavia's leaving the League of Nations. Prince Paul agreed to the latter. Recently the prince regent was in London and sought reinsurance from the Western Powers. The same thing was repeated that happened in the case of Gafencu, who was also very reasonable during his visit to Germany and who denied any interest in the aims of the western democracies. Afterwards it was learned that he had later assumed a contrary standpoint in England. Among the Balkan countries the Axis can completely rely only on Bulgaria, which is in a sense a natural ally of Italy and Germany."
Then missing a sentence:
"At the moment when there would be a turn to the worse for Germany and Italy, however, Yugoslavia would join the other side openly, hoping thereby to give matters a final turn to the disadvantage of the Axis."
That demonstrates the policy with regard to uncertain neutrals.
Then, as early as September 1940 this defendant reviewed the war situation with Mussolini. This defendant emphasized the heavy revenge bombing raids in England and the fact that London would soon be in ruins. It was agreed between the parties that only Italian interests were involved in Greece and Yugoslavia, and the Italy could count on German support.
Then von Ribbentrop went on further to explain to Mussolini the Spanish plan for the attack on Gibraltar and Germany's participation therein, and that he was expecting to sign the Protocol with Spain, bringing the latter country into the war on his return to Berlin.
That is Document 1842-PS, which is the next document in the book to the one which the Tribunal had just been looking, and the passage with regard to Greece and Yugoslavia occurs in the middle of the first page, if I might just read a very short extract:
"With regard to Greece and Yugoslavia, the Foreign Minister stressed that it was exclusively a question of Italian interests, the settling of which was a matter for Italy alone, and in which Italy could be certain of Germany's sympathetic assistance," I don't think I need trouble the Tribunal with the rest.
MR. BIDDLE:I think you had better read the next paragraph.
SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: "But it seemed to us to be better not to touch on these problems for the time being, but to concentrate on the destruction of England with all our forces instead. Where Germany was concerned, she was interested in the northern German districts (Norway etc.), and this was acknowledged by the Duce."
I am very grateful to you, your Honor.
That I put in as Exhibit 143.
A month or two Later, in January 1941, at the meeting between Hitler and Mussolini in which this defendant participated the Greek operation was discussed. Hitler had stated that the German troops in Rumania were for use in the planned campaign against Greece."
the Tribunal the reference to the points which are mentioned at the foot of Page 3 of the English text.
With regard to that meeting there is a cross-reference in Count Ciano's diary, Count Ciano having attended as Italian Foreign Minister, and He recalls his impression of that meeting in the diary for the 20/21 of January by saying:
"The Duce was pleased with the conversation on the whole. I am less pleased. Above all, because Ribbentrop who had always been so boastful in the past told me when I asked him outright, how long the war would last, the he saw so possibility of its ending before 1942."
Despite that somewhat pessimistic statement to Count Ciano, a short time later, three weeks later, when it was a question of encouraging the Japanese, this defendant took a more optimistic line.
On the 13th of February 1941, he saw Ambassador Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador, and that conversation appears in Document 1834-PS, which is United Sates Exhibit 129. That was read previously, and again I simply give the reference on Page 3 of the English version.
The second last paragraph deals with the optimistic account of the military position and the position of Bulgaria and Turkey. I don't think I need read it further, because it gives the Tribunal the reference.
THE PRESIDENT:Which page was it on?
SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: On Page 3 of the document. Oh, I'm sorry, my Lord. It is marked Page 3 at the top. It is actually page 3 if you count the distribution page. It is marked Page 3 at the top, and it is a paragraph that begins "Militarily the Reich Foreign Minister--
THE PRESIDENT:I have it.
SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: Then after that in March this defendant put forth is efforts to get Yugoslavia to join the Axis, and on the 25th of March the defendant, in a note to the Prime Minister Cvetkovitch, said ---and this is Document 2450-PS, which is Exhibit GB-123--he gave the assurance:
"The Axis power governments, during this war will not direct a demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or transportation of troops through the Yugoslav state or territory."
"After that, it is only fair to point out that there was the coup d'etat in Yugoslavia. General Simowitsch took over the Government, and two days after the assurance which I just read at the meeting of the 27th of March, 1941, at which this defendant was present, Hitler outlined the military campaign against Yugoslavia and promised the destruction of Yugoslavia and the demolition of Belgrade by the German Air Force. That is contained in Document 1746-PS, which is Exhibit GB-120, and that was read by my friend, Colonel Fillimore, at an earlier stage so I don't need to read it again.
The final action of this defendant with regard to Yugoslavia was that after the invasion of Yugoslavia, von Ribbentrop was one of the persons directed by Hitler with the drawing of the boundaries for the partition and division of Yugoslavia, The preliminary directive for that was Document 1195-PS, which I now put in as Exhibit GB 144.
We now come to the aggression against the Soviet Union, and the first -
THE PRESIDENT:Has that been read, 1195-PS?
SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: That was the last one.
THE PRESIDENT:Has it been read?
SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. I put in 1195, That is the directive for the partition of Yugoslavia.
THE PRESIDENT:Yes, but you aren't reading it. Had it already been read or not?
SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: No, it has not. I am much obliged, your Lordship. I will now read the relevant sentence with regard to this.
THE PRESIDENT:Yes.
SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: On Page 2, Section 2, your Lordship will see the words "the drawing up of boundaries."
THE PRESIDENT:Yes.
SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: And in paragraph 1 it says:
"If the drawing up of boundaries has not been laid down in the above Part I, it will be carried out by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces in agreement with the Foreign Office"--that is the defendant--" the plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan"--the defendant Mooring--"and the Reich-Minister of the Interior."
THE PRESIDENT:Who is Reich Minister of the Interior?
SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: I think the defendant Frick.
THE PRESIDENT:Yes, I think it was.
SIR DAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am grateful to your Lordship. I had forgotten that hadn't been read before.
Now then, as I say, we come to the aggression against the Soviet Union, and the first document which hasn't been put in so far, which I now put in as Exhibit GB 145, is TC-25, the German-Soviet non-aggression Pact.
On the 23 August 1939 this defendant had signed the German-Soviet nonaggression Pact. Now, the first point at which this defendant seems to have considered special problems of aggression against the Soviet Union was just after the 20 April 1941 when Rosenberg, the Defendant Rosenberg, and this defendant met or communicated to consider the problems which were expected to arise in Eastern occupied territory. This defendant appointed his Counsellor, Grosskopf, to be his liaison man with Rosenberg and also assigned a Consul General, called Brautigam, who had many years experience in the USSR as a collaborator with Rosenberg. That is shown in Document 1039-PS, which is already United States Exhibit 146.
I didn't propose to read it again as it had been read. That passage to which I have referred is the first paragraph on the top of Page 2, beginning "After notification to the Reich Foreign Minister". It is that paragraph which I have just mentioned.
That was in April 1941. The following month, on the 18 May 1941, the German Foreign Office prepared a declaration setting forth operational zones in the Arctic Ocean, the Baltic and Black Seas, to be used by the German Navy and the Air Force in the coming invasion of the Soviet Union.