That is Affidavit No. 4, which will be USA 535. I invite the Tribunal's attention to these and will read them into the transcript. The statement of 7 November 1945:
"In April, 1939 I was instructed by Hitler to start military preparations for a possible campaign against Poland. Work was immediately begun to prepare an operational and deployment plan. This was then presented to Hitler and approved by him, as amended by a change which he desired. After the operational and deployment orders had been given to the two commanders of the army groups and the five commanders of the armies, conferences took place with them about details, in order to hear their desires and recommendations. After the outbreak of the war I continued this policy of keeping in close and constant touch with the commanders-in-chief of army groups end of armies by personal visits to their headquarters, as well as bytelephone, teletype, or wireless. In this way I was able to obtain their advice and their recommendations during the conduct of military operations. In fact, it was the accepted policy and common practice for the commanderin-chief of the army to consult his subordinate commanders-in-chief and maintain a constant exchange of ideas with them.
"The commander-in-chief of the army and his chief of staff communicated with army groups and through them, as well as directly, with the armies-through army groups on strategic and tactical matters; directly on question affecting supply and administration of conquered territory occupied by the armies. An army group had no territorial jurisdiction. It had a relativel small staff, which was concerned only with military operations. In all territorial matters it was the commander-in-chief of the army, and not of the army group, who exercised jurisdiction.
"Signed, von Brauchitsch."
"There follows a supplement to my statement of 7 November:
"When Hitler had made a decision to support the realization of his politic objectives through military pressure or through the application of military force, the commander-in-chief of the army, if he was at all involved, ordinarily first received an appropriate oral briefing or an appropriate oral command.
Operational and deployment plans were next worked out in the OKH. After these plans had been presented to Hitler, generally by word of mouth, and had been approved by him, there followed a written order from the OKW to the three branches of the armed forces. In the meanwhile the OKH began to transmit the operational and deployment plans to the army groups and armies involved.
THE PRESIDENT: In my copy it is OKW.
COL. TAYLOR: That is an error, sir; it should be OKH.
"Details of the operational and deployment plans were discussed by the OKH with the commanders-in-chief of the army groups and armies and with the chiefs of staff of these commanders. During the operations the OKH maintained a constant exchange of ideas with the army groups by means of telephone, radio, and courier. The commander-in-chief of the army used every opportunity to maintain a personal exchange of ideas with the commanders of army groups, armies, and lower echelons, by means of personal visits to them.
"In the war against Russia the commanders of army groups and armies were individually and repeatedly called in by Hitler for consultation. Orders for all operational matters went from the OKH to army groups, and for all matters concerning supply and territorial jurisdiction from the OKH directly to the armies.
"Signed, von Brauchitsch." the army that means the commanders-in-chief of army groups and armies -participated in planning and directing the evolution of the plans, as those affidavits show. The Oberbefehlshabers were also the repositories of general executive powers in the areas in which their army groups and armies were operating. In this connection, I invite the Court's attention to 447-PS, which is already in evidence as US 135; 447-PS, this being a directive of 13 March 1941, signed by Keitel and issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. This directive sets out various regulations for the operations against the Soviet Union which were actually begun a few months later, on 22 June. Under paragraph Roman I of this document
THE PRESIDENT: Is this in the first book?
COL. TAYLOR: The third book, Book No. 3, your Honor. The documents, your Honor, are in numerical order in Document Books 2 and 3. Document Book 2 contains C and L; Document Book 3 contains PS: and this, being 447-PS, will be in Document Book 3 in numerical order within the PS's. And within that document, under paragraph Roman I, the paragraph entitled "Area of Operations and Executive Power " (Vollziehende Gewalt), the Tribunal will find sub-paragraph 1, in which the following appears. That is page I of the translation, paragraph 2:
"It is not contemplated to declare East Prussia and the General Government an area of operations. However, in accordance with the unpublished Fuehrer orders from 19 and 21 October 1939, the commander-in-chie of the Army shall be authorized to take all measures necessary for the execution of his military aim and for the safeguarding of the troops. He may transfer his authority on to the commanders-in-chief" -- that, in the original German, is Oberbefehlshaber -- "of the army groups and armies. Orders of that kind have priority over all orders issued by civilian agencies." civilian agencies, was vested in the commander-in-chief of the army, with authority to transfer it to commanders-in-chief of army groups or armies -to the group as defined in the Indictment. states -- that is the 4th paragraph, on page 1 of the document:
"The area of operations created through the advance of the army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The commander-in-chief of the army has the right to exercise the executive power (Vollziehende Gewalt) in this area, and may transfer his authority on to the commanders-in-chief (Oberbefehlshaber) of the army groups and armies."
THE PRESIDENT: This would be a convenient time to break off.
(Whereupon at 1245 hours the hearing of the Tribunal adjourned to reconvene at 1400 hours) Military Tribunal, in the matter of:
The
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit tomorrow in closed session to consider matters of procedure, and there will therefore be no public session tomorrow.
COLONEL TAYLOR: Your Lordship, I have just one more document dealing with this subject of the structure of the Group before passing on to the substantive charges of criminality. That will be found in document Book 2. This document is the official command invitation to participate in the consultation at the Reich Chancellery on 14 June 1941, eight days prior to the attack on the Soviet Union. This is one of the meetings that was referred to in the last paragraph of the affidavits by Halder and von Brauchitsch, which were read into the record this morning. It is signed by Colonel Schmundt, the Chief Wehrmacht Adjutant to Hitler, and is dated at Berchtesgaden, 9 June 1941. It begins:
"Re Conference 'Barbarossa'" -- that being the code word for the attack on the Soviet Union -- "The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has ordered reports on 'Barbarossa' by the Commanders of Army Groups, Armies and Naval and Air Commanders of equal rank." in the bottom line of the chart on the wall, Army Groups, Armies and Naval and Air Commanders of equal rank. conference, and I would just like in closing on this subject to run through that list to find out who the participants in this conference were and how closely they parallel the structure of the group as we find it in the Indictment. The Tribunal will see that the list of participants begins at the foot of Page 1 of the translation:
General Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, who was then commander-in-
chief of the Army, and a member of the group. General Halder, who was chief of the Army Staff, and a member of the group. Then three subordinates who were not members of the group, Paulus, Heusinger, and Gyldenfeldt. Operations Division of the Naval War Staff, not a member of the group.
On the air side: General Milch, State Secretary and Inspector of the Air Force, again not a member of the group. General Jeschonnek, chief of the General Staff of the Air Force and a member of the group; and two of his assistants. we find Keitel, Jodl, Warlimont, all members of the group, were present, with an assistant from the General Staff. members of the group.
Then we pass to the officers from the Field Commands: General von Falkenhorst, Army High Command, Norway, member of the group. General Stumpff, Air Fleet 5, member of the group. Rundstedt, Reichenau, Stuelpnagel, Schobert, Kleist, all from the Army, all members of the group.
Air Force: General Loehr, Air Fleet 4, member of the group.
General Fromm and General Udet were not members. One was director of the Home Forces, commander of the Home Forces, and the other the Director General of Equipment and Supply.
The Navy: Raeder, a member of the group; Fricke, chief of the Naval War Staff, and a member of the group, and, of course, an assistant who was not a member. Carls, Navy Group North, member of the group; likewise Schmundt. as Oberbefehlshaber. Keller, a member of the group. the group.
And it will accordingly be seen that except for a few assisting officers of relatively junior rank, all the participants in these consultations were members of the group as defined in the Indictment, and that in fact the participants included almost all the members of the group who were concerned in the impending operations against the Soviet Union.
the description of the General Staff and High Command Group and its composition and structure and general manner of functioning. I turn now to the charges levelled against this group in the Indictment. the planning, preparation, initiating and waging of the illegal wars set forth in counts 1 and 2, and for the war crimes and crimes against humanity detailed in counts 3 and 4. keep in mind that under the Charter the group may be declared criminal in connection with any acts of which an individual defendant who was a member of the group may be convicted. the individual defendants in this case. Five of the individual defendants, or one-quarter of the individuals here, are members of the group. Defendant Goering. Goering is a defendant in this case in numerous capacities. He is a member of the General Staff and High Command group by reason of having been a commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, from the time when the Air Force first came into the open and was officially established, until about one month prior to the end of the war.
During the last month of the war he was replaced in this capacity by von Greim, who committed suicide shortly after his capture at the end of the war. Goering is charged with crimes under all counts of the Indictment.
The next listed defendant who is a member of the group is Keitel. He and the remaining three defendants are all four of them in this case primarily or solely in their military capacities, and all four of them are professional soldiers or sailors, or OKW, when the OKW was first set up in 1938, and remained in that capacity throughout the period in question. We held the rank of Field Marshal throughout most of this period, and in addition to being the Chief of the OKW, he was a member of the Secret Cabinet Council and of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich. Keitel is charged with crimes under all four counts.
The Defendant Jodl was a career soldier. He was an Oberstleutnant, or Lieutenant Colonel, when the Nazis came to power, and ultimately attained the rank of Generaloberst or Colonel General. He became the Chief of the Operations Staff of the Wehrmacht and continued in that capacity throughout the war. He also is charged with crimes under all four counts. side. The defendant Raeder is in a sense the senior member of the entire group, having been Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy as early as 1928. He attained the highest rank in the German Navy, Grossadmiral. He retired from the Supreme Command of the Navy in 1943, in January, and was replaced by Doenitz. Raeder is charged under counts 1, 2 and 3 of the Indictment. when the Nazi came to power. During the early years of the Nazi regime, he specialized in submarine activities and was in command of the U-boat arm when the war broke out.
He rose steadily in the Navy, and was chosen to succeed Raeder when the latter retired in 1943, then became C in C of the Navy and attained the rank of Grossadmiral.
When the German Armed Forces collapsed near the end of the war Doenitz succeeded Hitler as head of the German Government. He is charged under Counts 1, 2 and 3 of the Indictment. whole. We must except the Defendant Goering, who is primarily a Nazi party politician nourishing a hobby for aviation as a result of his career in 1914-18. But the others made soldiering or sailoring their life work. They collaborated with and joined in the most important adventures of the Nazis, but they were not among the early party members. They differ in no essential respects from the other 125 members of the group. They are, no doubt, abler men in certain respects. They rose to the highest positions in the German Armed Forces, and all but Jodl attained the highest rank. group, and we can examine their ideas as they have expressed them in these documents and their actions, with fair assurance that these ideas and actions are characteristic of the other group members. Command group under counts 1 and 2 of the Indictment, their activities in planning and conspiring to wage aggressive and illegal wars. Here my task is largely one of recapitulation. The general body of proof relating to aggresive war has already been laid before the Tribunal by my colleague, Mr. Alderman, and the distinguished members of the British delegation.
Many of the documents to which they drew the Tribunal's attention showed that the defendants here who were members of the General Staff and High Command group participated knowingly and willfully in crimes under counts 1 and 2. I propose to avoid referring again to that evidence so far as I possibly can, but I must refer to one or two of them again to focus the Tribunal's attention on the part which the General Staff and High Command group played in aggressive war crimes. prepare military plans. In peace time military staffs customarily concern themselves with the preparation of plans for attack or defense based on hypo-thetical contingencies.
There is nothing criminal about carrying of these exercises or preparing these plans. That is not what the defendants and this group are charged with. Germany by threat of force or force itself, and they joined knowingly and enthusiastically in developing German armed might for this purpose. They were advised in advance of the Nazi plans to launch aggressive wars. They laid the military plans and directed the initiation and carrying on of the wars. These things we believe to be criminal under Article 6 of the Charter. part of all branches of the Armed Forces, and particularly by the high-ranking fficers who control these forces. To the extent, therefore, that German preparation for and the waging of aggressive war are historical facts of common knowledge, already proved, it necessarily follows that the General Staff and High Command group, and the German Armed Forces, participated therein.
leaders to insist that until the troops marched they lived in an ivory tower unwilling to see the direction to which their work went. some of these men now fully admit they participated gladly with the Nazis because the Nazi aims coincided closely with their own.
I think that the documents which Mr. Alderman read into the transcript already adequately reflect the purposes and objectives of the German General Staff and High Command group during the period prior to the absorption of Austria. During this period occurred, as is charged in the Indictment, firstly, secret rearmament, including the training of military personnel, the production of war munitions and building of an air force. Secondly, the Goering announcement on 10 March 1935 that Germany was building a military air force. Third, the law for compulsory military service of 16 March 1935, fixing the peace time strength of the German Army at 500,000. And, finally, and fourth, the reoccupation of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936 and the refortification of that area.
Those particular facts do not require judicial proof. They are historical facts, and likewise, the fact that it would have been impossible for the Nazis to achieve these things without cooperation by the Armed Forces is indisputable from the very nature of things.
Mr. Alderman described to the Tribunal and read from numerous documents which illustrate these events. He included numerous documents concerning the secret expansion of the German Navy in violation of treaty limitations, under the guidance of the defendant Raeder. as US 24, which was adopted on the same day that Germany unilaterally renounced the armament provision of the Versailles Treaty. He read von Blomberg's plan, dated 2 May 1935, for the reoccupation of the Rhineland. That is C-159, US 54; and Blomberg's orders under which the reoccupation was actually carried out.
between the military leaders and the Nazis. I need not labor that point further.
show the state of mind and the objectives of the German military leaders during this early period. One document, read from by Mr. Alderman, which reflects the viewpoint of the German Navy on the opportunities which Naziism offered for rearmament so that Germany could achieve its objectives by force or threat of force, is a memorandum published by the High Command of the German Navy in 1937, entitled "The Fight of the Navy Against Versailles." That is C 156, U. S. 41. The Tribunal will recall that this memorandum, this official publication of the German Navy, stated that only with the assistance of Hitler had it been possible to create the conditions for rearmament. The defendant Jodl has stated this better than I could possibly put it in his speech to the Gauleiters on 7 November 1943. That is in Document L 172, U.S. 34, from which Mr. Alderman read at length. objectives of the Nazis were leading Germany in the direction of war. I invite the Court's attention to Document C-23, which is already in the record as U.S. 49. This consists of some notes made by Admiral Carls, of the German Navy, in September, 1938. These notes were written by Admiral Carls by way of comment on a "Draft Study of Naval Warfare Against England," and they read in part as follows. That will be found, your Lordship, on page 3 of the translation of Document C-23:
"There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.
"1. If according to the Fuehrer's decision Germany is to acquire a position as a world power, she needs not only sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval communications and secure access to the ocean.
"2. Both requirements can only be fulfilled in opposition to Anglo-French interests and would limit their position as world powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by peaceful means. The decision to make Germany a world power therefore forces upon us the necessity of making the corresponding preparations for war.
"3. War against England means at the same time war against the Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well and a large number of countries overseas:
in fact, against 1/2 to 1/3 of the whole world.
"It can only be justified and have a chance of success if it is prepared economically as well as politically and militarily and waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an outlet to the ocean." was. Parts of the German Airforce during this pre-war period were developing even more radically aggressive plans for the aggrandizement of the Reich. Document L-43, GB-29, is a study prepared by the Chief of a branch of the General Staff of the Air Force called the "Organization Staff." The study in question is a recommendation for the-organization of the German Air Force in future years up to 1950. The recommendation is based on certain assumptions, and one assumption was that by 1950 the frontiers of Germany would be as shown on the map which was attached as an enclosure to this study.
There is only one copy of the map available, your Honor. Hungary, Poland and the Baltic coast up to the Gulf of Finland are all included within the borders of the Reich. The Court will also note, at page 2 of the document itself -- that is L-43 -- that the author envisaged the future peace-time organization of the German Air Force as comprising seven group commands, four of which lie within the borders of Germany proper at Berlin, Brunswick, Munich and Koenigsberg, but the three others are proposed to be at Vienna, Budapest and Warsaw. forces, I want to stress once more the basic agreement and harmony between the Nazis and the German military leaders. Without this agreement on objectives there might never have been a war. In this connection I want to direct the Tribunal's attention to an affidavit by von Blomberg, formerly Field Marshal, Reich War Minister, and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces until February, 1938, I will read the affidavit into the transcript.
"From 1919, and particularly from 1924, three critical territorial questions occupied attention in Germany. These were the questions of the Polish Corridor, the Ruhr, and Memel.
"I myself, as well as the whole group of German staff officers, believed that these three questions, outstanding among which was the question of the Polish Corridor, would have to be settled some day, if necessary by force of arms. About ninety per cent of the German people were of the same mind as the officers on the Polish question. A war to wipe out the desecration involved in the creation of the Polish Corridor and to lessen the threat to separated East Prussia surrounded by Poland and Lithuania was regarded as a sacred duty, though a sad necessity. This was one of the chief reasons behind the partially secret rearmament which began about ten years before Hitler came to power and was accentuated under Nazi rule.
"Before 1938-1939 the German generals were not opposed to Hitler. There was no reason to oppose Hitler, since he produced the results which they desired.
After this time some generals began to condemn his methods and lost confidence in the power of his judgment.
However, they failed as a group to take any definite stand against him, although a few of them tried to do so and as a result had to pay for this with their lives or their positions.
"Shortly before my removal from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in January 1938, Hitler asked me to recommend a successor. I suggested Goering, who was the ranking officer, but Hitler objected because of his lack of patience and diligence. I was replaced as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces by no officer, but Hitler personally took over my function as Commander. Keitel was recommended by me as a Chef de bureau. As far as I know, he was never named Commander of the Armed Forces but was always merely a 'Chief of Staff' under Hitler, and in effect conducted the administrative functions of the Ministry of War. At my time Keitel was not opposed to Hitler and therefore was qualified to bring about a good understanding between Hitler and the Armed Forces, a thing which I myself desired and had furthered as Reichswehrminister and Reichskriegminister. To do the opposite would have led to a civil war, for at that time the mass of the German people supported Hitler. Many are no longer willing to admit this. But it is the truth.
"As I heard, Keitel did not oppose any of Hitler's measures. He became a willing tool in Hitler's hands for every one of his decisions.
"He did not measure up to what might have been expected of him." closely in some respects by an affidavit by Colonel General Blaskowitz. That is affidavit No.5 in Document Book 1 and will be U.S.A. Exhibit 537. Blaskowitz commanded an army in the campaign against Poland and the campaign against France. He subsequently took command of Army Group G in southern France and held command of Army Group H, which retreated beyond the Rhine, at the end of the war. The first three paragraphs of his affidavit are substantially identical with the first three paragraphs of von Blomberg's, and since they are available in all languages, for expedition I will start reading with paragraph 4, where the affidavit is on a different subject:
"After the annexation of Czechoslovakia we hoped that the Polish question would be settled in a peaceful fashion through diplomatic means, since we believed that this time France and England would come to the assistance of their ally. As a matter of fact, we felt that if political negotiations came to naught the Polish question would unavoidably lead to war, that is, not only with Poland herself but also with the Western Powers.
"When in the middle of June I received an order from the OKH to prepare myself for an attack on Poland, I knew that this war came even closer to the realm of possibility. This conclusion was only strengthened by the Fuehrer's speech on 22 August 1939 on the Obersalzberg when it clearly seemed to be an actuality. Between the middle of June 1939 and 1 September 1939 the members of my staff who were engaged in preparations participated in various discussions which went on between the OKH and the army group. During these discussions such matters of a tactical, strategic and general nature were discussed as had to do with my future position as Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Army during the planned Polish campaign.
"During the Polish campaign, particularly during the Kutno operations, I was repeatedly in communication with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and he, as well as the Fuehrer, visited my headquarters. In fact, it was common practice for commanders-in-chief of army groups and of armies to be asked from time to time for estimates of the situation and for their recommendations by telephone, teletype or wirless, as well as by personal calls. These front commanders-in-chief thus actually became advisers to the OKH in their own field, so that the positions shown in the attached chart embrace that group which was the actual advisory council of the High Command of the German Armed Forces." those of Halder and Brauchitsch, vouches for the accuracy of the structure and organization of the General Staff and High Command group as described by the prosecution.
The Tribunal will * *---* - * - *---* - * also note that the von Blomberg affidavit and the first part of the Brauchitsc affidavit make it clear beyond question that the military leaders of Germany knew of, approved, supported, and executed plans for the expansion of the Armed Forces beyond the limits set by treaties.
The objectives they had in mind are obvious from the affidavits and documents to which reference has been made. In these documents and affidavits we see the Nazis and the Generals in agreement upon the basic objective of aggrandizing Germany by force or threat of force, and collaborating to build up the armed might of Germany, in order to make possible the subsequent acts of aggression. We turn now to an examination of those particular acts of aggression, which have already been described to the Tribunal in general, with the particular purpose of noting participation in these criminal acts by the General Staff and High Command group. save time I propose to read from very few documents. Accordingly, when I cite them I think there is probably no need for the Tribunal to try to find them in the documents before it. Most of them are in evidence and I propose to cite them for purposes of recapitulation, without reading very much.
The Tribunal will recall that Mr. Alderman read into the transcript portions of a document, 386-PS, U.S. 25, consisting of notes by Colonel Hossbach on a conference which was held in the German Chancellery in Berlin on the 5th of November 1937. Hitler presided at this conference, which was a small and highly secret one, and the only other participants were the four principal military leaders and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the defendant Neurath. The four chief leaders of the Armed Forces--Blomberg, who was then Reich Minister for war, and the Commanders-in-Chief of the three branches of the Armed Forces, von Fritsch for the Army, Raeder for the Navy, and Goering for the Air Force--were present. Hitler embarked on a general discussion of Germany's diplomatic and military policy, and stated that the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia was an essential preliminary 'for the improvement of our military position' and 'in order to remove any threat from the flanks.'
The military and political advantages envisaged included the acquisition of a new source of food, shorter and better frontiers, the release of troops for other tasks, and the possibility of forming new divisions from the population of the conquered territories.
Blomberg and von Fritsch joined in the discussion and von Fritsch stated "that it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia with special consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications. Austria came to fruition. Mr. Alderman has already read into the record portions of the diary kept by the defendant Jodl. The portion here in question, 1780-PS, U.S. 72, of this diary shows the participation of the German military leaders in the *---*tion of Austria. As is shown by Jodl's diary entry for 11 February, 1938, the defendant Keitel and other generals were present at the Obsersalzberg meeting between Schuschnigg and Hitler, and the purpose is shown clearly by the entry which recites that "in the evening and on 12 February General Keitel with General V. Reichenau and Sperrle at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol." The General Von Reichenau referred there was at this time the head commander of Wehrkreis 7, one of the military districts into which Germany was divided. He subsequently commanded the Tenth Army in Poland and the Sixth Army in France, and was a member of the group as defined in the indictment. Sperrle who was in Spain during the Civil War and then commanded Luftflotte 3, the Third German Air Fleet, practically throughout the war, was also a member of the group. Two days later Keitel and others were preparing proposals to be submitted to Hitler which would give the Austrian Government the impression that Germany would resort to force unless the Schuschnigg agreement was ratified in Vienna. 1775-PS, U.S. 73, and signed by the defendant Keitel. Portions of Keitel's proposals to the Fuehrer are as follows:
"To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe. No troops movements or redeployments. Spread false but quite credible news which may lead to the conclusion of military preparations against Austria, a) through V-men"--that means agents--"in Austria; b) through our customs personnel (staff) at the frontier; c) through travelling agents.
Going down the document to 4, Keitel proposed: "Order a very active make-believe wireless exchange in Wehrkreis VII and between Berlin aid Munich; 5) real maneuvers, training flights and winter maneuvers of the Mountain Troops near the frontier; 6) Admiral Canaris has to be ready beginning on February 14 in the Service Command Headquarters in order to carry out measures given by order of the Chief of the OKW."
As Jodl's diary shows under the entry for 14 February, these deceptive maneuvers were very effective and created in Austria the impression that these threats of force might be expect to create. About a month later armed intervention was precipitated by Schuschnigg's decision to hold a plebiscite in Austria. Hitler ordered mobilization in accordance with the pre-existing plans for the invasion of Austria, these plans being known as "Case Otto", in order to absorb Austria and stop the plebiscite. Jodl's diary under the entry for 10 March 1938 tells us:
"By surprise and without consulting his ministers Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which should bring strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation.
"Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Goering. General Von Reichenau is called back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General v. Schobert is ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is with the District Leader, Gauleiter, Buerckel in the Palatinate." Commander of Wehrkreis 7 and Commander of the Eleventh Army in Russia, and was a member of the group as defined inthe indictment. in that the invasion was not closely scheduled and timed in advance. This is is the case simply because the invasion was precipitated by an outside event-Schuschnigg's order for the plebiscite. But, although for this reason the element of deliberately timed planning was lacking, the foregoing documents make abundantly clear the participation of the military leaders at all stages.
At the small policy meeting of November, 1937, when Hitler's general program for Austria and Czechoslovakia was outlined, the only others present were the four principal military leaders and the Foreign Secretary. Schuschnigg to the heaviest military pressure. Keitel and others immediately thereafter worked out and executed a program of military threat and deception to frighten the Austrian Government into acceptance of the Schuschnigg protocol. When the actual invasion took place, it was, of course, directed by the military leaders and executed by the armed forces and we are indebted to the defendant Jodl for a clear statement of why the German military leaders were only too delighted to join with the Nazis in bringing about the end of Austrian independence. in L-172, which is U.S. 34, Jodl explained: (that is at page 5, paragraph 3 of the translation):
"The Austrian Anschluss, in its turn, brought with it, not only fulfillment of an old national aim, but also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position. Whereas up till then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected, in a most menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the allies, in particular Russia,) Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. Its own strategic position had now become so unfavorable that she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with vigour before effective aid from the West could be expected to arrive."
The foregoing extract from Jodl's speech makes a good transition to the case of Czechoslovakia -- "Case Green", or "Fall Gruen". I propose to treat this very briefly. Mr. Alderman has covered the general story of German aggression against Czechoslovakia very fully and the documents he read from are full of evidence showing the knowing participation in this venture by Keitel, Jodl, and other members of the group.
the four principal military leaders (386-PS, U.S. 25) may be called to mind.
Austria and Czechoslovakia were listed as the moxt proximate victims of German aggression. After the absorption of Austria, Hitler, as head of the State, and Keitel, as Chief of all the Armed Forces, lost no time in turning their attention to Czechoslovakia. From this point on, nearly the whole story is contained in the Schmundt file (388-PS, U.S. 26) and Jodl's diary, both of which have been read from extensively. These two sources of information go far, I think, to demolish what is urged in defense of the military defendants of the General Staff and High Command Group. They seek to create the impression that the German generals were pure military technicians; that they were not interested in, or not informed about political and diplomatic consideration; that they prepared plans for military attack or defense on a purely hypothetical basis. They say all this in order to suggest that they did not share and could not estimate Hitler's aggressive intentions; that they carried out politicallyconceived orders like military automatons, with no idea whether the wars they Launched were aggressive or not. read the Schmundt file and read General Jodl's diary. They make it abundantly clear that aggressive designs were conceived jointly between the Nazis and the generals; that the military leaders were fully acquainted with the political and diplomatic developments - indeed, German generals had a strange habit of turning up at diplomatic foregatherings, and, indeed, if the documents did not show these things, a moment's thought must show them to be true. It cannot be executed by an unprepared, weak, or recalcitrant military leadership. It has, of course, been said that war is too important a business to be left to soldiers alone, and this, is, no doubt, true, but it is equally true that aggressive diplomacy is far toe dangerous a business to be conducted without military advice and support and no doubt some of the German Generals had qualms about Hitler's timing and the boldness of some of his moves. Some of these doubts are rather interestingly reflected in an entry from Jodl's diary which has not yet been read.