COLONEL STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the next and final subject of the criminal organizations is the General Staff and High Command, to be presented by Colonel Taylor.
COLONEL TELFORD TAYLOR: Your Lordship and members of the Tribunal: The indictment seeks the declaration of criminality under Articles 9 to 11 of the Charter against six groups or organizations, and the last one listed in the indictment is described as a group, described as the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces. widely one from another, both in their composition and in their functions, but all of them are related and we believe that they are logically indicted together before the Tribunal because they are the primary agencies and the chief tools by means of which the Nazi conspirators sought to achieve their aims. All six of them were either established by, controlled by, or became allied with the Nazis, and they were essential to the success of the Nazis. They were at once the principal and indispensable instruments, the party, the government, the police, and the armed forces. It is my task to present the case in chief against the General Staff and High Command group. other groups and organizations against which we have sought this declaration. For example, the leadership corps of the Nazi Party, of the NSDAP, is the leadership corps of the party itself, the party which was the embodiment of Nazism, which was the instrument primarily through which Hitlerism rode to full power and tyranny in Germany. The SA and the SS were branches -- to be sure, large branches -- of the Nazi party. The German police had certain roots and antecedents which antedated Hitlerism, but it became 99 per cent a creature of the Nazi Party and State. The Reichs-cabinet was in essence merely a committee or series of committees of Reich Ministers, and when the Nazis came to power, quite naturally these ministerial positions were filled for the most part by Nazis. ALL these other groups and organizations, accordingly, either owe their origin and development to Nazism or automatically became nazified when Hitler came to power.
I need not remand the Tribunal that German armed might and the German military tradition andedate Hitlerism by many decades. One need not be a graybeard to have very vivid personal recollections of the war of 1914 to 1918, of the Kaiser and of the scrap of paper. For these reasons, I want to sketch very briefly, before going into the evidence, the nature of our case against this group which is unique in the particulars I have mentioned. the size and the permissible scope of activities of the German armed forces were severely restricted. That these restrictions did not destroy or even seriously undermine German militarism, the last few years have made abundantly apparent. The full flowering of German military strength came about through collaboration, collaboration between the Nazis on the one hand and the career leaders of the German armed forces, the professional soldiers, sailors, and airmen. affairs. He found a small Reichwehr and a body of professional officers with a morale and outlook nourished by German military history. The leaders of these professional officers constitute the group named in the indictment, the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces. This part of the case concerns that group of men.
Now, needless to say, it is not the prosecution's position that it is a crime to be a soldier or a sailor or to serve one's country as a soldier or sailor in time of war. The profession of arms is an honorable one and can be honorably practiced, but it is too clear for argument that a man who commits crimes cannot plead as a defense that he committed them in uniform.
Now, it is not in the nature of things and it is not the prosecution's position that every member of this group was a wicked man or that they were all equally culpable, but we will show that this group not only collaborated with Hitler and supported the essential Nazi objectives, we will show that they furnished the one thing which was essential and basic to the success of the Nazi program for Germany, and that was skill and experience in the development and use of armed might.
Why did this group support Hitler and the Nazis? I think Your Honors will sec, as the proof is given, that the answer is very simple. The answer is that they agreed with the truly basic objectives of Hitlerism and Nazism and that Hitler gave the generals the opportunity to play a major part in achieving these objectives. The generals, like Hitler, wanted to aggrandize Germany at the expense of neighboring countries and were prepared to do so by force or threat of force. Force, armed might, was the keystone of the arch, the thing without which nothing else would have been possible. two alternatives, either to collaborate with and expand the small German army, known as the Weichswehr, or to ignore the Reichswehr and build up a separate army of their own. The generals feared that the Nazis might do the latter and accordingly were more inclined to collaborate. Moreover, the Nazis offered the generals the chance of achieving much that they wished to achieve by way of expanding German armies and German frontiers, and so, as we will show, the generals climbed onto the Nazi bandwagon. They saw it was going in their direction for the present. No doubt they hoped later to take over the direction themselves. In fact, as the proof will show, ultimately it was the generals who were taken for a ride by the Nazis. conquest and then succeeded in submerging them politically and, as the war proceeded, they became his tools. But as these military leaders became the tools of Nazism, it is not to be supposed that they were unwitting or that they did not participate fully in many of the crimes which we will bring to the notice of the Tribunal. The willingness, and indeed the eagerness of the German professional officer corps to become parties of the Nazis will be fully developed. There will be first a description of the composition and functioning of the General Staff and High Command group as defined in the indictment; next, the evidence in support of the charge of criminality under Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment; finally, the evidence in support of the charges under Counts 3 and 4.
which have been given the number CC. The first of these books is a series of sworn statements or affidavits which are available to the Tribunal in English and in Russian and in French, and which have been available to the defendants in German. The second and third books are the usual type of document books, separated merely for convenience of handling.
The second book contains documents in the C and L series, and the third book, in the PS and R series. For the convenience of the Tribunal we have had handed up a list of these documents in the order in which they will be referred to. short mimeographed statement entitled "Basic Information on the Organization of the German Armed Forces." That has also been handed up in English, Russian and French, and has also been made available to the Defendants' Information Center in German. indictment. Armed Forces known as the Great General Staff. This name, the German General Staff or Great General Staff, persists in the public mind, but the Grosse Generalstab no longer exists in fact. There has been no such single organization, no single German General Staff since 1918, but there has, of course, been a group of men responsible for the policy and the acts of the German armed forces, and the fact that these men have no single collective name does not prevent us from collecting them together. They cannot escape the consequences of their collective acts by combining informally instead of formally. The essence of a general staff or a high command lies not in the name you give it, but in the functions it performs, and the men comprised within the group as we have defined it in the indictment do constitute a functional group welded together by common responsibility, those officers who had the principal authority and responsibility under Hitler for the plans and operations of the German armed forces. German Armed Forces and then look at the composition of the group as specified in the indictment. As I just mentioned, we have prepared a very short written exposition of the organization of the German armed forces which we have handed up to the Tribunal. That document contains a short sketch setting forth the basic history and development of the Supreme Command of the German armed forces since 1933, and the structure as it emerged after its reorganization in 1938.
It also contains a simple chart which in a few moments will be displayed at the front of the courtroom. It also contains a short glossary of German military expressions and it contains a comparative table of rank in the German Army and in the SS, showing the equivalent ranks in the American Army and the equivalent ranks for the German Navy and the British Navy. I may say that military and naval ranks differ slightly among the principal nations, but that by and large they follow the same general pattern and terminology. controlled by a Reich Defense Minister who at that time was Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg. Under von Blomberg were the chief of the Army staff who at that time was von Fritsch, and of the naval staff, the Defendant Raeder. Owing to the limitations imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, the German Air Force at that time had no official existence whatever. in Germany, there was a change in the titles of these officers, but the structure remained basically the same. Field Marshal von Blomberg remained in supreme command of the armed forces, with the title of Reich Minister for Mar and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Von Fritsch assumed the title Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and Raeder Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. this same time, but it was not put under von Blomberg. It was an independent institution under the personal command of the Defendant Goering who had the double title of Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. principal German generals and the affidavits with reference to it will be introduced in a few moments.
It shows the organization, the top organization, of the armed forces as it emerged in 1938 after the reorganization which I will now describe. their positions and Blomberg's ministry, the War Ministry, was wound up. The War Ministry had contained a division or department called the Wehrmacht Amt, meaning the Armed Forces Department, and the function of that department had been to coordinate the plans and operations of the Army and Navy. From this Armed Forces Department was formed a new overall armed forces authority known as the High Command of the German Armed Forces - that is the box in the center right under Hitler - known in German as Oberkommando Der Wehrmacht, and usually known by the initials OKW. coordination of all armed forces matters was vested in the OKW which was really Hitler's personal staff for these matters. The Defendant Keitel was appointed Chief of the OKW and the most important division of the OKW, shown just to the right, was the Operations Staff, of which the Defendant Jodl became the chief. in a decree issued by Hitler on the 4th of February, 1938. This decree appeared in the Reichsgesetzblatt, and I invite the Court's attention to it by way of judicial notice. Copies are available and I would like to read the decree which is very short, into the transcript. I quote:
"Command authority over the entire armed forces is from now on exercised directly by me personally."
THE PRESIDENT: Where do we find it?
COLONEL TAYLOR: That is not a document, your Honor, because it is a decree from the Reichsgesetzblatt and subject to judicial notice, but copies are available here if the Tribunal cares to look at it.
I will continue with the second paragraph of this decree:
"The Armed Forces Department in the Reich War Ministry with its functions becomes the High Command of the Armed Forces and comes directly under my command as my military staff.
the Chief of the former Armed Forces Department, with the title of Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces. His status is equal to that of a Reich Minister.
"The High Command of the Armed Forces also takes over the affairs of the Reich War Ministry. The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, as my representative, exercises the functions hitherto exercised by the Reich War Minister. The High Command of the Armed Forces is responsible in peace-time for the unified preparation of the defense of the Reich in all areas according to my directives.
"Berlin, 4 of February. Signed by Hitler, by Lammers, and by Keitel.
branches of the Armed Forces: OKH, OKM, and the Air Force. The Air Force didn't receive the official designation OKL until 1944, and the Defendant Raeder remained after 1938 as Commander in Chief of the Navy, but Von Fritsch, as well as Blomberg, passed out of the picture, Von Fritsch being replaced by Von Brauchitsch as Commander in Chief of the Army. Goering continued as Commander in Chief of the Air Force. In 1941 Von Brauchitsch was replaced as Commander in Chief of the Army-that is the first box in the left column--by Hitler himself, and in 1943 Raeder was replaced as Commander in Chief of the Navy by the Defendant Doenitz. The Defendant Goering continued as Commander in Chief of the Air Force until the last month of the war.
OKW, OKH, OKM and OKL each had its own staff. These four staffs did not have uniform designations. The three staffs of the Army, Navy and Air Force are the three boxes in a horizontal line next to the bottom. The staff of the OKW is the little box to the right at the top, bearing the name of Jodl and Warlimont. the Generalstab or the General Staff. In the case of OKW, it was known as the Fuehrungstab or Operations Staff, but in all cases, the functions were those of a general staff in military parlance. German General Staff but, rather, that there were four, one for each branch of the Service and one for the OKW as the overall inter-Service Supreme Command.
So we come to the bottom line on the chart. Down to the bottom line we have been concerned with the central staff organization at the center of affairs. Now we pass to the field. Under OKH, OKM and OKL came the various fighting formations of the Army, Air Force and Navy, respectively. Germans, as indeed it is among the nations generally, as an army group or in German, heeresgruppe. Those are shown in the box in the lower left hand corner.
An army group or heeresgruppe controls two or more armies -- in German, armeen. Underneath the army come the lower field formations, such as corps, divisions and regiments, which are not shown on the chart. known as an air fleet or luftflotte, and the lower units under the air fleet were called corps, jagdeerps, or divisions, fliegerdivisionen. Those lower formations again we have not shown on the chart. controlled all naval operations in a given area, with the exception of the high seas fleet itself and submarines. The commanders of the fleet and the submarines were directly under the German Admiralty. group against which the Prosecution seeks the declaration of criminality. It is defined in Appendix B of the Indictment. The group comprises, firstly, German officers who held the top positions in the four supreme commands which I have just described, and, secondly, the officers who hold the top field commands. in the supreme commands, we find that the holders of nine such positions are included in the group. Four of these are positions of supreme authority: The Chief of the OKW, Keitel; the Commander in Chief of the Army, Von Brauchitsch, later Hitler; Commander in Chief of the Navy, Raeder, and later Doenitz; Commander in Chief of the Air Force, Goering and later Von Greim. those commanders in chief: The Chief of the Operations Staff of the OKW, Jodl; the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, Halder and later others; the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force, and later others; the Chief of the Naval War Staff. of OKW. Throughout most of the war that was General Warlimont, whose name is shown under Jodl's on the chart. The particular responsibility of Jodl's deputy was planning, strategic planning, and for that end of the war in May 1945.
February, 1938 was selected as the opening end of the war.
Indictment includes, as members of the group, all commanders in chief in the field who had the status of Oberbefehlshaber in the Army, Navy or Air Force. The term Oberbefehlshaber rather defies literal translation into English. Literally, the components of the word mean "over-command-holder", and we can perhaps best translate it as "commander in chief". had the status and title of oberbefehlshaber, although they didn't get the formal designation until 1944. In the Navy, officers holding the senior regional commands and, therefore, in control of all naval operations in a given sector, had the status of oberbefehlshaber. the Army, Navy or Air Force during the period in question. All but approximately a dozen of them are still alive. The entire General Staff and High Command group, as defined in the Indictment, comprises about 130 officers, of whom 114 are believed to be still living. Those figures, of course, are the cumulative total of all officers who at any time belonged to the group, during the seven years and three months, from February 1938 to May 1945. much smaller. That was about 20 at the outbreak of the war, and it rose to about 50 in 1944 and 1945. That is to say, that at any one moment of time in 1944, the group, the active group, would have consisted of the nine individuals occupying the nine staff positions and about 41 naval, air force or army commanders in chief. Command group has been described in a series of affidavits by some of the principal German field marshals and generals. These affidavits are included in Document Book 1. I want to state briefly how these statements were obtained.
ability and experience in interviewing high ranking German prisoners of war were briefed by an Intelligence Officer and by the trial Counsel on the particular problems presented by this part of the case, the organizational side of the German Armed Forces.
These officers were already well versed in military intelligence and were fluent in German. It was emphasized that the function of these interrogating officers was merely to inquire into and establish the facts with respect to the organization of the Armed Forces, to establish facts on which the Prosectuion wanted to be accurately informed. special knowledge which they could be presumed to possess by reason of the positions which they had held in the past. After each interview, the interrogator prepared a report, and from this report such facts as appeared relevant to the issues before the Tribunal were extracted and a statement embodying them was prepared. This statement was then presented to the German officer at a later interview in the form of a draft, and the German officer was asked whether it truly reproduced what he had said and was invited to alter it in any way he saw fit. The object was to procure the most accurate testimony on organizational matters that we could. Tribunal will see that they fully support the Prosecutions description of the group and conclusively establish that this group of officers was, in fact, the group which had the major responsibility for planning and for directing the operations of the German Armed Forces. Defense has copies in German. of Generaloberst, or Colonel General--the equivalent of a four-star general in the American Army. His affidavit will be US Exhibit 531. Halder was Chief of the General Staff of OKH. That would be the box second from the bottom on the left hand side. He was Chief of the General Staff of the OKH from September, 1938 to September,1942. He is,accordingly, a member of the group and well qualified by his position to testify as to the organization. His statement is short, and I will read it in full:
"Ultimate authority and responsibilityfor military affairs in Germany Armed Forces (at the same time head of the State), that is to say, the Army, Navy and the Air Corce.
In practice, supervision within this field was exercised by a relatively small group of high ranking officers.
Thes members of this group according to the instructions of the OK* in the nam Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (at the sane time the Head of the State.)
"The members of this group were charged with the responsibility of "Prior to any operation, members of this group were assembled and gi appropriate directions by the Head of the State.
Examples of such meetin on 14 June, 1941, prior to the first Russian campaign.
The composition *---* shown in the attached chart.
This was, in effect, the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces.
/Signed/Halder."
room and which was attached to the affidavit. The two meetings referred which will be Exhibit USA 532.
Von Brauchitsch held the rank of Field also and was Commander in Chief of the Army from 1938 to 1941; therefor also a member of the group.
I need, not read his statement, since it is forth in full in the transcript at this point.
The only difference betwe the two statements is in the last sentence of each.
Halder states that t group described in the indictment "was, in effect, the General Staff and Rich Command of the German Armed Forces", whereas Von Brauchitsch puts it a little differently, saying, "In the hands of those who filled the posi tions shown in the chart lay the actual direction of the Armed Forces."
(The document referred to above is set forth herewith as follows.)
"Ultimate authority and responsibility for military affairs in Germa "Specialized military matters were the responsibility of the three Armed Forces (at the some time Head of State), that is to say the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.
In practice, supervision within this field was exercised by a relatively small group of high ranking officers.
Thes members of this group according to the instructions of the OK* in the na* Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (at the same time Head of State.)
"The members of this group were charged with the responsibility "Prior to any operation, members of this group were assembled and given appropriate directions by the Head of State.
Examples of such Chancellery on 14 June 1941 prior to the first Russian campaign.
The other were as shown in the attached chart.
In the hands of those who Armed Forces."
COLONEL TAYLOR (Continuing) Now, the Tribunal will see from these affidavits that the chart which is on display at the front of the Court and which is contained in the short expository statement has been laid before von Brauchitsch and Halder and that these two officers have vouched for it under oath as an accurate picture of the top organization of the German Armed Forces. The statements by von Brauchitsch and Halder also fully support the Prosecution's statement that the holders of the positions shown on this chart constitute the group in whom lay the major responsibility for the planning and execution of all Armed Forces matters. forth some of the matters of detail to which I adverted in describing the group. It is quite short. Affidavit Number 6, which becomes Exhibit USA 533, and I'll read it in full into the transcripts:
"The most important department in the OKW was the Operations Staff, in much the same way as the General Staff was in the Army and Air Force and the Naval War Staff in the Navy. Under Keitel there were a number of departmental chiefs who were equal in status with Jodl but in the planning and conduct of military affairs they and their departments were less important and less influential than Jodl and Jodl's staff.
"The OKW Operations Staff was also divided into sections. Of these the most important was the section of which Warlimont was chief. It was called the National Defense Section, and it was primarily concerned with the development of strategic questions. From 1941 onwards, Warlimont, though charged with the same duties, was known as Deputy Chief of the OKW Operations Staff.
"There was during World War II no unified General Staff such as the Great General Staff which operated in World War I.
"Operational matters for the Army and Air Force were worked out by the group of high ranking officers described in my statement of 7 November (in the Army, General Staff of the Army, and in the Air Forces, the General Staff of the Air Force).
"Operational matters of the Navy were, even in World War I, not worked out by the Great General Staff but by the Naval Staff. Signed: Halder."
with the functions of the General Staffs of the four commands of OKW, OKL, OKH, and OKM and fully supports the inclusion in the group of the Chiefs of Staff of the four Services, as well as the inclusion of Warlimont as Deputy Chief of the OKW staff because of his strategic planning responsibilities. The Tribunal will remember that the highest fighting formation in the German Air Force was known as an air fleet or Luftflotte and that all commanders in chief of their fleets are included in this group. That is the box in the lower right hand corner. the commanders of air fleets always had the status of oberbefehlshaber, but they were not formally so designated until 1944. These facts are set forth in an affidavit by the son of Field Marshal von Brauchitsch. His son had the rank of oberst, or colonel, in the German Air Force and was personal aide to the Defendant Goering as Commander in Chief of the Air Force. His affidavit is Number 9 and becomes US 534. It reads as fallows:
"Luftflottenchefs have the same status as the oberbefehlshaber of an army. During the war they had no territorial authority and, accordingly, exercised no territorial, jurisdiction.
"They were the highest troop commanders of the Air Force units sub ordinate to them and were directly under the command of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force.
"Until the summer of 1944 they bore the designation befehlshaber and from then on that of oberbefehlshaber. This change of designation carried with it no change in the functions and responsibilities that they previously had.# group and the personnel of it. The staff of the Tribunal have referred to me two inquiries which have been addressed to the Tribunal by Counsel for the group and it seemed to me it might be appropriate if I disposed of those inquiries now as to the composition of the group. The letters were turned over to me two days ago.
group, as defined in the Indictment, is contingent upon rank, whether it includes officers, including a definite rank such as field marshal or generaloberst.
The answer to that is clearly, No. As has been pointed out, the criterion of membership in the group is whether one held one of the positions on the chart up there, and one would be in the group if one held one of the positions, no matter what one's rank. Rank is no criterion. In point of fact, I suppose, everybody in the group held at least the rank of general in the German Army, which is the equivalent of lieutenant general in ours.
"general staff corps". The answer to that is "No". There was in the German Army a war academy, and graduates of the war academy were given the branch of Service described as the general staff corps. They signed themselves "Colonel im Generalstab." They functioned largely as adjutants and assistants to staff officers. I suppose there were some thousands of them-- two or three thousand. But they are not included in the group. Many of them were officers of junior rank. They are not named in the Indictment, and there is no reason and no respect in which they are comprehended within the group as defined.
The other letter of inquiry is from Dr. Exner, who states that he is in doubt as to the meaning of "Oberbefehlshaber", and goes on to state that he believes that Oberbefehlshaber includes commanders-in-chief in theaters of war, the commanders-in-chief of army groups, and the commanders-in-chief of armies. That is quite right. Those are the positions as shown in the chart.
Let us now spend a few minutes examining the way this group works. In many respects, of course, the German military leaders functioned in the same general manner as obtained in the military establishments of other large nations. General plans were made by the top staff officers and their assistants In collaboration with the field generals or admirals who were entrusted with the execution of the plans. A decision to wage a particular campaign would be made, needless to say, at the highest level, and the making of such a decision would involve political and diplomatic questions, as well as purely military considerations. When, for example, the decision was made to attack Poland, the top staff officers in Berlin and their assistants would work out general military plans for the campaign. These general plans would be transmitted to the commanders of the army groups and armies who would be in charge of the actual campaign, and then there would follow consultation between the top field commanders and the top staff officers at OKW and OKH, in order to revise and perfect and refine the plans. of ideas and recommendations between the top staff officers at OKW and OKH on the one hand, and the principal field commanders on the other hand, is graphically described in two affidavits by Field Marshal von Brauchitsch.