his collaboration with Rosenberg and I will invite the Court's attention once more to Exhibit C-66, which is Exhibit G.B. 81. In the page headed "Weser-Ubung," the second paragraph of the Raeder report, reads as follows:
"In the farther developments, I was supported by Commander Schreiber, Naval Attache in Oslo and the M-Chief personally -- in conjunction with the Rosenberg Organization. Thus, we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin at the beginning of December and were taken to the Fuehrer by me -- with the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg." ments in December. contact personally with Quisling are not very clear. But I would draw the Court's attention to the Document C-65, which precedes -
THE PRESIDENT: Would you read the end of that paragraph?
MR. ELVYN JONES: With your Lordship's permission, I would like to revert to that in a later stage of my unfolding of the evidence.
In the Document C-65, which will be Exhibit G.B. 85, we have a report of Rosenberg to Raeder, in which the full extent of Quisling's preparedness for treachery and his potential usefullness to the Nazi aggressors was reported and disclosed to the Defendant Raeder. with, in reading Rosenberg's statement, 007-PS. But if the Court will look at the second paragraph of Exhibit G.B. 85, C-65, it reads as follows:
"The reasons for a coup, on which Quisling made a report, would be provided by the fact that the Storthing--" --that is to say the Norwegian Parliament -- "--had, in defence of the constitution, passed a resolution prolonging its own life which is to become operative on January 12th. Quisling still retains in his capacity as a long-standing officer and a former Minister of War, the closest relations with the Norwegian Army. He showed me the original of a letter which he had received only a short time previously from the Commanding Officer in Narvik, Colonel Sunlo. In this letter, Colonel Sunlo frankly lays emphasis on the fact that; if things went on as they were going at present, Norway was finished." paragraphs, the details of a treacherous plot to overthrow the government of his own country by the traitor Quisling, in collaboration with the Defendant Rosenburg, will be indicated to the Court.
"A plan has been put forward which deals with the possibility of a coup, and which provides for a number of selected Norwegians to be trained in Germany with all possible speed for such a purpose, being allotted their exact tasks, and provided with experienced and die-hard National Socialists, who are practiced in such operations. These trained men should then proceed with all speed to Norway, where details would then require to be further discussed. Some important centres in Oslo would have to be taken over immediately, and at the same time the German Fleet, together with suitable contingents of the German Army, would go into operation when summoned specially by the new Norwegian Government in a specified bay at the approaches to Oslo. Quisling has no doubts that such a coup, having been carried out with instantaneous success -- would immediately bring him the approval of these sections of the Army with which he at present has connections, and thus it goes without saying that he has never discussed a political fight with then.
As far as the King is concerned, he believes that he would respect it as an accomplished fact." by subsequent developments.
The last sentence reads:
"Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops required which accord with German calculations." of abuse sufficiently strong to describe that degree of treachery.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that document dated?
MR. ELVYN JONES: That document does not bear a date.
THE PRESIDENT: The will take off now.
(Whereupon at 1700 o'clock the Tribunal adjourned to reconvene on 7 December 1945, at 1000 o'clock).
Official transcript of the International Military Tribunal, in the matter of:
The United States of
MR. ELWYN JONES: May it please the Tribunal, yesterday afternoon when the Tribunal adjourned I was dealing with the stage of the Nazi conspiracy against Norway at which the activities of the Defendants Raeder and Rosenberg converged. The Court will remember that I submitted in evidence Exhibit C-65, which was a report from the Defendant Rosenberg to Raeder regarding Quisling, and ending with the infamous words: "Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops required which accord with German calculations." material parts of Exhibit C-66, which was the report of Raeder to Admiral Assmann, which disclosed how, in December of 1939, the Defendant Raeder did in fact meet Quisling and Hagelin. the purposes of the record, will be GB-86. The Court will observe that that is a report by Raeder of a meeting of the Naval Staff with Hitler on the 12th of December, 1939, at 1200 hours, in the presence of the Defendants Keitel and Jodl and Puttkammer, who at this time was adjutant to Hitler.
The report is headed "Norwegian Question", and the first sentence reads:
"C-in-C Navy"--who of course was the Defendant Raeder--"has received Quisling and Hagelin. Quisling creates the impression of being reliable." of Quisling's views, views with which the Court is by now familiar because of my reading of extracts from the document 007-PS; but I draw the Court's attention to the fourth paragraph in document C-64, beginning:
"The Fuehrer thought of speaking to Quisling personally so that he might form an impression of him. He wanted to see Rosenberg once more beforehand, as the latter has known Quisling for a long while. C-in-C Navy"--that is, of course, Raeder--"suggests that if the Fuehrer forms a favorable impression, the OKW should obtain permission to make plans with Quisling for the preparation and carrying out of the occupation.
"(a) By peaceful means; that is to say, German forces summoned by Norway, or "(b) To agree to do so by force."
this report to Hitler.
If the Court will now look at Exhibit C-66, which is Raeder's record of these transactions for the purposes of history, the Court will observe, in the last sentence of the second paragraph of the section of C-66 headed "(b) Weseruebung", these words:
"Thus, we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin at the beginning of December and were taken to the Fuehrer"-
THE PRESIDENT: I haven't got it.
MR. ELWYN JONES: I beg your Lordship's pardon; it is C-66, the second page, headed "Weseruebung", in the second paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.
MR. ELWYN JONES: The third line.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ELWYN JONES: "Thus, we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to Berlin at the beginning of December and were taken to the Fuehrer by me, with the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg."
And then the Court will observe a note at the end of the page: "At the crucial moment, R"--presumably Rosenberg--"hurt his foot, so that I visited him in his house on the morning of the 14th of December."
That is, of course, Raeder's note, and it indicates the extent of his contact in this conspiracy.
The report continues:
"On the grounds of the Fuehrer's discussion with Quisling and Hagelin on the afternoon of the 14th of December, the Fuehrer gave the order that the preparations for the Norwegian operation were to be made by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
"Until that moment, the Naval War Staff had taken no part in the development of the Norwegian question, and continued to be somewhat skeptical about it. The preparations, which were undertaken by Captain Kranke in the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, were founded, however, on a memorandum of the Naval War Staff." ring to the crucial moment was an appropriate one, because the Court will see that on that day, the 14th of December, Hitler gave the order that preparations for the Norwegian operation were to be begun by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. document book, and which the Court will remember is Rosenberg's report on the activities of his organization--it is after the "D" documents--if the Court will turn to about ten lines from the bottom of the first page of Annex I, dealing with Norway, the Court will see that there were further meetings between Quisling and the Nazi chiefs in December, and I am going to read now the section beginning:
"Quisling was granted a personal audience with the Fuehrer on 16 December, and once more on 18 December. In the course of this audience the Fuehrer emphasized repeatedly that he personally would prefer a completely neutral attitude of Norway, as well as of the whole of Scandinavia. He did not intend to enlarge the theater of war and to draw still other nations into the conflict." here was an instance where pressure had to be brought to bear on Hitler to induce him to take part in these operations.
The report continues:
"Should the enemy attempt"--there is a mis-translation there--"to extend the war, however, with the aim of achieving further throttling and intimidation of the Greater German Reich, he would be compelled to gird himself against such an undertaking. In order to counterbalance increasing enemy propaganda activity, he promised Quisling financial support of his movement, which is based on Greater German ideology. Military exploitation of the question now raised was assigned to the special military staff, which transmitted special missions to Quisling. Reichsleiter Rosenberg was to take over political exploitation. Financial expenses were to be defrayed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs"--that is to say, by Ribbentrop's organization-"the Minister for Foreign Affairs"--that is to say, Ribbentrop--"being kept continuously informed by the Foreign Affairs Bureau," which, of course, was Rosenberg's organization.
"Chief of Section Scheidt was charged with maintaining liaison with Quisling. In the course of further developments he was assigned to the Naval Attache in Oslo. Orders were given that the whole matter be handled with strictest secrecy." and the Nazi service chiefs. January 1940 is not full, but the Court will see that the agitation of the Defendants Raeder and Rosenberg did bear fruit, and I now invite the Court to consider a letter of Keitel's, Exhibit C-63, which, for the purposes of the record, will be GB-87. The Court will observe that that is an order--a memorandum--signed by Keitel, the Defendant Keitel, dated the 27th of January, 1940. It is marked "Most Secret, five copies; reference, Study 'N'", which was another code name for the Weseruebung preparations, "Access only through an officer."
It is headed: "C-in-C of the Navy"--that is to say, the Defendant Raeder--"has a report on this."
The document reads:
"The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces wishes that Study 'N' should be further worked on under my direct and personal guidance, and in the closest conjunction with the general war policy. For these reasons the Fuehrer has commissioned me to take over the direction of further preparations.
"A working staff has been formed at the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Headquarters for this purpose, and this represents at the same time the nucleus of a future operational staff."
Then, at the end of the memorandum:
"All further plans will be made under the cover name 'Weseruebung.'" I should like respectfully to draw the Tribunal's attention to the importance of that document, to the signature of Keitel upon it, and to the date of this important decision.
various aspects of the invasion of Norway and Denmark had been confined to a relatively small group, whose aim had been to persuade Hitler of the desirability of undertaking this Norwegian operation; and the issuance of this directive of Keitel's on the 27th of January, 1940, was the signal that the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces, the OKW, had accepted the proposition of the group that was pressing for this Norwegian adventure, and turned the combined resources of the German military machine to the task of producing practical and coordinated plans for the Norwegian operation. planning for the invasion of Norway and Denmark was started through the normal channels. Defendant Jodl, to see how the preparations progressed. That is Exhibit Number 1809-PS, which will be, for the purposes of the record, GB-88. That, the Court will observe, is the last document in the document book.
are set out in the diary, because the first three pages relate to entries which will be dealt with in another part of the case.
I invite the Court's attention to page 3 of these extracts from Jodl's diary, beginning at the bottom, February 6th. The entry under the date line of February 6th starts: "New idea: Carry out 'H' and Weser Exercise only end guarantee Belgium's neutrality for the duration of the war."
I would like to repeat that entry, if I may be permitted to do so:
"New idea: Carry out 'H' and Weser Exercise only and guarantee Belgium's neutrality for the duration of the war."
The next entry which I invite the Court's attention to is the entry of the 21st of February.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What does that mean: "To carry out 'H'"?
MR. ELWYN JONES: That is a reference to another code word, "Hartmudt", which the Court will see disclosed in a subsequent document, That is another code word for this Norwegian and Danish operation.
The entry of February 21st in Jodl's diary reads: "Fuehrer has talked with General von Falkenhorst, and charges him with preparation of 'Weser Exercise.' Falkenhorst accepts gladly. Instructions issued to the three branches of the armed forces."
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): "Weser Exorcise" -- is that Norway too?
MR. ELWYN JONES: That is Norway too, My Lord, yes. That is a translation of "Weseruebung."
The entry on the next page, under the date of February 28th:
"I propose, first to the Chief of OKW and then to the Fuehrer, that Case Yellow"--which, as the Court knows, is the code name for the invasion of the Netherlands--"and Weser Exercise"--the invasion of Norway and Denmark--"must be prepared in such a way that they will be independent of one another as regards both time and forces employed. The Fuehrer completely agrees, if this is in any way possible." 6th that the neutrality of Belgium might be observed had been abandoned by February 28th. Court with further entries of the 28th of February, which relate to the forces to be employed in the invasion of Norway and Denmark.
February 29th, the second paragraph:
"Fuehrer also wishes to have a strong task force in Copenhagen and a plan, elaborated in detail, showing how individual coastal batteries are to be captured by shock troops. Warlimont, Chef Landesverteidigung, instructed to make out immediately the order of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and Director of Armed Forces to make out a similar order regarding the strengthening of the staff."
And there, for the moment, I will leave the entries in Jodl's diary and refer the Court to the vital document C-174, which, for the purposes of the record, will be GB-89. And the Court will see, from that document, that it is Hitler's operation order to complete preparations--the Court will observe that that is Hitler's order to complete the preparations for the invasion of Norway and Denmark. It bears the date of the 1st of March, 1940, and it is headed: "The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Most Secret."
Then, "Directive for Fall Weseruebung.
"The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces--Fall Weseruebung. This operation should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic; further, it should guarantee our ore base in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start line against Britain."
Paragraph 2 reads:
"In view of our military and political power in comparison with that of the Scandinavian States, the force to be employed in the Fall Weseruebung will be kept as small as possible. The numerical weakness will be balanced by daring actions and surprise execution. On principle we will do our utmost to make the operation appear as a peaceful occupation, the object of which is the military protection of the neutrality of the Scandinavian States. Corresponding demands will be transmitted to the Governments at the beginning of the occupation. If necessary, demonstrations by the Navy and the Air Force will provide the necessary emphasis. If, in spite of this, resistance should be met with, all military means will be used to crush it."
There follows, in paragraph 2 on the next page:
"I put in charge of the preparations and the conduct of the operation against Denmark and Norway the Commanding General of the 21st Army Corps, General von Falkenhorst."
Paragraph 3: "The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in Norway must take place simultaneously. I emphasize that the operations must be prepared as quickly as possible. In case the enemy seizes the initiative against Norway, we must be able to apply immediately our own counter-measures.
"It is most important that the Scandinavian States as well as the Western opponents should be taken by surprise by our measures. All preparations, particularly these of transport and of readiness, drafting and embarkation of the troops, must be made with this factor in mind.
"In case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be kept secret, the leaders and the troops will be deceived with fictitious objectives."
Then paragraph 4 on the next pare, "The Occupation of Demark", which is given the code name of "Weseruebung Sued"."The task of Group XXI:
Occupation by surprise of Jutland and of "Added to this, haveing secured the most important places, the and to the east coast."
Paragraph 5: "Occupation of Norway, Weseruebung Nord".
"The task of the Group XXI: Capture by surprise of the most "The Navy will take over the preparation and carrying out of the transport by sea of the landing troops."
And there follow a reference Court's attention to that reference.
This is paragraph 5 on pare 3 of Hitler's directive:
"The Air Force, after the occupation has been completed, will ensure Britain."
decision of Hitler
THE PRESIDENT: Did you draw our attention to the Defendant by whom it was initialled on the first page?
MR. ELWYN JONES: Fricke, that's right, on the first page of that document; that is an initial by Fricke.
THE PRESIDENT: Is this a different name - Fricke?
MR. ELWYN JONES: That is a different person altogether. That is a high functionary in the German Admiralty, and has no connection with the Defendant who is before the Tribunal. reports were coming in through Rosenburg's organization from Quisling, and if the court will again turn for the last time to Exhibit 007-PS, which is Rosenburg's report, the Tribunal will observe the kind of information which Rosenburg's organization was supplying at this time. The third paragraph, Quisling reports -- that is in Annx I in Rosenburg's report, the section dealing with Norway, on my copy, referring to the second page of the Annex, the paragraph beginning with:
"Quisling's reports, transmitted to his representative in Germany, Hagelin, and dealing with the possibility of intervention by the Western Powers in Norway with tacit consent of the Norwegian Government, became more urgent by January. These increasingly better substantiated communications were in sharpest contrast to the views of the German Legation in Oslo, which relied on the desire for neutrality of the then Norwegian Nygardszvold Cabinet, and was convinced of that government's intention and readiness to defend Norway's neutrality. No one in Norway knew that Quisling's representative for Germany maintained closest relations to him; he therefore succeeded in gaining a goothold within governmental circles of the Nygardszvold cabinet and in listening to the cabinet members' views. Hagelin transmitted what he had heard to the Bureau (Rosenburg's bureau), which conveyed the news to the Fuehrer through Reichsleiter Rosenburg. During the night of the 16th. to 17th. of February, English destroyers attacked the German steamer 'Altmark' in Jessingjord."
by the British destroyer Cossack against the German naval auxiliary vessel "Altmark," which was carrying three hundred British prisoners, captured on the high seas, to Germany through Norwegian territorial waters. The position of the British delegation with regard to that episode, is that the use that was being made by the "Altmark" of Norwegian territorial waters was in fact a flagrant abuse in itself of Norwegian neutrality, and the action taken by H.M.S. Cossack, which was restricted to rescuing the three hundred British prisoners on board. No attempt being made to destroy the "Altmark" or to capture the armed guards on board her was fully justified under international law. ment of the British view on the "Altmark" episode -- The Rosenburg report continues:
"The Norwegian Government's reaction to this question permitted the conclusion that certain agreements had been covertly arrived at between the Norwegian Government and the Allies. Such assumption was confirmed by reports of Section Scheidt, who in turn derived his information from Hagelin and Quisling. But even after this incident the German Legation in Oslo championed the opposite view, and went on record as believing in the good intentions of the Norwegians." reports of the traitor Quisling to the considered judgment of German diplomatic representatives in Norway. The result of the receipt of reports of that kind was the Hitler decision to invade Norway and Denmark. The culminating details in the preparations for the invasion are again found in Jodl's diary, which is the last document in the document book. I will refer the Court to the entry of the 3rd of March:
"The Fuehrer expressed himself very sharply on the necessity of a swift entry into N, which is Norway, with strong forces.
"No delay by any branch of the armed forces. Very rapid acceleration of the attack necessary."
Then the last entry on March 3: "Fuehrer decides to carry out 'Weser Exercise' before case 'Yellow' with a few days interval." the German High Command for some time had been decided by this date, and the fate of Scandinavia was to be sealed before the fate of the Low Country; and the Court will observe from those entries of March 3 that by that date Hitler had become an enthusiastic convert to the idea of a Norwegian aggression.
The next entry in Jodl's diary of the 5th of March: "Big conference with the three commanders-in-chief about 'Weser Exercise.' Field Marshal in a rage because not consulted till now. Won't listen to anyone and wants to show that all preparations so far made are worthless.
Result: (a) Stronger forces to Narvik.
(b) Navy to leave ships in the ports (Hipper or Luetzow in Trondheim).(c) Christians and can be left out at first.
(d) Six divisions envisaged for Norway.
(e) A foothold to be gained immediately in Copenhagen."
Then the next entry which I desire to draw the Court's attention "Fuehrer does not give order yet for 'W' (Weser Exercise).He is still looking for an excuse."
flagrant aggression. It reads:
"English keep vigil in the North Sea with fifteen to sixteen submarines; doubtful whether reason to safeguard own operations or prevent operations by Germans.
Fuehrer has not yet decided what reason to give for 'Weser Exercise.
'" "Misgivings of Task Force 21"--the Court has seen from documents that I have put in already that Task Force 21 was Falkenhorst's Force, which was detailed to conduct this invasion--"Misgivings of positions at 05.
30 hours and close of diplomatic negotiations.
for help go out to England and America. If resistance is put up it must be ruthlessly broken.
The political plenipotentiaries them."
Comment upon that entry is, I think, unnecessary. The next entry, sentence:
"Individual naval officers seem to be lukewarm concerning the Weser Exercise and need a stimulus.
Also Falkenhorst and none of their business.
Franke sees more disadvantages than "In the evening the Fuehrer visits the map room and roundly declares that he won't stand for the Navy clearing out of the Norwegian ports right away.
Narvik, Trondheim and Oslo will have to remain occupied by naval forces."
Then April 2nd:
"Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Commander-in-Chief All confirm preparations completed.
Fuehrer orders carrying out of the Weser Exercise for April 9th."
"Fuehrer drafts the proclamation. Piepenbrock, Chief of talks with Quisling in Copenhagen."
operation orders that were issued in connection with the aggression against Norway and Denmark, but I propose only to draw the Court's attention to two of them to illustrate the extent of the secrecy and deception that was used by the defendants and their confederates in the course of that aggression. I would now draw the court's attention to Exhibit C-115 which, for the purposes of the record, will be Exhibit G.B. 90. First of all, I will draw the court's attention to the second paragraph, "General Orders," with a date, the 4th of April, 1940:
"The barrage-breaking vessels, Speerbreechers, will penetrate inconspicuously and with lights on into Oslo Fjord disguised as merchant steamers.
"Challenge from coastal signal stations and lookouts are to be answered by the deceptive use of the names of English steamers. I lay particular stress on the importance of not giving away the operation before zero hour." dated the 24th of March 1940: "Behavior during entrance into the harbor." The third paragraph is the part that I wish to draw the court's attention to. "The disguise as British craft must be kept up as long as possible. All challenges in morse by Norwegian ships will be answered in English. In answer to questions a text with something like the following content will be chosen:
"Calling at Bergen for a short visit; no hostile intent.
"Challenges to be answered with names of British warships:
Koeln -- H.M.S. Cairo;
Koenigsberg -- H.M.S. Calcutta;
Bromso -- H.M.S. Faulkner;
Karl Peters -- H.M.S. Halcyon;
Leopard -- British destroyer;
Wolf -- British destroyer;
"Arrangements are to be made enabling British war flags to be illuminated. Continual readiness for making smoke." Annex three to Flag Officer Reconnaissance Forces; most secret. Next page, page two: "Following is laid down as guiding principle should one of our own units find itself compelled to answer the challenge of passing craft. To challenge in case of the 'Koeln' H.M.S. Cairo. Then to order to stop: (1) Please repeat last signal (2) Impossible to understand your signal. In case of a warning shot: Stop firing. British ship. Good friend. In case of an inquiry as to destination and purpose: Going Bergen. Chasing German steamers."
Then I would draw the court's attention to C-151, which for the purposes of the record will be G.B. 91, which is Doenitz's order in connection with this operation. If the Court will observe, it is headed "Top Secret, Operation Order 'Hartmut.' Occupation of Denmark and Norway. This order comes into force on the codeword 'Hartmut.' With its coming into force the orders hitherto valid for the boats taking part lose their validity.
"The day and hour are designated as 'Wesser-Day' and 'Weser-Hour', and the whole operation is known as 'Weseruebung'.
"The operation ordered by the codeword has its objective the rapid surprise landing of troops in Norway. Simultaneously Denmark will be occupied from the Baltic and from the land side." by Doenitz to this process of deception: "The naval force will as they enter the harbor fly the British flag until the troops have landed, except presumably at Narvik." of April 1940 the Nazi onslaught on unsuspecting and almost unarmed people of Norway and Denmark was launched. When the invasions had already begun a German memorandum was handed to the governments of Norway and Denmark attempting to justify the German action, and I would like to draw the Court's attention to Exhibit T.C.55.
That is at the beginning of the book of documents; the sixth document of the book. I am not proposing to read the whole of that memorandum. I have no doubt the defending counsel will deal with any parts which they consider relevant to the defense. The Court will observe that it is alleged that England and France were guilty in their maritime warfare of breaches of international law; and that Britain and France are making plans themselves to invade and occupy Norway, and that the government of Norway was prepared to acquiesce in such a situation.
The memorandum states--and I would now draw the Court's attention to page three of the memorandum; to the paragraph just below the middle of the page beginning "The German Troops"--"The German troops therefore do not set foot on Norwegian soil as enemies. The by German troops as bases for operations against England.