First of all, we are hearing the case of the main German war criminals and not the promises of Allied countries.
Secondly, the document which Dr. Seidl is attempting to submit has been rejected by the Tribunal as it is a document of unknown origin and, of course, cannot be a document having probitive value.
DR. SEIDL:May I just say the following, Mr. President, in answer?
Mr. President, this document is an essential part of the Non-Aggression Pact which has been submitted by the Prosecution in evidence as GB 145. Now I should like to submit the text-
THE PRESIDENT:The question is whether it is the document which has been rejected by the Tribunal. Is it the document which has been rejected by the Tribunal?
DR. SEIDL:It was refused as a document, but it seems to me there is a difference, Your Honor, in connection with the question of whether, with the testimony of the witness, this document may be shown to the witness, and I should like to affirm this question for the reason that the Prosecution, in cross examination, for their part, have the possibility of submitting to the witness the document which they have, and on the basis of the testimony of the witness we will see which text is the correct one or whether these two texts agree at all.
THE PRESIDENT:Where does the document which you are presenting come from?
DR. SEIDL:I received this document a few weeks ago from a source, a man on the Allied side, who seems entirely reliable to me, but I received it only on condition that I would not divulge the exact source, and it seems perfectly understandable to me.
THE PRESIDENT:Do you say that you received it a few moments ago?
DR. SEIDL:Weeks ago.
THE PRESIDENT:It is the same document that you say just now that you presented to the Tribunal and the Tribunal rejected?
DR. SEIDL:Yes, but the High Tribunal decided that I might secure a new affidavit from Ambassador Gauss and submit it to the High Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: I know, but you have not done so. We do not know what affidavit Dr. Gauss has made.
DR. SEIDL:I have this affidavit of Ambassador Gauss. I have it in hand, but it has not been translated as yet.
MR. DODD:I join General Rudenko in objecting to the use of this document. We now know that it comes from some anonymous source. We do not know the source at all, and anyway it is not established that this witness does not remember himself what this purported agreement amounted to. I do not know why he can not ask him, if that is what he wants to do.
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Seidl, you may ask the witness what his recollection is of the treaty, without putting the document to him. Ask him what he remembers of the treaty, or the protocol. BY DR. SEIDL:
QMr. Witness please describe the contents of the agreement insofar as it remains in your recollection.
AWe are concerned here with a very comprehensive and extensive secret appendix agreement to the Non-Aggression pact which was concluded at that time. The scope of this document was very large for the reason that it partitioned spheres of influence and drew a line between those areas which, under given circumstance would be of interest to Soviet Russia and others which should belon to the German sphere of interest.
To the Soviet Russian sphere, the following were to belon Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, the eastern part of Poland, and, as far as I can recall, certain areas of Rumania were also dealt with. Anything west of this area was to belong to the German sphere of interest.
Of course, this secret agreement was not maintained in this form. On a later occasion, either in September or October of the same year, a certain change was made, an amendment was made to the agreement which existed, and the essential difference was, so far as I recall, that Lithuania, or in any event the largest part of Lithuania, was to be put into the Russian sphere of influence, and vice versa in the Polish area.
The line of demarcation of the two spheres of interest was moved to a considerable extent to the west.
I believe that with this matter the essential content of the secret agreement and the later secret appendix agreement may be summarized.
Q Is it correct that in the case of a territorial change, the line of de-
marcation was agreed upon in the territory of Poland, the Polish State?
AWhether the expression "line of demarcation" was contained in this protocol or whether it was a line of separation of the spheres of interest -- I cannot give you the exact wording.
QBut a line was mentioned and drawn?
AJust this line which I have just mentioned, and I believe I do remember that this line, later on, when this agreement was realized, was adhered to in the main, perhaps not in every detail, but on the whole, yes.
QDo you recall -- and this is my last question -- whether this secret appendix agreement of the 23rd of August 1939 also contained an agreement dealing with the future fate of Poland?
AThis secret agreement included and brought with it a complete new order in Poland, and it may very well have been that explicitly or imlicitly a new order was set forth in the agreement, but I would not commit myself as to the wording.
DR. SEIDL:Mr. President, I have no further questions. BY THE PRESIDENT:
QWitness, did you see the original of the secret treaty?
AI saw a photographic copy of the original, and perhaps the original as well, but in any event I had the photostatic copy in my hands repeatedly. I had a photostatic copy in my personal safe, had it locked up in my personal safe.
QWould you recognize a copy of it if it was shown to you?
AOh, I do believe so with certainty, Your Honor, yes.
The original signatures were appended as well, and they were marked. That would let me recognize it immediately.
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal will adjourn.
(A recess was taken)
21-May-A-NG-24-1
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal has been considering whether it ought to put to the witness the document in the possession of Dr. Seidl, but, in view of the fact that the contents of the original have been stated by the witness and by other witnesses and that it dois not appear what is the origin of the codument which is in Dr. Seidl's possession, the Tribunal has decided not to put the document to the witness.
The Tribunal will now adjourn (The Tribunal adjourned until 22 May 1946 at 1000 hours.)
Official Transcript of the International Military Tribunal in the Matter of the United States of America, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against Hermann "ilhelm Goering et al, Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 22 May, 1946, 1000-1700,Lord Justice Lawrence presiding.
THE PRESIDENT:DR. Siemers,I think yesterday we got to the stage whether any of the other Defendants' Counsel wishes to ask any questions.
DR.Seimers:(Counsel for defendant Raeder)Yes, indeed, I believe Dr. von Luedinghausen wishes to examine the witness.
ERICH VON WEIZAECKER -- Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION -- Resumed BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for defendant von Neurath)
QWitness, I should like to put several questions to you about the activity of Mr. von Neurath in the capacity of foreign minister. At that time you were director of the political department of the foreign office. What were those dates?
AFrom the late summer of 1936, in a deputy capacity, and beginning with the spring of 1937, until the spring of 1938, in a full capacity.
QBut before then you had the opportunity to work with Mr. von Neurath, and on an occasion in the year 1932, in the autumn of that year, you attended the same disarmament conference at Geneva?
AYes.
QWhat tendencies did Mr. Von Neurath follow, and what was the attitude that he represented at the disarmament conference? What was his position?
AThe attitude of Mr. von Neurath was prescribed along the lines of the League of Nations; and disarmament was stipulated according to the treaty. He followed those lines.
QIn other words, he followed the same policy which his predecessors followed at this conference?
AIt was always the same.
Q All the regimes and all the governments before then were inter-
ested in bringing about peace and unity, and had followed their policies accordingly. Did Mr. von Neurath represent these same peaceful policies?
AI never noticed anything to the contrary in him.
QAt that time -- that is in the year 1932 -- did you notice in any way that he had national socialist tendencies, or that he was sympathetic with the National Socialists?
AI had the impression that there was no common meeting point between him and national socialism.
QCan you briefly give us his foreign political beliefs, and what he was at that time? Was he a belligerent or was he a representative of a determined peace policy and a policy of negotiation and understanding?
AI should like to say that Mr. von Neurath represented the peaceful revisionist policy, the same policy that had been carried on by his predecessors. He pursued a good neighbor policy, a policy of being good neighbors with all without binding himself in a political way in any manner. But as far as a war-like tendency is concerned in his political leanings, I never noticed anything like that at all.
QIn the year 1936, when you became one of his closest collaborators, did he change his political beliefs at all, or were they always the same?
AIt was always the same.
QHe was especially interested in bringing about an understanding with England an well as with France; is that right?
A I had the impression that Mr. von Neurath wanted to bring about an understanding with all sides.
QI should like to put a few more questions to you which more or less show his relationship with Hitler.
According to your knowledge of the circumstances - that is, as a collaborator of von Neurath -- was he of the opinion that he had the confidence at all times of Adolf Hitler during the time when he was foreign minister, and that Hitler allowed himself to be advised and lead by him?
AAs far as I am in a position to judge, he was an advisor but not a confident of Hitler.
QBut there was a certain contact between both of these gentlemen; is that not right?
A was never a witness to any such contacts.
QDid you observe that von Neurath and Hitler met and frequently discussed political matters, and to the effect that these things which were to happen would happen? Did they discuss any matters like that?
AI can tell you this much only, that we of the foreign office regrette that the contact was not closer; and we were especially sorry since Hitler frequently was not in Berlin. e considered, that the contact was not quite binding enough.
QThen, you cannot speak of a close collaboration between Hitler and von Neurath?
ANot in my opinion, no.
QAnd in your opinion and according to your observation, how did the activity of von Neurath effect foreign pollicy? Was he the leading man there, or was he a retarding element, a brake, so to speak?
AI have no clue to the effect that important foreign political actions were influenced by von Neurath. But I can well imagine that certain actions in the important political sphere -
THEPRESIDENT: (Interposing) I do not think we can have the witness can imagine. We cannot have the witness telling us what he can imagine. I think the question is too vague, and not a proper question to ask. BY VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
QDuring the time when Mr. von Neurath was foreign minister, did any agency of the party influence foreign policies, and specially to the effect of being contrary to the tendencies of von Neurath?
A I do not believe that. There was not only one agency but many who acted along these lines, and those were the agencies who had the connections and influence with Hitler.
That was beyond control; but according to the outcome, one could gather that.
QDo you know why, for what reason, the Anti-Comintern Pact, which in November of 1935 was concluded with Japan, was not signed by von Neurath but by then Special Ambassador von Ribbentrop in London?
AWasn't that in 1936?
QYes, that is correct. that was in 1936.
AI assure for this reason, that Hitler liked to use several personalities for the same thing and then to select from among these personalities the one he considered suitable for carrying it through.
Q as von Neurath in agreement with this Anti-Comintern Pact?
AThat I do not know.
QAnd what was the personal policy of von Neurath? Did he try to Keep old officials in office or did he try to bring in National Socialist officials?
AMr. von Neurath was always interested in keeping old officials whom he knew in the Foreign Office and to keep them in other positions as well.
QAnd that was changed at the moment when he resigned?
ANot immediately, but later on to an increasing extent.
QNow, just two more questions. What was the attitude of Mr. von Neurath when he was no longer Foreign Minister, when political questions become acute in the autumn of 1938 and when the Munich Conference was concluded? hat was his activity in that connection?
AI recall a scene in the Reich Chancellory, --It took place on the day before the Munich agreement, -- on which occasion Mr. von Neurath very determinedly and decidedly advised that there should be a policy of appeasement and advised that they follow the suggestion of Russolini to have a Four-Power conference
QDo you Know that, after the departure of von Neurath from the Foreign Office, the policy was that he was forbidden to have any more foreign political information?
AI do believe I recall that the successor of Mr. von Neurath reserved that sphere for his own.
DR. VON LUEDING HAUSEN:I have no further questions.
DR LATERNSER: Dr. Laternser, counsel for the General Staff and the O.K.W.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
QDr. von Weizsaecker, beginning in the summer of 1943, you were German Ambassador at the Holy See in Rome?
AYes.
QAt the same time, the Commander in Chief in the Mediteranean Theater was Field Marshal Kesselring?
AYes.
QThat is, he was the Commander in Chief in this theater from the 25th of September, 1943, onward?
AYes.
QBefore that time an Italian Gener 1 had this post?
AYes.
QWere you frequently called in by Kesselring in order to arbitrate conflicts between the German authorities and the local population?
AThere was a Very close connection between Field Marshal Kesselring's and my own position, not only in order to clear up differences but, first of all, to prevent differences.
QDid you, through you frequent contacts with Field Marshal Kesselring, receive impression of him, specifically, of the attitude of the Military -
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Laternser, you are asking about Field Marshal Kesselring. We are not trying von Kesselring. What relevance has this question got?
DR. LATERNSER:This question is relevant for this reason: In cross examination of Field Marshal Kesselring the Prosecution brought forth incriminating material to the effect that the military leadership in Italy did not follow the usages of war and the laws of humanity. I distinctly remember that, Mr. President, and this may be Seen on Page 5805, and applied to an objection to Dr. Siemers that this concerned itself with an accusation against the General Staff. Through just a few questions, I should like to ask the witness about this material which incriminates the General Staff.
THE PRESIDENT:If you wish to ask him anything that he knows about accusations which have been made by the Prosecution against Kesselring as a member of the General Staff, then you may do that.
DR. LATERNSER:Yes, Mr. President. I started with that idea and that was to be a preparatory question.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
QMr. von Weizsaecker, in the Italian theater of war, the objects of art of Italy, were they spared and were they put in safe keeping?
AThe German Wehrmacht, the German Air Forces, under the leadership of Field Marshal Kesselring, went to the greatest trouble to spare church goods, the actual churches and church property. This, however, was a large chapter in the activities of the Field Marshal and his Staff and, of course, success was not wanting.
QCan you give us one or two especially significant examples on this point?
AThere is such a wealth of examples that I would like to mention only that six months or a year ago there was an exhibition of manuscripts which took place in the Vatican. These were objects which were saved, for the most part, through the activities of the German Wehrmacht; and the German Wehrmacht is to be thanked for it.
QThat is sufficient, Nr. von Weizsaecker. The High military leadership in Italy is accused of treating the Italian population especially harshly and cruell: Can you tell us anything about the fact that, on the part of the high military leadership in Italy, certain measures were taken for the feeding of the population at a period of time when the food problem was a difficult one?
AThis question is especially to the food problem?
QYes, the food problem in Rome.
AMy sphere of observation was just Rome. and I can say in this connection that Field Marshal Kesselring told me one day that half of his days were being used up in concerning himself with the feeding of Rome; and I know a higher military official -- I believe his name was Seiphart or something like that, who with great devotion concerned himself with this problem and carried it through with success.
QNow, Mr. Witness, I come to my last question. Through your observation of the activities of the high military leaders in Italy you gained a clear picture of those people. Did you, through that observation, receive the impression that there was sincere effort to carry through the usages of war and the laws of humanity and to adhere to these?
AThat is a matter of course. Otherwise, certainly success could not have come about. Perhaps it is not known here that in the autumn of 1943 the Holy See published a communique, an official communique, to the effect that the behavior of the German soldiers in Rome was being praised especially and the sparing of the Eternal City could not have been realized if the German Wehrmacht had not acted the way it did.
QAnd that was a special merit of Field Marshal Kesselring?
AI would say that when the History of this time is being written, at the top of the list of merits will be Pope Pius the XII. Then praise will be accorded, in the second place, to the German Wehrmacht under the leadership of von Kesselring.
DR. LATERNSER:Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant von Papen).
QIt was assorted that in the summer of '34, that the defendant, who has been made special ambassador to Vienna, from Vienna pursued a policy of aggressive expansion, including the entire southeast up into Turkey, and that, among other things, that neighboring states like Hungary and Poland received offers from himregarding total aggrandizement from the partition of Czechoslovakia. Did this policy actually exist?
AI'm sorry. I did not understand your question.
QDid this policy, which I just outlined, actually exist?
AMy observation dates only from the late summer of 1936, for before that time I was abroad. That Mr. von Papen carried on a southeastern policy from Vienna or that he was charged therewith, I did not notice. Even later, the Foreign Office could not charge him with such a mission for he was not subordinate to the Foreign Office.
QAnd this policy, as I've just outlined, did that exist in the Foreign Office when you assumed your term?
APlease repeat the question.
QDid this policy -
AWhich policy?
QAggressive expansion on the part of Germany to the southeast up into Turkey, partition of Czechoslovakia, and the relinquishing of part of Czechoslovakia to Poland and Hungary.
AIn the year '39?
Q '36, 1936.
ANo.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. ELWYN JONES:
QWitness, I want to ask you one or two questions about the Athenia matter. You have told the Tribunal that you, yourself, saw the American charge d'affaires and informed him about the middle of September that the Athenia could not have been sunk by a German U-Boat. That is so, is it not?
A I did not see the American charge d'affaire in the middle of September, but on the same day on which I heard of the sinking, and that must have been, perhaps, the 3rd or 4th or 5th of September.
QWere you already assuring the American representatives as early as that that a U-boat could not have been responsible?
AYes, that's correct.
QAnd did yourecommend or, rather, did the German Foreign Office recommend that the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy should receive the American naval attache and tell him the same thing, namely, that a U-boat could not have sunk the Athenia?
AThat I don't know, I only dealt with the charge d'affaire.
QI'd like you to look at a new document, D-804, which willbe Exhibit GB-477, which is an extract from the SKL file on the Athenia case. You will see that that is a report from Neubauer to the Naval Attache and it roads as follows:
"The Foreign Office has had a report of the meeting between the Commanderin-Chief of the German Navy and the American Naval Attache on the 13th of September, 1939, passed on to it by telephone; it is worded as follows:
"On the 16th of September, at about 1300 hours, the Commander-in-Chief of --"
AI'm sorry; I haven't found the place as yet.
QYou may follow the English copy, witness, if you'd loke. I read the second paragraph:
"On the 16th of September, at about 1300 hours, theCommander-in-Chief of the navy received the American Naval Attache on the advice of the Reich Foreign Minister, and told him more or less the following: He had intended for some days already -- as he know -- to write him to visit him, in order to tell him his opinion about the sinking of the 'Athenia', in view of the continued baiting about it. However he had waited for the return of the submarine that had been employed in waging war against merchant ships, at the time in question which might possibly be concerned, in order to receive reports about their activity personally. He repeated most emphatically that the sinking of the 'Athenia' was not caused by a German submarine. The ship nearest to the place of the incident was at the time actually situated about 170 sea miles away from the place of the sinking.
Besides this, the instructions according to which the commanders had to wage war against merchant shipping had after all been published. Up to date, in no case had these instructions been even slightly disregarded. On the contrary, an American captain reported a short time before about the particularly courteous and chivalrous behaviour of the submarine commanders."
Well, now, it's clear from that, is it not, that the German Foreign Office was most anxious to cover up this matter of the "Athenia" as best it could; was it not?
ANo, there was nothing to be covered up.
QWhen you discovered at the end of September that in fact it was the U-30 that had sunk the Athenia, there was then a good deal to be covered, was there not?
AI believe that I stated yesterday already that I received no knowledge to that effect.
QAre you saying that you didn't know at the end of September, on the return of the U-30, that the U-30 had in fact sunk the Athenia?
AI do not remember that in anyway at all.
QWhen did you first discover that the U-30 had sunk the Athenia?
A (No answer).
QWhen did you first discover that the U-30 had sunk theAthenia?
AAccording to my recollection, not at all during the war.
QBut I understood you to say yesterday that you thought that the publication in the Voelkischer Beobachter, accusing Winston Churchill of sinking the Athenia, was a piece of perverse imagination; is that right?
ACompletely.
QAre you clearly saying to the Tribunal that -- there you were in a responsible job -- are you saying to the Tribunal that youdid not discover the true facts about the Athenia until the end of the war, when you were directly concerned in the Foreign Office with this matter?
AI already yesterday told you everything that I know about this. It seems to me that it was realized later in the Naval Staff, that the sinking of theAthenia is to be traced back to a submarine: but I cannot recall that this fact was told to me or the Foreign Office.
QAt any rate, the defendant Raeder took no steps to correct the information that had been passed to theAmerican diplomatic representatives, did he?
AI do not recall at all that Admiral Raeder advised me or the Foreign Office of the fact.
QWell, with regard to the defendant, Raeder took no steps to correct the information that had been passed to theAmerican diplomatic representative did he?
AI do not recall at all that Admiral Raeder advised me or the Foreign Office of the fact.
QWell, with regard to the defendant, Raeder took no steps to correct the information that had been passed totheAmerican diplomatic representatives, did he?
AI do not recall at all that Admiral Raeder advised me or the Foreign Office of the fact.
QWell, with regard tothe defendant vonNeurath -
If it please the Tribunal, I'm not proposing to question the witness as to the earlier diplomatic history, as this Tribunal has indicated that it is desirable toreserve the matter for the defendants as they go into the witness's box later.
But I want to ask you a general question. What was the earliest date at which responsible officials of the Foreign Office like yourself first realized that Hitler intended to wage aggressive war?
AThat the foreign political policy of the Hitler regime was a dangerous one, that I realized for the first time in May, '33, and I realized the development. The fact that an aggressive war was planned, perhaps, in the summer of 1938, did I realize that, but that the course of the foreign policy which we were pursuing might very easily lead to war.
QAlready in April, 1938, the foreign political situation was so tense that you sent a special memorandum to all German diplomatic representatives dealing with the situation and the situation of crisis.
A That may be. May I be permitted to read the document?
QI want you to look at document 3572-PS, which is a memorandum of the 25th of April, 1938, signed by yourself, and a copy of which was sent to all the German diplomatic representatives. It will be exhibit GB-478. That document reads:
"Since the work in the field of preparation for the mobilization has made further progress within Germany in the Armed Forces and in all civiladministrations including the Foreign Office, it is necessary now that in the case of government offices abroad corresponding measures also be taken in their area of jurisdiction without delay."
And then there follows a series of instructionas to the actions that are to be taken on the commencement of the period of crisis or of actual mobilization, and there is an insistence in the last paragraph, but one:
"I request the heads of offices, without waiting for further instructions to start considering now the measures to be taken into consideration in their sphere of activity in the case of a serious situation. In the interest of absolute secrecy it must be observed strictly that the number of people informed remains as restricted as possible."
That suggests,does it not, that as early as April, 1938, you were conscious of theimminent approach of actual mobilization; is that so?
A May I ask whether this document is for the year 1938 or 1939?
I can not quite distinguish the date.
Q 25 April 1938.
AThat may be.
QNow, you yourself were opposed to Hitler's aggressive foreign policy, were you not?
AI did not quite understand your question.
QYou yourself were opposed to Hitler's aggressive foreign policy, were you not?
AI personally, you mean? Completely.
QDid you endeavor to persuade the defendant von Neurath also to oppose Hitler's aggressive foreign policy?
AMr. von Neurath at that time was not Foreign Minister at all.
QBut he continuedto be a very important functionary of the Nazi state, did he not?
AI believe that his influence was even smaller than before this period, but I did keep in contact with him, and I believe that I agreed with his opinion and he with mine.
QAnd yet he continued to serve th Nazi state, in particular, in a territory which was acquired as a result of this policy of aggression; is that not so?
AI should be grateful to you if you put this question to Mr. von Neurath rather than to me.
QNow, you were in Italy and in Rome, were you not, in March of 1944?
AYes.
QYou have given me some evidence as to the behavior of the German forces in Italy. Were you in Rome at the time of the massacres in the Adiantine caves? You remember the incident, do you not?
AYes.
QWhere 325 Italians were murdered and 57 Jews were thrown in as a bit of make-weight. You were there when that happened, weren't you?
AI believe it was 320 prisoners who were murdered in this cave which you just mentioned.
Q Were you consulted about that matter?
ANo.
QThat was an action by German forces, was it not?
AI believe the German police, rather than the German armed forces.
QAnd you know, witness, that there were many murders of that kind carried out by the SS during the period of German activity in Italy, do you not?
A i do not know about many murders which took place, but I know that the German police could do quite a bit in this connection.
QYou know that they left terror and brutality shetever they left their mark upon Italy; is that not so?
AThe German Police, yes.
MR. ELWYN JONES:I have no fuether questions.
THE PRESIDENT:Do you want to re-examine?
DR.SIEMERS: (Counsel for defendant Raeder) I have no more questions, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT:Then the witness can retire.
-----------------
DR. SIEMERS:Mr. President, May I please be permitted to call my witness Vice-Admiral Schulte Moenting.
-----------------
ERICHSCHULTE-MOENTING, a witness, took the stand and testified as follow: BY THE PRESIDENT:
QWill you state your full name?
AErich Schulte-Moenting.
QWill you repeat this oath after me:
I swear by God, Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT:You may sit down.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. SIEMERS:
QAdmiral, please tell us briefly in what positions you were active in the year 1925 through 1945, with especial reference to the positions which were directly under Grand Admiral Raeder.
A 1925 to 1928, I Was Marine and Naval Adjutant of Reichspresident Hindenburg, and simultaneously second adjutant of the Chief of the Marine Laeders.
From 1929 until 1933 I had several different positions.
From 1933 to 1937 I was First adjutant with Raeder.
From 1937 to 1939 I had combat commands.
From 1939 to 1943 I was chief of staff with Grand Admiral Raeder. Then I became sea commander in southern France until the invasion, in connection with the commanding general in est Trojndheim.
After the collapse, I was for some months active with the British navy. Then in autumn I was interned in a general camp in England.
QIf you recall, please tell us the month in the year 1939 in which you started activity as chief of staff with Raeder.
AThe first of January 1939.
QCan you tell us briefly about the prestige of Raeder as a navy expert and especially his prestige abroad. I am referring only to navy technicalmatter
AYes, I believe that because of the many years' service that I had with Raeder, I have an overall picture. Raeder for 15 years was the head of the Navy. He was known as a navy officer. He was known in the imperial Navy, and he was the opponent of the British Admiral Baity in the Skaggerak Battle.
THE PRESIDENT:Witness, will you kindly observe that light. When the yellow light goes on, you are talking too fast. When the red light goes on, you must stop.
AHe was known through his literary activity at the time of the "Tirp* era and later after the first world war he was known for his true works about the cruiser war of the last world war, and he received a doctor's degree for and made his name in the technical field.
QThe defendant is accused of building up the navy with the intention of carrying on an aggressive war, even when the Treaty of Versailles applies as early as that.
AThat is not correct. From all my conversations which I had with Raeder the thought -- much less the word -- of an aggressive war was not mentioned. I believe that all of his actions and his directives contradict this.