THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal considers that you ought to be prepared to go on now. It is you who asked for the evidence of Dahlerus to be interposed, and Dahlerus was your witness, not the Prosecution's witness, and, therefore presumably you know what Dahlerus was going to say.
DR.STAHMER: I then ask for the opportunity of discussing the matter with the Defendant.
THE PRESIDENT: The Court has just been adjourned for 10 minutes.
DR. STAHMER: I was not able to settle the matter in that short period of time.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal are of the opinion that you must ask these questions now and go on with the examinati on if you wish to examine the Defendant Goering on these matters, and you must do it now.
DR. STAHMER: Very well.
BY DR. STAHMER:
which is contained in Dahlerus's book. He stated this morning to my question that it was contained therein. I submit this map to you, which is to be found on page 53, and ask for your explanation of it. between Dahlerus, myself, and I believe the Fuehrer was also there, I took a map from the atlas spontaneously and outlined in red, blue and green certain regions, not as regions which we should demand from Poland, but those regions in which Germans lived. Since Dahlerus was of this opinion -- this is to be seen from the fact that on a nearby map he repeated the same markings -- he wrote as follows along side the first part marked as "containing German population", and then "according to Goering, regions containing Polish inhabitant:
He then stated, "Goering's first suggestion for the boundary agrees with the boundary line between German and Polish populations". That was not a suggested boundary, but a limitation between the two populations and was th only authentic suggestion that was made to the Polish Government. a distinction was made between the various populations, German and Polish. I the one area, there is a majority of Germans, and in the other area there are only Poles. Dahlerus was informed of these suggestions as to boundaries that were made in very general terms. mitted to Henderson, and the one which, since I drew it up, and understood it, went telephonically to the Ambassador for it to be examined.
Q Can you please repeat the last sentence? I believe it didn't come through. official suggestion which he, as the leader, the only person justified to ma* such a suggestion, had worked out, and it was also this suggestion that was read by Ambassador Henderson, and since he did not understand it, it was phoned by Dahlerus to Henderson in order that he might study it carefully and that he might be sure that the English Ambassador understood it in its entire There was, as I have always said, an enormous risk, since the Fuehrer had forbidden that this information be made public; I nevertheless decided to do so.
Nevertheless, as far as my actions were concerned, I point again to the notations: "Goering's indication of German population; Goering's indication of Polish population" and that was only made for his use as a means of orientation. him to come immediately to Berlin because in the meantime the situation had become serious. Please clarify this statement and explain this dangerous situation. came clear to me that the tension had reached its peak. The Fuehrer had stated that if a solution of the problem could not be brought about diplomatically, the solution would have to be brought about. At that time, since it was a statement without discussion made before the higher officers who would come into action in case there was a war, I, as senior officer, permitted myself to tell the Fuehrer, that the Wehrmacht would do its duty.
It was a matter of coursem that if the Wehrmacht were called upon it would do its duty.
as soon as possible. It was now a matter of days. The 25th or the 26th had been named as the day of the invasion. I wanted to make a last effort for negotiations. In order to tell the Fuehrer if such negotiations could be undertaken successfully, I hoped to be able to obtain a diplomatic or political solution. Consequently, it was in connection with the Fuehrer's speech on the 22nd that I wanted to call Dahlerus's attention to this matter. I, of course, did not tell him, and there was no good reason why i, as a German soldier, should tell this to a foreigner, and certainly not as an officer. That is the reason why I did not say anything -- the reasons I have recently outlined. top secret military matters, and could never be revealed, nor could we ever let such information come to the attention of the foreigh press. I point out that we had herein the same procedure as every other country in this world has had. these negotiations through the foreigh office? question should be settled peacefully. The work of the foreigh office is an official work. Here it was being worked on anyway according to the policies as set down by the Fuehrer, and I could only make my influence felt by an immediate appeal, and outside official channels. I did not have any official position as regards the foreigh countries, nor was I a foreign minister. matter of formality, but it was the more practical way of achieving something. If I wanted, however, to effect an influence on the Fuehrer, it was only possible to me if I said something to the Fuehrer* the effect that with his official approval it would make it much easier for the bringing about of an official solution. That would go more rapidly.
to take place simultaneously with the official negotiations. This was clear to England? at one or two points touched the official channels that were, at the same time, being presented.
That is to say first, the phase where Ambassador Henderson, instead of returning immediately to Berlin, stayed for one or two days in London in order to speak with the unofficial negotiator, Dahlerus,in order to inform the British Government of just what these unofficial negotiations were, as preparation for the official negotiations would be much better. this was the 28th -- could be taken in the direction of a peaceful solution. I believe this is demonstrated by the fact that the sane attitude was to be found on the part of the English Ambassador, who made a very clear expression of this fact. During these whole negotiations it was not a question, as far as I was concerned, of isolating Poland keeping England out of the quarrel, but it was a question of the Polish Corridor which had come up,to bring about some peaceful settlement on the lines of the Munich Agreement. Those were my effort until the last moment. If it had only been a question of eliminating England from the quarrel, then, firstly, the English diplomacy would have recognized that immediately -- it has enough training. However, it did enter into these negotiations. And, secondly, I would probably have used an entirely different tactic.
It is not that I am reconstructing this in retrospect; I am speaking of exactly what happened in those days -- what I wanted, and what I did. The test mony of what Dahlerus says in his book regarding his talks with the Fuehrer did not by any means take place as he describes them. His attitude in his book is a very subjective one, for the Fuehrer would not have been long a party to such a talk. unessential, but will be emphasized by the Prosecution, namely, that I, in a theatrical way, handed two collaborators swords so that they night take part * the aggressive action. One of these who is said to have received a sword from was my civilian secretary, Koerner. The most I could have given him was a pen. because it was his task to carry out the Four Years plan. The second person to whom I am supposed to have handed a sword was my chief of staff, a minister. director, who also was no soldier, but whose main task during the war was exclusively that of keeping my civilian, not my military, staff in order. For both these matters neither of these gentlemen needed either a sword or encouragement to behave in a military way.
action against Poland on the 26th of August, and that this date was later postponed? negotiations, that must not be forgotten -- if then these negotiations had not led to a clarification of the problem, as a consequence of the general mobilization of Poland, and as a consequence of boundary disputes that had actually taken place -- I remind you of the many thousands of Germans who had fled and had been beaten; in other words, the atmosphere at this time was such that the Fuehrer believed that a solution could only be brought about in a belligerent way. This delay came about precisely because, one, we believed that a diplomatic solution could be found, and then it was for me a matter of course that I shouldincrease my unofficial efforts toward peace, and that is the explanation of the conversations of Dahlerus in Berlin and London that took place so often. the situation was it was described very clearly by Dahlerus. The English Government did not send any ultimatum after the 1st of September, but it sent a note in which it demanded the withdrawal of German troops from Poland.
THE PRESIDENT: Will the interpreter please the Tribunal what the last question asked by Counsel was? Does the shorthand writer know?
(Interpreter repeated the question).
THE PRESIDENT: As far as we have heard we have had no answer to it yet.
DR. STAHMER: I have not understood what is going on, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The question you asked was whether the date of the 26th of August was arranged for the action to take place against Poland and the defendant Goering has been speaking for some considerable time and has not answered that question yet as far as I have heard.
THE WITNESS: I have answered that. Actually the 26th of August was seen by the Fuehrer as the date for the invasion, since he hold it necessary, in view of the situation at that time. It was then possible to persuade him to a postponement in order that further negotiations might be carried on. BY DR. STAHNER:
Q How is to be explained that Hitler's suggestion failed?
A "which suggestion? proposal that was read to the British Ambassador in a note, that is to say, the British Government was informed what demands Germany would make against Poland. This suggestion was not entirely understood and was then unofficially carried on. The British Government was unofficially informed of it and, as previously described, the proposal was carried by Dahlerus to London. It came to naught because the Polish Government did not consent to discuss this proposal. First there was a delay so that there might be a plenipotentiary appointed. Then they waited for an emissary. First of all it was thought that the Polish Ambassador might be this emissary but he, however, declared that he was not justified to conduct any negotiations. Because of that the Fuehrer decided on invasion the next day. This telegram I also sent to the British Ambassador via Dahlerus, the telegram of the Polish Government to its ambassador, in which it forbade him from conducting any negotiations regarding proposals or to make any proposals or to hand in any note on the subject. turned over to Dahlerus so that he could turn it over in turn to Henderson and I told him in addition, despite any scruples I might have had, that it was of extraordinary importance that the British Government should find out as quickly as possible about the intransigeance of the Polish attitude so that it might exercise some influence on the Polish Government to correct this condition.
I thus demonstrated that I knew the secret, I had cracked the Polish diplomatic code and thus endangered Germany with this unique occurrence, in that I should reveal this secret and I can only justify it by my wish to avoid war at the very last moment. I should, therefore, like to read the appendix to the official communique, the message from the Polish Government to the Polish Ambassador. I skip the first part and read only the following:
"..s a particular secret for the Ambassador, he is informed -- conduct official negotiations under no circumstances. In the event that oral or written suggestions are made tell the Reich Government that you have no plenipotentiary powers to respond to thorn and that your power extends only to that of turning over that communication to your government. You can do nothing until you receive further instructions." to do anything in the direction of peace and this telegram which the Fuehrer read also made him very doubtful of the possibility of reaching any peaceful understanding with Poland. of maintaining peace? But I should not like to rely altogether on the evidence of this took but also on what I can say here under oath. It was my firm will to do everything I could to settle this problem peacefully. I did not want war, consequently I did everything I could so far as I possibly could to avoid it. That has nothing to do with what preparations I, as a matter of duty in my capacity as a soldier, was obliged to make. which might possibly have killed Dahlerus. What can you say to this?
he would have to correct himself, that he had not received this absurd news from no, but that there was some confusion on his part because I mentioned Ribbontrop's name in some entirely different context. I had only one concern and that is what I brought his attention to.
Dahlerus flew in my own private plane to London at that time. Tension was very acute then; all states were mobilizing and a state of war was imminent. Official air transport had been cut off so that it was not a very simple matter for a German plane to fly to London or that, vice versa, a British plane could fly to Berlin with a courier. Such a plane would have run into danger from anti-aircraft. I wanted, as far asp ossible, to obviate this danger by telephoning Dutch and English offices. This was the reason for my telling Dahlerus that I hoped he would go and return safely because in those times it would have been easy for an accident to take place. being sent. I never discussed the matter of Dahlerus with Ribbontrop. He did not even know that he was flying or that there were any negotiations between me and the British Government; in other words there was confusion there. Dahlerus and Hitler?
Q What did Hitler say then about Poland? situation that existed in Poland before the outbreak of war could, now that peace had come about, no longer be considered. Now, of course, he wanted to get back again those German provinces that had been taken from Germany in 1919. But, at that time he pointed out that a General Government in Warsaw would not interest him but he pointed out strongly to Dahlerus that this was a question which concerned Germany and Russia, in first order, and there could be no question of a solution with England because a great part of Poland had already been turned over to Russia. This, in other words, was an agreement that he could no longer settle unilaterally with England Russia would also have to participate in it.
DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions. BY DR. JUSTICE JACKSON:
and ask you if it is correct.
"I think I was Deputy Chairman (referring to the Reich Defense Council), I don't even know, I heard about that but I assure you under my oath, I assure you under my oath, that at no time and at no date did I participate in a single meeting when the Council for the Defense of the Reich was called together as such."
Is that a correct transcription of your testimony?
Q I ask to have your attention called to 3575. PS (U.S.A. Exhibit 781) which is the minutes of the Reich Defense Council of the 18 of October, 1938, with your presiding?
I call your attention to the statement that the "meeting consisted solely of a three hour lecture by the Field Marshal, No discussion took place."
Is that correct?
(witness handed document) document. document, did you? Would you pause to answer that question?
A I had not previously seen this document. I have to read it now first. It says:
"Notes on the 18.of November; meeting of the Reich Defense Council." people. There were present all Reich Ministers and Secretaries of State, finally the High Commands, Chiefs of Staff of the three parts of the army, Bormann as deputy of the Fuehrer, General Deluege, SS Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich, Reich Work Leader, Reich Commissar, the President of the Reichsarbeitsamt and others. Council as such. This is a meeting about the Reich Defense Council within the framework of a much larger program. Hence then, there is a question here of a meeting regarding the Reich Defense Council, part of a program that was much larger than the Reich Defense Council itself.
Q I call your attention to the fact that the "Field Marshal stated it to be a task of the Reich Defense Council to corelate all the forces of the nation for accelerated building up of German armament."
Do you find that?
Q Thesecond paragraph?
Q And II, "The first task, the assignment is to raise the level of armament from a current index of 100 to one of 300."
DR. SIEMERS: (Counsel for the defendant Raeder): I cannot quite see the reason why documents are not submitted to the Defense before they are submitted to the Court. I had not previously known of this document. ments were suddenly presented by the Prosecution without its having made any effort to inform theDefense of their existence.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is perfectly true, and I think every lawyer knows that oneof the great questions in this case is credibility, and that if we have to, in cross-examination, submit every document before we can refer to it in cross-examination after we hear their testimony, the possibility of useful cross-examination is destroyed. Now, of course he did not know, and we have had the experience of calling document after document to their attention, always to be met with some explanation, carefully arranged and read here from notes. No defendant has over had better opportunity to prepare his case than these defendants, and I submit that cross examination of them should not be destroyed by any requirement that we submit documents in advance.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you wish to say something?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes. I should like to make two points. First, I am entirely agreeable if Justice Jackson wants to make use of the element of surprise. I should only be thankful if the Defense would be permitted in its turn to use the element of surprise. Nevertheless, we have been told heretofore that we must show every document we intend to use weeks ahead of time so that the Prosecution has several weeks in order to take an attitude towards this document. as defense counsel, should be provided withthis surprise at the same time that the document is submitted to the Court. However, I have no copy either of this document or of the previous documents.
THE PRESIDENT: What you have just said is entirely inaccurate. You have never been compelled to disclose any documents which you wished to put to a witness in cross examination, This is cross examination and therefore it is perfectly open to counsel for the Prosecution to put any document without disclosing it beforehand, just as defense counsel could have put any document to witnesses called on behalf of theProsecution if they had wished to do so in cross examination.
any such document as this, a copy of it will be supplied to them for that purpose.
DR. SIEMERS: Does the Defense have the opportunity, now that the document is becoming known to the entire Tribunal, of becoming familiar with this document, in other words, of getting a copy of it?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
DR. SIEMERS: We should be thankful if we could have a copynow.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am frank to say I don't know whether we have adequate copies to furnish them to all of the defense counsel now.
THE PRESIDENT: May be you haven't, but you can lot them have one or more copy.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But I do not think we should furnish copies until the examination with reference to that document is completed.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Dix.
DR DIX: I should like to make request, would it be technically impossible that at least the counsel of these defendants who are being cross examined also receive a copy of the .document at the same time that the document is submitted, so that defense counsel will be in a position, just as the Tribunal is, to follow' the cross examination? When Justice Jackson says that it is his opinion that it is correct that the Defense should only receive the document after the cross examination, I ask, in the interest of the dignity and prestige of the Defense, to object to that. I do not believe that he means by that, that should the Defense have these documents in its hands at the same time as the Tribunal, through signs or some other means the counsel would influence the witness or would in any way disturb the Prosecution.
Justice Jackson certainly did not mean that, but one might draw that conclusion.
I therefore make this request; If, for the purposes of cross examination, in view of the altogether justified element of surprise, a document is presented and at the same time is submitted to the Tribunalm then at least it should be given at the same time to the counsel for the witness who is on the stand or who has called the witness so that he can have some idea of what the witness is being confronted with.
Goering could read this document, but Dr.Stahmer could not. In other words, he is not in a position to follow Justice Jackson's cross examination. That is certainly not the intention of the Tribunal and is certainly not good. I should therefore like to ask Justice Jackson to reply to my application in order to assist the Tribunal in its decision on what appears to me to be a matter of course.
THE PRESIDENT: Justice Jackson, the Tribunal is inclined to think -the Tribunal certainly thinks -- that you are perfectly right, that there is no necessity at all, as I have already stated, to disclose the document to the defendants before you use it in cross-examination. But, at the time you use it in cross examination, is there any objection to handing a copy of it to the counsel for the defendant who is being cross examined?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In some instances it is physically impossible because of our situation in reference to these documents. A good many of these documents have come to us very lately Our photostatic facilities are down.
THE PRESIDENT: I am not suggesting that you should hand it to all of them, but only to Dr. Stahmer.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If we have copies, I have no objection to doing that, but if we do not have them in German -- our difficulty has always been to get German copies of these documents.
DR. DIX: May I say one thing more. If it is not possible in German, then it should at least be possible in English. One English copy will certainly be available. If it is a question of a German witness, the document will be submitted to him in German since German is his native tongue. I believe that will certainly be possible.
(Dr. Seimers approached the lectern) THE PRESIDENT:
We don't really need to hear more than one Counsel on this short point. I have already ruled upon your objection which was that this document should be produced beforehand the Tribunal has already ruled that objection should be denied.
DR. SEIMERS (Counsel for the Defendant Raeder): Mr. President, my application was that the defense should receive these documents at the same time the Tribunal does. I am, not of the opinion onbraced by Dr. Dix, that only one Defense Counsel should receive it. If it is a document regarding the Reich Defense Counsel, then as a document it is important to several of the Defendants. One copy is therefore not sufficient. Each Defense lawyer must have one.
THE PRESIDENT: But not at this moment. There are, as we all know, the very greatest difficulty in producing all these documents, and extraordinary efforts have been made by the Prosecuand the Translating Division to supply the Defendants with documents, and with documents in German, and it is not necessary that every member of the Defense Counsel have these documents at the time the witness is being cross-examined. I am sure the Prosecution will do everything they can to lot you have the documents in due course--any documentsthat is being used. one copy of the document is supplied to the Counsel for the witness who is being cross-examined. As I say, the Prosecution will doubtless let you have copies of these documents in due course. You are appearing for the Defendant Raeder, and the Defendant Raeder, I on afraid at the present rate, will not be in the witness box for some time.
DR. SIEMERS: The result of that is that the Defense Counsel who does not have a copy does not understand what is point on, I ash the Court to Consider that it is not because of technical matters that the procedure cannot be followed. The document is, however, mimeographed and with, the help of a stencil; it is entirely indifference whether 20, 40, 80, or 150 copies are drawn from the stencil.
It makes no difference from the point of view of time, perhaps four or five minutes.
I belkeve for this reason that one can hardly take refuge in this matter in the technical difficulties.
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel for the Prosecution will consider what you say, but no rule has been made by the Tribunal that every document should be supplied to every Counsel during crossexamination.
THE WITNESS: I should like to say in regard to the document that this -
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask that the witness be instructed to answer the question and reserve his explanations until his Counsel takes him on. Otherwise, this cross-examination cannot successfully be conducted, in the sense of being reasonable in time.
THE PRESIDENT: I have already explained, on several occasions, that it is the duty of the defendants when they are in the witness-box, and the duty of witnesses, to answer questions directly in the affirrmative or in the negative, and if they have any explantaions to make afterwards, they can make it, after answering the question directly. BY MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:
Q. I call your attention to Item 3, under II, "Finances"; reading as follows:
"Very critical situation in the Reich Exchequer. Relief initially through billion imposed on Jewry and through profits accruing to the Reich in the Aryanization of Jewish enterprises".
You find that in the minutes, do you not?
A. Yes, that is there.
Q. And you find the minutes signed by Woermann, do you not?
A. No, that is not true. I beg your pardon. Woermann (pronounced differently from Mr. Justice Jackson) signed that. I know Bermann's signature.
Q. I said Woermann-- all right, my poor pronunciation. Well, was it not a fact that you set up a working committee under the Reich Defense Council which did meet from time to time and did carry on certain work?
A. I have already testified to that effect.