"There remained always the possibility to shift it again, depending on the building program of the English Fleet.
"The various terminologies have only a naval technical significance and do not permit conclusions as to political plans." text. The word "terminierungen", translated "terminology" is, in my opinion, not correct. Instead of being translated by the word "terminology, it should most likely be "terms" or "termination". BY DR. SIEMERS: Lohmann correct and how can you supplement this basic point of view. on this matter. All these expositions are, in my opinion, preparations which are taken and have to be taken in every war navy if it is to be equipped according to plan and be ready for use. 135, page 1, under Figure 2 -- that because the tension between Germany and Poland became more critical, it forced us to use a practical instead of a theoretical preparation for war, and that was interpreted to mean that at some period of time -- I believe in the year 1930 -- we planned an aggressive war against Poland. objective, an attack of Poland on East Prussia, and could not go beyond that. That was the objective of the work which we carried through, in case of an attack by Poland. At that time, an aggressive war against Poland or anyone else by the very weakly armed German forces would have been utter nonsense. I would like to point out again that the year 1938 first of all was the end figure of the Ship Armament Plan Phase 1, and these armored ships were to be built in '36 and '38.
DR. SIEMERS: I would like to call your attention to the fact that this was Raeder Document No. 7.
A (Continuing): Then Hitler decreed a Five -Year Plan, which incidentally ran from 1933 to 1938. The KG was to be set for the year 1938. Then the KG Endziel was set for the year 1944-45, and the reason for the setting of this date was, as it is set down in this document, the part that you have just read, that we needed that time for financial and material capacity to build large ships. This was not a period of time in which aggressive action was planned. Engliah Naval Agreement, is that correct?
Perhaps I did not formulate my question clearly. When it was said that from then on a new plan was set up, it meant thereby that it was in accord with the German-English Naval Agreement? be understood and interpreted in that way, as saying "a new navy in accord with the German-British Naval Agreement?"
1933. with national socialism before 1933? for the first time and talked to him for the first time. It was at the occasion of a festivity given by General von Blomberg at the home of the chief of the general staff, von Hammerstein, in the evening, and at which occasion the Reich defense minister, General von Blomberg, Hitler, the older generals who were in leading positions, and other generals were to be present.
Later I shall return to this occasion. But before that time, I had no connection whatsoever with national socialism. I knew only Admiral von Klewetzow; I had known him from the first world war. He had been on the staff of Admiral von Scheer, with whom I had many social connections, and who at a rather early date met Hitler. matters and had a surprisingly large knowledge of these matters. On the other hand, I do believe that von Klewetzow had talked to Hitler about his opinion of the navy. But beyond that, I had no other connections. office, even though you had no correction with national socialism? commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht, had called the leader of the largest party to be Reich Chancellor, I believe that if I had gone to him and told him I wanted to resign or had any intentions of resigning because he had called in a new chancellor, that he would without doubt have considered that an insult, and, indeed, would have dismissed me. I did not have any occasion at all to ask my superior to be relieved of my military position just because he in his capacity as Reich president had called in a now Reich chancellor.
directives about political matters? after the dinner at the home of General von Hammerstein. Before the dinner, I had met him, and after the dinner he gave a speech. He was accompanied by the foreign minister, Mr. von Neurath. There were no other party members present. and spoke about the fact that he wanted equal rights for the German Reich. He wanted to recapture the equal rights, but also mentioned the fact that he would try to rid the country of the shackles of the Versailles Treaty, to r estore national sovereignty to Germany within; and he also discussed his social aims, the establishment of a true community among the people, and the aims that the standard of living of the workers was to be increased, that agriculture was to be promoted, and that unemployment was to be eliminated; he emphasized especially -- and this seems to have been his main point -that the entire policy -- that is, domestic as well as foreign policy -- was to be in his hands alone, that the Wehrmacht was not to have anything to do with this at all, that the Wehrmacht was not to be used in domestic unrests, and that he would have other forces to deal with these matters. that it could develop into that factor which would be necessary in order to prevent the Reich from becoming or being the "football" of oahte nations; and for that reasonit would be necessary for the Wehrmachtto devote its entire work in the coming years to the preparation of its main objective, the training for the defense of the country, so that, if necessary it could use its force. In that way, the Wehrmacht would be the only bearer of arms, and in that structure there was nothing to be changed.
It was rather a large circle that was gathered there. As far as belligerent or war intentions were concerned, they were not even mentioned. He mentioned Vice President von Hindenburg, and appointed him as commander - i chief of the Wehrmacht with special honors.
And one got the impression that he respected and honored very much this man who was honored throughout the land. and gave to the chief of the army and the other chiefs. the navy, and what was the basic position taken by Hitler at this occasion; that is, his position towards the navy? who was my superior, who was the Reich defense minister. I reporte d a very few days after this, but I cannot recall the exact date. coming leadership of the navy. I told Hitler first of all about the position of the navy, about the rather small navy due to the Versailles Treaty, about the rather small power that it had, and about the political incidents, such as theTreaty of Washington, London, 1938, and then the Disarmament Conference; and about all of these matters he had been completely advised. policy was to be put at the disposal of the navy. I remember these words especially well. entanglements with England, Japan, or Italy, but above all not with England. And he wanted to document this by the fact that he would try in an agreement with England to establish the power ratio of the German navy versus the English navy. Through this step, he wanted to show that once and for all he wanted to give England the right in her dominating world interests, because of her interests all over the world, to have naval dominance. The German navy would have to be only in the framework of a European continental background; and the German navy would have to be developed only to that extent.
the navy. The actual ratio of power between the two navies was not discussed at this time; rather, it was discussed later. and it afforded extraordinary satisfaction, for it meant that we were now excluded from a senseless rivalry with the first sea power, and I saw the possibility of a solid and a gradual construction of our navy. joy and with much understanding; and later the same understanding met the Russian pact. The naval agreement meant a wonderful development. this was a going back. But this limitation was accepted with a great understanding by the majority of allGermans.
Q Grand Admiral, how did you personally stand toward Hitler? How did you judge him in the course of the years? How did Hitler act toward you? who had tremendous will power, who was a master in the art of dealing with people and treating people, and according to my observation in the first years a very great politician, and who because of his national and social objectives, which I have already named, had -
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks this might be taken more shortly. We have heard it from so many of the others.
DR. SIEMERS: By that you mean the injecture of his relationship to Hitler at this point, the Tribunal considers that irrelevant?
THE PRESIDENT: He might do it shortly.
DR. SIEMERS: I ask you to br brief, please, Grand Admiral.
THE WITNESS: I would like to show only in this connection with Hitler just why at no period of time I left him, which is an accusation against me by the prosecution, the fact I did not leave Hitler. The first steps which he undertook in domestic politics, as well as foreign politics, created without doubt a great wonder for his political craftiness and also brought forth the hope that since as he was taking the first step without less of blood, and without entering into political intrigue, he would be able to leade us peacefully -
THE PRESIDENT: We have heard this as I have pointed out, as to this quality or power of Hitler's ability by nearly every one of the defendants and it is very cumulative, and if this defendant wishes to say he was greatly impressed by Hitler's qualities, that is quite sufficient. All of the rest is cumulative.
THE WITNESS: Very well. Then I should like to say only in the first year I had no cause to give any reason to think whether I should remain in my position or not.
DR. SIEMERS: Grand Admiral, at a later time we shall deal with this. Therefore, we shall now leave this point according to the wish of the Tribunal, to ask you, but briefly, how did this naval agreement of 1935 come about. I am referring to Raeder Exhibit No. 11, in the Document Book, Roman Numeral I, page 59.
This document contains the naval agreement in the form of a letter of the German Foreign Minister to the British Government. The letter contends it was established on the British side, as is shown by the introductory words: "Your Excellency, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of to-day's date, in which you were so good as to communicate to me on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom the following:"
On the part of the British the following statements were made:
"During the last few days the representatives of the German Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have been engaged in conversations, the primary purpose of which has been to prepare the way for the holding of a general conference on the subject of the limitation of naval armaments. I now have much pleasure in notifying your Excellency of the formal acceptance by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of the proposal of the German Government discussed at those conversations that the future strength of the German Navy in relation to the aggregate naval strength of the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations should be in the proportion of 35:100. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom regard this proposal as a contribution of the greatest importance to the cause of future naval limitation. They further believe that the agreement which they have now reached with the German Government, and which they regard as a permament and definite agreement as from to-day between the two Governments"
THE PRESIDENT: This is a well known document and the Tribunal will take judicial notice of it, of course. It isn't necessary to read it all.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well. small "f", on the part of the British Government it was recognized that as far as submarines were concerned, Germany was permitted to have the same number as Britain. At that time that was about 52,000 tons. That was more than a hundred U-boats. The Government of the German Reich obligated itself solely to be satisfied with forty-five per-cent of the total U-boat tonnage of the United Kingdom.
as a peaceful development on the part of the Germans and was that hailed in the Navy
AAs I have already said it wa*---*et with great satisfaction.
DR. SIEMERS: Since an attitude dating to previous years has more weight than a declaration which is made here and now, I would like to submit Raeder Exhibit No. 12, Document Book Roman Numeral I, page 64. This document deals with a writing by Grand Admiral Raeder for the construction of the Officers Corps. This is dated 15 July, 1935. It is dated sometime after the naval agreement was signed. At that time Raeder said and I quote the second paragraph:
"The agreement resulted from the decision of the Fuehrer to fix the ratio of the fleets of Germany and England at 35:100. This decision, arrived at after deliberations on European politics formed the point of departurefor the London conferences. This decision was imperturbably adhered to and our demands were all together met. The underlying purpose of the Fuehrer's decision is the will to exclude the possibility of antagonism between Germany and England for all future times, and, consequently, to exclude naval rivalry between the countries forever."
And the sentence on page 66 is also important. The rest I wish the High Tribunal to take judicial notice of.
"Throughthe agreement the construction of the German Navy to the extent fixed by the Fuehrer was formally approved of by England."
Then comes the actual tonnage. when I should like to call attention to the final sentence, which shows the position and attitude of the British at the time:
"In the political sphere this agreement is of importance since it represents the first stop in a practical understanding, and because it brought about the first step to relaxation of the inflexible front up to now kept up against Germany by our former Allies, which was demonstrated recently at Stresa in particular vigor." followed in the next years?
DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, I should like to submit Raeder Exhibit No. 13. This is a document which makes it possible for me to dispense with testimony here in Court of Vice Admiral Lohman. In Document Book I, page 68, this Document is entitled:
"The Now Plan for the Development of the German Navy", and it is a basic piece of work.
It is a report on the part of Vice Admiral Lohman, who in the summer of 835, gave that speech at the Hanseatic University at Hamburg. I ask the High Tribunal to take judicial notice of this Document and it's vital points, and since this is a basic work which was engaged upon, and officially requested, I should like to quote the following only: Admiral Lohman sets forth first of all that because of the freedom of the armed forces the navy no longer had to adhere to limitation but that Hitler then insisted on this copy fromwhich I now quote to you verbatim:
"The Fuehrer, however, chose another way. He preferred to negotiate on the state of German Naval armament direct with Britain which, as our onetime enemy" - I beg your pardon, I am quoting from page 70 - "has tried for years to show an understanding for our difficult position." were misleading:
"The more surprising then was the ratification of the treaty which expressed the full agreement of both governments,and did not, like some armament treaties of former times, leave more embitterment than understanding in its trail. The sense of fairness, which British statesmen, along all the often very dirty paths of higher politics, have not lost, broke through in view of the unreserved uprightness of the German declarations, the worthy decision of the German representatives and the passionate will for peace, whichinspire the speeches and acts of our Fuehrer. Unlike former times, the speeches of the British leaders expressed respect and recognition. And this has been acknowledged by us as a sign of an honest preparedness to understand. Hardly less valuable than the attitude of the official leaders are the voices from the circles of British war-veterans. For example: When, In November, 1918, the German Fleet was taken by British Squadrons to be interned in Scapa Flow, the British C-in-C Fleet, Lord Beatty, the great enemy of our Cruiser Admiral H ipper, gave the famous signal: Do not forget that the enemy is a contemptible beast,' this C-in-C Fleet expressed on several occasions his dislike for Germany. But on 26th June, the same Beatty stated in the House of Lords: 'I am of the opinion that we should thank the Germans, They came to us with hands outstretched, announcing that they agreed to the comparative strengths of 35:100. " "If they had offered other proposals we could not have prevented them.
It is truly and in fact a thankful fact that there is at least one country in the world whose competition in armament we do not have any need to fear." was set at 35,000 tons. This limitation plays a part in the Prosecution document C.23. It is of a certain importance that in this document next to the words "battleship 35,000 tons" the words "Panama Canal" are mentioned. The limitation to 35,000 tons is not a significant and important as the Prosecution would like us to believe. This is the origin: The United States of America at that time wanted to limit the tonnage to 35,000 tons because of the Panama Canal, because if there had been any larger tonnage the Panama Canal would have had to be made larger. I shall return to this point later, since this limit of 35,000 tons was not maintained. mentioned of 52,700 tons, as the proof that this was the point of departure for comparison with German U-boats. It is a matter of history and it is set down here that France did not participate in this limitation and at that time had 93,000 tons, from the lightest U-boat. 96 ready and 15 were in the dock. It is also know to history that Germany -- and this is shown on the same pagealways wanted to do away with U-boats. They agreed to an elimination, since 315 had to be destroyed after the first World War. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q. Grand Admiral, did the agreement with the British as is shown through these documents, did this show itself in other connections?
A. I tried to maintain a good agreement like this and to express my views to the British Navy and this took place, for instance, when through an English News agency through a phone call the death of the Admiral of the Fleet Jellicoe was made known to me. He served as the head of the Fleet in the first World War and he had been our opponent, and a very noble one. Through this agency I gave a message to the English fleet.
THE PRESIDENT: I doubt if this really has any effect on the issues we have to consider.
THE WITNESS: In any event, I tried to bring about a good understanding with the British Navy in the future and to maintain this good understanding. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q. On the 17th of July 1937 there was a further German-English Naval agreement, It was signed on that d . I am submitting this document as Raeder Exhibit Number 14, Document Book I, Page 81. This is a rather lengthy document which has been translated and printed in the document book only in part, and in order to understand the infringement which the Prosecution accuses us of I have to refer to several points contained in this document. This agreement concerns the limitation of the naval armament and the exchange of information concerning naval construction and expansion. In Article 4 we find the limitation to 35,000 tons for battleship, a limitation which we have already mentioned; and in Article 11 and 12, articles which are shown, I will not read because of the technical character but which I ask the Tribunal to take note of -- these articles set forth the oblications on the part of both governments to provide annual programs of their vessels, and that is to take place within the first four months of each calendar year. the annual program is to be stated, and four months before the launching of the ship, information is to be given out. In order to understand this matter, that is, the naval agreement, and the accusations made against the defendant in this connection, I would like to refer to Articles 24 to 26. The three articles show -
THE PRESIDENT: Summarize these articles.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes. I did not intend to read them, Your Honor. I just want to quote a point or two from them. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q. In these articles the conditions and stipulations are mentioned according to which one of the two partners to the agreement could deviate from the agreement. Therefore, from the beginning it was considered competent to deviate from the agreement according to certain conditions. Under Article 24 if one of the partners was to be involved in a war, according to Article 25 in case another power, for instance the United States or France or Japan, and were to build a vessel or purchase a vessel larger than those provided for in this agreement -- and in this article it says expressly under Figure 4 and refers to the limitation of battleships to 35,000 tons, -- one was bound, if there was any deviation, to notify their partners.
According to Article 26, this shows the general basis for a deviation from the agreement in case it would be required by national security, I any such consideration obtained, it was possible to deviate. Details are not necessary at this point.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The deviation is subject to notification of the other party under sub-article 2. It was just relevant on 26, any deviation is subject to notification to the other party of the deviation.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it, Dr. Siemers?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, of course. I believe -
THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution say that this agreement was broken?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes. To the remains just made by Sir David I would like to say that I referred to the fact that a deviation was permitted under these con tions but that the obligation was present that the other partners were to be n tified. Perhaps that did not come through before. BY DR. SIEMERS: under the same point of view which you have already stated. Are any other fact remarkable? Facts which relate to the agreement? had made with other powers -- these treaties had expired as I remember, and th and the circumstance that we in 1937 were asked to join the treaty which had * made by all of these powers, this fact of being invited meant that Germany fr* now on would be included into the frame-work of these treaties.
DR. SIEMERS: There seems to be a technical disturbance. I do not get the German on my mike. Neither does the witness, Neither do the court reporters.
(A short recess was taken.) BY DR. SIEMERS: this German- English Naval Agreement, and this is found in the document C-23, equal to U.S.49; in Document Book 10. Page 3 of the British Delegation. This document is dated 18 February, 1938, It has been mentioned repeatedly in this proceeding and reads, at the beginning: "The true displacement of the battleships "Scharnhorst-Gneisenau" and "F/G" exceeds by 20% in both cases the displacement reported to the British." Then we find a list which shows that the "Scharnhorst" was given as 26,000 tons but the actual displacement was 31,000 tons, and in the depth that was given there was a difference of one meter. The "Bismarck" and "Tirpitz" were reported as 35,000 tons but had an actual displace ment of 41.700 and there is a difference of 8 centimeters. Therefore, according to what we have seen, there is a clear infringement or violation of the Treaty. Grand Admiral, I am assuming that you do not dispute this violation of the Treaty? which we had to consider, the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Bismarck and Tirpitz -
THE PRESIDENT: It seems you are again stating these things to the Tribunal making ststements instead of asking questions of the witness.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe, Mr. President, that I was incorporating my documentary evidence to bring about a transition so that one could follow the story. I was about to put the question, and my question was: The four battleships mentioned, at the time of this document was drawn up, were they in actual service?
Q None of these battleships?
DR. SIEMERS: If I am permitted to do so, I should like to refer to the fact that I have the exact dates of the putting in service of these ships, facts which would be hard for the witness to testify to. This is from an affidavit by Lohmann -
THE PRESIDENT: I think you must prove them. You can't state them without proving them.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes. I am ready to do that, Your Honor.
I am referring to Raeder Exhibit No. 2, which has been submitted to the Tribunal already. This is the affidavit by Lohmann, Page 5 of Document Book 1, Page 8. I quote "The German Navy, within the bounds of the German-English Naval Agreement, the German Navy commissioned four battleships. As far as I can still determine with certainty the dates for the laying down, launching and commissioning, I am stating them herewith. "Scharnhorst" - laying down cannot be ascertained with certainty; launching, 3 October, '36; commissioning, 7 January, '39. "Gneisenau" - laying down cannot be ascertained by me; launching, 8 December, '36; commissioning, 31 May, 1939. "Bismarck" - laying down. 1936; launching, 14 February, 1939; commissioning, 2 August, 1940. "Tirpitz" - laying down, 1936; launching 1 April, '39; commissioning, 1941" Exact date cannot be ascertained by Admiral Lohmann. I would like to mention that the other ships mentioned under C-23 were each planned but in the summer of 1939 were broken up, and that applies only to the first letter "H". There were no actual final preparations. determine how this violation is to be considered. The prosecution has said that this violation of the Treaty was criminal for it contained intentions of aggression. In order to save time, since there are technical problems involved, before I question the Defendant further I would like to refer to my documentary proof, which I am referring to with the permission of the High Tribunal, that Raeder Exhibit 15 is now being submitted by me, and, in my opinion, we can see from it that there were no intentions of aggression present here.
Raeder Exhibit No. 15 is an affidavit -- I beg your pardon -- it is Document I, Page 94. This document deals with an affidavit which was deposed at Hamburg on the part of Dr. Ing. h.c. Suechting, and this document is important for the reputation of Document C-23, and for that purpose, to refute, I should like to quote:
"Iam the former ship building director of the ship-building-yard of Blohm & Voss in Hamburg. I was with this firm from 1907 to 1945, and I am conversant with all the questions of construction of capital and merchant ships, especially as engineer I was informed in detail about the construction of capital ships for the German Navy. Dr. Walter Siemers, attorney at law, at Hamburg, presented to me the document C 23, dated 18 February 1938, with the request to express my opinion about it. From this document it can be seen that the Navy-contrary to the prior agreement -- informed the British about the displacement and the draught of the capital ships "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" and in addition of some more designed capital ships of about 20% less than they naturally had. In order to explain why this information was given, I state the following: I believe the information given to the British, that according to Naval Agreement 4, had to be given four months before keel was laid down, was based upon the fact that the capital ships "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" in the beginning were designed to be constructed with the given displacement of 26,000 tons and a draught of 7.50 meters, and the capital ship F("Bismark") with a displacement of 35,000 tons and a draught of 7.90 meters. If these capital ships were later built with a greater displacement and a greater draught, these changes were made upon orders or requests of the Navy that appeared during the working out of the plans and had to be fulfilled by the construction office. The changes were based upon the viewpoint again and again pointed out by the Navy, to construct the capital ships in such a way that would become as nearly as unsinkable as possible. The increase of the tonnage was meant to increase the offensive power of the ship --"I beg your pardon, Mr. President. "The increase of the tonnage was meant not to increase the offensive power of the ship but was done for defensive and protective purposes." I should like to offer that in the English text there is a mistake in translation. In this text the word "Not", n-o-t-, is missing. In the te xt it says: "The increase of the tonnage was meant--" and it should read: "was not meant". "As for capital ships, the Navy increasingly in the course of time made a point of having the body of the ship divided into more compartments in order to make the ship as unsinkable as possible and the protection -- in case of water flooding the ship-as good as possible.
Therefore the new battleships were built with a great width, very many bulk-heads, with only about ten meters distance, and many length-and transverse bulk-heads outside the torpedo bulk head. At the same time the strength of the vertical, as well as the horizonatl armour, as far as I am informed, are greater and divided on wider spaces, as is used by other navies. In order -
THE PRESIDENT: In other words, his explanation is that they were altered in the course of construction for technical reasons. It doesn't matter what the technical reasons are.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President, but I do believe that when we are concerned with a violation of a Treaty, a violation which is known to be a fact, it is correct to show just how the violation took place. I do not believe that in each and every violation of a treaty one can say, that is a war crime. The point is whether this violation of the Treaty was a war crime in the sense of the Charter and therefore occurred with the intention to carry on aggressive wars. A harmless violation which, in the final analysis, takesplace in every commerce, that can not be a crime.
THE PRESIDENT: The affidavit is before us. We shall read it. In fact you have already read the material parts.
Now, I think we had better adjourn. How long do you expect to be?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, it is very difficult for me to judge that accurately, but I would judge that I shall be able to conclude sometime tomorrow. I hope, Mr. President, that I shall be able to conclude at noon, but I am asking Your Honor to take into consideration that I must include my documentary proof in my testimony and this documentary proof will be dealt with in this connection in my case.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal hopesthat you will make your presentation as short asyou possibly can. We have already been so long a time over this Defendant.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1400 hours, 16 May 1946)
DR. SIEMERS: MR. President, first I make a formal request, and will ask that I may have a second secretary here in the courtroom. She was here this morning, but she was just told she could not come into the courtroom, and she is outside the door now.
THE PRESIDENT: All right. BY DR. SIEMERS: Suechting; is it true and by what process was the thought or idea based to enlarge the battleships by about twenty percent? that time when we were beginning on the construction of the battleships again. When we could see that we would have a very small number of battleships, the thought arose that we should increase the unsinkability of the ships asmuch as possible in order to make the battleships as strong as possible. We had nothing to do with stronger armament, or anything like that; only the unsinkability and resistance against shots. strengthen the divisions of the ship, and the space within the ship. This meant a great deal more of iron had to be built into the ships, thereby, the draft and the displacement were made greater. This was unfortunate from my point of view; so we had projected the ships with a comparatively small draft, because then the lines of the draft ere extremely shallow, whereas, ships with a deep draft could not go in and out in a tide. We wanted to build these ships with a small draft, and by building in these many now projects the draft became greater, and also the displacement. construction, partly because of the fact we had a comparatively slight experience in the construction of battleships?
A Yes. The designers in the shipyards of the Navy, and the designers and engineers in the big shipyards had for a very long time not built any big warships. They lacked experience, and as a result these disadvantageous changes became necessary. I close this second phase. tonnage surpass the tonnage accorded by the Fleet Agreement? war.
Q Grand Admiral, in this connection I should like to refer to Raeder's Exhibit No. 8, which has already been submitted, document book No. 1, page 40, under Roman numeral II. This affidavit at the moment gives the comparative figures, which show how much battleship tonnage Germany had according to the Naval Agreement. Please take notice of it. I won't read everything, but the only important thing is that according to comparison with the English figures, Germany had 183,750 tons, at that time, and we had 3 armor cruisers with 30,000 tons, so that according to this affidavit we still had 153, 750 tons.