A Yes, and that went so far that the armament minister -- with reference to Prussian ministers who had different attitudes than the Reich ministers, that he was attacked by then and was reported to the Reich Chancellor for doing things which he wasn't allowed to do; whereas the Reich Government itself had passed these matters already and had signed him as the responsible party for them.
Q This means, doesn't it, that these things were only kept secret for inner political reasons, so that they weren't appearing, but they had been approved by the Reich, hadn't they?
A Yes, they had. As far as these terms are concerned, this means
Q I beg your pardon. But under these circumstances I shall come to column 2, under figure 20, considering that this point was emphasized by the Prosecution. It deals with the arming of fishing vessels, and it had been pointed out that these warning shots should be made littleof.
Q These fishing vessels were tiny ships which were actually unarmed. They were serving the purpose of fishing, of supervising the fishing in the North Sea all the way to Iceland, and in the case of emergencies, they were assisting these fishing vessels; that is to say, to take people aboard who had taken sick and also to protect fishermen of other nations. We considered that it was suitable that at least a five centimeter gun should be mounted on these ships which were actually war ships. "For warning shots" means that they had to be in a position, when they wanted to draw the fishermen's attention to something, to fire a salute shot. It was quite an insignificant affair altogether, and it wasn't artificially reduced in its significance because it was a Bagatelle. firms carrying out rearmament tasks. The Versailles Treaty had allowed certain firms whereas others weren't allowed to be given orders. In effect, other firms had also been given orders. Perhaps you can generally make a statement on that. disarmament conference would be making progress. Certain points had already been accepted which meant improvements and we had to expect, therefore, that the few factories which we had would during the subsequent years show a greater output.
That became necessary to the shipping replacement plan. Consequently, such factories which were turning out special articles were more efficiently equipped; but this is never a case of having guns. These are automatic ignitors, explosives, then there are mine containers, small items, but special items which could only be produced by certain firms. But, apart from the firms which were allowed, such firms were also employed which had not been passed. So, for instance, the Fried. Krupp Grusonwerk A. G. at Magdeburg, that's No. 25, was given the task of manufacturing Flak guns and anti-aircraft guns; barrels from two centimeters to 2.5 centimeters applies to 26, which is a firm manufacturing anti-aircraft explosives. Under No. 27 -
Q I don't think, Mr. Witness, we need go into details. And then, of course, there is a case of engines which were used more and more. I have one question which applied to all these figures. Isn't there a certain compensation due to the fact that some of the firms which had been passed and for some economic reasons had already dropped out?
A Yes, you can certainly say that. These firms had comparatively few orders which alone couldn't keep them together.
Q Witness, I think one can't only say so; I think one must say so. May I draw your attention to the items under 22 and in particular to column 3, which states: "The list has been superceded in any case by the exclusion of firms."
Q That leaves us with 29 and 30. Twenty-nine, "The preparations in this sphere of major experimental boats." I think that these were preparations on a very small sector.
AAt the moment I can't tell you for certain what this is.
Q In that case I don't think that the Tribunal will attach a lot of importance to it. Probably in the near future the following serious breaches will be necessary, up to and including 1934. You've answered the question in principle by your remark regarding the planned and partly already operative discussions with the British Government.
A Yes, that's what we're concerned with. case as these conferences went on with the British Government and the Admiralty.
A You can't say that about them all. Take 1 to 3, for instance, they were mines. The numbers of mines were to be increased or respectively more modern material was to replace the old one. Then we go on and we come to the transfer of guns from the North Sea to the Baltic. thing looked to a naval expert like you; you see, the whole complex, would you say that these are minor violations and how far would you say did they have an aggressive character. defense and at a time when we were completely merely without a defense. The individual items, as I explained yesterday, are so unimportant that one needn't spend a great deal on them at all. I believe that the control commission, too, had the impression that not too much weight need to be attributed to all these matters because when, in 1925, the control commission left Kiel, where it had been stationed and where it had worked together with the organization of the command staff, Commander Fenshow, the chief of such a commission, who was mostly interested in matters relating to guns, together with a Captain Rankin, who was a specialist for these matters, said the following words:
"Now we must draw the dividing line --" No, I'm sorry.
"Now we must leave. We are sorry to leave. We didn't have a very pleasant task; we certainly didn't. I must tell you one tiling. You must not think that we believe what you have been saying. You have not said a single true word, but you have given the information so cleverly that we might have believed you, and for that I am grateful to you."
Q. I now come to Document C-29, which is US-46.
Mr. President, it is in Raeder's Document Book 10, on page 8; I mean the document book of the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean 10-A?
DR. SIEMERS: No, 10, page 8. This document, too, was submitted during the general speech of the Prosecution at the beginning of the trial on 27 November. It is a speech -- or, correction -- it is a document signed by Raeder of 31 January 1933, general directives for the support of the German armament industry by the navy. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q. The Prosecution have pointed out and have thought fit to draw the conclusion from it that as soon as one day after Hitler's nomination as Chancellor of the Reich, you were acting positively on his behalf by means of this letter. Please, will you define your attitude?
A. There is no connection between this letter and Hitler's coming into power at all. It must be admitted that between the evening of 30 January and the morning of the 31st, it would be impossible to compile so long and complicated a document, which has been carefully thought out. This document is the outcome of the hope which has already been mentioned, the hope which had arisen under Papen and Schleicher that the rules of the Versailles Treaty and the Disarmament Conference might be somewhat relaxed. The British Delegation had repeatedly said that they were in favor of a gradual state of equality. they were suitable for armament and putting them into as good a condition as possible. This should be done by increasing their output and making them capabel fo meeting competition.
As I say in this letter under (c), all countries were making efforts in that direction at that time, even those that, unlike Germany, were in no way restricted -- Great Britain, France, North America, Japan, and particularly Italy. They all made considerable effort to insure markets for their armament industry. I was trying to follow them in this particular sphere, and it was necessary that within the Naval Command Staff there should be an understanding in the various departments for the fact that this industry would need support in that manner and in a measure which would not be toommean. Technical developments should be kept secret. That is why I state under (e) that it is not so important to keep small details secret as it is that generally one should be at the top and in the lead. importance to guaranteeing the continuing support of the industry concerned by the navy, even after the present restrictions had been relaxed, so that the industry would have confidence abroad and could sell their goods. on my own behalf.
Q. Can you tell us when, approximately, these directives were created by you?
A. In the course of the month of January -- I would say in perhaps the beginning of January -- we had a meeting about it, and then I wrote this document.
Q. Certainly two to three weeks before the writing of this letter?
A. Yes, certainly.
Q. I can not imagine that any organization might write a letter like this a day after the thought for the document had first arisen.
May I ask you now to tell me just one more thing. This point, the lossening of the present restrictions, that means the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, I presume, by means of a disarmament conference. You have mentioned that four times in this document, so that I assume that was your basis.
A. Yes, it was. The whole atmosphere at the time was just like that. It was such that one could expect an improvement.
Bruening, had fought, and you felt it your duty to take certain precautions?
Q I think there is no need to go into further detail. I have read this document again and again, and I have not been able to find any point on the basi of which the prosecution could come to the conclusion that you had National Socialist ideas.
I now come to document C-140. It is US 51, and is in the document book 10-A at page 104.
A May I interrupt you please? Would it not be appropriate that I should say now what I wanted to say in addition to the statement already made regarding C-154, regarding airplanes?
DR. SIEMERS: I beg to apologize. It would be practical before going over to another subject that the witness should deal with this point. I had forgotten it.
The Prosecution have submitted document C-156. It is Captain Schuetzler's bock from the year 1937. Nearly all the same violations were contained therein which were found in C-132, so that that document would be dealt with simultaneous ly BY DR. SIEMERS: tructed in Holland, which was dealt with, but there is yet one more point to which I want you to state your views, and that is the question of certain preparations regarding the navy aircraft which night later on be permitted. aviation sector. As I see from this book, there had been purchases of a number of aircraft. They were put in the hands of a firm called Severn G.m.b.H, limited Company, which was known to the armed forces minister. Anti-aircraft had been allowed in the Versailles Treaty, both on the border and on the coast, and these anti-aircraft guns had to fire in firing exercises. The Control Commission had allowed us a certain number of aircraft for this purpose, which were towing the targets. Those aircraft were being flown by old navy pilots, who were being employed by this Limited Company. The company, in turn, was led by an old navy flier were not allowed to have any aircraft, we dealt with certain aspirants, before they joined the navy, by having them trained in civil aviation as pilots for one year.
In other words, for one year, they were being trained as pilots, and then they joined the navy and went through their ordinary navy training. and which was dissolved in the summer of 1928 by Reichs Armed Forces Minister Groener, there were these aircraft which had been purchased, and Minister Groene in the autumn of 1928, soon he himself had made the contacts so as to be able to watch for correct handling of the whole matter, carrying out experiments regarding the development of aircraft for a later naval air force.
allowed to manufacture a model of each one of the types which we might be able to use, whereas we were not allowed to accumulate aircraft. That had been prohibited by the Government explicitly; and so it happened that as years went by this company was developing a number of aircraft types which we could use at a later stage when aviation would once more be permitted. pilots. That is to say, there were certain exercises during which ships would learn how to behave with regard to aircraft. When such a period of exercises occurred, when these youg, newly trained fliers were also used, then they were discharged from the Navy for that period. It is a small matter, but formally it was always carried out. book 10-A on page 104. It is a letter from the Reich Defense Minister von Blomber dated the 25th of October 1933.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say 1933?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, Mr. President, Page 104.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, my page 104 says 1935.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg to apologize, but according to my list it should be on page 104.
THE PRESIDENT: How is it headed? Is it "Directives for the armed forces in case of sanctions"?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes. Sanctions are mentioned under Figure 1, but that is not the heading.
THE PRESIDENT: No, but it is signed "Blomberg." It begins, "Appendix to the Reich Minister for Defense."
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: My Lord, it must be'33 from the subject matter. It must be a misprint. I notice that Dr. Siemers' copy has got '33, and from the subject matter dealt with it must be '33.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. Very well.
BY DR. SIEMERS:
25th of October 1933. It is addressed, to the chief of the Army and Chief of the Navy and the Reich Minister for Aviation. Witness, had prepared military plans for an armed resistance which might become necessary because of Germany's renunciation of the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, perhaps you can briefly state your view. hadn't known of before. This directive appeared 11 days after we left the League of Nations, and it deals with defensive measures only in the event that because of that departure from the League of Nations there might be some sanctions by other powers against Germany.
It says under 2-C, first of all, "I prohibit any practical preparations." So that, to begin with, nothing was actually done following this directive, The Reich Minister for Defense was merely asking for my report regarding what should be done. the Navy at the time, because the situation remained absolutely quiet. There was no need to assume that the case of a defense would even arise.
Q The words under figure "-A which say "preparation for possible sanctions" would show that this is merely a case for defense. That was 11 days before the document was written, That is known, and it has been mentioned by the Prosecution. It is contained on page 255 of the records of this trial.
We shall now come to document C-166. This is US Exhibit 48.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, this is in document book 10 on page 36. It is a document dated the 12th of March 1934, and it is written by a Naval Commander and refers to the getting ready of auxiliary cruisers, preparation of auxiliary cruisers. The Prosecution have only quoted paragraphs 1 and 2 of this document, and they have pointed out that according to it, auxiliary cruisers were to be constructed and were to be camouflaged as transport ships "O". contradicted, and I refer to Lohmann's affidavit, which is document Raeder Number 2, contained in my document book, Volume 1, page 5. I refer to the paragraph "The document 3166, submitted to me as a communication from the Naval Command Office, of the 12th of March 1934, deals with the preparation of auxiliary cruisers, which, as stated in the document, were to be known as transport ships "O". These ships were not to be newly constructed but were to be selected from the stock of the German Merchant Marine according to the specifications given in the document, and were to be examined as to their suitability for this purpose.
Then plans were made for reconstruction in case of necessity, but the boats remained in the Merchant Marine,."
May I state at this point that in the English translation 'the word "Umbau" has been translated by the word "reconstruction." I have my doubts whether this is quite correct. I presume that the interpreter has now correspondingly tranlated it. It should be "conversion." I know the German word "umbau" has some connection to the English word "changes."
I continue to quote:
"The order to select such boats from German ship owners was also received at the Navy Office, Hamburg, where I was serving at that time." So far I quote Admiral Lohmann. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Mr. Witness, is Lohmann's statement correct? Have you anything to add?
A No, I can only emphasize again that we weren't concerned with immediate construction but merely the selection of suitable ships, and that we were investigating the question of which alterations should be made before these ships could be used as auxiliary cruisers. e were concerned with the making of drawings, and, as stated under figure 12, these preparations or drawings should be ready by the 1st of April 1935. They were to be submitted to the Naval Command Staff, so that, if necessary, the ship concerned could be taken out in case of necessity and converted.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe, gentlemen of the Tribunal, that the whole misunderstanding would not have arisen if the Prosecution had translated two further sentences, The English version is very short and figure 11 is missing. This is the wording of figure 11, and I quote.
"Request is made that in cooperation 'K', to begin with, the suitable vessels should be selected, and that it should be ascertained how many 15 centimeter guns can be mounted to achieve the necessary broadside," and so forth.
This contains the word "selected", so that this isn't, as the Prosecution has stated, the construction of auxiliary cruisers but the selection of merchant vessels.
THE WITNESS: Yes, and the ships continued to sail for the Merchant Marine.
DR. SIEMERS: The second sentence which I find, unfortunately, is not in the English translation of the Prosecution is the following, and I quote:
"As long as there is only a restricted number of guns which can be placed at our disposal for this purpose, preparations are only to be made for four transport ships. An increase of this number to brobably six will happen at at time when more guns are available, and until then the experiences regarding the preparation of the first auxiliary cruisers will have been made." and this shows the insignificance of the whole matter.
I now come to the document C-189, which is US-44. It is in document book No. 10 of the British Delegation, on page 66.
Please, will you state your attitude? I want to remind you that this is a conversation between you, Grand Admiral Raeder, and the Fuehrer in June, 1934, aboard the battleship Karlsruhe. which are mentioned in this brief document, which deals with the conversation you had with Hitler in June 1934?
The first question: Why did Hitler not want the increase in the displacement of the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau to be known; why didn't he announce it, although, according to this document, these were defensive weapons and every expert would notice the displacement of these ships and, in fact, did see that? might do with the two armored ships D and E. After the expectant naval pact with England was concluded, these two ships, which Hitler had passed for my Navy in 1934 -- we realised that we should not continue to construct these armored ships, as such, since the material at our disposal could be used for more suitable purposes. American, or any other Admiralty would, without difficulty, be able to see, as soon as he sighted the ship, that the 10,000 tons had now become 26,000?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, when you are examining a witness directly, you ought not to put leading questions which put into his mouth the very answer that you desire. You are stating all sorts of things to this witness and then asking him, "isn't that so?"
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. I shall make every effort to put my questions differently.
THE WITNESS: My answer is different anyway. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Yes?
A First of all, here we are concerned with plans. I asked permission to alter the plans for these two armored ships, first, by strengthening their defensive weapons, that is to say, the armor plates; then, an increase of their offensive armament, namely, a third 28-centimeter tower. A new 28-centimeter tower was something which the Fuehrer was not vet willing to grant because, as I saidbefore, he did not, under any circumstances, want to disturn the negotiations going on with Great Britain.
To begin with, therefore, he only permitted a medium displacement of some 18,000 to 19,000 tons. We were quite aware of the fact that if the point had come where a third 28-centimeter tower could be mounted, then the displacement would be 25,000 to 26,000 tons. because it is customary in the navy that constructions of new ships should be announced as late as possible. That was the principal reason. high speed which is mentioned, did not want to draw the attention of the countries abroad to those constructions. However, apart from that, any reason not to announce these things did not exist.
Q Please, will you come to figure 2 of the document? That has been particularly held against you by the prosecution, because there you state the view that the fleet must be developed to oppose England later on. program our example. The French Navy was developing the Dunkirk type, with 38 centimeter guns and high speed, at the time that we had made that our example. Particularly, as you will hear later, according to Hitler's views, arming against England was out of the question. It was our intention to reconstruct these two armored ships by building anti-aircraft ships with 28 centimeter guns for high speeds. However, we heard that the King George type was being designed in England, which had 35.6 centimeter guns, and which were stronger, therefore, than the French type.
That is why I said, "We shall, later on, anyhow, have to depart from taking the French types as an example and work with reference to England with their 35 centimeter guns."
There is an error in the translation regarding "oppose England". It says, in my text, that developments should be coordinated with the British developments. That means that we should design our boats in accordance with the English ships. But even that was out of date shortly afterwards, because France was now building ships with 38 centimeter guns. Therefore, we decided that we too would, build ships with 38 centimeter guns. That was the Bismarck later on.
The Word "oppose" doesn't make sense at all, at a time when we were aiming at an agreement with Britain, which would mean that under no circumstances could we have any fight with England.
equally important by the prosecution, and I quote:
"Fuehrer demands keeping the construction of U-boats complete secret, with reference to the plebscite being considered in the Saar."
A The Fuehrer's wish to keep submarine construction and preparation secret is something I have mentioned before. This is the point where he was most sensitive, because under no circumstances did he wish these negotiations to be disturbed. It was quite generally the case that during all that period he was very cautious and would not do anything, under any circumstances, which might interfere with this naval pact which he was anxious to conclude.
Q I don't quite understand the reference to the keeping secret of submarines. They weren't being built, were they?
A No. This is the keeping secret of the preparations, you see. It is merely a brief way of expressing that.
Q We now cone to document C-19, which is US045. It is in document book number 10 of the British Delegation, on page 67. This is a conversation between Hitler and Raeder on the second of November 1934 aboard the Emden. you, according to which he wished speedy reconstruction of the Navy up to 1938, and that, in an emergency, he would get Dr. Ley to place at the disposal of the Navy some one hundred and twenty million marks from the Laborer's Front.
Did you have anything to do with raising funds for rearmament?
A. I can't hear.
Q. Can you hear now?
A. Yes, I can.
Q. This document, as I said, mentions one hundred and twenty to one hundred and fifty million, which Hitler was going to place at your disposal through Ley. Did you have anything to do with raising funds for the rearmament of the Navy?
A. No, not actually the raising of sunds. I was applying for finances from the Minister of Defense for the Reich, who would pass such finances on to me. I presume that this statement was made because the allotment which had been granted for the Navy appeared too small to me. Then came the Fuehrer's statement that in an emergency he would get Ley to act. This did not actually happen. I received my funds only through the Reich Minister of Defense.
Q. Although the accusation of the prosecution does not appear quite clear to me, I want to come back to this figure once more. I want to point out that an armored cruiser of the old, small, 10,000-ton type, cost seventyfive to eighty million. How was this figure of one hundred and twenty to one hundred and fifty millions large enough to place the Navy in a position to. carry out large-scale armament?
A. Well, it isn't true. Apart from those two armored cruisers there were two battleships which were under construction, so you can imagine how the costs increased.
Q. So that this total figure is not decisive?
A. No, it is not a decisive one.
Q. Will you pass on, then, to figure 2 please? According to this figure 2 of the document, you had pointed out to Hitler during this conference that possibly, during the first quarter of 1935, six submarines might be constructed or assembled.
Q. The reason whi I said this was because I knew that at the beginning of 1935 the freedom for the armed forces, without any restriction, was being aimed at. I thought that perhaps this might create a critical situation and sanctions, something which Hitler always expected. suggested that if any particular steps for a defense would be necessary should the situation become critical, then six submarines should be previously assembled, which would normally be assembled later. Parts were to be used which would be obtained abroad.
Q. Did Hitler actually give the order?
A. No. The order was not given.
THE PRESIDENT: We might break off now.
(A recess was taken) BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Then we shall turn to document C-159 and that is US-54. This document may be found in the document book of the British document 10-A, page 110. This document is dated the 2nd of March 1936, the document written by von Blomberg, and deals with the demilitarization zone. Did you, witness, carry out long preparation for the action which took place on the 7th of March 1939? Will you please pause between question and answer. liar to me only through the document of the 2nd, of March. I would like to point out and refer you to figure "6", where it says that in order to preserve the peaceful character of the operation, military secutiry or advance measures are not to be taken without my express orders; therefore, it was shown that the entire action was to have a peaceful character. book of the British Delegation 10, page 128. This document deals with a memorandum of the suprem command of the Wehrmacht, the OKW, to the commander in chief of the navy, dated 1936 and it seems to be from the 6th of March 1938, as shown from the wording; therefore, it deals with the same subject matter as a document mentioned before this. May I please have your opinion and attitude on this?
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give me the page again.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL*FYFE: 128-A, my Lord.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes. BY DR. SIEMERS: connaissance on the 6th of March was to take place; that is the day before the occupation of the Rhine. That would be, air reocnnaissance above the North Sea was to take place and the decision whether U-boats were to be used as a means of reconnaissance, that decision he was to roach the next day; thereupon, I issued an order on the 6th of March 1936 and decreed a special-
Q I beg your pardon. I would like to point out that the order by Raeder, on the 6th of March 1936, is appended to the same document; therefore, it is at the disposal of the High Tribunal.
It is verbatim. Please continue. planning of the channels to be used by the U-boats in the bay on the 7th of March and I pointed out especially that it was to be avoided, that a wrong picture was to be given of the intentions of the Fuehrer and to make more difficult the nature of this peaceful action. of the 6th of March 1936, may be found under Figure 5. It is the last few lines action was to take place.
Q Were those large preparations?
DR. SIEMERS: Then we shall turn to the last documents which deal with the same topic of Versailles and rearmament, document C-135, equal to GB-213, to be found in document book 10, page 20. That is the document book of the British Delegation, book 10. This has the heading: History of the KD." That is the war organization and mobilization plan. This dates from the year 1938. This document was read in its entirety by the Prosecution and a very grave accusation is brow forth thereby, because the document says that Hitler had put the demand that within five years, that up until the 1st of April 1938, he would create a Wehr macht which would serve as a political instrument of power and also, since this document mentions, establishment organization, 1938 and have the final objective of the KD, of the war organization. With special consideration for the significance of this point, I asked Vice-Admiral Lohmann to give us his position and attitude to this rather technical question. We are dealing with Raeder Exhibit No.2, in my document book Roman I and Roman III, page 5. I believe that here there is a misunderstanding in the concepts as used by the prosecution. The concepts "Kriegsgliederungs" and "Aufklarungsgliederung" have been misunderstand and I ask permission to read this affidavit in conjunction with my documents, and I quote Roman III:
Order of Initial Distribution, that is Aufstellungsgliederung, AG, and Order of Battle, Kriegsgliederung, KG, I would like to add that because of reasons of simplicity, since C-153 and 135 belong together I have treated them together. Therefore, I would like to make this statement for the record, that 153 is US-43, and may be found in British Document Document Book 10-A on page 107. It has the heading "Armament plan for the Third Armament Phase. It is a rather long document and is dated the 12th of May 1934.
"The above named documents, submitted to me, deal with the order of initial distribution, the order of battle, the mobilisation-plan and the armament-plan. The first 3 plans or respective orders of distribution have essentially the same these, and differ only in their manner of composition The armament-plan differs from the other plans in as much as it deals only with new construction and the required new materials, and is hence less extensive.
"The German Navy, like all the armed forces -- and no doubt the armed forces of every nation -- made such plans in order to be able, in case of a conflict or of war-entanglements, to prepare in time and use efficiently the means of combat on hand. Due to the change of conditions, military developments, change of personnel, and the advances in the techniques, such plans were newly revised every year. An essential part of these preparations self-evident for any armed forces, consisted in the order of initial distribution, mobilisation - or battle order, which gave a survey of all naval installations on land and sea, their local defences and their tactical subordination, as well as of all war-material on hand and material to be secured within set time limits, or to be increased or newely organised. The military command based all its operative contemplations upon this order of battle, Kriegsgliederung, K.G., while the political leadership judged from it the possibilities according to the number and strength of the available military means.
"The order of battle always had to be prepared with very much foresight and was issued by the High Command of the Navy, the OKM, usually 1 1/2 years before it was to go in effect, so a to enable the responsible offices to begin in time with the necessary preliminaries such as placing financial requests with the Navy-Budget-Office, requests for materials, steel, iron etc.
, in so far as all this was not already provided for in the peace.-time expansion of the navy.
"When Hitler in 1933 in his Five-Year-Plan, demanded an armed force by 1 April 1938, which he could throw into the balance as an instrument of political power, the initial order of distribution of 1938, the Aufstellungsgliederung, was worked out independently of the yearly planned initial order of distribution, and up to 1935 it dealt mostly with the possibilities not yet exhausted, of the Treaty of Versailles and with supplementing the naval force with craft which was not limited in type or number. After the Naval Fact of 1935, the planned order of battle 1938 was replaced by an "order of battle, final goal", K.G. Endziel, in which the number of warships on hand and those to be built of all types was to be in the proportion of 35:100 measured by the tonnage actually on hand in the English Fleet. In consideration of the monetary and material possibilities, the capacity of the shipyards and the long time required to build large warships, this final goal was in the meanwhile set for the year 1944-45.