The very fact therefore, that as soon as the Nazi leaders cannot get what they want, but are not entitled to, from Poland by merely asking for it, and that, on their side they made no further attempt to settle the dispute "By peaceful means" in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, and of the Kellogg Pact, to which the Agreement pledged both Parties, because in itself it created a stronger presumption of aggressive intentions against Hitler and his associates.
That presumption becomes a certainty when the documents which I am about to call the attention of the Tribunal to are studied.
On the 10th of May Hitler issued an order for the capture of economic installations in Poland, and on the 16th of May the defendant Raeder, as Commander in Chief of the Navy, issued a memorandum setting out the Fuehrer's instructions to prepare for the operation "Fall Weiss" at any time from the 1st September 1939.
But the decisive document is the record of the Conference held by Hitler on May 23, 1939, with various high-ranking officers, including the defendants Goering, Raeder and Keitel. The details of the whole document will have to be read to the Tribunal later. I am merely summarizing the substantial effect of this part of it now. Hitler then stated that the solution of the economic problems with which Germany was set at first could not be found without invasion of foreign States and attacks on foreign property. Danzig, and I am quoting, "Danzig is not the subject of the dispute of Poland. It is a question of expanding our living space in the East. There is, therefore, no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision: to attack Poland, at the earliest opportunity. We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of this isolation will be decisive. The isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful politics."
So he explained to his confederates. He anticipated the possibility that war with England and France might result, but a two front war which was to be avoided if possible, yet, England was recognized, I say with pride, as the most dangerous enemy which Germany had. England, he said, I quote, "England is the driving force against Germany, the aim wall always be to force England to her knees."
More than once he predicted that the war with England and France would be a life and death struggle. All the same," he concluded, "Germany will not be forced into war but she would not be able to avoid one."
On the 14th of June, 1939, General Blaskowitz, then Commander in Chief of the 3rd Army Group, issued a detailed battle plan for the "Fall Weiss". The following day von Brauchitsch issued a memorandum in which it was stated that the object of the impending operation was to destroy the Polish Armed Forces. "High Policy demands, " he said, "High Policy demands that the war should be begun by heavy surprise blows in order to achieve quick results."
The preparations proceeded apace. On the 22nd June Keitel submitted a preliminary time table for the operation which Hitler seems to have approved and suggested that the scheduled maneuver must be camouflaged -- must be camouflaged "In order not to disquiet the population." On the 3rd of July Brauchitsch wrote to Raeder urging that certain preliminary naval moves should be abandoned in order not to prejudice the surprise of the attack. On the 12th and 13th August Hitler and Ribbentrop had a conference with Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister.
It was a conference with which the Tribunal will have to be referred from several points of view. I summarize How what is the Blaskowitz matter: At the beginning of the conversation Hitler emphasized the strength of the German position, of the German western and eastern fortifications, and of the strategic and other advantages that they held in comparison with those of England, France and Poland. Now I quote from the captured document this, Hitler said this:
"Since the Poles through their whole attitude had made it clear that in any case in the event of a conflict they would stand on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, a quick liquidation at the present moment could only be of advantage for the unavoidable conflict with the western democracies. If a hostile Poland remained on Germany's eastern frontier, not only would the eleven East Prussian divisions be tied down, but also further contingents would be kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This would not be necessary in the event of a previous liquidation." Then this: "Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for the neutrals to be liquidated one after the other. This process could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing with an uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a neutral of that kind."
Ciano was for postponing the operation. Italy was not ready. She believed that a conflict with Poland would develop into a general European war. Mussolini was convinced that conflict with the Western
But that the Fuehrer said that the Danzig question must be disposed of one way or the other by the end of August. I quote "He had, therefore, decided to use the occasion of the next Polish provocation in the form of an ultimatum."
On the 22nd of August Hitler called his Supreme Commanders together at Obersalzburg, and gave the order for the attack: In the course of what he said he made it clear that the decision to attack had in fact been made not later than the previous spring. He would give a spurious cause for starting the war. At that time the attack was timed to take place in the early hours of the 26th of August. On the day before, the 25th of August, the British Government, in the hope that Hitler might still be reluctant to plunge the world into war, and in the belief that a formal treaty would impress him more than the informal assurances which had been given previously, entered into an agreement, or expressed agreement for mutual assistance with Poland, embodying the previous assurances, that had been given earlier in the year. It was known to Hitler that France was bound by the Franco-Poland Treaty of 1921, and that that of the Guarantee pact signed at Locarno in 1925 to intervene in Poland's favor in case of aggression, and for a moment Hitler hesitated. The defendants Goering and Ribbentrop in the interrogations which you will see in the future, agreed that it was the Anglo-Polish Treaty which led them to call off or rather postpone the attack, which was timed for 26. Perhaps he hoped that after all there was still some chance of repeating what he had called the Czech affair. If so, his thoughts were short lived. On the 27th of August Hitler accepted Mussolini's decision not at once to come into the war, but asked for propaganda support, and a display of military activities on the part of Italy so as to create uncertainty in the minds of the Allies. Ribbentrop on the same day said that the Armies were marching.
In the meantime, of course, and particularly during the last month, desperate attempts were being made by the Western Powers to avert war. You will have details of them in evidence. Of the intervention of the Pope. Of President Roosevelt's message. Of the offer by the British Prime Minister to do our utmost to create the conditions in which all matters in issue could be the subject of free negotiations, and to guarantee the resultant decisions.
But this and all the other efforts of honest men to avoid the horror of a European conflict were pre-destined to failure. The Germans were determined that the day for war had come. On the 31st August Hitler issued a top secret order for the attack to commence in the early hours of the 1st September.
The necessary frontier incidents duly occurred. Was it, perhaps, for these that Keitel had been instructed by Hitler to supply Heydrich with Polish uniforms, and so without a declaration of war, without even giving the Polish Government an opportunity of seeing Germany's final demands, and you will hear the evidence of the extraordinary diplomatic negotiations, if one can call it such, that took place in Berlin, without giving Poland any opportunity at all of negotiating or arbitrating demands which Nazi Germany was making, the Nazi troops invaded Poland.
On the 3rd of September Hitler sent a telegram to Mussolini thanking him for his intervention but pointing out that the war was inevitable and that the most promising moment had to be picked after cold deliberation. And so Hitler and his confederates now before this Tribunal began the first of their wars of aggression for which they had prepared so long and so thoroughly. They waged it so fiercely that within a few weeks Poland was overrun.
On the 23rd November 1939, Hitler reviewed the situation to his military Commanders and in the course of what he said he made this observation:
"One year later Austria came; this step was also considered doubtful. It brought about a tremendous reinforcement of the Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all the Western fortifications had to be finished. Then followed the creation of the Protectorate, and with that the basis of action against Poland was laid. But I was not quite clear at the time whether I should start first against the East, and then in the West, or vice versa.
The decision came to fight with Poland first.
One might accuse me of wanting to fight again and again. In struggle, I see the fate of all human beings."
He was not sure when to attack first. But that sooner or later he would attack bears out it was in the East, but not in the West, so was never in doubt, and he had been warned not only by the British and French Prime Ministers but even by his confederate Mussolini that an attack on Poland would bring England and France into the War. He chose what he thought was the opportune moment, and he struck.
Under the circumstances the intent to wage war against England and France, and to precipitate it by an attack on Poland, is not to be denied. Here was defiance of the most solemn treaty obligations. Here was neglect of the most pacific assurances. Here was aggression, naked and unashamed, which was indeed to arouse the horrified and heroic resistance of all civilized peoples, but which was to tear down many of the pillars of our civilization.
Once started upon the active achievement of their plan to secure the domination of Europe, if not of the world, theNazi Government proceeded to attack other countries, as occasion offered.
The first actually to be attacked, actually to be invaded after the attack upon Poland were Denmark and Norway.
On the 9th of April 1940 the German Armed Forces invaded Norway and Denmark without any warning, without any declaration of war. It was a breach of the Hague Convention of 1907. It was a breach of the Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation signed between Germany and Denmark dated 2nd June, 1926. It was, of course, a breach of the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928. It was a violation of the non-aggression Treaty between Germany and Denmark made on the 31st of May 1939. And it was a breach of the most explicit assurances which had been given. After his annexation of Czechoslovakia had shaken the confidence of the world, Hitler attempted to reassure the Scandinavian States. On the 28th of April, 1939, he affirmed that he had never made any request to any of them which was incompatible with their sovereignty and independence. On the 31st of May, 1939, he signed a non-aggression Pact with Denmark.
On the 2nd of September, the day after he had invaded Poland and seized Danzig, he again expressed his determination to observe the inviolability and integrity of Norway in an aide memoire which was handed to the Norwegian Foreign Minister by the German Minister in Oslo on that day.
A month later, on the 6th of October, 1939, he said in a public speech:
"Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even points of controversy with the Northern States, neither has she any today. Sweden and Norway have both been offered non-aggression pacts by Germany, and have both refused them solely because they do not feel themselves threatened in any way."
When the invasion of Denmark and Norway was begun in the early morning of 9 April 1940, a German memorandum was handed to the Governments of those countries attempting to justify the German action.
Various allegations against the Governments of the invaded countries were made. It was said that Norway had been guilty of breaches of neutrality. It was said that she had allowed and tolerated the use of her territorial waters by Great Britain. It was said that Britain and France were making plans. This is to invade and occupy Norway that the government of that country was prepared to acquiesce in such an event.
I do not propose to argue the question whether or not these allegations were true or false. That question is irrelevant to the issues before this Court. Even if the allegations were true -- and they were patently false -- they would afford no conceivable justification for the action of invading without warning, without declaration of war, without any attempt at mediation or conciliation. Aggressive war is none the less aggressive war because the state which wages it believes that other states might in the future take similar action. The rape of a nation is not justified because it is thought she may be raped by another. Nor even in self-defense are warlike measures justified except after all means of mediation have been tried and failed and force is actually being exercised, against the State concerned.
But the matter is irrelevant, because in actual fact, with the evidence which we now possess, it is abundantly clear that the invasion of these two countries was undertaken for quite different purposes. It had been planned long before any question of breach of neutrality or occupation of Norway by England could ever have occurred, and it is equally clear that the assurances repeated again and again throughout 1939 were made for no other purpose than to lull suspicion in those countries and to prevent them taking steps to resist the attack against them which was all along in active preparation.
For some years the defendant Rosenberg, in his capacity as Chief of the Foreign Affairs Bureau --APA--of the N.S.D.A.P., had interested himself in the promotion of fifth column activities in Norway and he had established close relationship with the "Nasjonal Samling," a political group headed by the now notorious traitor Vidkun Quisling.
During the winter of 1938-1939 APA was in contact with Quisling and later Quisling conferred with Hitler and with the defendants Raeder and Rosenberg. In August 1939 a special 14-day course was held at the school of the office of Foreign Relations in Berlin for 25 followers whom Quisling had selected to attend it. The plan was to send a number of selected and "reliable" men to Germany for a brief military training in an isolated camp. These "reliable men" were to be area and language specialists to German special troops who were taken to Oslo on coal barges to undertake political action in Norway. The object was a coupe in which Quisling would seize his leading opponents in Norway, including the King, and prevent all military resistance from the beginning. Simultaneously with these fifth column activities Germany was making her military preparations. On the 2 of September 1939, as I said, Hitler had assured Norway of his intention to respect her neutrality. On 6 October he said that the Scandanavian States were not menaced in any way. Yet on 3 October the defendant Raeder was pointing out that the occupation of bases, if necessary by force, would greatly improve the German strategic position. On the 9 October Doenitz was recommending Trondheim as the main base, with Narvik as an alternative base for fuel supplies. The defendant Rosenberg was reporting shortly afterwards on the possibility of a coup detat by Quisling, immediately supported by German military and naval forces. On the 12 September 1939 the defendant Raeder advised Hitler, in the presence of the defendants Keitel and Jodl, that if Hitler was favor able impressed by Quisling, the OKW should prepare for the occupation of of Norway, if possible with Quisling's assistance but if necessary entirely by force.
Hitler agreed, but there was a doubt whether action should be taken against the Low Countries or against Scandinavia first.
Weather conditions delayed the march against the Low Countries. In January 1940 instructions were given to the German Navy for the attack on Norway.
On 1 March a directive for the occupation was issued by Hit ler.
The general object was not said to be to prevent British encroach ment in Scandinavia and the Baltic but to guarantee our ore bases in Sweden and to rive our navy and air force a wider start line against Britain."
But the Directive went on:
"... on principle we will do out utmost to make the operation appear as a peaceful occupation the object of which is the military protection of the Scandinavian States.
.. It is important that the Scandinavian States as well as the Western opponents should be taken by surprise by our measures.
.. In case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be kept secret, the leader and the troops will be deceived with fictitious objectives."
The form and success of the invasion are well known. In the early hours of the 9 April, 7 cruisers and 14 destroyers and a number of tor pedo boats and other small craft carried advance elements of six divisions totalling about 10,000 men, forced an entry, and landed troops in the outer Oslo Fjord, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik.
A small force of troops was also landed at Arendal and Egersund on the southern coast.
In addition, airborn troops were landed near Oslo and Stavanger, and aircraft.
The German attack came as a complete surprise.
All the invaded towns along the coast were captured according to plan and with only slight losses.
Only the plan to capture the king and Parliament failed.
But brave as was the resistance which was hurriedly organized throughout the country, nothing could be done in the face of the long planned surprise attack, and on the 10 June military resistance ceased.
So was another act of aggression brought to completion.
Almost exactly a month after the attack on Norway, on the 10 May 1940, the German Armed Forces, repeating what had been done 25 years be fore, streamed into Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg according to plan--a plan, that is, of invading withour warning and without any declaration of war.
What was done was, of course, a breach of the Hague Convention, and is so charged.
It was a violation of the Locarno agreement of 1925, which the Nazi Government affirmed in 1935, only illegally to repudiate it a couple of years later.
By that agreement all questions incapable of settlement by ordinary diplomatic means were to be settled by arbitration.
You will see the comprehensive terms of those treaties. It was a breach of the Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation signed between Germany and the Netherlands on 20 May 1926.
It was a breach of a similar treaty with Luxembourg on 11 September 1929.
It was a breach of the Briand-Kellogg Pact.
But those treaties had not perhaps derived in the minds of the Nazi Rulers of Germany any added sanctity from the fact that they had been solemnly concluded by the governments of pre-Nazi Germany; so let us just look at the specific assurances and undertakings which the Nazi Rulers themselves crave to these states which lay in the way of their plans against France and England and which they always intended to attack.
Not once, not twice, but eleven times the clearest assurances were given to Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.
On those assurances solemnly and formally expressed, those countries were entitled to rely and aid rely.
In respect of their breach these Defendants are charged.
On the 30th January 1937 Hitler said:
"As for the rest, I have more than once expressed the desire and the hope of entering into similar good and cordial relations with our neighbours.
Germany has, and here I repeat this solemnly, given the assurance time and time again, that, for instance, between her and France there cannot be any humanly conceivable points of con troversy.
The German Government has further given the assurance to Belgium and Holland that it is prepared to recognise and to guanantee the inviolability and neutrality of these territories."
After Hitler had remilitarised the Rhineland and had repudiated the Locarno Pact, England and France sought to re-establish the position of security for Belgium which Hitler's action had threatened.
They, there fore, themselves gave to Belgium on the 24th April 1937, a specific guarantee that they would maintain in respect of Belgium, undertakings of assistance which they had entered into with her both under the Locarno pact and too Covenant of the League of Nations.
On the 13th October, 1938, the German Government also made a declaration assuring Belgium of its intention to recognise the inviolability and integrity of that country.
It is, perhaps, convenient to deal with the remaining assurances as we review the evidence which is available as to the preparations and intention of the German Government prior to their invasion of Belgium on the 10th May As in the case of Poland, as in the case of Nroway and Denmark, so als here the dates speak for themselves.
As early as August, 1938 steps were being made to utilise the Low Countries as defense bases for decisive action in the West in the event of France and England opposing Germany in the aggressive plan on foot against Czechoslovakia.
In an air force letter dated 25th August, 1938 which deals with the action to be taken if England and and France should interfere in the operation against Czechoslovakia, it is stated "It is not expected for the moment that other States will intervene against Germany.
The Dutch and the Belgian area assumes in this connection much more importance for the prevention of the war in Western Europe than during the world war.
This is to be mainly an advance advance base for the air war."
In the last paragraph of that order it is stated "Belgium and the Netherlands when in German hands represent an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war against Great Britain as well as against France."
That was in August, 1938. Eight months later (on the 28th April, 1939) Hitler is declaring again "I was pleased that a number of European states availed themselves of this declaration by the German Government to express and emphasize their desire to have absolute neutrality."
A month later, on the 23rd May, 1939, Hitler held the conference in the Reich Chancellery, to which we have already referred. The Minutes of that meeting report Hitler as saying, "The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. If England and France enter the war between Germany and Poland they will support Holland and Belgium in their neutrality ...... Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at securing new defence lines on Dutch soil up to the Zuyder Zee".
Even after that he was to give his solemn declarations that he would observe the neutrality of these countries. On the 26th August, 1939 when the crisis in regard to Danzig and Poland was reaching its climax the very day he picked for the invasion of Poland declarations assuring the Governments concerned of the intention to respect their neutrality were handed by the German Ambassadors to the King of the Belgians, the Queen of the Netherlands and to the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg in the most solemn form. But to the Army, Hitler was saying "If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held a successful war against England will be secured."
On the 1st September, Poland was invaded, and two days later England and France came into the War against Germany, in pursuance of the treaty obligations already referred to. On the 6 October Hitler renewed his assurances of friendship to Belgium and Holland, but on the 9 October, before any kind of accusation had been made by the German Government of breaches of neutrality, Hitler issued a directive for the conduct of the war.
In that directive he stated:
" 1) If it becomes evident in the near future that England and France acting under her leadership, are not disposed "to end the war, I am determined to take firm and offensive action without letting much time elapse.
" 2) A long waiting period results not only in the ending of the advantage to the Western Powers, of Belgian and perhaps also of Dutch neutrality, but also strengthens the military power of our enemies to an increasing degree, causes confidence of the neutrals in German final victory to wane, and does not help to bring Italy to our aid as brothers-in-arms.
" 3) I therefore issue the following orders for the further con duct of military operations:
(a) Preparations should be made for offensive action on the Northern flank of the Western front crossing the area of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland.
This attack must be carried out as soon and as forcefully as possible.
(b) The object of this attack is to defeat as many strong sections of the French Fighting Army as possible, and her ally and partner in the fighting, and at the same time to acquire as great an area of Holland, Belgium and Northern France as possible, to use as a base offering good prospects for waging aerial and sea warfare against England and to provide ample coverage for the vital district of the Ruhr."
Nothing could state more clearly or more definitely the object behind the invasion of these three countries than that document expresses it.
On the 15th October 1939 the Defendant Keitel wrote a most secret letter concerning Fall Gelb which was the code name for the operation against the Low Countries. In it he stated: "The protection of the Ruhr area by moving A/C reporting service and the air defence as far forward as possible in the area of Holland is significant for the whole conduct of the war.
The more Dutch territory we occupy the more effective can the defence of the Ruhr area be made. This point of view must determine the choice of objectives of the army even if the army and navy are not directly interested in such territorial gain. It must be the object of the army's preparations, therefore, to occupy on receipt of a special order the territory of Holland in the first instance in the area of the Grebbe-Marse line. It will depend on the military and political attitude of the Dutch as well as on the effectiveness of their flooding, whether objects can and must be further extended."
The Fall Gelb operation had apparently been planned to take place at the beginning of November, 1939. We have in our possession a series of 17 letters dated from 7th November until the 9th May postponing almost from day to day the D-day of the operation, so that by the beginning of November all the major plans and preparations had been made.
On the 10th January 1940 a German aeroplane force-landed in Belgium. In it was found the remains of an operation order which the pilot attempted to burn, setting out considerable details of the Belgian landing grounds that were to be captured by the Air Force. Many other documents have been found which illustrate the planning and preparation for this invasion in the latter half of 1939 and early 1940, but they carry the matter no further, and they show no more clearly than the evidence to which I have already referred, the plans and intention of the German Governments and its armed forces.
On the 10th May 1940 at about 0500 hrs. in the morning the German invasion of Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg began.
Once more the forces of aggression marched on. Treaties, assurances, the rights of Sovereign States meant nothing. Brutal force, covered by as great an element of surprise as the Nazi's could secure, was to seize that which was deemed necessary for striking the mortal blow against England, the main Enemy. The only fault of these unhappy countries was that they stood in the path of the German invader. But that was enough in his designs against England and France, and they were invaded.
A recess was then taken at 1528 to 1545.
On the 6th of April, 1941, German armed forces invaded Greece and Yugoslavia.
Again the blow was struck without warning and with the cowardice and deceit which the world now fully expected from the self styled "Herrenvolk."
It was a breach of the Hague Convention. It was a breach of the Pact of Paris.
It was a breach of a specific assurance given by Hitler on the 6th of October 1939.
He said this: "Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss I informed Yugoslavia that from now on the frontier with this country will also be an unalterable one and that we only desire to live in peace and friendship with her."
But the plan for aggression against Yugoslavia had, of course, been in hand well before that.
In the aggressive action eastward towards the Ukraine and the Soviet territories security of the Southern flank and the lines of communication had already been considered by the Germans.
The history of the events leading up to the invasion of Yugoslavia by Germany is well known.
At three o'clock on the morning of the 28th of October 1940 a three-hour ultimatum had been presented by the Italian Government to the Greek Government and the presentation of that ultimatum was immediately followed by the aerial bombardment of Greek provincial towns and the advance of Italian troops into Greek territory.
The Greeks were not prepared. They were at first forced to withdraw.
But later the Italian advance was first checked, then driven towards the Albanian frontier and by the end of 1940 the Italian Army had suffered severe reverses at Greek hands.
Of the German position in the matter there is, of course, the evidence of what occurred when, on the 12th of August, 1939, Hitler held his meeting with Ciano.
You will remember that Hitler said then: "Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for the neutrals to be liquidated one after the other.
This process could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing with an uncertain neutral.
Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a neutral of this kind."
Then the conference went on and it met again on the 13th of August and, in the course of lengthy discussions, Hitler said this:
"In general, however, success by one of the Axis partners not only strategical but also psychological strengthening of the other partner and also of the whole Axis would ensue.
Italy carried through a number of successful operations in Abyssinia, Spain and Albania, and each time against the wishes of the Democratic Entente.
These individual actions have not only strengthened Italian local interests but have also reinforced her general position.
The same was the case with German action in Austria and Czechoslovakia.
The strengthening of the Axis by these individual operations was of the greatest importance for the unavoidable clash with the Western Powers."
And so once again we see the same procedure being followed. That meeting had taken place on the 12th and he 13th of August of 1939. Less that two months later, Hitler was giving his assurance to Yugoslavia that Germany only desired to live in peace and friendship with her, with the Yugoslav State, the liquidation of which by his Axis Partner he had himself so recently suggested.
Then came the Italian ultimatum to Greece and war against Greece and the Italian reverse.
We have found amongst the captured documents an undated letter from Hitler to Mussolini which must have been written about the time of the Italian aggression against Greece.
"Permit me", Hitler said, at the beginning of this letter to assure you that within the last fourteen days my heart and my thoughts have been more than ever with you. Moreover, Duce, be assured of my determination to do everything on your behalf which might ease the present situation for you. When I asked you to receive me in Florcen, I undertook the trip in the hope of being able to express my views prior to the beginning of the threatening conflict with Greece, about which I had only received general information. First, I wanted to request you to postpone the action, if at all possible, until a more favorable time of the year, at all events until after the American Presidential Election. But in any case, however, I wanted to request you, Duce, not to undertake this action without a previous lightning-like occupation of Crete, and for this purpose, I also wanted to submit to you some practical suggestions in regard to the employment of a German parachute division and a further airborne division. Yugoslavia must become dis-interested, if possible, however, from our point of view interested in cooperating in the liquidation of the Greek question. Without assurances from Yugoslavia, it is useless to risk any successful operation in the Balkans. Unfortunately, I must stress the fact that waging a war in the Balkans before March is impossible. Hence it would also serve to make any threatening influence upon Yugoslavia of no purpose, since the Serbian General Staff is well aware of the fact that no practical action could follow such a threat before March.
Hence, Yugoslavia must, if at all possible, be won over by other means and other ways."
On the 12th of November of 1939 in his Top Secret Order, Hitler ordered the OKH to make preparations to occupy Greece and Bulgaria, if necessary. Apparently, ten divisions were to be used in order to prevent Turkish intervention. I think I said 1939; it should, of course, have been the 12th of November 1940. And to shorten the time the German divisions in Rumania were to be increased.
On the 13th of December Hitler issued an order to OKW, OKL, and OKH, OKM, and the General Staff on the operation "Marita", as the invasion of Greece was to be called. In that order it was stated that the invasion of Greece is planned and is to commence as soon as the weather was advantageous. A further order was issued on the 11th of January of 1941.
On the 28th of January of 1941 Hitler saw Mussolini. The defendants Jodl, Keitel and Ribbentrop were present at the meeting. We know about it from Jodl's notes of what took place. We know that Hitler stated that one of the purposes of German troop concentrations in Rumania was for use in the plan "Marita" against Greece.
On the 1st of March, 1941, German troops entered Bulgaria and moved towards the Greek frontier. In the face of this threat of an attack on Greece by German as well as Italian forces, British troops were landed in Greece on the 3rd of March, in accordance with the declaration which had been given by the British Government on the 13th of April, 1939, that Britain would feel bound to give Greece and Roumania respectively all the support in her power in the event of either country becomming the victim of aggression and resisting such aggression. Already, of course, the Italian operations had made that pledge operative.
On the 25th of March of 1941, Yugolsavia, partly won over by the other means and other ways to which Hitler had referred, signed the three-power pact which had already been signed by Germany, Italy and Japan. The preamble of the Pact stated that the three powers would stand side by side and work together.
On the same day the Defendant Ribbentrop wrote two notes to the Yugoslav Prime Minister assuring him of Germany's full intention to respect the sovereignty and independence of his country. That declaration was just another example of the treachery employed by German diplomacy. We have already seen the preparations that had been made. We have seen Hitler's attempts to tempt the Italians into an aggression against Yugoslavia.