A To speak briefly and to state the facts, fir st of all we ascertained that quite generally Hitler had stated the wish for a large-scale propaganda campaign.
Goebbels took on the job of making the necessary proposals and preparing them, and it was Goebbels who first thought of setting the Reichstag on fire. Goebbels talked about this to the leader of the Berlin SA Brigade, Carl Ernst, and he suggested in detail how it should be carried out.
A certain chemical was chosen, known to every expert, and it was to be sprayed. It ignites after a certain period, I think hours or minutes. So as to get inside the Reichstag, one needed the corridor which connected the palace of the Reich President with the Reichstag Building. A group of ten reliable SA men were made ready, and now Goering was informed about every detail of the plan. Goering, quite by accident, wasn't making an election speech on that particular evening, but at a late hour was still sitting at his desk in the Ministry of the Interior in Berlin.
It was expected from Goering, and he gave assurances that he would do so, that the police would be instructed, while still suffering from shock, to take up a false trail. Right from the beginning it was intended that the Communists should be debited with this crime, and it was in that sense that these ten SA men who had to carry out the crime had been instructed.
That is, in a few words, the story of the events. To tell you how we got hold of the details, I have only to add that one of these ten who had to spread the chemical was a notorious criminal, and six months later he was thrown out of the SA. When the award which he had been promised did not arrive, he thought that he should go to the Reich Court, sitting in Leipzig at the time, and report his knowledge to them. He was taken before an interrogator who composed a record, but the Gestapo heard of it and the letter to the Reich Supreme Court was intercepted and destroyed.
That SA man by the name of Rail who betrayed the plan, was murdered by men of Goering and by order of Gestapo Chief Diehls. Upon finding the body, we picked up the trail of the whole story.
QWhat happened to the ten SA man who carried out the Reichstag fire? Are any of them alive now?
ANone of them are still alive. Most of them were killed on the 30th of June under the pretext of the Roehm revolt. Only one, a certain Heini Gewehr, was taken over by the police as a police officer, and we followed his trail as well.
He was killed on active service as a police officer on the Eastern Front.
QI think you testified that you also investigated, with the entire affair of Roehm, the murders that followed the Roehm affair. Didn't you so testify?
AI can't say that I carried out the investigation, since we, the Ministry of the Interior, had actually been excluded from the whole affair. But matters were, such that after the 30th of June, all cries for help and all complaints of the affected people reached us in the Ministry of the Interior, During the 30th of June, we received radio messages currently, and heard, through occasional persons in Goering's palace, and through neighbours , what the details were.
QNow, about how many people were killed in that purge?
AWe have never been able to establish that figure exactly, but I estimate that no more than 150 to 200 persons lost their lives, which, considering the situation at that time, was an incredible figure.
I, myself, sat together with Minister of Justice Guertner to compare the list which he had been given by Hitler and Goering regarding the number of the dead, and we ascertained that that list which contained 77 names of dead, who had supposedly been killed justly, was exceeded by nearly 100 per cent, through these names which we had received from the Adjutant General's Department or which we had heard through telephone calls from the Ministry of the Interior.
QNow, did you ascertain who selected the men who were killed in that purge?
AFirst of all, we ascertained that Himmler, Heydrich and Goering had compiled exact lists, because I myself listened when in Goering's palace, and I heard it confirmed by Daluege who was present, and also by Nebe who was present from the first second, that no one of those who were killed was mentioned by name. One only referred to it as "No, so and so has now been dealt with"; "No, so and so is missing", and "No, so and so will be dead forthwith", but there is no doubt that on that occasion Heydrich and Himmler had a special list of their own.
On that official list there were several Catholics, Klausner and others, and I cannot, for instance, say under oath in this courtroom whether Schleicher's murder was done by order of Goering or whether he was a man who was on Heydrich's or Himmler's special list.
QNow, was the defendant Frick fully informed as to the facts which you knew about the illegal conduct of the Gestapo?
AYes. Every bit of material which arrived which was important had to be taken to him by me, and I have already described how all these matters were sent to the Secret State Police or to the Interior Ministers of the counties by us by way of reports, so that the situation was, of course, that considering that only the most important things were put before Frick personally, amongst all this material I estimate that several hundred complaints were received daily. Those important things had to be put before Frick, because he had to sign them personally, since Goering was always complaining as soon as he saw that some young official could make requests to the Ministry of State himself and could sign them.
QNow, was Frick informed of your conclusions about the Roehm purge?
AYes, because oh Sunday, while the murderers were carrying on, I talked to Frick about the murder of Strasser, Klausner and Schleicher, and the many other murders, and Frick was particularly disgusted about the murder of Schleicher because he considered that an act of personal revenge on Himmler's and Goering's part. Likewise, Frick was disgusted about the murder of Klausner, Bohse, Edgar Jung, and the many others who had been murdered without being guilty. He was quite disgusted.
QBut when Frick signed the decree, along with Hitler, declaring these murders legitimate and ordering no prosecutions on account of those murders, Frick knew exactly what had happened from you, is that the fact?
AHe knew it from me, and he had seen it himself, no doubt. At that moment, the story of the 30th of June must have been known to Frick.
QNow, did Frick over talk with you about Himmler and Heydrich as being bad and dangerous, cruel persons?
AOn that Sunday, the first of July, Frick said to me "If Hitler doesn't very soon do with the SS and Himmler what he has done with the SA today, then he will experience from the SS many things worse than those he has now experienced with the SA."
That foresight touched me deeply at that time, to hear that Frick would say that so openly, before me.
QBut notwithstanding the estimate he made of those men as dangerous persons, did he not thereafter appoint them both in his Ministry of Interior?
AWell, of course, they were actually appointed by Hitler. I can only say that when I took leave from Trick at the time I left the Ministry of Interior in May, 1935, Frick said to me literally this:
The eternal scandal attached to my person had taught him that from now on he would only collect Party members in his Ministry and as much as possible those who had the Golden Party Emblem.
It might be that as things went on he might even have been forced to allow Himmler into his Ministry and the murderer Heydrich he would not allow into his Ministry under any circumstances These are the last words I exchanged with Frick.
QBoth were put in charge of matters that were under his legal control, were they not?
AYes, they became members of the Reich Ministry of the Interior and Frick remained their superior. BY THE PRESIDENT:
QDid you say that those were the last words which you exchanged with the defendant Frick?
AYes.
QThat was in 1935?
AYes, I have not met him after that or talked to him.
QNow, after 1934 Frick was the Minister in charge of the running and controlling of concentration camps, was he not, Dr. Gisevius?
AIn my opinion the Reich Minister of the Interior was responsible from the beginning for all police matters in the Reich and therefore also the concentration camps and I do not believe that one can say he had only had that responsibility since 1934.
QWell, I am willing to accept your amendment to my question.
I ask that you be shown document number 3751-PS of the United States, which has not yet been offered in evidence.
(Witness handed document)
Now, this purports to be a communication from Dr. Guertner, the Minister of Justice, to Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior. That would be from your friend Dr. Guertner to Frick, would it not?
AI believe I heard you say "friend". Guertner during the time he acted as Minister did not act in such a way that I could call him my friend.
QWell then, tell us about Guertner. Tell us about Guertner's position in this situation because we have a communication here apparently from him.
A Guertner at that time and without doubt tried a lot to uncover the cruelty in the camps and to take proceedings.
All together and in individual cases Guertner did try quite a lot but that law after the 30th of June was signed by him which made all these dreadful things legal and apart from that, Guertner never drew the consequences from his views. But particularly that document which you put before me was such an attempt on Guertner's part and amongst the decent officials in the Ministry of Justice, to clarify principally the question of the terror of the Gestapo. As far as I recollect this is one of these letters which we discussed unofficially beforehand so as to, shall we say, provoke an answer.
QI now desire to read some parts of this into the record. It becomes U.S. Exhibit 828. I will offer it as such.
Will you kindly follow the German text and see if I correctly quote:
"My dear Reichsminister:
"Enclosed you will find a copy of a report of the Inspector of the Secret State Police, dated 28 March, 1935.
"This report gives me an occasion to state my fundamental attitude toward the question of the boating of internees. The numerous instances of ill-treatment which have come to the knowledge of the administration of justice can be divided into three different causes for such illtreatment of prisoners:
"1. Boating as a disciplinary punishment in concentration camps.
"2. Ill-treatment, mostly of political internees, in order to make them talk.
"3. Ill-treatment of internees arising out of sheer fun, or for sadistic natives."
I think I will not take the Tribunal's time to read his comment on number one or timber two.
"About number three --"
Do you find that in the German text?
AYes.
Q "The experience of the first revolutionary years has shown that the persons who are charged to administer the beatings generally lose pretty soon the feeling for the purpose andmeaning of their actions and permit themselves to be governed by personal feelings of revenge or sadistic tendencies.
As an example, members of the guard detail of the former concentration camp at Bredow near Stettin completely stripped a prostitute who had an argument with one of them and boat her with whips and cowhides in such a fashion that the woman two months later still showed two open and infected wounds."
I shall not go into the dimensions, they are not important.
"In the concentration camp at Kemna near Wuppertal, prisoners were locked up in a narrow clothing locker and were then tortured by blowing in cigarette smoke, upsetting the locker, etc. In some cases the prisoners were given first salt herring to eat, so as to produce an especially strong and torturing thirst.
"In the Hohenstein concentration camp in Saxony, prisoners had to stand under a dripping apparatus especially constructed for this purpose until the drops of water which fell down in even intervals caused seriously infected wounds on their scalps.
"In a concentration camp in Hamburg four prisoners were lashed for days, once without interruption for three days and nights, once five days and nights, to a grating in the form of a cross, being fed so meagerly with dried bread that they almost died of hunger.
"Those few examples show such a degree of cruelty which is an insult to every German sensibility, that it is impossible to consider any extenuating circumstances.
"In conclusion, I should like to present my opinion about these three points to you, my dear Herr Reichsminister, in your capacity as cabinet member in charge of the establishment of protective custody and the camps for protective custody."
And he goes on to make certain recommendations for action by the Minister.
I do not know whether the Tribunal cares to have more of this road.
Was any improvement in conditions noted after the receipt of that communication by Frick?
AThe letter was received during those very days when I left the Ministry of the Interior. I should like to say only one thing as far as the letter is concerned.
The things described in it are really only a fraction of the things which we knew.
I participated when this letter was prepared by talking to the officials concerned in the Ministry of Justice. The Minister of Justice could only quote those matters which had reached him through some legal channels and by accident, perhaps, through some proceeding which had been instituted. But there can be no doubt that this letter was merely the cause and the cause in turn was a very cheeky letter from Heydrich to Guertner, dated the 28th of March, 1935, in which he denies that the Minister of Justice has the right to prosecute in the cases described.
The letter, therefore, does notintroduce anything new into my statements and no doubt you all have convinced yourself that these conditions which started at that time did never cease but that they got worse and worse as time went on.
QNow, there came a time when Heydrich was assassinated in Prague, did there not?
AYes, the very brave Czechs did achieve something which we unfortunately did not achieve. That will always be to their glory.
QNow, I suppose the Czechs expected and did you expect that the assassination of Heydrich would result in name improvement in this condition?
AWe asked ourselves, was Canaris, Oster, Nebe and the others of the group, we asked ourselves whether it was possible at all that an even, worse man could possibly be sound after such a monster as Heydrich and as far as that is concerned we really did think that the Gestapo terror would now be alleviated and that perhaps a certain amount of legal treatment might be brought about or that at least the cruelties might be reduced.
Q And then came Kaltenbrunner. Did you notice any improvement after the appointment of Kaltenbrunner?
Tell us about that.
AKaltenbrunner came, yes, and things got worse every day. Once more we had the experience that perhaps the impulsive actions of a murderer like Heydrich weren't as bad as the cold, legal logic of a lawyer who was handling such a dangerous instrument as the Gestapo.
QCan you tell us whether Kaltenbrunner took an even more sadistic attitude than Himmler and Schellenberg had done? Were you informed about that?
AYes. I know that Heydrich, in a certain sense, felt something like a bad conscience when he committed his crimes. At any rate, he didn't like it too well if, in the circles of the Gestapo, these things were discussed openly. Nebe, who , as Chief of the Criminal Police, had the same rank as the Chief of the Gestapo, Mueller, always told me that Heydrich was anxious and was making every effort to cover up and conceal his crimes.
Upon the entry of Kaltenbrunner into that organization, that habit ceased, and now it was openly said amongst the department chiefs of the Gestapo what all these matters were about. They were openly discussed. Of course, the war had started and these gentlemen lunched together, and I repeatedly had the experience that Nebe returned completely exhausted from such luncheons. It came to the point where he had a nervous breakdown. On two occasions Nebe had to take sick leave for lengthy periods because he simply could not stand that open cynicism with which mass murder, and the technique of mass murder, was now being discussed.
I need only remind you of the gruesome chapter of the installation of the first gas chamber, which was discussed in detail amongst these people, just as were the experiments regarding how one could most quickly and most efficiently remove the Jews. They were the most horrible descriptions which I have ever heard in this life of mine; and, of course, it is so much worse when you hear them from some one who is still under the impression of such discussions, and who is practically collapsing, both physically and psychologically. That is worse, of course, than when you hear it via documents.
Nebe became so ill, that on the 20th of July, he really had persecution mania and was only a human wreck after everything he had gone through.
Q Was it the custom to have daily dinner conferences of the chiefs of the Main Security Office, these who happened to be in town?
ADaily luncheon conferences, yes, and everything was discussed, including questions which were of particular importance to us, because we heard about details of the methods used by the Gestapo against our group.
So as to prove my statements, I can report in this instance that, for instance, the arrest order issued against Goerdler on the 17th of July was mentioned. It was solved during such a luncheon conference, and Nebe warned us at once. That is the reason why Goerdler could escape for a lengthy period, at least, and why we could know how far the Gestapo was informed about our plot.
QAnd who were the regular attendants at those luncheon conferences?
AKaltenbrunner was in the chair. Then there was Gestapo Leader Mueller, Schellenberg, Ohlendorf, and Nebe.
QAnd do you know whether, at those meetings, the new kinds of torture and the technique of killing by gas, and other measures in the concentration camps, were discussed.
AYes. It was discussed in great detail, and sometimes I received the description a few minutes later.
QNow, what is the situation with reference to the information of the foreign office about the conduct of the Gestapo? Will you tell us what was done to inform the Foreign Office from time to time of the crimes that the Gestapo were committing?
AThe Foreign Office, particularly during the earlier years, was being continuously informed, since nearly every day some foreigner was nearly beaten to death or robbed. Then came the diplomatic missions, with their complaints; and these complaints were sent to the Ministry of the Interior by the Foreign Ministry. That came into my sphere. Sometimes four or five such notes from the Foreign Office regarding perpetrations of the Gestapo reached me, and I can testify that in the course of the years no perpetration of the Gestapo was left out of these particular notes.
QDid you make certain reports to the Foreign Office which were so dispatched that you are reasonably certain they would reach Neurath?
ARibbentrop wasn't the Foreign Minister yet.
Q No, Neurath.
AI very often discussed these matters with the officials from the Foreign Office, because they were very particular and because the officials of the Foreign Office were most appalled. I asked them quite often to have these matters put to the Minister through the official, authorized channels. Over and above that, one of the closest cooperators of the Foreign Minister, the Chief of Records, Ambassador von Buelow-Schwandte, was given material by me, as much as was possible. And, according to the information I received from Buelow-Schwandte, he repeatedly submitted that material to Neurath.
QNow, were certain of the collaborators close collaborators of von Papen? Was von Papen subject to action by the Gestapo?
ATo start with, the entire group around von Papen was continuously put under surveillance by the Gestapo in the earlier years; and amongst wide circles of the people there was the impression that von Papen was particularly interested in decency and right. A large group collected around von Papen, and, of course, that was most carefully watched by the Gestapo. Complaints were received by the score by von Papen, and there was a careful listing in von Papen's office, since no doubt von Papen quite often took these papers either to Goering or to Hindenburg.
The closest collaborators of von Papen were, of course, suspected by the Gestapo and so, on the 30th of June 1934, Oberregierungsrat von Boder, the closest assistant of von Papen, was shot dead in the doorway of von Papen's ministry room, and two other assistants of von Papen were made prisoners.
The man who worked on the radio speeches that von Papen, Jung, was arrested weeks before the 30th of June, and murdered on the morning of the 1st of July, when he was found in a ditch near the highway near Oranienburg.
QDid von Papen continue in office after that?
AI have never heard that he resigned, and I know that very soon after the Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss was murdered he was sent to Vienna as Hitler's Ambassador.
QDid he ever make any protests that you know of?
AI personally heard nothing about that at the time, although, of course we were extremely keen to hear which minister might be protesting.
However, any letter originating from Papen to the Ministry of the Interior never did arrive.
QWere some of his collaborators murdered again after the Anschluss in Austria?
AOn the day of the Anschluss, and when the SS entered Austria, von Papen's closest collaborator, Legation Counsul Freiherr von Ketteler, was kidnapped by the Gestapo. We looked for him for many weeks, until three or four weeks later his body was washed up on the banks of the Danube.
QAfter that, did Papen continue to serve as a part of the Hitler Government, and accept further offices from Hitler's hands?
AHe wasn't any longer a member of the Government at the time. Immediately after the march into Austria von Papen was made Ambassador, which rather put him out of action. However, it didn't take long before he continued his activities as charge d'Affaires at Ankara.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:Does the Tribunal desire to rise at this points
THE PRESIDENT:You would like a little more time, wouldn't you, with this witness?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:It will take a little more time, your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT:Yes. We will adjourn now.
(The Tribunal adjourned until Friday, 26 April 1946, at 1000 hours.
Official transcript of the International Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, against Hermann Wilhelm Goering et al, Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 26 April 1946, 1000-1300, Lord Justice Lawrence, presiding.
HANS BERND GISEVIUS--Resumed CROSS-EXAMINATION-Continued BY MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:
QMay it please the Tribunal.
Dr. Gisevius, yesterday you made some reference to Herbert Goering in saying that Schacht had sent word to you about the Gestapo microphones in Schacht's house. Will you tell us who Herbert Goering was in relation to the defendant?
AHerbert Goering was a cousin of the defendant Goering. I had known him for many years. Herbert, as well as his brothers and sisters, warned me, over a period of years, about the disaster which would overtake Germany if at any time a man like their cousin Hermann Goering would have a position of even the smallest responsibility. They called my attention to the characteristics of the defendant, which, in the meantime, all of us had gotten to know, starting with his vanity, his love of ostentation, his lack of responsibility, his lack of scruples, and his walking over the dead, so to speak.
In this way I had been informed about the defendant and knew just what to expect of him.
QNow, during the period when you were making these investigations and having these early conversations with Schacht, and up until about 1937, you, as I understand it, were very critical of Schacht because he had helped the Nazis to power and continued to support them. Is that true?
AI did not understand how an intelligent man, and one who was as wise in economics as he was, could enter into a close relationship with Hitler the way he did. The puzzle that confronted me was all the greater when, on the other side, this man Schacht, from the beginning onward, in a thousand small ways, resisted the Nazis, and then, judging from the rather sharp and humerous remarks which were made about the Nazis, how the German public was glad to hear them.
I was confronted by a puzzle, until I actually met the man.
QDuring this period Schacht did have great influence with the German people, did he not, particularly with German people of responsibility and power?
AHe had tremendous influence, and many Germans hoped to see a proponent of decency and right in him; and the German people heard that he undertook many steps in that direction.
I would like to call your attention to the activities in the Ministry of Economics.
QI think we have covered that, and I am anxious to get along with this, if I may interrupt you.
AYes.
QDuring this period you reported to Dr. Schacht fully concerning your findings about the criminal activities of the Gestapo, did you not?
AYes; on occasion I spoke quite frankly.
QAnd he took the position, as I understand you, that Hitler and Goering did not know about these things.
AYes. He was of the opinion that Hitler did not know anything about such terrible things, and that Goering, perhaps knew only a part.
QAnd he stood by Goering until 1937, when Goering pushed him out of the Economics Office, did he not?
AI believe that I might fix the period of time at the end of 1936. Of course, I may be wrong. I believe it would be more correct to say that Schacht looked for support from Goering and hoped that Goering would protect him from the Party and the Gestapo.
QIn other words, Schacht did not heed your warnings about Goering until late 1936 or 1937?
AThat is correct.
Q And during this period there would be notdoubt, would there, that Schacht was the dominant economic figure in the rearmament program until he was superseded by Goering with the Four Year Plan?
AI do not know whether everything came through to me. He was at the top of the Economics Ministry and he was the leading man for German economy, of course, not only for rearmament but for all questions of G erman economy. And, of course, rearmament was just a part of German economy.
QNow Schacht believed, and as I understand it you believed, during all this period, that under G erman constitutional law no war Could be declared except by authority of the Reich cabinet. Is that correct?
AYes.
QIn other words, from the point of view of the German constitution, the war was illegal, by German law, as declared and carried out by Hitler, in your view.
AAccording to our determined opinions, yes.
QI think we found out yesterday the position you were to have if there was a successful overthrow of the Hitler regime. Schacht was under consideration for Chancellor, was he not, if that movement was successful?
ANo. It is only correct as to the first offer that Halder made in August of 1938, or perhaps even July 1938, when he visited Schacht for the first time. At that time he asked--and I had word of this information--Halder asked Schacht whether, in the case of a change in the government, he would be ready to take over a position like that. Schacht replied that he would be ready for anything and everything if the generals would eliminate the Nazi regime and Hitler.
In the year 1939 several opponents formed into a group, and at the very latest there was a period of time when Beck was the acknowledged head of all conspirators, all conspirators from the leftist to the rightist wing. Together with Beck, Goerdler emerged as the leading personality for the position of Reich Chancellor, and after that period of time we were to speak only of Goerdler in that regard.
Q Now, I want to ask you some questions about the Defendant Keitel. Of course, we have heard that Hitler was the actual head of the state, but I want to ask you whether Keitel occupied a position of real leadership and power in the Reich.
AKeitel had one of the most influential positions in the German Third Reich. I would like to say also that I was a very close friend of four of the closest collaborators of Keitel. They were the chief of the Waffen Amt in the OKW, the murdered General Olbrecht. Rather, he committed suicide. No, he was murdered. Number 2, the chief of the Abwehr, Admiral Canaris. He was also murdered. And, lastly, the chief of the army economy, General Thomas, who, through a miracle, escaped being murdered.
With all of these men I might say I was linked in close companionship and friendship, and from these men I found out very exactly what tremendous influence Keitel had on the OKW and on the entire dealing with the army, and also through the representation of the army before the German people.
It may be that Keitel did not influence Hitler to a great extent, but I must testify to the fact that Keitel influenced the OKW and the army all the more.
Keitel decided which files were to be transmitted to Hitler. It was not possible that Admiral Canaris or one of the other gentlemen I mentioned could, of his own accord, submit very urgent reports to Hitler. Keitel took these reports, and what he did not like he did not transmit or he gave these men the order not to report in the sense quoted.
Also, Keitel repeatedly threatened these men that they were to limit themsleves exclusively to their own sector and their own problems, and that each and every political expression which was to be intetpreted as critical toward the Party, toward the Gestapo, against the persecution of the Jews, against the murders in Russia, or against the fight against the churches -- that if the: made any utterances in that regard he would not protect them, and, as he said later, that he would not stop to dismiss these gentlemen from the armed forces and to turn them over to the Gestapo.
These notes which Admiral Canaris made in his diary, I have seen these personally; also the notes of General Oster which dealt with the discussions in the OKW. I talked with Dr. Sack of the army about this, and I am very much con cerned with testifying here that General Fieldmarshal Keitel, who should have protected his own officers, repeatedly threatened then with the Gestapo.
He put these men undet pressure, and these gentlemen considered that as a special insult.
QIn other words, whether Keitel could control Hitler or not, he did have a very large control of the entire OKW underneath him. Is that not true?
ADid you say Hitler?
QWhether Keitel could control Hitler or not he did control and command the entire OKW underneath him ?
AYes.
QAnd he did prohibit contacts for the purpose of giving information to Hitler by subordinate officers in the OKW?
AYes.
QIn other words, whatever Hitler's own inclinations may have been, the these men, in this dock formed a ring around him which kept out information from your group as to what was going on unless they wanted Hitler to hear it, isn't that a fact?
AYes, that is true, and I believe that I really should cite two examples which I consider especially significant. First of all, it was tried with every means to have Keitel warn Hitler before the invasion of Belgium and Holland and to tell him, Hitler that is, that the information which had been submitted by Keitel regarding the violation of the Dutch and Belgians was wrong. The counter-intelligence was to produce these reports which would involve the Dutch and Belgians. Admiral Canaris at that time refused to sign these reports and he told Keitel repeatdly that these reports which have been produced by the OKW were wrong. That is one example of reports that Keitel did not transmit to Hitler -- things which he should have transmitted to Hitler.
A second thing was that Keitel was asked by Canaris and Thomas as far as the details of the murders in Poland and Russia were concerned to submit the facts to Hitler. Admiral Canaris and his friends were very much concerned to prevent and cut off even the beginning of these mass murders and to inform Keitel while the first preparations by the Gestapo were being taken for these misdeeds and atrocities. We were in the possession of proof through Nebe and other personalities. Keitel was informed.
as to this in detail, and here again he did not resist. He who did not stop the Gestapo at the beginning, should and could not be surprised if at the end disaster by the millions arose.
THE PRESIDENT:Mr. Justice Jackson. I think you put your question "did not these men in the dock form a ring which prevented you getting to Hitler", and the question was answered rather as though it applied only to Keitel. If you intended to put it with reference to all Defendants. I think it ought to be cleared up.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:I think that is true. BT MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:
QEach of the Defendants who held ministerial positions of any kind controlled the reports which should go to Hitler from that particular ministry, did they not?
AAs far as this general question is concerned, I must reply very cautiously, for, first of all, it was a close clan which put a cordon of silence around Hitler, A man like von Papen or von Neurath cannot be included in this group or clan, for it was true that von Papen and von Neurath, and perhaps one or the other of the Defendants, did not have the possibility, or not for a long time, to have access to Hitler and to regulate the access. Besides von Neurath there was also von Ribbentrop. I can only say that a certain group, which was probably known, was the most intimate and close circle.
QI should like you to identify those of the Defendants who had access to Hitler and those who were able to prevent access to Hitler by their subordinates. That would apply, would it not, to Goering, Ribbentrop, Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Frick. and to Schacht, during the period until he broke with them, as you have testified, and to Doenitz, Raeder, Sauckel, and Speer?
AYou mentioned some and some are missing. To mention Jodl: I would like to call your attention to the tremendous and disastrous influence which this Defendant had and the positions which he had with Hitler. I believe my testimony shows that Schacht did not lock the doors with Hitler, but that he could only be glad about each open and decent report which actually reached Hitler from his ministry.
As far as this is concerned, I do not believe he had a special position of not being evil and to block access. I believe his problem is that of a responsibility.
QShaould I have included Funk in the group that had access to Hitler?
AFunk, without a doubt, had access to Hitler for a long time, and for his part Funk had the responsibility that the affairs in the Reichsbank and in the ministry of economics were directed in such a way as Hitler desired it.
Funk was an expert and put his expert knowledge at the service of Hitler, without doubt.
QDid you prepare or participate in preparing reports which were sent to Keitel as to the criminal activities of the Gestapo?
AYes.
QDid others participate with you in the preparation of those reports?
A Yes, it was the work of a group. We gathered reports about plans of the Gestapo and preparations, and we gathered material about the first cruelties, so that the courageous men at the front, officers of the General Staff and of the Army, put up workers, made photographs, and this material came to the group, Canaris and Oster.
Then the problem arose how we would bring this material to the access of Keitel. It was generally known that officers, even highly placed officers like Canaris and Thomas, were forbidden to report on political matters. The difficulty was, therefore, not to have Canaris and the others to be put under the suspicion that they were stabbing in politics; but we chose another way, a detour that they were sending agents' reports from foreign countries abroad to occupied countries; and under this ruse that in this case this or that agent in countries was reporting about atrocities abroad or that agents travelling through had seen cruelties or had found these despicable photographs. Under this ruse we submitted these reports to Fieldmarshal Keitel.
QNow, did Canaris and Oster participate in submitting those reports to Keitel?
AYes. Without Canaris and without Oster the working out and the gathering of this material would not have been possible at all.
QAnd what positions did Canaris and Oster hold with reference to Keitel at this time when these reports were being submitted?
ACanaris was the senior officer of the OKW. Formerly he had to represent Keitel, when Keitel was absent. Keitel was concerned that some one else took his place, usually his Party men, General Reineke and Oster, as the representative of the Chief of Staff for Canaris and in close relation to him. Keitel could not have wished for a closer contact in reality and in truth than through these two men in the service of the Wehrmacht.
QSo these reports which were sent to Keitel came from the highest men in his own organization under himself?
AYes.
QNow, what did they report to Keitel? Let me ask you if they reported to him that there was systematic program of murder of the insane going on?