QYou know that the Stahlhelm in the year 1934 was taken into the SA. I thought I would like to ask you on this occasion whether it was up to the individual member of the Stahlhelm to say no or to protest in any way against his being taken over into the SA.
AOf course it was possible, as everything was possible in the Third Reich.
QWhat would have been the possible consequences?
AThe possible consequences would have been a tremendous conflict with the SA leader or Party leader. At that time I was not a Stahlhelm member and I can say that it must have been very hard for many people to make the decision to reject the transfer into the SA. Minister Selte at the top had been betrayed or as it was said during that time, sold into the SA. A nontransfer into the SA was a sign of distrust against National Socialism.
Q From my correspondence with the former members of the Stahlhelm, it may be seen that these people who, as former members of the Stahlhelm, were taken over into the SA, remained a foreign body and were in steady and constant opposition against the NSDAP and the SA.
Is that correct?
ASince I myself did not belong to that organization any longer, I can only say that I assume that these meters of the Stahlhelm did not feel very much at home in their new surroundings.
QDo you know whether the members of the Stahlhelm, before 1934 and since 1934, took part in crimes against the peace, against the church, and so forth?
ANo, I know nothing about that.
QI would also like to ask yow, so far as you know, about the SA. You talked rather freely yesterday regarding the SA leaders. I would like to ask you to limit your answers to a circle of SA members, which would differentiate between the simple SA man and the Brigadefuehrer.
Now, could you tell, from the position of the simple man to that of the leader -- and I remember the statements you made yesterday -- could you tell that these people intended to commit crimes against the peace?
AOf course, it is very hard to answer such a general question. If you are asking me about the SA men, I can only say no.
QDid you notice that SA men were arrested and that SA men were put into concentration camps?
AYes, I saw that many times. Many SA men were interned in 1933, 1934 and 1935, in those years; that is, when it was my official capacity to observe these things. They were arrested by the Gestapo, beaten to death, were tortured, and were put into concentration camps.
QCould a man who was in the SA, or someone who was on the other side -could they judge from the activity of the SA, from an individual to the entire membership, and gather that the SA intended to commit crimes against the peace?
ANo. If I recall correctly, the higher command of the OKW tried to find out whether Hitler was planning a war; and, of course, I cannot assume that a simple SA man would have knowledge of something that we ourselves did not know positively.
Q The prosecution asserted that the SA incited the youth and the German people to war.
You were a member of the Gestapo. Did you observe anything like that? An activity along those lines could not escape your notice.
AThat is another tremendously general question. I do not know how far certain thoughts would have been looked upon as war-like, but I cannot imagine that in the years up until 1938, among the mass of the SA, that there was a different opinion and mood from the mass of the German people; and the opinion was that the thought of war was utter nonsense.
QCould you see any clues from which you might have judged that the SA intended to commit crimes against peace, or that they had already committed such crimes?
AAs far as the simple SA man is concerned, I must say "no" again, and this is true of the mass of the SA people. As far as the higher leaders are concerned, that I do not know. However, the mass of the membership did not know about such things and had not been trained for that.
QWitness, it may not be denied that acts had been committed by a series of SA men, that they committed acts for which they should be punished. You know the SA and know what took place during revolutionary periods and afterwards. Are you in a position to give me an estimate, on a percentage basis, of just how many of the members of the SA acted in such a way that they should be punished?
I would like to call your attention to the fact that up until, perhaps 1932 or 1933, the SA-
THE PRESIDENT:Just a moment. Dr. Boehm. The Tribunal doesn't think that is a proper question to put to a witness, what percentage of a group of this sort, of hundreds of thousands of men, take a certain view.
DR. BOEHM:This question seems to be very important for my case, Mr. President. We are concerned here with a witness who was outside the SA, who belonged to the Gestapo, and as such was perhaps one of the few who could look into the activities of the SA, and actually did look into them. He seems to be a man who will create and get the confidence of the Tribunal.
I wanted him to state the number of the SA membershipwho should have been punished.
He is one of the few who can give any testimony in that connection. I believe that if the witness is in a position to give his testimony here, the testimony given by him will be of great importance to the Tribunal also.
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal has already ruled that not only this witness, but other witnesses, are not in a position to give such evidence, and the question is denied. BY DR. BOEHM:
QWitness, do you know of cases in which SA members worked in opposition to the SA?
AI have already answered your question when I said that a number of SA members were arrested by the Gestapo.
QDo you know what criminal or penal proceedings were taken against these men, and how many?
AToo few, I am sorry to say, if you put your question that way. Unfortunately, there were many who committed misdeeds and who ran around scott free.
QWhat relation were they to the entire SA, as a membership?
THE PRESIDENT:That is the same question over again. BY DR. BOEHM:
QDo you know under what circumstances one could leave the SA?
AThe same rules that applied to all organizations of the Party applied here also.
DR. BOEHM:I have no further questions. BY DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff, OKW):
QWitness, you said some time ago, in replying to a question of my colleague Dr. Dix, that after the defeat at Stalingrad a military putsch was to be organized. You testified at that point that discussions had already taken place, as well as the fact that preparations had been made, and that the execution or carrying through of the military putsch was prevented because the Field Marshal in the East had let down the conspirator's group.
I am asking you now to give us details about this situation, so that I can follow your conclusion after the Field Marshal let down this conspirator's group.
ASince the beginning of the war, or the outbreak of the war, Generaloberst Beck tried to get in touch with this other Field Marshal. He wrote letters and he sent couriers. I remember, above all, correspondence with General Field Marshal von Mannstein, and I saw the answer of von Mannstein in the year 1942. I had this reply in my hand.
According to the strictly military expoundings that the war had been lost, von Mannstein could reply only that the war was not 1 st so long as one did not consider it as lost. Beck said that an answer like that from the Field Marshal--he said that as long as he had a reply like that, strategic questions could not be dealt with.
Several months later another attempt was made to van General Field Marshal von Mannstein. General Treskow, also a victim of the 20th of July, journeyed to the headquarters of Mannstein. Oberstleutnant von Schulenburg also went to the headquarters of Mannstein. However, it was not possible to win von Mannstein for our side.
After Stalingrad we tried to get in touch with Field Marshal von Kluge, and he again tried to get in touch and win Mannstein.
This time discussions went so far that Kluge gave us definite assurances, and he also assured us that a discussion could be had in the Fuehrer's headquarters, and the date was set. Because of the importance of that day, a special telephone connection was made from headquarters, from Fellgiebel to the OKW in Berlin. This telephonic connection was established, and I personally was present when this telephone conversation took place. Even today I can see the stack of paper in which it was said, in sober words, that Mannstein, against and contrary to the agreement made previously, had permitted himself to be persuaded by Hitler to remain in office. And Kluge was satisfied, with very small military concessions.
At that time we considered this a gross disappointment, and I would like to emphasize and repeat again what Beck said at that time when we were let down.
QWhat other preparations had been made in this special connection?
AWe made definite agreements with Field Marshal von Witzleben. Witzleben was the commander of the entire West, and for that reason he was very important for the bringing about of a putsch in the West. We had further direct agreements with the military governor of Belgium, General von Falkenhausen. In addition, just like on the 20th of July, 1944, we had a certain quota of armored troops in the vicinity of Berlin, and had deployed them there. Furthermore, the commanders of the troops involved had been called together in the OKW in case these people were to act.
QThat was all at the time of Stalingrad?
AYes, at the time of the Stalingrad putsch.
QPlease continue.
AWe had made all other political preparations which, in a case like that, would have to be made.
QYes. What were the reasons why this intended military putsch was not carried through?
AWhat was that?
QWitness, what were the reasons why this putsch was not carried through?
A Against all expectations, Field Marshal Paulus capitulated, and it was the first known mass capitulation; it was something which we had not expected.
Paulus, before the capitulation, gave out a call to the Eastern Front and to the German people, in which the strategy of Hitler and the giving over of Stalingrad were branded.
With this clew work Kluge wanted to say that in the future he would not take any further military orders from Hitler and, through this chain of events, we hoped to circumvent the problem of the oath which always gave him trouble, so that one field marshal after the other would refuse military obedience to Hitler, and Back was to take over the supreme military command in Berlin.
QWitness, you just mentioned the military oath. Do you know anything about the fact whether Blomberg and Beck resisted or tried to resist when the armed forces took their oath to Hitler?
AI knew only that Beck up until the last few days of his life described the day of his giving of the oath to Hitler as theblackest day of his life and gave me an exact picture of how he personally felt. He told me that he had been summoned to a military roll call; and that suddenly it was said that an oath of allegiance was to be given to thenew head of state; that a new oath was to be used; and Beck never rid himself of the terrible thought that at that time he perhaps should not have given his oath. And he told me that while he was on his way home, he had told one of his colleagues, "This is the blackest day of my life."
QWitness, in your testimony, you also mentioned thatbetween the Polish campaign and the Western campaign, that is with the beginning of the Western campaign, a further military putsch was to be tried, and that this putsch never materialized because Halder and Fieldmarshal von Brauchitsch evaded it, and you used the term "ausgewiesen." And now I'm asking you to tell me just how you arrived at this opinion. Give me the facts for your opinion that they had evaded -
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:I do not raise an objection that this is harmful to us if we hove plenty of time, but this evidence as to these putsche, and threatened putsches and rumored putsches and rumored putsches was all admissible here in our view only as bearing on the attitude of the defendant Schacht's. We are not trying these generals, for being in a putsch or not being in a putsch. For allpurposes it is just as well as they should not be i a putsch. I do not know what purpose this can have in doing it over again, I call the Tribunal's attention for the limited purpose which this historical matter was admitted and suggest that it is serving no purpose in this connection to review it.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the answer to that, Dr. Laternser?
DR. LATERNSER:Since the witness talked about this complex of questions and testified that Halder and Brauchitsch evaded and I am not in a position to determine whether the judgement used by the witness is correct as seen by the facts, I believe I am obligated to clarify this point. Rather generally, I would like to add that, as far as the Prosecution is concerned, the justification is there for the prosecution to enter into this point. I would like to refer to the contention of the French Prosecutor in which he said that in allthese circumstances it was beyond comprehension why the whole German people did not rise to a man against the entire regime. That is, if I am to start with the assertion of the Prosecution, then my questioning of this point is of great importance, and I, therefore, ask that I may be permitted to ask this question.
THE PRESIDENT:The charge against the High Command is not that they were a criminal organization within the meaning of the Charter; that is to say that they planned an aggressive war or that they committed war crimes or crimes against humanity in connection with an aggressive war. Well, whether or not they took part or were planning to take part in a putsch to stop the war does not seem very material to any of those questions.
DR. LATERNSER:I agree with you, Mr. President, that it is not of special importance. On the other hand, I believe that if a point -
THE PRESIDENT:I did not say that it was not of special importance. I say thatit was not material to the relevancy. The Tribunal does not think that any of these questions are relevant.
DR. LATERNSER:Then I will withdraw my question. I have one more and that will be my final question. BY DR. LATERNSER:
QWitness, can you tell me the names of those generals who on the 20th of July participated in the assassination?
THE PRESIDENT:Well, what has that got to do with any charge against the High Command?
DR. LATERNSER:The General Staff is accused of having been a participant in a conspiracy. The question -
THE PRESIDENT:We are not here to consider the honor of the High Command. We are here to consider whether or not they are a criminal organiza tion within the meaning of the Charter, and that is the only question with which we are going to deal with so far as you are concerned.
DR. LATERNSER:Mr. President, the General Staff and the OKW is accused of having been participant in a conspiracy. If I prove, and I am trying to do that with this question, that of this General Staff on the contrary took part in an action against the regime, then the answer of my question to this point can be used that the opposite was true; and, for that reason, I ask that I be able to put my question.
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal does not think what the General Staff did in July, 1944, when the circumstances were entirely different to what they were in September, 1939, has any relevancy to the question whether they took part, either before or in September, '39.
DR. LATERNSER:Mr. President, if I put myself on the side of the Prosecution, I must assume that the Prosecution assumes that the conspiracy continued. I have not seen from anything that has been submitted that the conspiracy stopped or supposedly stopped at a certain period of time. So that the answering of this question seems to be of importance. I would like to supplement my statement, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT:Well, Dr. Laternser.
DR. LATERNSER:I wanted to add, Your Honor, that just as far as the membership of my group is concerned, the period of time between '38 and '45 -
THE PRESIDENT: You mean the group which changed; therefore they might be different in '44?
DR. LATERNSER:The point, Mr. President, and in addition to that, especially a largo membership of the people belonging to this circle in the course of '44, because of their official position, actually came to this group, and I do consider this point pertinent.
THE PRESIDENT:All right. BY DR. LATERNSER:
QWitness, my question was, can you give me the names of those generals who participated in the attempted assassination of the 20th of July 1944?
AG eneral Oberst Beck, General Fieldmarshal Witzleben, General Olbrecht, General Hoebner.
QJust one question. General Hasa, and, certainly, a large number of other generals, whom I am not able to enumerate so rapidly. Here I just mentioned those names of the men who were at that address that afternoon.
QDo you know, witness, whether Fieldmarshal Rommel was active in this?
AI cannot answer just yes for it is a fact that Rommel, as well as Fieldmarshal von Kluge, did participate. But it would give the wrong picture if Fieldmarshal Rommel especially would appear in the category of those who fought against Hitler. Mr.Rommel was a typical Party general and he wanted connection with us very late, and we had a rather unsavory taste when all of a sudden Mr. Rommel in the light of his military catastrophe, proposed to us to have Hitler assassinated but, if possible, Goering and Himmler as well. And, even then, he did not wish to be there at the first, but he wanted to be in a special reserve and to put his popularity at our disposal a little later on. Therefore, it is quite a problem just when these gentlemen entered our group as people who have been beaten, same one who wanted to save their reputation, or who were with us right from the beginning.
QDid you talk with Rommel about this?
ANo.
Q Then, a further question. On the 20th of July were officers, of the General Staff active?
AYes, a large, group.
QAbout how many?
AI can't give you the number for at that time I did not have any inside information as to how many Staufenberg had on his side from the General Staff. I know that Staufenberg and Hansen and some others had found a number of clean courageous officers of the General Staff, and that they could count on the support of many members of the General staff but whom they could not initiate into their plans beforehand.
QYes, that is enough for the present. You later mentioned General von Treskow. Did you know him personally?
AYes.
QDo you know anything about the fact that General von Treskow after he found out of the commissar decree, that he saw von Rundstedt and that he was instrumental that this decree was not transmitted in von Rundstedt's sector?
ATreskow for many years has belonged to our group and there was no action where he called the attention of his superiors to such decoction I know how at that time the famous commissar decree was known, to us, at first through hearsay, and we at once sent a courier to Treskow to tell him of the bastardly---and how Treskow, after a decree had been publsihed. called upon von Rundstedt, as you described the situation.
THE PRESIDENT:You said a while ago that you were just going to ask your last question.
DR. LATERNSER:Mr. President, I am sorry I could not keep to that. I had one further question, but this was my last one.
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal will adjourn.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendant's counsel wish to ask any questions of the witness?
(No response)
Then do the Prosecution desire to cross examine?
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:
QMay it please the Tribunal, I have a few questions to you, Dr Gisevius, and if you will answer them as nearly as possible, yes or no, as you are capable of giving a truthful answer, you will save a great deal of time.
The Tribunal perhaps should know your relations with the Prosecution. Is it not a fact that within two months of the surrender of Germany I met you at Wiesbaden, and you related to me your experiences in the conspiracy that you have related here?
AYes.
QAnd you were later brought here, and after coming here were interrogated by the Prosecution as well as by the Counsel for Frick and for Schacht?
AYes.
QNow, your attitude and viewpoint is, as I understand you, that of a German who felt that loyalty to the German people required continuous opposition to the Nazi regime. Is that a correct statement of your position?
AYes, yes.
QAnd you had a very large experience in police matters in Germany,
AYes.
QIf your Putsches or other moves to obtain power in Germany were successful, it was planned that you would be in charge of the police in the reorganization, was it not?
AYes, indeed.
QEither as Minister of the Interior or as Police Commissioner, whatever it might be called.
AYes, certainly.
QNow, you represented the belief that it was not necessary to govern Germany with concentration camps and with Gestapo methods; is that correct?
AYes.
QAnd you found all of the ways of presenting your viewpoint to the German people cut off by the Gestapo methods which were used by the Nazi regime; is that a fact?
AYes.
QSo that there was no way open to you to obtain any change in German policy except through revolt or assassination, or means of that kind?
ANo. I am convinced that until 1937 or the beginning of 1938 the possibility did certainly exist that by means of a majority in the cabinet or by means of pressure from the armed forces a change in the situation in Germany could have been brought about.
Q Then, you fix 1937 as the time when it ceased to be possible by peace ful means to effect a change in Germany; is that correct?
AThat is how I would judge it, yes.
QNow, it was not until after 1937 that Schacht joined your group; is that not a fact?
AWell, as far as I said, the group wasn't formed until 1937, 1938, but for example, Schacht got me into touch with Goerdeler in 1936, and the acquaintance between Schacht and Oster existed since 1936, just as Schacht knew a large number of other members of the group and for some considerable time.
QBut Schacht did not become convinced, as I understand your statement to us, until after 1937, until the Putsch affair, that he wouldn't be able to handle Hitler in some peaceful way; is that not correct?
AWhat do you mean? Peaceful? In that case, yes. The answer is yes. Schacht until the end of 1937 did believe that a legal removal of Hitler should be impossible.
QBut by the end of 1937, as you now say, the possibility of a peaceful removal of Hitler had become impossible, in fact.
AAs we considered it, yes.
QYes. Now, there was, as I understand your view in going to the Generals, there was no power in Germany that could stop or deal with the Gestapo except the Army.
AYes. I would answer that question in the affirmative.
QThat is, in addition to the Gestapo, this Nazi regime also had a private army in the SS, did they not, and for a period in the SA?
AYes.
QAnd if you were to come back successfully at the Nazi regime, you had to have manpower which only the Army had; is that right?
AYes, people who could be found among the armed forces, but we were als trying to get hold of the people among the police, and we needed all the decent officials in the ministry -- generally speaking, the masses of the people.
Q But the Wehrmacht was the source of power capable of dealing with the SS and the Gestapo if the generals had been willing?
AOf that we were convinced.
QAnd that is the reason you kept seeking the help of the generals and felt left out when they wouldn't give you their assistance, finally?
AYes.
QNow, there came a time when everybody connected with your group knew that the war was lost.
AYes, quite.
QAnd that was before these plots on Hitler's life and it was apparently before the Schwabendorf plot and before the July 20th plot, that the war was lost, was it not?
AI should like to make it quite clear that no one in our group-no one couldn't knew, even when the war started, that Hitler could never possibly win this war.
QBut it became very much more apparent as time went on, not only that the war could not be won by Germany but that Germany was ping to be physically destroyed, as a result of the war; is that not true?
AYes.
QYet, under the system which the Nazi regime had installed, you had no way of changing the course of events in Germany except by assassination or a revolt; is that true?
AYes.
QAnd so you resorted to those extreme measures, knowing that Hitler could never make peace with the Allies; is that true?
AYes.
QAnd your purpose in this was to save Germany the last destroying blows which unfortunately she received from the point of view of the Germans; is that not a fact?
AI should like to say that we, since the beginning of the war, no longer considered Germany alone. I think that I must be permitted to say that we bore our share in the responsibility of Germany as far as the war was concerned.
QWell, what you were endeavoring to do was to get the war to an end, since yo had not been able to stop its commencement, were you not?
AYea.
QAnd that was impossible as long as Hitler was at the head of the government and this group of men behind him?
AYes.
QNow, there was another plot on Hitler's life that you haven't mentioned. "as there not a bomb that was later found to have been a Communist bomb; was it not?
AThis happened on the 9th of November 1939, in the Buergerbraukeller, the beercellar in Munich. It was a bomb individual of Communists, I believe.
QNow, at none of these times when Hitler's life was endangered, by a strange coincidence was Goering or Himmler ever present; is that not true
AYes.
QDo you attach any importance to that fact?
AWe have quite often regretted this; for instance, if the attempt had succeeded, if Goering and Himmler had assisted Hitler on the 17th of July--but as years went by the situation was that this clique separated themselves so much and protected themselves so much, that they could hardly be found together anywhere; and Goering, of course, was gradually so keen on his art collection at Karin Hall that he was hardly ever present during serious conferences.
QNow, the assassination of Hitler would have accomplished nothing, from your point of view, if the number two man had stepped into Hitler's place, would it?
AThat, for a long time, was a debatable problem and Brauchitsch, for instance, was imagining that together with Goering they wanted to create a temporary regime. Our group always refused to be together with that man for even one single hour.
QHow did you plan -- if you were successful -- to deal with the other defendants here, with the exception of the defendant Schacht, all of whom, I understand, you regard as a part of the Nazi government?
A These gentlemen would have gone behind looked doors, and I think until they had been sentenced, they wouldn't have had to wait for any law,
QNow, does that apply to every man in this dock with the exception of Schacht?
AYes, every man.
QThat is, you recognized thorn, your group recognized them all parts and important parts of the Nazi regime--a Nazi conspiracy. Is that a fact?
AI shouldn't like to tie myself down to the words "Nazi conspiracy." Tic considered thorn the men responsible for everything and all the unceasing misery which that government had brought to Germany and the world.
QI should like to ask you a few questions about the Gestapo. You testified generally in reference to the crimes which were committed by that organization and I ask you to state whether that included the torturing and burning to death of a large number of persons?
AI don't think that question came through correctly.
QI am asking you as to the crimes committed by the Gestapo and I am asking if it included the torturing and burning to death of thousands of persons ?
AYes.
QDid it involve the unlawful detention of thousands of innocent people?
AYes.
QThe throwing of them into concentration camps where t hey were tortured and beaten and killed?
AYes.
QDid the Gestapo engage in wholesale confiscation of property?
AYes, to a degree; they called it "property hostile to the state."
QAnd did it practice extortion against Jews and against others?
AIn masses and by the millions.
QDid the Gestapo hinder and molest the public officials who were too prominent to be murdered until they resigned or were driven from office?
A The Gestapo used every means from murder to the means of that of coercion.
QNow, the question arises here as to whether the members of the Gestapo know what the Gestapo was doing, and will you please tell the Tribunal what the situation was as to the membership in that organization and its knowledge of its program?
AI had already committed my statements by saying that every member of the Gestapo from the first or second day, would have to see and have to know what that institution is doing.
QNow, there were some people who were taken into the Gestapo at the beginning, who were transferred from other branches of the civil service, were they not, who were in a sense invariably members of the Gestapo?
AYes; these members in the course of the first year were eliminated because of being unreliable politically.
QAnd the transfer took place at the time Goering set up the Gestapo, did it not?
THE PRESIDENT:What did the witness mean by "eliminated"?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:I think eliminated from the Gestapo.
THE WITNESS:Gradually they were released from the service of the Gestapo. BY JUSTICE JACKSON:
QNow, after the purge of the 30th of June 1934, were special pains taken to see that no one was permitted in the organization who wasn't in sympathy with its program?
AThese attempts started after the 1st of April 1934 when Himmler and Heydrich took ever the business. Actually, beginning with that date, no official was employed or allowed into the Gestapo unless Himmler and Heydrich were sure that he had the attitude which they desired. It may be that during the first month some officials, bureau officials, did got in who had not yet been cleared or did, of course, take quite a lent time after the SS had educated their own criminal officials and trained the police.
QHowever did there come a time, and if so, will you fix it as nearly as possible, after which every member of the Gestapo must have known the criminal program of that organization?
A For many years I have considered that question myself and discussed it with neighbors and my friends.
The reply entailed very great responsibility and because of my knowledge of that responsibility, I should like to say that from the beginning of 1935, at the very last, at the very latest, everyone had to know what authority, what organization he was joining and which type of orders he might have to expect.
QYou have testified as to theinvestigations which you made when you were connected with the police administration and you mentioned the Reichstag fire but you did not tell us what your findings were when you investigated that. Will you please tell us?