SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Thank you.
BY GENERAL RUDENKO:
QIf I understand you, Mr. Goering, you said that all the basic decisions concerning foreign, political, and military matters were taken by Hitler alone? Individually?
AYes, certainly. Also that he was the Fuehrer.
Q Should I understand that Hitler took those decisions without listening to the opinions of specialists who studied the question and the intelligence material concerned with these matters?
AThat was different in various cases. In certain individual cases he certainly had evidence which was brought to him without which the experts could know for certain. In other cases, he probably expressed to the advisorsthat he intended to do something and what he demanded from them to be given.
QIn that case, do I understand you correctly to mean that in the decision of serious matters, Hitler used the analysis and published material given to him by his close assistants who advised him according to their speciality. Is that correct?
AThat, in close cooperation from men who worked in connection with these things.
QWill you tell me then, who were such close assistants and associates of Hitler's on the subject of the airforce?
ANaturally, I.
QAnd on the question of economics?
AIn economic matters, it was I.
QAnd on the questions concerning the political matters of the country?
AThey were different. It depended on what question came up for discussion and it depended on how far the Fuehrer wanted to know about those things. On those would depend whom he would call for advice and consultation.
QWhom can you tell me, were among such close assistants and associates?
AThe close associates of the Fuehrer as I said before, were first, I, myself, and another close associate was -- perhaps it is the wrong word -Dr. Goebbels. Then, of course, you have got to consider the time. It differed during the 20 years, and in the end, to a very considerable degree. It was Bormann during the time of 1933 and 1934 , and shortly before the end, it was Himmler also, in certain instances and among certain questions. And if the Fuehrer was considering certain specific questions, then he would, of course, as it is the custom in every Government, call on that person who know most about the question and obtain the information from him.
Q Can you also name which close assistants were associated with him in the field of foreign politics?
AAs far as foreign policy is concerned, the actual foreign policies, the political decisions of the most important nature, were taken by himself after careful consideration, and he then conveyed them to ids officers. In very few cases only could there be a discussion through me and the necessary execution of policy took place between the foreign office and the ministry.
QThe defendant Ribbentrop?
AYes, naturally, he was the foreign minister concerned, but he did not make foreign policy.
QAnd along strat egic questions, who advised Hitler?
AThere were several people. As far as the sphere of influence is concerned, and when strategic questions were brought up, it concerned the three supreme commanders and chiefs of staffs, and particularly the leaders of the armed forces.
QWho, of the defendants, can be placed in the category of such consultants?
AIf I was asked by the Fuehrer, then the adviser on strategic matters was the chief of the leadership staff, Colonel General Jodl, and as far as the military administrative questions were concerned, the supreme commanders, of whom I was one, Raedar, and later Doenitz for the Navy. The other representatives of the Army did not take part.
QThe next question, if we approach the subject not theoretically but functionally, could we come to the conclusion that the purpose of thenature with regard to any question as regards any commendations made by Hitler's leading associates--did they have considerable influence on Hitler's final decisions?
AIf I am disregarding the purely formal point of view and presumably you are referring to the military subject, then the situation was . . .
QNo, I mean all spheres. All considerations of questions such as economies, interior politics, foreign policy, military and strategic questions. I mean all questions. I mean, if we approach the subject not theoretically, but functionally, did their recommendations have any considerable influence on Hitler's final decisions? That is what I mean.
A Partly, yes. It would partially depend on whether it would be right to the Fuehrer.
QThat's clear. Let's go on to the next question. Just whendid you begin preparing plans for the German military invasion against the Soviet Union in accordance with the plan Barbarossa. Just precisely when?
AThe lining up of the airforce for the case by Barbarossa was carried out by my general staff after we received the first Fuehrer's order in that direction. That was in November.
QIn 1940?
AIn 1940. But as far as we are concerned, we were not only concerned with Russia, but with all those countries who were not already involved with the war but could eventually be in the war.
QAll right. Was that in November 1940, when Germany was preparing to attack Russia? Plans were already being prepared for this attack with your participation?
AThe other day I explained that exactly, that at that time a possible plan for the possible transfer of political balance had been worked out.
Q I ask you to reply to this question briefly, yes or no. I think it is possible to reply to the question briefly.
Once more I say, in November 1940, more than half a year before the attack on the Soviet Union, plans were already prepared, with your participation, for the attack on the Soviet Union. Can you reply to this briefly?
AYes, but not in the sense in which you are representing it.
QIt seems to me that I have put the question quite clearly, that there is no ambiguity at all here. How much time did it take for the Plan Barbarossa to be prepared?
AIn one sector, for the air -
QIf you are informed on all phases of the plan, then I would like you to answer with regard to all phases of the Plan Barbarossa.
AGenerally, I can only answer for the air, where it took place pretty quickly.
QIf you please, just how long did it take to prepare the Plan Barbarossa?
AAfter so many years I cannot today tell you that without some confusion. I can't give you the exact date, but I have answered your question. As far as the air force was concerned, it happened comparatively quickly; as far as the army was concerned, it probably took longer.
QThus, you admit that the attack on the Soviet Union was planned several months in advance of the attack itself, and that you, as chief of German aviation and Reichsmarshal, participated directly in preparation of the attack.
AMay I divide your numerous questions. Firstly -
QThere were not too many questions asked at once. Excuse me please. You have admitted that in November 1940 the plan Barbarossa was prepared and developed.
AThat's right.
QAnd subsequent to that, I asked you, since you admit that, whether you, as chief of German aviation and Reichsmarshal, participated in plans for the attack months ahead of theirbeing put into effect. I asked you to reply to the last part of the question.
You admit that as chief of German aviation and Reichsmarshal you participated directly in preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union?
Do you admit that?
AI once more emphasize that I prepared for the possibility of an attack, first of all, within the limits given by the Fuehrer, that Soviet Russia was adopting a dangerous attitude; that from the beginning the certainty of an attack was not discussed, and that is contained in the directives of November 1940;
Secondly, I want to emphasize that my position as Reichsmarshal is of no importance here. That is a title and not a rag.
QBut you do not deny -- rather, you agree -- that the plan was already prepared in November 1940?
AYes.
QIt appears to me that the question has already been covered in such detail before the Tribunal that we do not have to talk too much about the Plan Barbarossa, which is quite clear. I shall go on to the next question:
Do you admit that the objectives of the war against the Soviet Union consisted of invading and seizing Soviet territory up to the Ural Mountains and connecting it with the German Reich, including Crimea, the Caucasus; subjugation by Germany of the Ukraine, of Byelorussia, and of other regions of the Soviet Union? Do you admit that such were the objectives of that plan?
AThat I certainly will not admit.
QYou do not admit that. Don't you remember that at the conference in Hitler's headquarters on the 16th of June 1941, at which you were present, as well as Bormann, Keitel, Rosenberg and others, Hitler stated the objectives of the attack against the Soviet Union in just the terms in which I have stated them? This was shown by the document submitted to the Tribunal. Have you forgotten that document? Have you forgotten about that?
AI can (remember the document exactly, and I can roughly remember the discussion at the conference. I said that this document written down by Bormann appears to me extremely exaggerated regarding these demands. At any rate, at the beginning of the war, such demands had not been discussed, nor had they before.
Q But you do admit that there are minutes of such a conference?
AI admit that because I have seen it. It was a document prepared by Bormann.
QYou also admit that according to the minutes of this meeting, you participated in this conference.
AI was present at that conference, and for that reason I doubt that record.
QDo you remember that in those minutes the objectives of the war were formulated? I shall remind you of various parts of the minutes. It is not necessary to read all the minutes.
AMay I ask to be shown a copy of that Record.
QThe minutes state -
You would like a copy of the minutes of the meeting?
AI ask to have it.
QIf you please. You would like to read the document?
ANo, only where you are going to quite it.
QPage 2, second paragraph, point 2, about Crimes:
"We emphasize" -- do you find the place? Have you got it?
AJust a moment. I haven't found it yet. Yes, I've got it.
Q "We emphasize ", states this point 2, "that we are bringing liberation to Crimea. Crimea must be liberated of all strangers, especially populated by the Germans. Also, Western Galicia must become a province of the German Reich."
Have you found that place?
AYes.
Q "A province of the Reich," it says.
AYes.
QI want to draw your attention to the end of the minutes, to the last part. It says here:
"The Fuehrer stresses the fact that these parts must become provinces of the Reich."
Have you found the place, "The Fuehrer stresses the fact"?
AYou mean the very last bit?
Q That's right.
A "Finally, it is ordered..."?
QA little higher above.
A "The Fuehrer orders...."?
QThat's right, "The Fuehrer orders that the Baltic countries as well must become provinces of the Reich." Then, it goes on, "The provinces of the Reich must also include Crimea, with its adjoining regions. These adjoining regions must be as big as possible. The Fuehrer says that about the Ukrainians, but that has no connection."
Go on further; skip one paragraph.
"The Fuehrer stresses that the Volga territory as well must become a province of the Reich , as well as the Baku Province which must become a military colony of the Reich. Eastern Karelia must also be included. However, in view of the large supplies of nickel available, regions where this is found must also be included. Great caution must be exercised in joining up with Finland and absorbing the Leningrad region into the Reich. The Fuehrer would like to have Leningrad razed altogether."
Haven't you found the place about Leningrad and Finland?
AYes.
QThese are the minutes of the conference at which you were present on the 16th of June 1941, three weeks after Germany attacked the Soviet Union. You do not deny that such minutes exist, do you?
This is document 221.
AYou said three days, didn't you?
QThree weeks, not three days.
AOh, three weeks, I see.
QThree weeks after Germany attacked the Soviet Union on the 22ndof May, and the conference took place at Hitler's headquarters on the 16th of June at 15 hours, I think.
AThat is quite right. I have emphasized it all alone, but the record of this thing isn't right.
QAnd who took the minutes of the meeting?
ABormann.
QWhat was the point of Bormann's taking the minutes incorrectly?
AIn this connection Bormann has exaggerated in certain matters. As far as Crimea is concerned, it is correct.
QWell, let's be a little more precise. Germany wanted the Crimea to become a region of the empire, correct?
AThe Fuehrer wanted the Crimea, yes, but that was a goal aimed at before the war. The same applies to the free Balkan countries whichhad previously been taken by Russia. They, too, were to go to Germany.
QPardon me. You say that with regard to the Crimea, the question arose even before the war, that is, the question of trying to acquire Crimea for the Reich. How far ahead of the beginning of the war was that?
ANo, before the war the Fuehrer talked about the territorial aims. He did not mention such territorial aims, but he did aim at them. At that time, if you read that record, I myself considered the question premature and I refrained from discussing anything but practical matters during that conference.
QI still would like to be a little more precise. You state that with regard to the Crimea, there was some question about making the Crimea a region of the Reich?
AYes, that was discussed during that conference.
QAll right, With regard to the Baltic provinces, there was talk about those, too?
AI have just told you that, yes.
QAll right. With regard to the Caucasus, there was talk about annexing the Caucasus also?
A It was never mentioned that that should become German. We merely discussed the strongest German economic influence in that sphere.
QSo the Caucasus could be called a concession of the Reich?
AJust to what degree one could obviously not discuss until after a victorious peace. You can see Iran that record that it would be quite mad to discuss a few days after a war broke out, matters on which Bormann stated his opinion long before we knew what the outcome of the war would be.
QSo, aggrandizement of the Reich meant annexation of the Volga regions and the colonies there?
AThe exaggeration consists of the statement that at the time things were discussed which you couldn't discuss in practice at that time at all. You might have talked about territory which you occupied, and the administration, that is all.
QWe are trying to establish the facts at the present time, and these questions were discussed at the conference; they were posed there. You don't deny that, do you?
AIn part they were discussed, yes, but not as it is put in this record here.
QI would like to draw just one conclusion. It seems obvious that even then, at that conference, plans of seizing the territories were discussed in accordance with the plan prepared months ago. That is correct, isn't it?
AYes, that is correct, but I would like to emphasize -- would you permit me that I do emphasize -- that in connection with this record attribute these unlimited discussions to the fact that during the lengthy discussion of all these problems, it says:
"The Reichsmarshal underlined all the important points of view which must be exclusively decisive for us, namely, securing of the food supplies, economic system, and the securing of highways and communications."
I just wanted to bring the whole thing to some practical basis.
Q All right. You describe rather accurately your objectives, but what was the reason for your objection?
The most important thing, it appeared to you, was food supplies, and the rest would came later, is that correct? In that case you objected not to the plan, but to the period at which the plan should be fulfilled. You wanted food first and territory second, is that it?
ANo, that isn't the way it is stated. It is stated just as I have read it out. There were no secrets concerned, but it was just the way I read it.
QPlease read it once more, or please tell me once more just where you disagreed.
AWith reference to these long discussions about persons and annexation of territory, with reference to that, "The Reichsmarshal emphasized the most important points of view which wouldhave to be the decisive factors for us, namely, securing of the food supplies, the securing of the economic situation, and the securing of highways and communications, etc." In other words, railroads and so forth were also discussed.
This means that I wanted to stop an unlimited discussion duo to the intoxication of victory, and wanted to confine it to merely practical matters.
QIt is understandable that evidently this does not play so important a part. However, the objection you just gave does not mean that you objected to the annexation of the Crimea to the German Reich, or the annexation of other regions, isn't that correct?
AIf you only spoke German then, from the sentence which says, "opposed to that, the Reichsmarshal emphasized..." you would understand everything that is implied. In other words, I didn't say here, "I protest against the annexation of the Crimea," or, "I object to annexing the Baltic States." For that I had no reason. Had we been victorious, then after the declaration of peace we would have been able to gather how far we could use these territories or not, but at that moment we hand't finished the war, we hadn't won the war, and consequently I personally confined myself to practical problems.
QI understand you. In that case, you considered the annexation of these regions a step to come later. As you said yourself, after it was won you would have seized these provinces and annexed them.
AAs an old hunter, I acted according tothe principle of not sharing the bearskin before it was shot.
QI understand. And the bearskin should be divided only when the territories were seized completely, is that correct?
AJust how one could be able to use the skin could only be ascertained definitely after the bear was shot.
QLuckily, this did not happen.
AFor you.
QAnd so, summing this up on the basis of the replies which you gave to my question, it has become quite clear, and I think you will agree, that -
AThe one and only decisive aim of the war was to eliminate the danger which Russia represented to Germany.
QAnd to seize the Russian territories.
AI have tried repeatedly to make this point clear, namely that before the beginning of the war this was not discussed. I said that it was not discussed, but that the Fuehrer gathered from the attitude of Russia that there was a vital threat against Germany, and that he wished to eliminate that threat, and that he felt that to be his duty. What might have been done in peace, after a victorious war, is an entirely new question which at that time was not discussed in any shape or form. But, by that I do not want to say that we did not expect anything but a victorious war in the East or that we did not have any wishes regarding territorial gains.
Q. I would not like to return to the question of the so-called primitive war but nevertheless, since you touched on the subject, I would like to ask you the following.
You remember the testimony of Field Marshall Milch, who stated neither Goering nor he wanted war with Russia. Do you remember that testimony of your witness, Field Marshal Milch?
A.Yes, certainly quite exactly.
Q.You do remember. In that case why did you not want war with Russia, when you saw the so-called Russian threat?
A.Firstly, I have emphasized that that danger appeared to the Fuehrer to be of considerable extent and to be so close and secondly, in connection with the question put by my defense counsel, I have clearly and exactly stated my reasons why I believed that as far as the time factor was concerned, that danger was not at that time so close and why I thought that other measures of security should be taken first.
Q.But you do not deny the testimony of your witness?
A.Milch was of a somewhat different opinion than I myself. He considered it a serious danger to Germany due to the fact that a war on two fronts was about to begin. He was not so much of the opinion that Russia did not represent a danger but he was of the opinion that in spite of that danger one should take the risk raid not use attack as a preventative measure against that danger. I as far as the same factor was concerned, was of the same opinion.
Q.On the basis of your reply to questions during several sessions, there appeared to have been no country which you did not regard as a threat.
A.Most countries did not represent a danger to Germany but I personally have always considered Russia the greatest threat after 1933.
Q.Well, of course, by "most of the countries" you mean your allies, is that right?
A.No, I am thinking of most of the countries. If you would ask me again I would say that the danger to Germany, as far as my own opinion was concerned, appeared to me to originate from Russia's urge to advance westward and naturally I also saw a certain amount of threat coming from the two western countries, England and France and I saw a further danger in that same connection, in the event of Germany being involved in a was, as coming from America.
As far as the other countries were concerned, on the other hand, I did not expect them to be am immediate threat to Germany, at least as far as small countries were concerned. They would not be an immediate threat but might be, if they were used as bases in a war against Germany by the large countries.
Q.Naturally small countries were not of the same threat because you had already occupied the small countires. That has been previously established.
A.No, a small country, as such, does not represent a threat to me but if another large country uses the small one against me, then the small country too can grow into a threat and danger.
Q.I would not like to discuss the same thing further as it does not relate to the question. The basic question here is Germany's intentions with regard to the territory of the USSR and to that question you have already answered quite affirmatively and decisively.
I shall go on to the next question.
QDo you admit that as the Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan you were in direct charge of the preparations and of the working out of plans for the economic exploitation of all the occupied territory, as well as being in charge of the realization of these plans?
AI have already admitted that I assumed responsibility for the economic policy in the occupied territory and the measures which I had taken for the exploitation and use of that territory.
QCould you tell me how many million tons of grain and other products were exported from the Soviet Union to Germany during the war?
AI cannot give you the figure. How could I know that from memory? But I am sure it is by no means as large as it was stated here.
QOn the basis of your own documents I have the figure but we will pass on to that question later.
I would like to return to the same conference which has already been mentioned. You remember the document submitted by the Soviet Prosecution, the conference of the 16th of August, 1941, U.S.S.R. 170. On 16 August, 1941, there was a conference of commissars of the occupied regions and of the representatives of the military command. You stated at this conference -- and I would like to remind you of some of the things you said.
AMay I have a look at that record?
QYou want to see the minutes of the meeting? Certainly. The point is that it is quite a long document. It might take too much time to read the whole thing. I will ask you to only look at page 111 of this stenographic record. There is marked with pencil, especially the citations which I plan to quote here. On page 111, it states the following:
"Gentlemen: Fuehrer asks me to give as the general plenipotentiary the plan on a scale and on a basis which he has not given to anyone so far. He also empowered me --"
AJust one moment. May I mention the Four Year Plan?
QYes. I knew that. Evidently the translation has not reached you. I mentioned the Four Year Plan.
"He gave me social powers with regard to every phase of our economic structure, with regard to what country was concerned, both inside the country, inside the Party and with regard to the Armed Forces."
Is it correct you were given such special rights and prerogatives with regard to the citing on such subject?
AUnder the Four Year Plan I received plenipotentiary powers when it was formulated and for the first time authority was given without any limitation as far as the economic sphere was concerned. The highest authority in the Reich and the highest authority of the Armed Forces and the Party had to receive orders from me. After the beginning of the war these powers were extended to the economic structure of the occupied countries.
QIn that case I have stated and interpreted what wasstated at the conference correctly.
A Absolutely, even if it is wrongly translated in German.
QThe next citation indicates with regard to your special prepogatives and rights, the instructions which you gave as well as the orders you issued were compulsory for the other participants of the conference held on the 16th of August.
AYes.
QIn that case, when you used such expressions as "squeeze out, get all that is possible out of the territory", such sentences in the directives issued became orders for your subordinates, is that not correct?
ANaturally, they were then out into their proper form. These conference utterances made during direct discussions, needless to say, were not worded properly and were then -
QIn general, I agree with you.
AYou are referring to the passage:
"I may repeat you certainly were not sent there to look after the welfare and work for the welfare of the population."
Is that the piece you are referring to?
QLook at page 112.
AYes, that is just what I am reading.
QIt states here:
"I repeatnow, you are sent there not to work for the welfare of the population, but for the purpose of extracting everything possible out of those territories.
That is what I expect from you."
AYou have left out a sentence -- "So that the German nation --"
QPlease -- that is right.
AOne minute.
"So as to exploit it to theutmost so that the German nation can live.
That is what I expect you to achieve."
Before that it states, however, and this is the sentence I would like to read:
"In theoccupied territories these people have eaten themselves full and our nation has starved."
QAnd further you do not deny that these words belong to you:
"You are sent there not to work for the welfare of the population but to extract every possible --"
AYou have to read that in connection with the preceding part. That certainly is not what was said.
QDo you deny your own words as stated here?
ANo, I am not emphasizing that I did not say that but I am defending myself against the way you are underlining certain things and pulling them out of their context and I am stating they belong in the whole structure of the tiling.
QThese phrases in the document are very expressive.
THE PRESIDENT:General Rudenko, could you take slight pauses between your question and answer, between the answer and your question In order that the translators may get it more accurately.
GENERAL RUDENKO:Certainly, I will be glad to do that, Mr. President. BY GENERAL RUDENKO:
QI draw your attention to the following extract on page 113, which is also underlined. Here are some of your orders.
"I will do one thing. I shall make you fill the quotas which I demand from each territory. If you cannot fullfil such quotas, in that case, I will reorganize and place there the agencies whichunder all circumstances will be able to make you fullfil these quotas, regardless of whether you like it or not."
Do you see that extract? Is it correct that this is what you said at the conference?
A That quotation has not been translated by the interpreter as it is written down here in the original.
The interpreter who is translating your words into German is using certain expressions which are not contained in this document. Squeeze out . . .
QI would like to cite . . .
AIt says there "to get from and obtain." To get from and obtain, and to squeeze out, is a hell of a difference in German.
QTo get out and to squeeze out is about the same thing. And what about the phrase "I will place agencies there which under all circumstances will be able to make you place my orders." Have you found that place?
AGet from and not squeeze out of.
QDid you have any discussion with the commissars of the occupied territories, and whom do you refer to by "special agency"?
AThis doesn't only concern the commissioners of the Eastern territories; the commissioners from all territories were present there. This concerned the supplies of food which were to be raised by those various countries, and we were concerned with the whole food organization in the entire European theatre which we had occupied. Shortly before that meeting I had been told, and this was perfectly understandable as it always is in connection with such matters, that everybody was holding back so as to have the other pers pushed to the foreground, So as to bring the whole thing on to a brief factor, I didn't want these chaps to get the better of me in this connection, and since I knew that they were only offering me half I wanted one hundred percent more so that we would meet in the middle.
QI ask you; these demands which you have given to theparticipants in the conference, were they not mercilessly exploiting the occupied territories?
ANo, this concerns in the first place food supplies, this conference, I mean.
QBut I talk about plunder. Plunder can consist of plundering food supplies from the occupied territories?
A I have just said I was responsible for the feeding of practically the whole territory.
Some of it was territory for subsidiary food supplies, and others produced more and a certain solution had to be found, and that was ninety percent the subject matter of that conference, namely, to find out how much the individual commissioner had to supply. And in the course of that conference that I used same rather sharp simple and lively words is something that I do not by any means deny. Later on exact figures were obtained and settled on, namely, what had to be supplied, and that was in fact the outcome of that meeting.
QI want to draw your attention to page 116. It states here as follows, quoting you, page 118, please; have you found the place?
AYes.
Q "Once upon a time it appeared to me that war was somewhat simple. At one time this was called plunder; this meant taking that which one has conquered. At present, however, the forms and the terms have changed. For the reason" -- have you found the place?
AYes, I have found it and I said exactly that during that conference. I emphasize once more that . . .
QThat is just what I wanted to establish; that you really said that.
AI did say that, and now I should like to give you the reason that this is a statement where I wanted to say that originally war fed war. Today you call it probably something different, but in practice it must remain the same thing.
QAll right. I draw your attention to page 119. There, addressing the ether participants of the conference you state:
"You must be present wherever anything is obtainable which the German people need; like hunting dogs you must follow it up and with a commitment of life must you bring everything to Germany." Have you found that place?
AYes, I have found it.
QDid you say so.
AI certainly assume that I did say it, yes.